diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/Makefile | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/avc.c | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/exports.c | 74 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 19 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/security.h | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 32 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/mls.h | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/services.c | 239 |
8 files changed, 361 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile index 688c0a267b6..faf2e02e441 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Makefile +++ b/security/selinux/Makefile @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o ss/ -selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o +selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o exports.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index ac5d69bb337..a300702da52 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ out: int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno) { struct avc_callback_node *c; - int i, rc = 0; + int i, rc = 0, tmprc; unsigned long flag; struct avc_node *node; @@ -813,15 +813,16 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno) for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) { if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { - rc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, - 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL); - if (rc) - goto out; + tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, + 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL); + /* save the first error encountered for the return + value and continue processing the callbacks */ + if (!rc) + rc = tmprc; } } avc_latest_notif_update(seqno, 0); -out: return rc; } diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ae4c73eb308 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/exports.c @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* + * SELinux services exported to the rest of the kernel. + * + * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> + * + * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> + * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> + * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <tinytim@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + */ +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/selinux.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/ipc.h> + +#include "security.h" +#include "objsec.h" + +void selinux_task_ctxid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *ctxid) +{ + struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; + if (selinux_enabled) + *ctxid = tsec->sid; + else + *ctxid = 0; +} + +int selinux_ctxid_to_string(u32 ctxid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) +{ + if (selinux_enabled) + return security_sid_to_context(ctxid, ctx, ctxlen); + else { + *ctx = NULL; + *ctxlen = 0; + } + + return 0; +} + +void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid) +{ + if (selinux_enabled) { + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + *sid = isec->sid; + return; + } + *sid = 0; +} + +void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid) +{ + if (selinux_enabled) { + struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security; + *sid = isec->sid; + return; + } + *sid = 0; +} + +void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid) +{ + if (selinux_enabled) { + struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; + *sid = tsec->sid; + return; + } + *sid = 0; +} + diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index b61b9554bc2..90b4cdc0c94 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) return 1; } __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); +#else +int selinux_enabled = 1; #endif /* Original (dummy) security module. */ @@ -3229,7 +3231,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) goto out; /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ - if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP)) + if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); @@ -4052,13 +4054,6 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); } -static int selinux_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size) -{ - struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security; - - return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size); -} - /* module stacking operations */ static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) { @@ -4321,7 +4316,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, - .ipc_getsecurity = selinux_ipc_getsecurity, .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security, .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security, @@ -4428,6 +4422,7 @@ void selinux_complete_init(void) /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */ printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n"); + spin_lock(&sb_lock); spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); next_sb: if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) { @@ -4436,19 +4431,20 @@ next_sb: struct superblock_security_struct, list); struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb; - spin_lock(&sb_lock); sb->s_count++; - spin_unlock(&sb_lock); spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); + spin_unlock(&sb_lock); down_read(&sb->s_umount); if (sb->s_root) superblock_doinit(sb, NULL); drop_super(sb); + spin_lock(&sb_lock); spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); list_del_init(&sbsec->list); goto next_sb; } spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); + spin_unlock(&sb_lock); } /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label @@ -4543,6 +4539,7 @@ int selinux_disable(void) printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); selinux_disabled = 1; + selinux_enabled = 0; /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */ security_ops = secondary_ops; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 5f016c98056..063af47bb23 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -29,12 +29,7 @@ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM extern int selinux_enabled; -#else -#define selinux_enabled 1 -#endif - extern int selinux_mls_enabled; int security_load_policy(void * data, size_t len); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index 640d0bfdbc6..7bc5b6440f7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure. * - * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. */ #include <linux/kernel.h> @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc, if (!selinux_mls_enabled) { if (def_sid != SECSID_NULL && oldc) - *scontext += strlen(*scontext); + *scontext += strlen(*scontext)+1; return 0; } @@ -385,6 +385,34 @@ out: } /* + * Set the MLS fields in the security context structure + * `context' based on the string representation in + * the string `str'. This function will allocate temporary memory with the + * given constraints of gfp_mask. + */ +int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask) +{ + char *tmpstr, *freestr; + int rc; + + if (!selinux_mls_enabled) + return -EINVAL; + + /* we need freestr because mls_context_to_sid will change + the value of tmpstr */ + tmpstr = freestr = kstrdup(str, gfp_mask); + if (!tmpstr) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + } else { + rc = mls_context_to_sid(':', &tmpstr, context, + NULL, SECSID_NULL); + kfree(freestr); + } + + return rc; +} + +/* * Copies the effective MLS range from `src' into `dst'. */ static inline int mls_scopy_context(struct context *dst, diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h index 03de697c805..fbb42f07dd7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure. * - * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. */ #ifndef _SS_MLS_H_ @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc, struct sidtab *s, u32 def_sid); +int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask); + int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp, struct policydb *newp, struct context *context); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 61492485de8..c284dbb8b8c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -7,12 +7,13 @@ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> * * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure. + * Support for context based audit filters. * * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com> * * Added conditional policy language extensions * - * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify @@ -593,6 +594,10 @@ int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1; scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len,GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!scontextp) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } strcpy(scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]); *scontext = scontextp; goto out; @@ -1811,3 +1816,235 @@ out: POLICY_RDUNLOCK; return rc; } + +struct selinux_audit_rule { + u32 au_seqno; + struct context au_ctxt; +}; + +void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule) +{ + if (rule) { + context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt); + kfree(rule); + } +} + +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, + struct selinux_audit_rule **rule) +{ + struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule; + struct role_datum *roledatum; + struct type_datum *typedatum; + struct user_datum *userdatum; + int rc = 0; + + *rule = NULL; + + if (!ss_initialized) + return -ENOTSUPP; + + switch (field) { + case AUDIT_SE_USER: + case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: + /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */ + if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL) + return -EINVAL; + break; + case AUDIT_SE_SEN: + case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */ + if (strchr(rulestr, '-')) + return -EINVAL; + break; + default: + /* only the above fields are valid */ + return -EINVAL; + } + + tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tmprule) + return -ENOMEM; + + context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt); + + POLICY_RDLOCK; + + tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting; + + switch (field) { + case AUDIT_SE_USER: + userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr); + if (!userdatum) + rc = -EINVAL; + else + tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value; + break; + case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: + roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr); + if (!roledatum) + rc = -EINVAL; + else + tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value; + break; + case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: + typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr); + if (!typedatum) + rc = -EINVAL; + else + tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value; + break; + case AUDIT_SE_SEN: + case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC); + break; + } + + POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + + if (rc) { + selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule); + tmprule = NULL; + } + + *rule = tmprule; + + return rc; +} + +int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op, + struct selinux_audit_rule *rule, + struct audit_context *actx) +{ + struct context *ctxt; + struct mls_level *level; + int match = 0; + + if (!rule) { + audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, + "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n"); + return -ENOENT; + } + + POLICY_RDLOCK; + + if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) { + audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, + "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n"); + match = -ESTALE; + goto out; + } + + ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ctxid); + if (!ctxt) { + audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, + "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n", + ctxid); + match = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through + without a match */ + switch (field) { + case AUDIT_SE_USER: + switch (op) { + case AUDIT_EQUAL: + match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user); + break; + case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL: + match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user); + break; + } + break; + case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: + switch (op) { + case AUDIT_EQUAL: + match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role); + break; + case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL: + match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role); + break; + } + break; + case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: + switch (op) { + case AUDIT_EQUAL: + match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type); + break; + case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL: + match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type); + break; + } + break; + case AUDIT_SE_SEN: + case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + level = (op == AUDIT_SE_SEN ? + &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]); + switch (op) { + case AUDIT_EQUAL: + match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0], + level); + break; + case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL: + match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0], + level); + break; + case AUDIT_LESS_THAN: + match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0], + level) && + !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0], + level)); + break; + case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL: + match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0], + level); + break; + case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN: + match = (mls_level_dom(level, + &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) && + !mls_level_eq(level, + &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0])); + break; + case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL: + match = mls_level_dom(level, + &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]); + break; + } + } + +out: + POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + return match; +} + +static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = NULL; + +static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, + u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained) +{ + int err = 0; + + if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback) + err = aurule_callback(); + return err; +} + +static int __init aurule_init(void) +{ + int err; + + err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, + SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0); + if (err) + panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err); + + return err; +} +__initcall(aurule_init); + +void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void)) +{ + aurule_callback = callback; +} |