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-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c7
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c76
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/avc.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/xfrm.h5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.c2
8 files changed, 66 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index fc3e6628a86..a18f1fa6440 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -444,11 +444,15 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid,
ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid,
ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass);
+ if (ad->selinux_audit_data->denied) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u",
+ ad->selinux_audit_data->result ? 0 : 1);
+ }
}
/* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */
noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
- u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+ u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
struct common_audit_data *a,
unsigned flags)
{
@@ -477,6 +481,7 @@ noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
sad.tsid = tsid;
sad.audited = audited;
sad.denied = denied;
+ sad.result = result;
a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b332e2cc095..83d06db34d0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int selinux_enforcing;
static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long enforcing;
- if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long enabled;
- if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -1418,15 +1418,33 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
- if (opt_dentry) {
- isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
- rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
- isec->sclass,
- &sid);
- if (rc)
- goto out_unlock;
- isec->sid = sid;
- }
+ /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
+ * procfs inodes */
+ if (opt_dentry)
+ /* Called from d_instantiate or
+ * d_splice_alias. */
+ dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+ else
+ /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
+ * find a dentry. */
+ dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+ /*
+ * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+ * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
+ * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+ * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
+ * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
+ * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
+ * could be used again by userspace.
+ */
+ if (!dentry)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+ rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
+ dput(dentry);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ isec->sid = sid;
}
break;
}
@@ -2105,11 +2123,13 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
/*
- * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
- * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
+ * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs or nosuid and a
+ * transition is explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
*/
if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
return -EPERM;
+ if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+ return -EACCES;
} else {
/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
@@ -2752,6 +2772,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na
static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+ int result,
unsigned flags)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -2762,7 +2783,7 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
ad.u.inode = inode;
rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
- audited, denied, &ad, flags);
+ audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
@@ -2804,7 +2825,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
if (likely(!audited))
return rc;
- rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, flags);
+ rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
if (rc2)
return rc2;
return rc;
@@ -3205,24 +3226,20 @@ error:
static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
- int rc = 0;
- u32 sid = current_sid();
+ int rc;
+
+ /* do DAC check on address space usage */
+ rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
- /*
- * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
- * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
- * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
- * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
- */
if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
}
- /* do DAC check on address space usage */
- return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+ return rc;
}
static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
@@ -3303,6 +3320,9 @@ static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
case F_GETLK:
case F_SETLK:
case F_SETLKW:
+ case F_OFD_GETLK:
+ case F_OFD_SETLK:
+ case F_OFD_SETLKW:
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
case F_GETLK64:
case F_SETLK64:
@@ -5705,7 +5725,7 @@ static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
- key_perm_t perm)
+ unsigned perm)
{
struct key *key;
struct key_security_struct *ksec;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index f53ee3c58d0..ddf8eec03f2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static inline u32 avc_audit_required(u32 requested,
}
int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
- u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+ u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
struct common_audit_data *a,
unsigned flags);
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
if (likely(!audited))
return 0;
return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
- requested, audited, denied,
+ requested, audited, denied, result,
a, 0);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 14d04e63b1f..be491a74c1e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
{ "capability2",
{ "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend",
- NULL } },
+ "audit_read", NULL } },
{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
{ "tun_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } },
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 9f0584710c8..1450f85b946 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -46,10 +46,11 @@ static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
{
struct net *net;
- atomic_inc(&flow_cache_genid);
rtnl_lock();
- for_each_net(net)
+ for_each_net(net) {
+ atomic_inc(&net->xfrm.flow_cache_genid);
rt_genid_bump_all(net);
+ }
rtnl_unlock();
}
#else
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index d60c0ee6638..c71737f6d1c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long checkreqprot;
- if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index 933e735bb18..2cc49614984 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
#include "hashtab.h"
struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key),
@@ -40,6 +41,8 @@ int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum)
u32 hvalue;
struct hashtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+ cond_resched();
+
if (!h || h->nel == HASHTAB_MAX_NODES)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index c85bc1ec040..d307b37ddc2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -492,6 +492,8 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&bitmap, catdatum->value - 1, 1);
if (rc)
return rc;
+
+ cond_resched();
}
ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[l].cat);
c->range.level[l].cat = bitmap;
generated by cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 (git 2.46.0) at 2025-11-15 08:19:05 +0000