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-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c7
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c301
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/avc.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/objsec.h5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/xfrm.h16
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c31
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c30
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/constraint.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c118
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.h11
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c118
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c76
17 files changed, 511 insertions, 221 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index fc3e6628a86..a18f1fa6440 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -444,11 +444,15 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid,
ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid,
ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass);
+ if (ad->selinux_audit_data->denied) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u",
+ ad->selinux_audit_data->result ? 0 : 1);
+ }
}
/* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */
noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
- u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+ u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
struct common_audit_data *a,
unsigned flags)
{
@@ -477,6 +481,7 @@ noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
sad.tsid = tsid;
sad.audited = audited;
sad.denied = denied;
+ sad.result = result;
a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 794c3ca49ea..83d06db34d0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
+#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -81,7 +82,6 @@
#include <linux/syslog.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <linux/shm.h>
@@ -95,10 +95,6 @@
#include "audit.h"
#include "avc_ss.h"
-#define SB_TYPE_FMT "%s%s%s"
-#define SB_SUBTYPE(sb) (sb->s_subtype && sb->s_subtype[0])
-#define SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb) sb->s_type->name, SB_SUBTYPE(sb) ? "." : "", SB_SUBTYPE(sb) ? sb->s_subtype : ""
-
extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
/* SECMARK reference count */
@@ -110,7 +106,7 @@ int selinux_enforcing;
static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long enforcing;
- if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -123,7 +119,7 @@ int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long enabled;
- if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -237,6 +233,14 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
return 0;
}
+static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+ isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
+ kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
+}
+
static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
@@ -247,8 +251,16 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
list_del_init(&isec->list);
spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
- inode->i_security = NULL;
- kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
+ /*
+ * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
+ * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
+ * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
+ * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
+ * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
+ * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
+ * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
+ */
+ call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
}
static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
@@ -413,8 +425,8 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") has no "
- "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
+ "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
@@ -422,22 +434,22 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
- SB_TYPE_FMT") has no security xattr handler\n",
- sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
+ "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
+ sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
else
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
- SB_TYPE_FMT") getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
- SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), -rc);
+ "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
+ sb->s_type->name, -rc);
goto out;
}
}
if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT"), unknown behavior\n",
- sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
+ sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
else
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT"), %s\n",
- sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb),
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
+ sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
@@ -600,6 +612,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int rc = 0, i;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
@@ -655,11 +668,11 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
continue;
rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
- strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
+ strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
- "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") errno=%d\n",
- mount_options[i], sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), rc);
+ "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+ mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
goto out;
}
switch (flags[i]) {
@@ -806,8 +819,7 @@ out:
out_double_mount:
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
- "security settings for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT")\n", sb->s_id,
- SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
+ "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
goto out;
}
@@ -1406,15 +1418,33 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
- if (opt_dentry) {
- isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
- rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
- isec->sclass,
- &sid);
- if (rc)
- goto out_unlock;
- isec->sid = sid;
- }
+ /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
+ * procfs inodes */
+ if (opt_dentry)
+ /* Called from d_instantiate or
+ * d_splice_alias. */
+ dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+ else
+ /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
+ * find a dentry. */
+ dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+ /*
+ * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+ * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
+ * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+ * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
+ * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
+ * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
+ * could be used again by userspace.
+ */
+ if (!dentry)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+ rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
+ dput(dentry);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ isec->sid = sid;
}
break;
}
@@ -2093,11 +2123,13 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
/*
- * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
- * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
+ * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs or nosuid and a
+ * transition is explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
*/
if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
return -EPERM;
+ if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+ return -EACCES;
} else {
/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
@@ -2477,11 +2509,12 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
continue;
len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
- rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
- "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") errno=%d\n",
- mount_options[i], sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), rc);
+ "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+ mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
goto out_free_opts;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -2519,8 +2552,8 @@ out_free_secdata:
return rc;
out_bad_option:
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
- "during remount (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT")\n", sb->s_id,
- SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
+ "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
+ sb->s_type->name);
goto out_free_opts;
}
@@ -2739,6 +2772,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na
static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+ int result,
unsigned flags)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -2749,7 +2783,7 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
ad.u.inode = inode;
rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
- audited, denied, &ad, flags);
+ audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
@@ -2791,7 +2825,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
if (likely(!audited))
return rc;
- rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, flags);
+ rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
if (rc2)
return rc2;
return rc;
@@ -2881,7 +2915,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
if (rc == -EINVAL) {
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -3038,7 +3072,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
if (!value || !size)
return -EACCES;
- rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
+ rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -3192,24 +3226,20 @@ error:
static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
- int rc = 0;
- u32 sid = current_sid();
+ int rc;
+
+ /* do DAC check on address space usage */
+ rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
- /*
- * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
- * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
- * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
- * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
- */
if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
}
- /* do DAC check on address space usage */
- return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+ return rc;
}
static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
@@ -3290,6 +3320,9 @@ static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
case F_GETLK:
case F_SETLK:
case F_SETLKW:
+ case F_OFD_GETLK:
+ case F_OFD_SETLK:
+ case F_OFD_SETLKW:
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
case F_GETLK64:
case F_SETLK64:
@@ -3828,7 +3861,7 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
u32 nlbl_sid;
u32 nlbl_type;
- err = selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+ err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
if (unlikely(err))
return -EACCES;
err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
@@ -3846,6 +3879,30 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
+ * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
+ * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
+ * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
+ *
+ * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
+ * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
+ * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
+ * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
+ err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
+ else
+ *conn_sid = sk_sid;
+
+ return err;
+}
+
/* socket security operations */
static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
@@ -4313,8 +4370,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
PEER__RECV, &ad);
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
+ return err;
+ }
}
if (secmark_active) {
@@ -4451,27 +4510,18 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
{
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
int err;
- u16 family = sk->sk_family;
- u32 newsid;
+ u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
+ u32 connsid;
u32 peersid;
- /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
- if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
- family = PF_INET;
-
err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
if (err)
return err;
- if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
- req->secid = sksec->sid;
- req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
- } else {
- err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
- if (err)
- return err;
- req->secid = newsid;
- req->peer_secid = peersid;
- }
+ err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ req->secid = connsid;
+ req->peer_secid = peersid;
return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
}
@@ -4731,6 +4781,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family)
{
+ struct sock *sk;
u32 sid;
if (!netlbl_enabled())
@@ -4739,8 +4790,27 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
/* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
* because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
* before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
- if (skb->sk) {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
+ sk = skb->sk;
+ if (sk) {
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+
+ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
+ /* if the socket is the listening state then this
+ * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
+ * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
+ * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
+ * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
+ * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
+ * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
+ * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
+ * from the initial connection request (in the IP
+ * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
+ * security label in the packet itself this is the
+ * best we can do. */
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
+ sksec = sk->sk_security;
sid = sksec->sid;
} else
sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -4810,27 +4880,36 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
* as fast and as clean as possible. */
if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
+
+ secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+ peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+ if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ sk = skb->sk;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
/* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
* packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
* since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
* when the packet is on it's final way out.
* NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
- * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
- if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
+ * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
+ * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
+ * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
+ * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
+ * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
+ * connection. */
+ if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
+ !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
return NF_ACCEPT;
#endif
- secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
- peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
- if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
- return NF_ACCEPT;
- /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
- * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
- * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
- * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
- sk = skb->sk;
if (sk == NULL) {
+ /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
+ * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
+ * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
+ * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
if (skb->skb_iif) {
secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
@@ -4839,7 +4918,45 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
}
+ } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
+ /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
+ * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
+ * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
+ * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
+ * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
+ * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
+ * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
+ * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
+ * for similar problems. */
+ u32 skb_sid;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
+ return NF_DROP;
+ /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
+ * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
+ * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
+ * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
+ * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
+ * pass the packet. */
+ if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+ switch (family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+ break;
+ case PF_INET6:
+ if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+ default:
+ return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+ }
+ }
+ if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
+ return NF_DROP;
+ secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
} else {
+ /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
+ * associated socket. */
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
peer_sid = sksec->sid;
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
@@ -5433,7 +5550,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
str[size-1] = 0;
size--;
}
- error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
+ error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -5503,11 +5620,11 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
/* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
ptsid = 0;
- task_lock(p);
+ rcu_read_lock();
tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
if (tracer)
ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
- task_unlock(p);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
if (tracer) {
error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
@@ -5542,7 +5659,7 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
{
- return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
+ return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
}
static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
@@ -5608,7 +5725,7 @@ static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
- key_perm_t perm)
+ unsigned perm)
{
struct key *key;
struct key_security_struct *ksec;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index f53ee3c58d0..ddf8eec03f2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static inline u32 avc_audit_required(u32 requested,
}
int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
- u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+ u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
struct common_audit_data *a,
unsigned flags);
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
if (likely(!audited))
return 0;
return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
- requested, audited, denied,
+ requested, audited, denied, result,
a, 0);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 14d04e63b1f..be491a74c1e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
{ "capability2",
{ "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend",
- NULL } },
+ "audit_read", NULL } },
{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
{ "tun_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } },
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index b1dfe104945..078e553f52f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -38,7 +38,10 @@ struct task_security_struct {
struct inode_security_struct {
struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode object */
- struct list_head list; /* list of inode_security_struct */
+ union {
+ struct list_head list; /* list of inode_security_struct */
+ struct rcu_head rcu; /* for freeing the inode_security_struct */
+ };
u32 task_sid; /* SID of creating task */
u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
u16 sclass; /* security class of this object */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index fe341ae3700..ce7852cf526 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -33,13 +33,14 @@
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS 26
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS 27
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE 28
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES 29
/* Range of policy versions we understand*/
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
#else
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES
#endif
/* Mask for just the mount related flags */
@@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext,
int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
- u32 *out_sid);
+ u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 0dec76c64cf..1450f85b946 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@
#include <net/flow.h>
int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
- struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx);
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+ gfp_t gfp);
int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp);
void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
@@ -39,15 +40,17 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
+int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid);
static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
{
struct net *net;
- atomic_inc(&flow_cache_genid);
rtnl_lock();
- for_each_net(net)
+ for_each_net(net) {
+ atomic_inc(&net->xfrm.flow_cache_genid);
rt_genid_bump_all(net);
+ }
rtnl_unlock();
}
#else
@@ -79,11 +82,12 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid,
static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
{
}
-#endif
-static inline int selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
{
- return selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, sid, 0);
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return 0;
}
+#endif
#endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 6235d052338..0364120d1ec 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -101,6 +101,32 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
}
/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr - Get the cached NetLabel secattr
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Query the socket's cached secattr and if the SID matches the cached value
+ * return the cache, otherwise return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
+ const struct sock *sk,
+ u32 sid)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
+
+ if (secattr == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
+ (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+ return secattr;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
* selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate - Invalidate the NetLabel cache
*
* Description:
@@ -224,7 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
return 0;
- secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
+ secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, sid);
}
if (secattr == NULL) {
secattr = &secattr_storage;
@@ -410,6 +436,9 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_CONNLABELED)) {
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
lock_sock(sk);
+ /* call the netlabel function directly as we want to see the
+ * on-the-wire label that is assigned via the socket's options
+ * and not the cached netlabel/lsm attributes */
rc = netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr);
release_sock(sk);
if (rc == 0)
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index 332ac8a80cf..2df7b900e25 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/inet_diag.h>
#include <linux/xfrm.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/sock_diag.h>
#include "flask.h"
#include "av_permissions.h"
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] =
{
{ TCPDIAG_GETSOCK, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
};
static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] =
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 5122affe06a..c71737f6d1c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long checkreqprot;
- if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
if (length)
goto out;
- length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
if (length)
goto out;
@@ -731,11 +731,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
goto out;
- length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (length)
goto out;
- length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (length)
goto out;
@@ -817,11 +819,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
objname = namebuf;
}
- length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (length)
goto out;
- length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (length)
goto out;
@@ -878,11 +882,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
goto out;
- length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (length)
goto out;
- length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (length)
goto out;
@@ -934,7 +940,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2)
goto out;
- length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
if (length)
goto out;
@@ -994,11 +1000,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
goto out;
- length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (length)
goto out;
- length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (length)
goto out;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
index 149dda731fd..96fd947c494 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct constraint_expr {
u32 op; /* operator */
struct ebitmap names; /* names */
+ struct type_set *type_names;
struct constraint_expr *next; /* next expression */
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index 933e735bb18..2cc49614984 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
#include "hashtab.h"
struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key),
@@ -40,6 +41,8 @@ int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum)
u32 hvalue;
struct hashtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+ cond_resched();
+
if (!h || h->nel == HASHTAB_MAX_NODES)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index c85bc1ec040..d307b37ddc2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -492,6 +492,8 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&bitmap, catdatum->value - 1, 1);
if (rc)
return rc;
+
+ cond_resched();
}
ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[l].cat);
c->range.level[l].cat = bitmap;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index f6195ebde3c..9c5cdc2caae 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -143,6 +143,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
};
static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
@@ -613,6 +618,19 @@ static int common_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
return 0;
}
+static void constraint_expr_destroy(struct constraint_expr *expr)
+{
+ if (expr) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&expr->names);
+ if (expr->type_names) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->types);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->negset);
+ kfree(expr->type_names);
+ }
+ kfree(expr);
+ }
+}
+
static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
{
struct class_datum *cladatum;
@@ -628,10 +646,9 @@ static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
while (constraint) {
e = constraint->expr;
while (e) {
- ebitmap_destroy(&e->names);
etmp = e;
e = e->next;
- kfree(etmp);
+ constraint_expr_destroy(etmp);
}
ctemp = constraint;
constraint = constraint->next;
@@ -642,16 +659,14 @@ static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
while (constraint) {
e = constraint->expr;
while (e) {
- ebitmap_destroy(&e->names);
etmp = e;
e = e->next;
- kfree(etmp);
+ constraint_expr_destroy(etmp);
}
ctemp = constraint;
constraint = constraint->next;
kfree(ctemp);
}
-
kfree(cladatum->comkey);
}
kfree(datum);
@@ -1156,8 +1171,34 @@ bad:
return rc;
}
-static int read_cons_helper(struct constraint_node **nodep, int ncons,
- int allowxtarget, void *fp)
+static void type_set_init(struct type_set *t)
+{
+ ebitmap_init(&t->types);
+ ebitmap_init(&t->negset);
+}
+
+static int type_set_read(struct type_set *t, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ if (ebitmap_read(&t->types, fp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (ebitmap_read(&t->negset, fp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ t->flags = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int read_cons_helper(struct policydb *p,
+ struct constraint_node **nodep,
+ int ncons, int allowxtarget, void *fp)
{
struct constraint_node *c, *lc;
struct constraint_expr *e, *le;
@@ -1225,6 +1266,18 @@ static int read_cons_helper(struct constraint_node **nodep, int ncons,
rc = ebitmap_read(&e->names, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
+ if (p->policyvers >=
+ POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
+ e->type_names = kzalloc(sizeof
+ (*e->type_names),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!e->type_names)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ type_set_init(e->type_names);
+ rc = type_set_read(e->type_names, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1301,7 +1354,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
goto bad;
}
- rc = read_cons_helper(&cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp);
+ rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
@@ -1311,7 +1364,8 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
if (rc)
goto bad;
ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- rc = read_cons_helper(&cladatum->validatetrans, ncons, 1, fp);
+ rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->validatetrans,
+ ncons, 1, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
@@ -1941,7 +1995,19 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
if (rc)
goto out;
- hashtab_insert(p->filename_trans, ft, otype);
+ rc = hashtab_insert(p->filename_trans, ft, otype);
+ if (rc) {
+ /*
+ * Do not return -EEXIST to the caller, or the system
+ * will not boot.
+ */
+ if (rc != -EEXIST)
+ goto out;
+ /* But free memory to avoid memory leak. */
+ kfree(ft);
+ kfree(name);
+ kfree(otype);
+ }
}
hash_eval(p->filename_trans, "filenametr");
return 0;
@@ -2753,6 +2819,24 @@ static int common_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
return 0;
}
+static int type_set_write(struct type_set *t, void *fp)
+{
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+
+ if (ebitmap_write(&t->types, fp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (ebitmap_write(&t->negset, fp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(t->flags);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int write_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node *node,
void *fp)
{
@@ -2784,6 +2868,12 @@ static int write_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node *node,
rc = ebitmap_write(&e->names, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
+ if (p->policyvers >=
+ POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
+ rc = type_set_write(e->type_names, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
break;
default:
break;
@@ -3248,10 +3338,10 @@ static int filename_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
if (rc)
return rc;
- buf[0] = ft->stype;
- buf[1] = ft->ttype;
- buf[2] = ft->tclass;
- buf[3] = otype->otype;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ft->stype);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ft->ttype);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(ft->tclass);
+ buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(otype->otype);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
if (rc)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index da637471d4c..725d5945a97 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -154,6 +154,17 @@ struct cond_bool_datum {
struct cond_node;
/*
+ * type set preserves data needed to determine constraint info from
+ * policy source. This is not used by the kernel policy but allows
+ * utilities such as audit2allow to determine constraint denials.
+ */
+struct type_set {
+ struct ebitmap types;
+ struct ebitmap negset;
+ u32 flags;
+};
+
+/*
* The configuration data includes security contexts for
* initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems, TCP and UDP port numbers,
* network interfaces, and nodes. This structure stores the
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index ee470a0b5c2..4bca49414a4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1232,6 +1232,10 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
struct context context;
int rc = 0;
+ /* An empty security context is never valid. */
+ if (!scontext_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (!ss_initialized) {
int i;
@@ -1285,16 +1289,18 @@ out:
* @scontext: security context
* @scontext_len: length in bytes
* @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @gfp: context for the allocation
*
* Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
* has the string representation specified by @scontext.
* Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
* memory is available, or 0 on success.
*/
-int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
+int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
+ gfp_t gfp)
{
return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
- sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
+ sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
}
/**
@@ -1831,7 +1837,7 @@ static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
*/
int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
{
- struct policydb oldpolicydb, newpolicydb;
+ struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb;
struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
struct convert_context_args args;
@@ -1840,12 +1846,19 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
int rc = 0;
struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
+ oldpolicydb = kzalloc(2 * sizeof(*oldpolicydb), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!oldpolicydb) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1;
+
if (!ss_initialized) {
avtab_cache_init();
rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
if (rc) {
avtab_cache_destroy();
- return rc;
+ goto out;
}
policydb.len = len;
@@ -1855,14 +1868,14 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
if (rc) {
policydb_destroy(&policydb);
avtab_cache_destroy();
- return rc;
+ goto out;
}
rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab);
if (rc) {
policydb_destroy(&policydb);
avtab_cache_destroy();
- return rc;
+ goto out;
}
security_load_policycaps();
@@ -1874,36 +1887,36 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
- return 0;
+ goto out;
}
#if 0
sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
#endif
- rc = policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp);
+ rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp);
if (rc)
- return rc;
+ goto out;
- newpolicydb.len = len;
+ newpolicydb->len = len;
/* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
- if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb.mls_enabled)
+ if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
- else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb.mls_enabled)
+ else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
- rc = policydb_load_isids(&newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
+ rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
- policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
- return rc;
+ policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
+ goto out;
}
- rc = selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
+ rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
if (rc)
goto err;
- rc = security_preserve_bools(&newpolicydb);
+ rc = security_preserve_bools(newpolicydb);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
goto err;
@@ -1921,7 +1934,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
* in the new SID table.
*/
args.oldp = &policydb;
- args.newp = &newpolicydb;
+ args.newp = newpolicydb;
rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
@@ -1931,12 +1944,12 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
}
/* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
- memcpy(&oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb);
+ memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof(policydb));
sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
/* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
- memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
+ memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(policydb));
sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
security_load_policycaps();
oldmap = current_mapping;
@@ -1946,7 +1959,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
/* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
- policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb);
+ policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb);
sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
kfree(oldmap);
@@ -1956,14 +1969,17 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
- return 0;
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
err:
kfree(map);
sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
- policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
- return rc;
+ policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
+out:
+ kfree(oldpolicydb);
+ return rc;
}
size_t security_policydb_len(void)
@@ -2334,50 +2350,16 @@ int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
struct ocontext *c;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
- const char *subtype = (sb->s_subtype && sb->s_subtype[0]) ? sb->s_subtype : NULL;
- struct ocontext *base = NULL;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
- for (c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE]; c; c = c->next) {
- char *sub;
- int baselen;
-
- baselen = strlen(fstype);
-
- /* if base does not match, this is not the one */
- if (strncmp(fstype, c->u.name, baselen))
- continue;
-
- /* if there is no subtype, this is the one! */
- if (!subtype)
- break;
-
- /* skip past the base in this entry */
- sub = c->u.name + baselen;
-
- /* entry is only a base. save it. keep looking for subtype */
- if (sub[0] == '\0') {
- base = c;
- continue;
- }
-
- /* entry is not followed by a subtype, so it is not a match */
- if (sub[0] != '.')
- continue;
-
- /* whew, we found a subtype of this fstype */
- sub++; /* move past '.' */
-
- /* exact match of fstype AND subtype */
- if (!strcmp(subtype, sub))
+ c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+ while (c) {
+ if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
break;
+ c = c->next;
}
- /* in case we had found an fstype match but no subtype match */
- if (!c)
- c = base;
-
if (c) {
sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
if (!c->sid[0]) {
@@ -2972,25 +2954,21 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
int match = 0;
- if (!rule) {
- audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
- "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
+ if (unlikely(!rule)) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
- audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
- "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n");
match = -ESTALE;
goto out;
}
ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
- if (!ctxt) {
- audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
- "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
sid);
match = -ENOENT;
goto out;
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index a91d205ec0c..98b042630a9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
* xfrm_user_sec_ctx context.
*/
static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
- struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+ gfp_t gfp)
{
int rc;
const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
- ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, gfp);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len);
ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0';
- rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid);
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp);
if (rc)
goto err;
@@ -209,19 +210,26 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
NULL) ? 0 : 1);
}
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
- * incoming packet.
- */
-int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
+static u32 selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL;
- struct sec_path *sp;
+ struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
+ struct xfrm_state *x;
- if (skb == NULL)
- goto out;
+ if (dst == NULL)
+ return SECSID_NULL;
+ x = dst->xfrm;
+ if (x == NULL || !selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+ return SECSID_NULL;
+
+ return x->security->ctx_sid;
+}
+
+static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u32 *sid, int ckall)
+{
+ u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL;
+ struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
- sp = skb->sp;
if (sp) {
int i;
@@ -248,12 +256,37 @@ out:
}
/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
+ * incoming packet.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
+{
+ if (skb == NULL) {
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, ckall);
+}
+
+int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, 0);
+ if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECSID_NULL)
+ *sid = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(skb);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
* LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
- struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+ gfp_t gfp)
{
- return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx);
+ return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx, gfp);
}
/*
@@ -301,7 +334,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
{
- return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx);
+ return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx, GFP_KERNEL);
}
/*
@@ -327,19 +360,22 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
return rc;
ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!ctx) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
ctx->ctx_sid = secid;
ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len);
- kfree(ctx_str);
x->security = ctx;
atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
- return 0;
+out:
+ kfree(ctx_str);
+ return rc;
}
/*
generated by cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 (git 2.46.0) at 2025-11-13 21:59:29 +0000