diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
25 files changed, 1681 insertions, 1071 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index dca1c22d927..a18f1fa6440 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -65,14 +65,8 @@ struct avc_cache { }; struct avc_callback_node { - int (*callback) (u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 perms, - u32 *out_retained); + int (*callback) (u32 event); u32 events; - u32 ssid; - u32 tsid; - u16 tclass; - u32 perms; struct avc_callback_node *next; }; @@ -194,11 +188,9 @@ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page) for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) { head = &avc_cache.slots[i]; if (!hlist_empty(head)) { - struct hlist_node *next; - slots_used++; chain_len = 0; - hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list) + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list) chain_len++; if (chain_len > max_chain_len) max_chain_len = chain_len; @@ -247,7 +239,6 @@ static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void) int hvalue, try, ecx; unsigned long flags; struct hlist_head *head; - struct hlist_node *next; spinlock_t *lock; for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) { @@ -259,7 +250,7 @@ static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void) continue; rcu_read_lock(); - hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list) { + hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list) { avc_node_delete(node); avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims); ecx++; @@ -280,7 +271,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void) { struct avc_node *node; - node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC); + node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC); if (!node) goto out; @@ -307,11 +298,10 @@ static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL; int hvalue; struct hlist_head *head; - struct hlist_node *next; hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass); head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue]; - hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list) { + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list) { if (ssid == node->ae.ssid && tclass == node->ae.tclass && tsid == node->ae.tsid) { @@ -400,7 +390,6 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_dec node = avc_alloc_node(); if (node) { struct hlist_head *head; - struct hlist_node *next; spinlock_t *lock; hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass); @@ -410,7 +399,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_dec lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue]; spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag); - hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) { + hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) { if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid && pos->ae.tsid == tsid && pos->ae.tclass == tclass) { @@ -436,9 +425,9 @@ static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) { struct common_audit_data *ad = a; audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ", - ad->selinux_audit_data.denied ? "denied" : "granted"); - avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass, - ad->selinux_audit_data.audited); + ad->selinux_audit_data->denied ? "denied" : "granted"); + avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass, + ad->selinux_audit_data->audited); audit_log_format(ab, " for "); } @@ -452,71 +441,27 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) { struct common_audit_data *ad = a; audit_log_format(ab, " "); - avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.ssid, - ad->selinux_audit_data.tsid, - ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass); + avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid, + ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid, + ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass); + if (ad->selinux_audit_data->denied) { + audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u", + ad->selinux_audit_data->result ? 0 : 1); + } } -/** - * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions. - * @ssid: source security identifier - * @tsid: target security identifier - * @tclass: target security class - * @requested: requested permissions - * @avd: access vector decisions - * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit - * @a: auxiliary audit data - * @flags: VFS walk flags - * - * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance - * with the policy. This function is typically called by - * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be - * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit() - * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing. - * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must - * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released - * before calling the auditing code. - */ -int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a, - unsigned flags) +/* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */ +noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, + u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result, + struct common_audit_data *a, + unsigned flags) { struct common_audit_data stack_data; - u32 denied, audited; - denied = requested & ~avd->allowed; - if (denied) { - audited = denied & avd->auditdeny; - /* - * a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in - * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if - * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that - * permission. Take notice that this is unrelated to the - * actual permissions that were denied. As an example lets - * assume: - * - * denied == READ - * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule) - * selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & ACCESS == 1 - * - * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied - * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for - * ACCESS - */ - if (a && - a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny && - !(a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & avd->auditdeny)) - audited = 0; - } else if (result) - audited = denied = requested; - else - audited = requested & avd->auditallow; - if (!audited) - return 0; + struct selinux_audit_data sad; if (!a) { a = &stack_data; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE); + a->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; } /* @@ -530,15 +475,17 @@ int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK)) return -ECHILD; - a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass; - a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested; - a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid; - a->selinux_audit_data.tsid = tsid; - a->selinux_audit_data.audited = audited; - a->selinux_audit_data.denied = denied; - a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback; - a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback; - common_lsm_audit(a); + sad.tclass = tclass; + sad.requested = requested; + sad.ssid = ssid; + sad.tsid = tsid; + sad.audited = audited; + sad.denied = denied; + sad.result = result; + + a->selinux_audit_data = &sad; + + common_lsm_audit(a, avc_audit_pre_callback, avc_audit_post_callback); return 0; } @@ -546,27 +493,17 @@ int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, * avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events. * @callback: callback function * @events: security events - * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD - * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD - * @tclass: target security class - * @perms: permissions * - * Register a callback function for events in the set @events - * related to the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) - * and the permissions @perms, interpreting - * @perms based on @tclass. Returns %0 on success or - * -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory exists to add the callback. + * Register a callback function for events in the set @events. + * Returns %0 on success or -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory + * exists to add the callback. */ -int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 perms, - u32 *out_retained), - u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 perms) +int __init avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events) { struct avc_callback_node *c; int rc = 0; - c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_ATOMIC); + c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL); if (!c) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; @@ -574,9 +511,6 @@ int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, c->callback = callback; c->events = events; - c->ssid = ssid; - c->tsid = tsid; - c->perms = perms; c->next = avc_callbacks; avc_callbacks = c; out: @@ -607,7 +541,6 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, unsigned long flag; struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL; struct hlist_head *head; - struct hlist_node *next; spinlock_t *lock; node = avc_alloc_node(); @@ -624,7 +557,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag); - hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) { + hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) { if (ssid == pos->ae.ssid && tsid == pos->ae.tsid && tclass == pos->ae.tclass && @@ -680,7 +613,6 @@ out: static void avc_flush(void) { struct hlist_head *head; - struct hlist_node *next; struct avc_node *node; spinlock_t *lock; unsigned long flag; @@ -696,7 +628,7 @@ static void avc_flush(void) * prevent RCU grace periods from ending. */ rcu_read_lock(); - hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list) + hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list) avc_node_delete(node); rcu_read_unlock(); spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag); @@ -716,8 +648,7 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno) for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) { if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { - tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, - 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL); + tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET); /* save the first error encountered for the return value and continue processing the callbacks */ if (!rc) @@ -729,6 +660,41 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno) return rc; } +/* + * Slow-path helper function for avc_has_perm_noaudit, + * when the avc_node lookup fails. We get called with + * the RCU read lock held, and need to return with it + * still held, but drop if for the security compute. + * + * Don't inline this, since it's the slow-path and just + * results in a bigger stack frame. + */ +static noinline struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd) +{ + rcu_read_unlock(); + security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd); + rcu_read_lock(); + return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd); +} + +static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, u32 requested, + unsigned flags, + struct av_decision *avd) +{ + if (flags & AVC_STRICT) + return -EACCES; + + if (selinux_enforcing && !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE)) + return -EACCES; + + avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid, + tsid, tclass, avd->seqno); + return 0; +} + + /** * avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing. * @ssid: source security identifier @@ -749,7 +715,7 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno) * auditing, e.g. in cases where a lock must be held for the check but * should be released for the auditing. */ -int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, +inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, unsigned flags, struct av_decision *avd) @@ -764,26 +730,15 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass); if (unlikely(!node)) { - rcu_read_unlock(); - security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd); - rcu_read_lock(); - node = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd); + node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd); } else { memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd)); avd = &node->ae.avd; } denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed); - - if (denied) { - if (flags & AVC_STRICT) - rc = -EACCES; - else if (!selinux_enforcing || (avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE)) - avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid, - tsid, tclass, avd->seqno); - else - rc = -EACCES; - } + if (unlikely(denied)) + rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, flags, avd); rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; @@ -796,7 +751,6 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, * @tclass: target security class * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data - * @flags: VFS walk flags * * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions @@ -806,17 +760,15 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, * permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or * another -errno upon other errors. */ -int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, - u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata, - unsigned flags) +int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, + u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata) { struct av_decision avd; int rc, rc2; rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd); - rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata, - flags); + rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata); if (rc2) return rc2; return rc; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 6a3683e2842..83d06db34d0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/tracehook.h> #include <linux/errno.h> -#include <linux/ext2_fs.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> @@ -52,7 +51,9 @@ #include <linux/tty.h> #include <net/icmp.h> #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */ +#include <net/sock.h> #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ +#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> @@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ #include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */ -#include <linux/netlink.h> +#include <net/netlink.h> #include <linux/tcp.h> #include <linux/udp.h> #include <linux/dccp.h> @@ -81,6 +82,8 @@ #include <linux/syslog.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/msg.h> +#include <linux/shm.h> #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h" @@ -92,8 +95,6 @@ #include "audit.h" #include "avc_ss.h" -#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5 - extern struct security_operations *security_ops; /* SECMARK reference count */ @@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ int selinux_enforcing; static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enforcing; - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0; return 1; } @@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enabled; - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; return 1; } @@ -136,12 +137,28 @@ static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache; * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is - * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. + * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network + * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled. * */ static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void) { - return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0); + return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount)); +} + +/** + * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled + * + * Description: + * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true + * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the + * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling + * is always considered enabled. + * + */ +static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void) +{ + return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()); } /* @@ -216,6 +233,14 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) return 0; } +static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) +{ + struct inode_security_struct *isec; + + isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu); + kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec); +} + static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; @@ -226,8 +251,16 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) list_del_init(&isec->list); spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); - inode->i_security = NULL; - kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec); + /* + * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and + * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made + * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS + * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder + * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and + * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact. + * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too. + */ + call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu); } static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file) @@ -282,13 +315,14 @@ static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb) /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */ -static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = { +static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = { "uses xattr", "uses transition SIDs", "uses task SIDs", "uses genfs_contexts", "not configured for labeling", "uses mountpoint labeling", + "uses native labeling", }; static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry); @@ -305,8 +339,11 @@ enum { Opt_defcontext = 3, Opt_rootcontext = 4, Opt_labelsupport = 5, + Opt_nextmntopt = 6, }; +#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1) + static const match_table_t tokens = { {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"}, {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, @@ -351,6 +388,29 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid, return rc; } +static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) +{ + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; + + if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR || + sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS || + sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK) + return 1; + + /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/ + if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0) + return 1; + + /* + * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports + * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes. + */ + if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; @@ -384,8 +444,6 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) } } - sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP); - if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); @@ -394,15 +452,9 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); - if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS || - sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT || - sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE || - sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) - sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP; - - /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/ - if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0) - sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP; + sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED; + if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb)) + sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT; /* Initialize the root inode. */ rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root); @@ -456,15 +508,18 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, if (!ss_initialized) return -EINVAL; + /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS)); + tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; /* count the number of mount options for this sb */ - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) { if (tmp & 0x01) opts->num_mnt_opts++; tmp >>= 1; } /* Check if the Label support flag is set */ - if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) + if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) opts->num_mnt_opts++; opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); @@ -511,9 +566,9 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; } - if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) { + if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) { opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL; - opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP; + opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT; } BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts); @@ -550,7 +605,9 @@ static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag, * labeling information. */ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, - struct security_mnt_opts *opts) + struct security_mnt_opts *opts, + unsigned long kern_flags, + unsigned long *set_kern_flags) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int rc = 0, i; @@ -578,6 +635,12 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, "before the security server is initialized\n"); goto out; } + if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) { + /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to + * place the results is not allowed */ + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } /* * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once @@ -602,10 +665,10 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) { u32 sid; - if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP) + if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT) continue; rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], - strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid); + strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) { printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", @@ -668,14 +731,19 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC; - /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */ - rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid); - if (rc) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", - __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc); - goto out; + if (!sbsec->behavior) { + /* + * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this + * filesystem type. + */ + rc = security_fs_use(sb); + if (rc) { + printk(KERN_WARNING + "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", + __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc); + goto out; + } } - /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */ if (fscontext_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred); @@ -690,6 +758,11 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set * the superblock context if not already set. */ + if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) { + sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE; + *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS; + } + if (context_sid) { if (!fscontext_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, @@ -721,7 +794,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, } if (defcontext_sid) { - if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { + if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR && + sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) { rc = -EINVAL; printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is " "invalid for this filesystem type\n"); @@ -749,7 +823,37 @@ out_double_mount: goto out; } -static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, +static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb, + const struct super_block *newsb) +{ + struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security; + struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security; + char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK; + char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK; + + if (oldflags != newflags) + goto mismatch; + if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid) + goto mismatch; + if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid) + goto mismatch; + if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid) + goto mismatch; + if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { + struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = oldsb->s_root->d_inode->i_security; + struct inode_security_struct *newroot = newsb->s_root->d_inode->i_security; + if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid) + goto mismatch; + } + return 0; +mismatch: + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, " + "different security settings for (dev %s, " + "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name); + return -EBUSY; +} + +static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, struct super_block *newsb) { const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security; @@ -764,14 +868,14 @@ static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later */ if (!ss_initialized) - return; + return 0; /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */ BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)); - /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */ + /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */ if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) - return; + return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb); mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock); @@ -804,6 +908,7 @@ static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, sb_finish_set_opts(newsb); mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock); + return 0; } static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options, @@ -947,7 +1052,7 @@ static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data) goto out_err; out: - rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts); + rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL); out_err: security_free_mnt_opts(&opts); @@ -981,7 +1086,7 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR; break; - case SE_SBLABELSUPP: + case SBLABEL_MNT: seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR); continue; @@ -1189,6 +1294,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent } switch (sbsec->behavior) { + case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE: + break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) { isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid; @@ -1311,15 +1418,33 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent isec->sid = sbsec->sid; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { - if (opt_dentry) { - isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); - rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry, - isec->sclass, - &sid); - if (rc) - goto out_unlock; - isec->sid = sid; - } + /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on + * procfs inodes */ + if (opt_dentry) + /* Called from d_instantiate or + * d_splice_alias. */ + dentry = dget(opt_dentry); + else + /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to + * find a dentry. */ + dentry = d_find_alias(inode); + /* + * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed + * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we + * may find inodes that have no dentry on the + * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as + * these will get fixed up the next time we go through + * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes + * could be used again by userspace. + */ + if (!dentry) + goto out_unlock; + isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); + rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid); + dput(dentry); + if (rc) + goto out_unlock; + isec->sid = sid; } break; } @@ -1425,8 +1550,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap); int rc; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP); - ad.tsk = current; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP; ad.u.cap = cap; switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) { @@ -1445,7 +1569,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd); if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) { - int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0); + int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad); if (rc2) return rc2; } @@ -1468,8 +1592,7 @@ static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk, static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct inode *inode, u32 perms, - struct common_audit_data *adp, - unsigned flags) + struct common_audit_data *adp) { struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid; @@ -1482,19 +1605,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, sid = cred_sid(cred); isec = inode->i_security; - return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags); -} - -static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred, - struct inode *inode, - u32 perms, - unsigned flags) -{ - struct common_audit_data ad; - - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE); - ad.u.inode = inode; - return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags); + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp); } /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing @@ -1507,9 +1618,9 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; struct common_audit_data ad; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; - return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0); + return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); } /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing @@ -1522,9 +1633,21 @@ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode; struct common_audit_data ad; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = *path; - return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0); + return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); +} + +/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */ +static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, + struct file *file, + u32 av) +{ + struct common_audit_data ad; + + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; + ad.u.path = file->f_path; + return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad); } /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to @@ -1540,12 +1663,12 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, u32 av) { struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; - struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); int rc; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = file->f_path; if (sid != fsec->sid) { @@ -1560,7 +1683,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ rc = 0; if (av) - rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0); + rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); out: return rc; @@ -1584,7 +1707,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, sid = tsec->sid; newsid = tsec->create_sid; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, @@ -1593,7 +1716,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, if (rc) return rc; - if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) { + if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) { rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &dentry->d_name, &newsid); if (rc) @@ -1637,7 +1760,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir, dsec = dir->i_security; isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; av = DIR__SEARCH; @@ -1683,7 +1806,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); new_dsec = new_dir->i_security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = old_dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, @@ -1969,7 +2092,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file); int rc; rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); @@ -1998,6 +2121,15 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid; /* Reset exec SID on execve. */ new_tsec->exec_sid = 0; + + /* + * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs or nosuid and a + * transition is explicitly requested, then fail the exec. + */ + if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) + return -EPERM; + if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) + return -EACCES; } else { /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, @@ -2007,10 +2139,11 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return rc; } - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path; - if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) + if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) || + (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)) new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) { @@ -2092,37 +2225,36 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm)); } +static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd) +{ + return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0; +} + /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files) { - struct common_audit_data ad; struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; struct tty_struct *tty; - struct fdtable *fdt; - long j = -1; int drop_tty = 0; + unsigned n; tty = get_current_tty(); if (tty) { spin_lock(&tty_files_lock); if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) { struct tty_file_private *file_priv; - struct inode *inode; /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. - Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather - than using file_has_perm, as this particular open - file may belong to another process and we are only - interested in the inode-based check here. */ + Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly + rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular + open file may belong to another process and we are + only interested in the inode-based check here. */ file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct tty_file_private, list); file = file_priv->file; - inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; - if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, - FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) { + if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE)) drop_tty = 1; - } } spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock); tty_kref_put(tty); @@ -2132,62 +2264,19 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, no_tty(); /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ + n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred); + if (!n) /* none found? */ + return; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE); - - spin_lock(&files->file_lock); - for (;;) { - unsigned long set, i; - int fd; - - j++; - i = j * __NFDBITS; - fdt = files_fdtable(files); - if (i >= fdt->max_fds) - break; - set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j]; - if (!set) - continue; - spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); - for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) { - if (set & 1) { - file = fget(i); - if (!file) - continue; - if (file_has_perm(cred, - file, - file_to_av(file))) { - sys_close(i); - fd = get_unused_fd(); - if (fd != i) { - if (fd >= 0) - put_unused_fd(fd); - fput(file); - continue; - } - if (devnull) { - get_file(devnull); - } else { - devnull = dentry_open( - dget(selinux_null), - mntget(selinuxfs_mount), - O_RDWR, cred); - if (IS_ERR(devnull)) { - devnull = NULL; - put_unused_fd(fd); - fput(file); - continue; - } - } - fd_install(fd, devnull); - } - fput(file); - } - } - spin_lock(&files->file_lock); - - } - spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); + devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred); + if (IS_ERR(devnull)) + devnull = NULL; + /* replace all the matching ones with this */ + do { + replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0); + } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0); + if (devnull) + fput(devnull); } /* @@ -2417,10 +2506,11 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) u32 sid; size_t len; - if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP) + if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT) continue; len = strlen(mount_options[i]); - rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid); + rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) { printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", @@ -2481,7 +2571,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT) return 0; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root; return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad); } @@ -2491,14 +2581,14 @@ static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root; return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); } -static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name, +static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, - char *type, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) { @@ -2531,8 +2621,43 @@ static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) inode_free_security(inode); } +static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, + struct qstr *name, void **ctx, + u32 *ctxlen) +{ + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); + struct task_security_struct *tsec; + struct inode_security_struct *dsec; + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; + struct inode *dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode; + u32 newsid; + int rc; + + tsec = cred->security; + dsec = dir->i_security; + sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; + + if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) { + newsid = tsec->create_sid; + } else { + rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, + inode_mode_to_security_class(mode), + name, + &newsid); + if (rc) { + printk(KERN_WARNING + "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n", + __func__, -rc); + return rc; + } + } + + return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen); +} + static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, - const struct qstr *qstr, char **name, + const struct qstr *qstr, + const char **name, void **value, size_t *len) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); @@ -2540,7 +2665,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid, newsid, clen; int rc; - char *namep = NULL, *context; + char *context; dsec = dir->i_security; sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; @@ -2551,7 +2676,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; - else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) { + else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) { rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), qstr, &newsid); @@ -2573,22 +2698,16 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, isec->initialized = 1; } - if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) + if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (name) { - namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS); - if (!namep) - return -ENOMEM; - *name = namep; - } + if (name) + *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX; if (value && len) { rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen); - if (rc) { - kfree(namep); + if (rc) return rc; - } *value = context; *len = clen; } @@ -2651,13 +2770,36 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ); } +static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, + u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied, + int result, + unsigned flags) +{ + struct common_audit_data ad; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + int rc; + + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE; + ad.u.inode = inode; + + rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, + audited, denied, result, &ad, flags); + if (rc) + return rc; + return 0; +} + static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - struct common_audit_data ad; u32 perms; bool from_access; unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK; + struct inode_security_struct *isec; + u32 sid; + struct av_decision avd; + int rc, rc2; + u32 audited, denied; from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS; mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND); @@ -2666,21 +2808,34 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) if (!mask) return 0; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE); - ad.u.inode = inode; + validate_creds(cred); - if (from_access) - ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS; + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); - return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags); + sid = cred_sid(cred); + isec = inode->i_security; + + rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd); + audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc, + from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0, + &denied); + if (likely(!audited)) + return rc; + + rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags); + if (rc2) + return rc2; + return rc; } static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid; + __u32 av = FILE__WRITE; /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */ if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) { @@ -2694,7 +2849,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); - return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__WRITE); + if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)) + av |= FILE__OPEN; + + return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av); } static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) @@ -2743,13 +2901,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name); sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; - if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) + if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) return -EPERM; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, @@ -2757,10 +2915,32 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (rc) return rc; - rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid); + rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc == -EINVAL) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { + struct audit_buffer *ab; + size_t audit_size; + const char *str; + + /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the + * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ + if (value) { + str = value; + if (str[size - 1] == '\0') + audit_size = size - 1; + else + audit_size = size; + } else { + str = ""; + audit_size = 0; + } + ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); + audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context="); + audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); + audit_log_end(ab); + return rc; + } rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid); } if (rc) @@ -2805,7 +2985,10 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return; } + isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; + isec->initialized = 1; + return; } @@ -2889,10 +3072,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, if (!value || !size) return -EACCES; - rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid); + rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) return rc; + isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = 1; return 0; @@ -2917,7 +3101,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */ if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) @@ -2929,7 +3113,7 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { - struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; u32 sid = current_sid(); @@ -2940,7 +3124,7 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno()) - /* No change since dentry_open check. */ + /* No change since file_open check. */ return 0; return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask); @@ -2969,15 +3153,15 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, /* fall through */ case FIGETBSZ: /* fall through */ - case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS: + case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS: /* fall through */ - case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION: + case FS_IOC_GETVERSION: error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR); break; - case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS: + case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS: /* fall through */ - case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION: + case FS_IOC_SETVERSION: error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR); break; @@ -3040,31 +3224,27 @@ error: return rc; } -static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, - unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) +static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) { - int rc = 0; - u32 sid = current_sid(); + int rc; + + /* do DAC check on address space usage */ + rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr); + if (rc) + return rc; - /* - * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before - * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt - * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even - * if DAC would have also denied the operation. - */ if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) { + u32 sid = current_sid(); rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL); - if (rc) - return rc; } - /* do DAC check on address space usage */ - rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); - if (rc || addr_only) - return rc; + return rc; +} +static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) +{ if (selinux_checkreqprot) prot = reqprot; @@ -3123,11 +3303,6 @@ static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, switch (cmd) { case F_SETFL: - if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) { - err = -EINVAL; - break; - } - if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) { err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE); break; @@ -3138,21 +3313,21 @@ static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, case F_GETFL: case F_GETOWN: case F_GETSIG: + case F_GETOWNER_UIDS: /* Just check FD__USE permission */ err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); break; case F_GETLK: case F_SETLK: case F_SETLKW: + case F_OFD_GETLK: + case F_OFD_SETLK: + case F_OFD_SETLKW: #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 case F_GETLK64: case F_SETLK64: case F_SETLKW64: #endif - if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) { - err = -EINVAL; - break; - } err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); break; } @@ -3199,15 +3374,13 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file)); } -static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) { struct file_security_struct *fsec; - struct inode *inode; struct inode_security_struct *isec; - inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; fsec = file->f_security; - isec = inode->i_security; + isec = file_inode(file)->i_security; /* * Save inode label and policy sequence number * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission @@ -3225,7 +3398,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) * new inode label or new policy. * This check is not redundant - do not remove. */ - return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0); + return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file)); } /* task security operations */ @@ -3347,7 +3520,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) sid = task_sid(current); - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD; ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name; return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, @@ -3486,8 +3659,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph)) goto out; - ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; - ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; + ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; + ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; ret = 0; if (proto) @@ -3505,8 +3678,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, if (th == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = th->source; - ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; + ad->u.net->sport = th->source; + ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; break; } @@ -3521,8 +3694,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, if (uh == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; - ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; + ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; + ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; break; } @@ -3537,8 +3710,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, if (dh == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport; - ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport; + ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; + ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; break; } @@ -3565,8 +3738,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, if (ip6 == NULL) goto out; - ad->u.net.v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr; - ad->u.net.v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr; + ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr; + ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr; ret = 0; nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr; @@ -3586,8 +3759,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, if (th == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = th->source; - ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; + ad->u.net->sport = th->source; + ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; break; } @@ -3598,8 +3771,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, if (uh == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; - ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; + ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; + ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; break; } @@ -3610,8 +3783,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, if (dh == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport; - ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport; + ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; + ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; break; } @@ -3631,13 +3804,13 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, char *addrp; int ret; - switch (ad->u.net.family) { + switch (ad->u.net->family) { case PF_INET: ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto); if (ret) goto parse_error; - addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr : - &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr); + addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr : + &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr); goto okay; #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) @@ -3645,8 +3818,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto); if (ret) goto parse_error; - addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr : - &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr); + addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr : + &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr); goto okay; #endif /* IPV6 */ default: @@ -3688,8 +3861,12 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) u32 nlbl_sid; u32 nlbl_type; - selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); - selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid); + err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); + if (unlikely(err)) + return -EACCES; + err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid); + if (unlikely(err)) + return -EACCES; err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); if (unlikely(err)) { @@ -3702,6 +3879,30 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) return 0; } +/** + * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection + * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID + * @skb_sid: the packet's SID + * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID + * + * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is + * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create + * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy + * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure. + * + */ +static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid) +{ + int err = 0; + + if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL) + err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid); + else + *conn_sid = sk_sid; + + return err; +} + /* socket security operations */ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, @@ -3720,13 +3921,15 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; u32 tsid = task_sid(task); if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) return 0; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.u.net.sk = sk; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->sk = sk; return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad); } @@ -3804,6 +4007,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in char *addrp; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; unsigned short snum; @@ -3822,16 +4026,17 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in if (snum) { int low, high; - inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high); + inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high); if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) { err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); if (err) goto out; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); - ad.u.net.family = family; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum); + ad.u.net->family = family; err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad); @@ -3862,14 +4067,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in if (err) goto out; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); - ad.u.net.family = family; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum); + ad.u.net->family = family; if (family == PF_INET) - ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; + ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; else - ad.u.net.v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr; + ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr; err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad); @@ -3896,6 +4102,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) { struct common_audit_data ad; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; unsigned short snum; @@ -3920,9 +4127,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ? TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum); - ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum); + ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family; err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad); if (err) goto out; @@ -4011,10 +4219,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; int err; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.u.net.sk = other; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->sk = other; err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid, sksec_other->sclass, @@ -4041,9 +4251,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->sk = other->sk; return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad); @@ -4079,11 +4291,13 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif; - ad.u.net.family = family; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; + ad.u.net->family = family; err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); if (err) return err; @@ -4110,6 +4324,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) u16 family = sk->sk_family; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; @@ -4129,13 +4344,14 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family); secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); - peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); + peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return 0; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif; - ad.u.net.family = family; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; + ad.u.net->family = family; err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); if (err) return err; @@ -4154,8 +4370,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) } err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad); - if (err) + if (err) { selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); + return err; + } } if (secmark_active) { @@ -4292,27 +4510,18 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; int err; - u16 family = sk->sk_family; - u32 newsid; + u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family; + u32 connsid; u32 peersid; - /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ - if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) - family = PF_INET; - err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid); if (err) return err; - if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) { - req->secid = sksec->sid; - req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; - } else { - err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid); - if (err) - return err; - req->secid = newsid; - req->peer_secid = peersid; - } + err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid); + if (err) + return err; + req->secid = connsid; + req->peer_secid = peersid; return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family); } @@ -4346,6 +4555,11 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid); } +static void selinux_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk) +{ + skb_set_owner_w(skb, sk); +} + static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid) { const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; @@ -4373,6 +4587,24 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, fl->flowi_secid = req->secid; } +static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) +{ + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec; + + tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tunsec) + return -ENOMEM; + tunsec->sid = current_sid(); + + *security = tunsec; + return 0; +} + +static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) +{ + kfree(security); +} + static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) { u32 sid = current_sid(); @@ -4388,8 +4620,17 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) NULL); } -static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk) +static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) { + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; + + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, + TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL); +} + +static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) +{ + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it @@ -4399,20 +4640,19 @@ static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk) * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling * protocols were being used */ - /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use - * the sockcreate SID here */ - - sksec->sid = current_sid(); + sksec->sid = tunsec->sid; sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET; + + return 0; } -static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk) +static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; u32 sid = current_sid(); int err; - err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, + err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (err) return err; @@ -4420,8 +4660,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk) TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL); if (err) return err; - - sksec->sid = sid; + tunsec->sid = sid; return 0; } @@ -4433,7 +4672,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) struct nlmsghdr *nlh; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) { + if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) { err = -EINVAL; goto out; } @@ -4470,6 +4709,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, char *addrp; u32 peer_sid; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; u8 secmark_active; u8 netlbl_active; u8 peerlbl_active; @@ -4479,16 +4719,17 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled(); - peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); + peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return NF_ACCEPT; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0) return NF_DROP; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; - ad.u.net.family = family; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; + ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0) return NF_DROP; @@ -4517,7 +4758,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, return NF_ACCEPT; } -static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum, +static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *in, const struct net_device *out, @@ -4527,7 +4768,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum, } #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) -static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum, +static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *in, const struct net_device *out, @@ -4540,6 +4781,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum, static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family) { + struct sock *sk; u32 sid; if (!netlbl_enabled()) @@ -4548,8 +4790,27 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */ - if (skb->sk) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security; + sk = skb->sk; + if (sk) { + struct sk_security_struct *sksec; + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) + /* if the socket is the listening state then this + * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to + * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and + * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't + * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on + * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent. + * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is + * as any IP option based labeling should be copied + * from the initial connection request (in the IP + * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a + * security label in the packet itself this is the + * best we can do. */ + return NF_ACCEPT; + + /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */ + sksec = sk->sk_security; sid = sksec->sid; } else sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; @@ -4559,7 +4820,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, return NF_ACCEPT; } -static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum, +static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *in, const struct net_device *out, @@ -4575,6 +4836,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk = skb->sk; struct sk_security_struct *sksec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 proto; @@ -4582,9 +4844,10 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, return NF_ACCEPT; sksec = sk->sk_security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; - ad.u.net.family = family; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; + ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto)) return NF_DROP; @@ -4606,6 +4869,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, u32 peer_sid; struct sock *sk; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; @@ -4616,27 +4880,36 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, * as fast and as clean as possible. */ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family); + + secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); + peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); + if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) + return NF_ACCEPT; + + sk = skb->sk; + #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks * when the packet is on it's final way out. * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst - * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */ - if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL) + * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. + * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the + * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing + * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do; + * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per + * connection. */ + if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL && + !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)) return NF_ACCEPT; #endif - secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); - peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); - if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) - return NF_ACCEPT; - /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the - * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local - * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label - * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */ - sk = skb->sk; if (sk == NULL) { + /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming + * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet + * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded + * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */ if (skb->skb_iif) { secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid)) @@ -4645,15 +4918,54 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; } + } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { + /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the + * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In + * this particular case the correct security label is assigned + * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't + * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent + * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only + * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in + * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output() + * for similar problems. */ + u32 skb_sid; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid)) + return NF_DROP; + /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL + * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM + * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final" + * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied + * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely + * pass the packet. */ + if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) { + switch (family) { + case PF_INET: + if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) + return NF_ACCEPT; + break; + case PF_INET6: + if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) + return NF_ACCEPT; + default: + return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); + } + } + if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid)) + return NF_DROP; + secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; } else { + /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the + * associated socket. */ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; peer_sid = sksec->sid; secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; } - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; - ad.u.net.family = family; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; + ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL)) return NF_DROP; @@ -4682,7 +4994,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, return NF_ACCEPT; } -static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum, +static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *in, const struct net_device *out, @@ -4692,7 +5004,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum, } #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) -static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum, +static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *in, const struct net_device *out, @@ -4772,7 +5084,7 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, isec = ipc_perms->security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); @@ -4802,7 +5114,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) isec = msq->q_perm.security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, @@ -4827,7 +5139,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) isec = msq->q_perm.security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, @@ -4887,7 +5199,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, return rc; } - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; /* Can this process write to the queue? */ @@ -4918,7 +5230,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, isec = msq->q_perm.security; msec = msg->security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, @@ -4943,7 +5255,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) isec = shp->shm_perm.security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, @@ -4968,7 +5280,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) isec = shp->shm_perm.security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, @@ -5035,7 +5347,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) isec = sma->sem_perm.security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, @@ -5060,7 +5372,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) isec = sma->sem_perm.security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, @@ -5238,10 +5550,25 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, str[size-1] = 0; size--; } - error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid); + error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { + struct audit_buffer *ab; + size_t audit_size; + + /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the + * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ + if (str[size - 1] == '\0') + audit_size = size - 1; + else + audit_size = size; + ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); + audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context="); + audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); + audit_log_end(ab); + return error; + } error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &sid); } @@ -5293,11 +5620,11 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */ ptsid = 0; - task_lock(p); + rcu_read_lock(); tracer = ptrace_parent(p); if (tracer) ptsid = task_sid(tracer); - task_unlock(p); + rcu_read_unlock(); if (tracer) { error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, @@ -5320,6 +5647,11 @@ abort_change: return error; } +static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name) +{ + return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0); +} + static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen); @@ -5327,7 +5659,7 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) { - return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid); + return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL); } static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) @@ -5393,7 +5725,7 @@ static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k) static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, - key_perm_t perm) + unsigned perm) { struct key *key; struct key_security_struct *ksec; @@ -5462,6 +5794,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts, .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str, + .dentry_init_security = selinux_dentry_init_security, .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security, .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security, @@ -5493,7 +5826,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security, .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security, .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl, - .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap, + .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file, + .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr, .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect, .file_lock = selinux_file_lock, .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl, @@ -5501,7 +5835,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask, .file_receive = selinux_file_receive, - .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open, + .file_open = selinux_file_open, .task_create = selinux_task_create, .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank, @@ -5556,6 +5890,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr, .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr, + .ismaclabel = selinux_ismaclabel, .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx, .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid, .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx, @@ -5594,16 +5929,21 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc, .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec, .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow, + .tun_dev_alloc_security = selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security, + .tun_dev_free_security = selinux_tun_dev_free_security, .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create, - .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create, + .tun_dev_attach_queue = selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue, .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach, + .tun_dev_open = selinux_tun_dev_open, + .skb_owned_by = selinux_skb_owned_by, #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc, .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone, .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free, .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete, - .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc, + .xfrm_state_alloc = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc, + .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free, .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete, .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup, @@ -5685,21 +6025,21 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = { { .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute, .owner = THIS_MODULE, - .pf = PF_INET, + .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, }, { .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward, .owner = THIS_MODULE, - .pf = PF_INET, + .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, }, { .hook = selinux_ipv4_output, .owner = THIS_MODULE, - .pf = PF_INET, + .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, } @@ -5711,14 +6051,14 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = { { .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute, .owner = THIS_MODULE, - .pf = PF_INET6, + .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, }, { .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward, .owner = THIS_MODULE, - .pf = PF_INET6, + .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, } diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h index 47fda963495..ddf8eec03f2 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h @@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/lsm_audit.h> #include <linux/in6.h> -#include <asm/system.h> #include "flask.h" #include "av_permissions.h" #include "security.h" @@ -48,16 +47,99 @@ struct avc_cache_stats { }; /* + * We only need this data after we have decided to send an audit message. + */ +struct selinux_audit_data { + u32 ssid; + u32 tsid; + u16 tclass; + u32 requested; + u32 audited; + u32 denied; + int result; +}; + +/* * AVC operations */ void __init avc_init(void); -int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct av_decision *avd, - int result, - struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags); +static inline u32 avc_audit_required(u32 requested, + struct av_decision *avd, + int result, + u32 auditdeny, + u32 *deniedp) +{ + u32 denied, audited; + denied = requested & ~avd->allowed; + if (unlikely(denied)) { + audited = denied & avd->auditdeny; + /* + * auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in + * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if + * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that + * permission. Take notice that this is unrelated to the + * actual permissions that were denied. As an example lets + * assume: + * + * denied == READ + * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule) + * auditdeny & ACCESS == 1 + * + * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied + * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for + * ACCESS + */ + if (auditdeny && !(auditdeny & avd->auditdeny)) + audited = 0; + } else if (result) + audited = denied = requested; + else + audited = requested & avd->auditallow; + *deniedp = denied; + return audited; +} + +int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, + u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result, + struct common_audit_data *a, + unsigned flags); + +/** + * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions. + * @ssid: source security identifier + * @tsid: target security identifier + * @tclass: target security class + * @requested: requested permissions + * @avd: access vector decisions + * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit + * @a: auxiliary audit data + * @flags: VFS walk flags + * + * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance + * with the policy. This function is typically called by + * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be + * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit() + * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing. + * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must + * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released + * before calling the auditing code. + */ +static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, u32 requested, + struct av_decision *avd, + int result, + struct common_audit_data *a) +{ + u32 audited, denied; + audited = avc_audit_required(requested, avd, result, 0, &denied); + if (likely(!audited)) + return 0; + return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, + requested, audited, denied, result, + a, 0); +} #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, @@ -65,17 +147,9 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, unsigned flags, struct av_decision *avd); -int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct common_audit_data *auditdata, - unsigned); - -static inline int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct common_audit_data *auditdata) -{ - return avc_has_perm_flags(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, auditdata, 0); -} +int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, u32 requested, + struct common_audit_data *auditdata); u32 avc_policy_seqno(void); @@ -88,11 +162,7 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void); #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE 64 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE 128 -int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 perms, - u32 *out_retained), - u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 perms); +int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events); /* Exported to selinuxfs */ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index b8c53723e09..be491a74c1e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -145,9 +145,11 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { "node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } }, { "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } }, { "peer", { "recv", NULL } }, - { "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", NULL } }, + { "capability2", + { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", + "audit_read", NULL } }, { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } }, { "tun_socket", - { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } }, { NULL } }; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index 26c7eee1c30..078e553f52f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -38,7 +38,10 @@ struct task_security_struct { struct inode_security_struct { struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode object */ - struct list_head list; /* list of inode_security_struct */ + union { + struct list_head list; /* list of inode_security_struct */ + struct rcu_head rcu; /* for freeing the inode_security_struct */ + }; u32 task_sid; /* SID of creating task */ u32 sid; /* SID of this object */ u16 sclass; /* security class of this object */ @@ -58,8 +61,8 @@ struct superblock_security_struct { u32 sid; /* SID of file system superblock */ u32 def_sid; /* default SID for labeling */ u32 mntpoint_sid; /* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */ - unsigned int behavior; /* labeling behavior */ - unsigned char flags; /* which mount options were specified */ + unsigned short behavior; /* labeling behavior */ + unsigned short flags; /* which mount options were specified */ struct mutex lock; struct list_head isec_head; spinlock_t isec_lock; @@ -110,6 +113,10 @@ struct sk_security_struct { u16 sclass; /* sock security class */ }; +struct tun_security_struct { + u32 sid; /* SID for the tun device sockets */ +}; + struct key_security_struct { u32 sid; /* SID of key */ }; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index d871e8ad210..ce7852cf526 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -31,26 +31,30 @@ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY 24 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS 25 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS 26 +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS 27 +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE 28 +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES 29 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE #else -#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES #endif /* Mask for just the mount related flags */ #define SE_MNTMASK 0x0f /* Super block security struct flags for mount options */ +/* BE CAREFUL, these need to be the low order bits for selinux_get_mnt_opts */ #define CONTEXT_MNT 0x01 #define FSCONTEXT_MNT 0x02 #define ROOTCONTEXT_MNT 0x04 #define DEFCONTEXT_MNT 0x08 +#define SBLABEL_MNT 0x10 /* Non-mount related flags */ -#define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x10 -#define SE_SBPROC 0x20 -#define SE_SBLABELSUPP 0x40 +#define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x0100 +#define SE_SBPROC 0x0200 #define CONTEXT_STR "context=" #define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext=" @@ -66,12 +70,15 @@ extern int selinux_enabled; enum { POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER, POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM, + POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_REDHAT1, + POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK, __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX }; #define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1) extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer; extern int selinux_policycap_openperm; +extern int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork; /* * type_datum properties @@ -127,7 +134,7 @@ int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len); int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, - u32 *out_sid); + u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp); int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags); @@ -167,9 +174,10 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(void); #define SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS 4 /* use the genfs support */ #define SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE 5 /* no labeling support */ #define SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT 6 /* use mountpoint labeling */ +#define SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE 7 /* use native label support */ +#define SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX 7 /* Highest SECURITY_FS_USE_XXX */ -int security_fs_use(const char *fstype, unsigned int *behavior, - u32 *sid); +int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb); int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass, u32 *sid); @@ -219,7 +227,7 @@ extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno); extern void selinux_complete_init(void); extern int selinux_disable(void); extern void exit_sel_fs(void); -extern struct dentry *selinux_null; +extern struct path selinux_null; extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount; extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val); extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index b43813c9e04..1450f85b946 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -7,30 +7,25 @@ #ifndef _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ #define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ +#include <net/flow.h> + int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx); + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, + gfp_t gfp); int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp); void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, u32 secid); + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx); +int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid); void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x); int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x); int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir); int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, - struct xfrm_policy *xp, const struct flowi *fl); - -/* - * Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket) - */ -static inline struct inode_security_struct *get_sock_isec(struct sock *sk) -{ - if (!sk->sk_socket) - return NULL; - - return SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_security; -} + struct xfrm_policy *xp, + const struct flowi *fl); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM extern atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount; @@ -40,15 +35,23 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void) return (atomic_read(&selinux_xfrm_refcount) > 0); } -int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct common_audit_data *ad); -int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto); +int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct common_audit_data *ad); +int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto); int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall); +int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid); static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void) { - atomic_inc(&flow_cache_genid); + struct net *net; + + rtnl_lock(); + for_each_net(net) { + atomic_inc(&net->xfrm.flow_cache_genid); + rt_genid_bump_all(net); + } + rtnl_unlock(); } #else static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void) @@ -56,19 +59,21 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void) return 0; } -static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct common_audit_data *ad) +static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct common_audit_data *ad) { return 0; } -static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto) +static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct common_audit_data *ad, + u8 proto) { return 0; } -static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall) +static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, + int ckall) { *sid = SECSID_NULL; return 0; @@ -77,12 +82,12 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void) { } -#endif -static inline void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid) +static inline int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid) { - int err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, sid, 0); - BUG_ON(err); + *sid = SECSID_NULL; + return 0; } +#endif #endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c index 326f22cbe40..694e9e43855 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netif.c +++ b/security/selinux/netif.c @@ -252,8 +252,7 @@ static void sel_netif_flush(void) spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock); } -static int sel_netif_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained) +static int sel_netif_avc_callback(u32 event) { if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { sel_netif_flush(); @@ -265,7 +264,7 @@ static int sel_netif_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, static int sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, void *ptr) { - struct net_device *dev = ptr; + struct net_device *dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr); if (dev_net(dev) != &init_net) return NOTIFY_DONE; @@ -292,8 +291,7 @@ static __init int sel_netif_init(void) register_netdevice_notifier(&sel_netif_netdev_notifier); - err = avc_add_callback(sel_netif_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, - SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0); + err = avc_add_callback(sel_netif_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET); if (err) panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err); diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c index da4b8b23328..0364120d1ec 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c @@ -101,6 +101,32 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk) } /** + * selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr - Get the cached NetLabel secattr + * @sk: the socket + * @sid: the SID + * + * Query the socket's cached secattr and if the SID matches the cached value + * return the cache, otherwise return NULL. + * + */ +static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr( + const struct sock *sk, + u32 sid) +{ + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr; + + if (secattr == NULL) + return NULL; + + if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) && + (secattr->attr.secid == sid)) + return secattr; + + return NULL; +} + +/** * selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate - Invalidate the NetLabel cache * * Description: @@ -224,7 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB) return 0; - secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr; + secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, sid); } if (secattr == NULL) { secattr = &secattr_storage; @@ -410,6 +436,9 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_CONNLABELED)) { netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); lock_sock(sk); + /* call the netlabel function directly as we want to see the + * on-the-wire label that is assigned via the socket's options + * and not the cached netlabel/lsm attributes */ rc = netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr); release_sock(sk); if (rc == 0) @@ -442,8 +471,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr) sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED) return 0; - local_bh_disable(); - bh_lock_sock_nested(sk); + lock_sock(sk); /* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family * is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset @@ -464,7 +492,6 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr) sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED; socket_connect_return: - bh_unlock_sock(sk); - local_bh_enable(); + release_sock(sk); return rc; } diff --git a/security/selinux/netlink.c b/security/selinux/netlink.c index 161e01a6c7e..828fb6a4e94 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netlink.c +++ b/security/selinux/netlink.c @@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> -#include <linux/netlink.h> #include <linux/selinux_netlink.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> +#include <net/netlink.h> #include "security.h" @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static void selnl_add_payload(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int len, int msgtype, void * { switch (msgtype) { case SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE: { - struct selnl_msg_setenforce *msg = NLMSG_DATA(nlh); + struct selnl_msg_setenforce *msg = nlmsg_data(nlh); memset(msg, 0, len); msg->val = *((int *)data); @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static void selnl_add_payload(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int len, int msgtype, void * } case SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD: { - struct selnl_msg_policyload *msg = NLMSG_DATA(nlh); + struct selnl_msg_policyload *msg = nlmsg_data(nlh); memset(msg, 0, len); msg->seqno = *((u32 *)data); @@ -76,12 +76,14 @@ static void selnl_notify(int msgtype, void *data) len = selnl_msglen(msgtype); - skb = alloc_skb(NLMSG_SPACE(len), GFP_USER); + skb = nlmsg_new(len, GFP_USER); if (!skb) goto oom; tmp = skb->tail; - nlh = NLMSG_PUT(skb, 0, 0, msgtype, len); + nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, 0, 0, msgtype, len, 0); + if (!nlh) + goto out_kfree_skb; selnl_add_payload(nlh, len, msgtype, data); nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - tmp; NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = SELNLGRP_AVC; @@ -89,7 +91,7 @@ static void selnl_notify(int msgtype, void *data) out: return; -nlmsg_failure: +out_kfree_skb: kfree_skb(skb); oom: printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: OOM in %s\n", __func__); @@ -108,11 +110,14 @@ void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno) static int __init selnl_init(void) { - selnl = netlink_kernel_create(&init_net, NETLINK_SELINUX, - SELNLGRP_MAX, NULL, NULL, THIS_MODULE); + struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = { + .groups = SELNLGRP_MAX, + .flags = NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV, + }; + + selnl = netlink_kernel_create(&init_net, NETLINK_SELINUX, &cfg); if (selnl == NULL) panic("SELinux: Cannot create netlink socket."); - netlink_set_nonroot(NETLINK_SELINUX, NL_NONROOT_RECV); return 0; } diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c index 86365857c08..03a72c32afd 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netnode.c +++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c @@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node) break; default: BUG(); + return; } /* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check @@ -174,7 +175,8 @@ static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node) if (sel_netnode_hash[idx].size == SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) { struct sel_netnode *tail; tail = list_entry( - rcu_dereference(sel_netnode_hash[idx].list.prev), + rcu_dereference_protected(sel_netnode_hash[idx].list.prev, + lockdep_is_held(&sel_netnode_lock)), struct sel_netnode, list); list_del_rcu(&tail->list); kfree_rcu(tail, rcu); @@ -224,6 +226,7 @@ static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid) break; default: BUG(); + ret = -EINVAL; } if (ret != 0) goto out; @@ -297,8 +300,7 @@ static void sel_netnode_flush(void) spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock); } -static int sel_netnode_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained) +static int sel_netnode_avc_callback(u32 event) { if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { sel_netnode_flush(); @@ -320,8 +322,7 @@ static __init int sel_netnode_init(void) sel_netnode_hash[iter].size = 0; } - ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netnode_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, - SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0); + ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netnode_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET); if (ret != 0) panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret); diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c index 7b9eb1faf68..d35379781c2 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netport.c +++ b/security/selinux/netport.c @@ -234,8 +234,7 @@ static void sel_netport_flush(void) spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock); } -static int sel_netport_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained) +static int sel_netport_avc_callback(u32 event) { if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { sel_netport_flush(); @@ -257,8 +256,7 @@ static __init int sel_netport_init(void) sel_netport_hash[iter].size = 0; } - ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netport_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, - SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0); + ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netport_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET); if (ret != 0) panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret); diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c index 0920ea3bf59..2df7b900e25 100644 --- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c @@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ #include <linux/netlink.h> #include <linux/rtnetlink.h> #include <linux/if.h> -#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_queue.h> #include <linux/inet_diag.h> #include <linux/xfrm.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/sock_diag.h> #include "flask.h" #include "av_permissions.h" @@ -68,18 +68,18 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] = { RTM_GETADDRLABEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, { RTM_GETDCB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, { RTM_SETDCB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, -}; - -static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_firewall_perms[] = -{ - { IPQM_MODE, NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, - { IPQM_VERDICT, NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, + { RTM_NEWNETCONF, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, + { RTM_GETNETCONF, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, + { RTM_NEWMDB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, + { RTM_DELMDB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, + { RTM_GETMDB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, }; static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] = { { TCPDIAG_GETSOCK, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, { DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, + { SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, }; static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] = @@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] = { AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, { AUDIT_TTY_GET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, { AUDIT_TTY_SET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT }, + { AUDIT_GET_FEATURE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, + { AUDIT_SET_FEATURE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, }; @@ -145,12 +147,6 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm) sizeof(nlmsg_route_perms)); break; - case SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET: - case SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET: - err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_firewall_perms, - sizeof(nlmsg_firewall_perms)); - break; - case SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET: err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms, sizeof(nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms)); diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 48a7d0014b4..c71737f6d1c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -44,7 +44,9 @@ /* Policy capability filenames */ static char *policycap_names[] = { "network_peer_controls", - "open_perms" + "open_perms", + "redhat1", + "always_check_network" }; unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; @@ -52,7 +54,7 @@ unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str) { unsigned long checkreqprot; - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0; return 1; } @@ -174,7 +176,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS, "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u", new_value, selinux_enforcing, - audit_get_loginuid(current), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); selinux_enforcing = new_value; if (selinux_enforcing) @@ -202,7 +204,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, { char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN]; ssize_t length; - ino_t ino = filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino; + ino_t ino = file_inode(filp)->i_ino; int handle_unknown = (ino == SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN) ? security_get_reject_unknown() : !security_get_allow_unknown(); @@ -305,7 +307,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, goto out; audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS, "selinux=0 auid=%u ses=%u", - audit_get_loginuid(current), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); } @@ -344,7 +346,7 @@ static int sel_make_classes(void); static int sel_make_policycap(void); /* declaration for sel_make_class_dirs */ -static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, +static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name, unsigned long *ino); static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, @@ -485,7 +487,7 @@ static int sel_mmap_policy(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma) return -EACCES; } - vma->vm_flags |= VM_RESERVED; + vma->vm_flags |= VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP; vma->vm_ops = &sel_mmap_policy_ops; return 0; @@ -496,6 +498,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policy_ops = { .read = sel_read_policy, .mmap = sel_mmap_policy, .release = sel_release_policy, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, @@ -550,7 +553,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, out1: audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD, "policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u", - audit_get_loginuid(current), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); out: mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex); @@ -573,7 +576,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid); + length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -670,7 +673,7 @@ static ssize_t (*write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = { static ssize_t selinux_transaction_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *pos) { - ino_t ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino; + ino_t ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino; char *data; ssize_t rv; @@ -728,11 +731,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid); + length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid); + length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -814,11 +819,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) objname = namebuf; } - length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid); + length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid); + length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -875,11 +882,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid); + length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid); + length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -931,7 +940,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid); + length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -991,11 +1000,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid); + length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid); + length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -1041,8 +1052,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, ssize_t length; ssize_t ret; int cur_enforcing; - struct inode *inode = filep->f_path.dentry->d_inode; - unsigned index = inode->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; + unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; mutex_lock(&sel_mutex); @@ -1076,8 +1086,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, char *page = NULL; ssize_t length; int new_value; - struct inode *inode = filep->f_path.dentry->d_inode; - unsigned index = inode->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; + unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; mutex_lock(&sel_mutex); @@ -1232,6 +1241,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void) kfree(bool_pending_names[i]); kfree(bool_pending_names); kfree(bool_pending_values); + bool_num = 0; bool_pending_names = NULL; bool_pending_values = NULL; @@ -1257,12 +1267,8 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void) if (!inode) goto out; - ret = -EINVAL; - len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]); - if (len < 0) - goto out; - ret = -ENAMETOOLONG; + len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]); if (len >= PAGE_SIZE) goto out; @@ -1299,7 +1305,7 @@ out: #define NULL_FILE_NAME "null" -struct dentry *selinux_null; +struct path selinux_null; static ssize_t sel_read_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) @@ -1488,13 +1494,11 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir) static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct inode *inode; char *con; u32 sid, len; ssize_t ret; - inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; - sid = inode->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK; + sid = file_inode(file)->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK; ret = security_sid_to_context(sid, &con, &len); if (ret) return ret; @@ -1532,11 +1536,6 @@ static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir) return 0; } -static inline unsigned int sel_div(unsigned long a, unsigned long b) -{ - return a / b - (a % b < 0); -} - static inline unsigned long sel_class_to_ino(u16 class) { return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1)) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET; @@ -1544,7 +1543,7 @@ static inline unsigned long sel_class_to_ino(u16 class) static inline u16 sel_ino_to_class(unsigned long ino) { - return sel_div(ino & SEL_INO_MASK, SEL_VEC_MAX + 1); + return (ino & SEL_INO_MASK) / (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1); } static inline unsigned long sel_perm_to_ino(u16 class, u32 perm) @@ -1560,19 +1559,10 @@ static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino) static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - ssize_t rc, len; - char *page; - unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino; - - page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!page) - return -ENOMEM; - - len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino)); - rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len); - free_page((unsigned long)page); - - return rc; + unsigned long ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino; + char res[TMPBUFLEN]; + ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino)); + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len); } static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = { @@ -1583,19 +1573,10 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = { static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - ssize_t rc, len; - char *page; - unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino; - - page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!page) - return -ENOMEM; - - len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino)); - rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len); - free_page((unsigned long)page); - - return rc; + unsigned long ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino; + char res[TMPBUFLEN]; + ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino)); + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len); } static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = { @@ -1609,7 +1590,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf, int value; char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN]; ssize_t length; - unsigned long i_ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino; + unsigned long i_ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino; value = security_policycap_supported(i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK); length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", value); @@ -1678,13 +1659,9 @@ static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index, inode->i_ino = sel_class_to_ino(index); d_add(dentry, inode); - dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, "perms"); - if (!dentry) - return -ENOMEM; - - rc = sel_make_dir(dir->d_inode, dentry, &last_class_ino); - if (rc) - return rc; + dentry = sel_make_dir(dir, "perms", &last_class_ino); + if (IS_ERR(dentry)) + return PTR_ERR(dentry); rc = sel_make_perm_files(classname, index, dentry); @@ -1733,15 +1710,12 @@ static int sel_make_classes(void) for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++) { struct dentry *class_name_dir; - rc = -ENOMEM; - class_name_dir = d_alloc_name(class_dir, classes[i]); - if (!class_name_dir) - goto out; - - rc = sel_make_dir(class_dir->d_inode, class_name_dir, + class_name_dir = sel_make_dir(class_dir, classes[i], &last_class_ino); - if (rc) + if (IS_ERR(class_name_dir)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(class_name_dir); goto out; + } /* i+1 since class values are 1-indexed */ rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(classes[i], i + 1, @@ -1787,14 +1761,20 @@ static int sel_make_policycap(void) return 0; } -static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, +static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name, unsigned long *ino) { + struct dentry *dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, name); struct inode *inode; - inode = sel_make_inode(dir->i_sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO); - if (!inode) - return -ENOMEM; + if (!dentry) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO); + if (!inode) { + dput(dentry); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + } inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations; @@ -1803,16 +1783,16 @@ static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, inc_nlink(inode); d_add(dentry, inode); /* bump link count on parent directory, too */ - inc_nlink(dir); + inc_nlink(dir->d_inode); - return 0; + return dentry; } static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) { int ret; struct dentry *dentry; - struct inode *inode, *root_inode; + struct inode *inode; struct inode_security_struct *isec; static struct tree_descr selinux_files[] = { @@ -1832,25 +1812,19 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) [SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO}, [SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO}, [SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO}, - [SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUSR}, + [SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUGO}, /* last one */ {""} }; ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files); if (ret) goto err; - root_inode = sb->s_root->d_inode; - - ret = -ENOMEM; - dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME); - if (!dentry) - goto err; - - ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino); - if (ret) + bool_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME, &sel_last_ino); + if (IS_ERR(bool_dir)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(bool_dir); + bool_dir = NULL; goto err; - - bool_dir = dentry; + } ret = -ENOMEM; dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, NULL_FILE_NAME); @@ -1870,56 +1844,41 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3)); d_add(dentry, inode); - selinux_null = dentry; - - ret = -ENOMEM; - dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, "avc"); - if (!dentry) - goto err; + selinux_null.dentry = dentry; - ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino); - if (ret) + dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &sel_last_ino); + if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(dentry); goto err; + } ret = sel_make_avc_files(dentry); if (ret) goto err; - ret = -ENOMEM; - dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, "initial_contexts"); - if (!dentry) - goto err; - - ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino); - if (ret) + dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "initial_contexts", &sel_last_ino); + if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(dentry); goto err; + } ret = sel_make_initcon_files(dentry); if (ret) goto err; - ret = -ENOMEM; - dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, "class"); - if (!dentry) - goto err; - - ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino); - if (ret) + class_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "class", &sel_last_ino); + if (IS_ERR(class_dir)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(class_dir); + class_dir = NULL; goto err; + } - class_dir = dentry; - - ret = -ENOMEM; - dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, "policy_capabilities"); - if (!dentry) + policycap_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "policy_capabilities", &sel_last_ino); + if (IS_ERR(policycap_dir)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(policycap_dir); + policycap_dir = NULL; goto err; - - ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino); - if (ret) - goto err; - - policycap_dir = dentry; - + } return 0; err: printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: failed while creating inodes\n", @@ -1959,7 +1918,7 @@ static int __init init_sel_fs(void) return err; } - selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type); + selinux_null.mnt = selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type); if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) { printk(KERN_ERR "selinuxfs: could not mount!\n"); err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h index 149dda731fd..96fd947c494 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct constraint_expr { u32 op; /* operator */ struct ebitmap names; /* names */ + struct type_set *type_names; struct constraint_expr *next; /* next expression */ }; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h index 45e8fb0515f..212e3479a0d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h @@ -74,6 +74,26 @@ out: return rc; } +/* + * Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the high level of 'src'. + */ +static inline int mls_context_cpy_high(struct context *dst, struct context *src) +{ + int rc; + + dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[1].sens; + rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat); + if (rc) + goto out; + + dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens; + rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat); + if (rc) + ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat); +out: + return rc; +} + static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2) { return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) && diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c index 30f119b1d1e..820313a04d4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c @@ -213,7 +213,12 @@ netlbl_import_failure: } #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ -int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2) +/* + * Check to see if all the bits set in e2 are also set in e1. Optionally, + * if last_e2bit is non-zero, the highest set bit in e2 cannot exceed + * last_e2bit. + */ +int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit) { struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2; int i; @@ -223,14 +228,25 @@ int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2) n1 = e1->node; n2 = e2->node; + while (n1 && n2 && (n1->startbit <= n2->startbit)) { if (n1->startbit < n2->startbit) { n1 = n1->next; continue; } - for (i = 0; i < EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; i++) { + for (i = EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS - 1; (i >= 0) && !n2->maps[i]; ) + i--; /* Skip trailing NULL map entries */ + if (last_e2bit && (i >= 0)) { + u32 lastsetbit = n2->startbit + i * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE + + __fls(n2->maps[i]); + if (lastsetbit > last_e2bit) + return 0; + } + + while (i >= 0) { if ((n1->maps[i] & n2->maps[i]) != n2->maps[i]) return 0; + i--; } n1 = n1->next; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h index 922f8afa89d..712c8a7b8e8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h @@ -16,7 +16,13 @@ #include <net/netlabel.h> -#define EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS ((32 - sizeof(void *) - sizeof(u32)) \ +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT +#define EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE 64 +#else +#define EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE 32 +#endif + +#define EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS ((EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE-sizeof(void *)-sizeof(u32))\ / sizeof(unsigned long)) #define EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE BITS_PER_LONG #define EBITMAP_SIZE (EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE) @@ -117,7 +123,7 @@ static inline void ebitmap_node_clr_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n, int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2); int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src); -int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2); +int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit); int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit); int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value); void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c index 933e735bb18..2cc49614984 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> #include "hashtab.h" struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key), @@ -40,6 +41,8 @@ int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum) u32 hvalue; struct hashtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode; + cond_resched(); + if (!h || h->nel == HASHTAB_MAX_NODES) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index fbf9c5816c7..d307b37ddc2 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c @@ -160,8 +160,6 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l) { struct level_datum *levdatum; - struct ebitmap_node *node; - int i; if (!l->sens || l->sens > p->p_levels.nprim) return 0; @@ -170,19 +168,13 @@ int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l) if (!levdatum) return 0; - ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&l->cat, node, i) { - if (i > p->p_cats.nprim) - return 0; - if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&levdatum->level->cat, i)) { - /* - * Category may not be associated with - * sensitivity. - */ - return 0; - } - } - - return 1; + /* + * Return 1 iff all the bits set in l->cat are also be set in + * levdatum->level->cat and no bit in l->cat is larger than + * p->p_cats.nprim. + */ + return ebitmap_contains(&levdatum->level->cat, &l->cat, + p->p_cats.nprim); } int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r) @@ -500,6 +492,8 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp, rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&bitmap, catdatum->value - 1, 1); if (rc) return rc; + + cond_resched(); } ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[l].cat); c->range.level[l].cat = bitmap; @@ -517,6 +511,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, { struct range_trans rtr; struct mls_range *r; + struct class_datum *cladatum; + int default_range = 0; if (!policydb.mls_enabled) return 0; @@ -530,6 +526,28 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, r = hashtab_search(policydb.range_tr, &rtr); if (r) return mls_range_set(newcontext, r); + + if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim) { + cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; + if (cladatum) + default_range = cladatum->default_range; + } + + switch (default_range) { + case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW: + return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext); + case DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH: + return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, scontext); + case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH: + return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext); + case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW: + return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, tcontext); + case DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH: + return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, tcontext); + case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH: + return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, tcontext); + } + /* Fallthrough */ case AVTAB_CHANGE: if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h index 03bed52a805..e9364877413 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline int mls_level_eq(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2) static inline int mls_level_dom(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2) { return ((l1->sens >= l2->sens) && - ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat)); + ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat, 0)); } #define mls_level_incomp(l1, l2) \ diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index a7f61d52f05..9c5cdc2caae 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -133,6 +133,21 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = { .sym_num = SYM_NUM, .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, }, + { + .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS, + .sym_num = SYM_NUM, + .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, + }, + { + .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE, + .sym_num = SYM_NUM, + .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, + }, + { + .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES, + .sym_num = SYM_NUM, + .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, + }, }; static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version) @@ -603,6 +618,19 @@ static int common_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p) return 0; } +static void constraint_expr_destroy(struct constraint_expr *expr) +{ + if (expr) { + ebitmap_destroy(&expr->names); + if (expr->type_names) { + ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->types); + ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->negset); + kfree(expr->type_names); + } + kfree(expr); + } +} + static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p) { struct class_datum *cladatum; @@ -618,10 +646,9 @@ static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p) while (constraint) { e = constraint->expr; while (e) { - ebitmap_destroy(&e->names); etmp = e; e = e->next; - kfree(etmp); + constraint_expr_destroy(etmp); } ctemp = constraint; constraint = constraint->next; @@ -632,16 +659,14 @@ static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p) while (constraint) { e = constraint->expr; while (e) { - ebitmap_destroy(&e->names); etmp = e; e = e->next; - kfree(etmp); + constraint_expr_destroy(etmp); } ctemp = constraint; constraint = constraint->next; kfree(ctemp); } - kfree(cladatum->comkey); } kfree(datum); @@ -1146,8 +1171,34 @@ bad: return rc; } -static int read_cons_helper(struct constraint_node **nodep, int ncons, - int allowxtarget, void *fp) +static void type_set_init(struct type_set *t) +{ + ebitmap_init(&t->types); + ebitmap_init(&t->negset); +} + +static int type_set_read(struct type_set *t, void *fp) +{ + __le32 buf[1]; + int rc; + + if (ebitmap_read(&t->types, fp)) + return -EINVAL; + if (ebitmap_read(&t->negset, fp)) + return -EINVAL; + + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); + if (rc < 0) + return -EINVAL; + t->flags = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + + return 0; +} + + +static int read_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, + struct constraint_node **nodep, + int ncons, int allowxtarget, void *fp) { struct constraint_node *c, *lc; struct constraint_expr *e, *le; @@ -1215,6 +1266,18 @@ static int read_cons_helper(struct constraint_node **nodep, int ncons, rc = ebitmap_read(&e->names, fp); if (rc) return rc; + if (p->policyvers >= + POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) { + e->type_names = kzalloc(sizeof + (*e->type_names), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!e->type_names) + return -ENOMEM; + type_set_init(e->type_names); + rc = type_set_read(e->type_names, fp); + if (rc) + return rc; + } break; default: return -EINVAL; @@ -1291,7 +1354,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) goto bad; } - rc = read_cons_helper(&cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp); + rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp); if (rc) goto bad; @@ -1301,11 +1364,29 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) if (rc) goto bad; ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - rc = read_cons_helper(&cladatum->validatetrans, ncons, 1, fp); + rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->validatetrans, + ncons, 1, fp); if (rc) goto bad; } + if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) { + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3); + if (rc) + goto bad; + + cladatum->default_user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + cladatum->default_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); + cladatum->default_range = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]); + } + + if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) { + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 1); + if (rc) + goto bad; + cladatum->default_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + } + rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, cladatum); if (rc) goto bad; @@ -1914,7 +1995,19 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) if (rc) goto out; - hashtab_insert(p->filename_trans, ft, otype); + rc = hashtab_insert(p->filename_trans, ft, otype); + if (rc) { + /* + * Do not return -EEXIST to the caller, or the system + * will not boot. + */ + if (rc != -EEXIST) + goto out; + /* But free memory to avoid memory leak. */ + kfree(ft); + kfree(name); + kfree(otype); + } } hash_eval(p->filename_trans, "filenametr"); return 0; @@ -2141,7 +2234,10 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info, rc = -EINVAL; c->v.behavior = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE) + /* Determined at runtime, not in policy DB. */ + if (c->v.behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) + goto out; + if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX) goto out; rc = -ENOMEM; @@ -2723,6 +2819,24 @@ static int common_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr) return 0; } +static int type_set_write(struct type_set *t, void *fp) +{ + int rc; + __le32 buf[1]; + + if (ebitmap_write(&t->types, fp)) + return -EINVAL; + if (ebitmap_write(&t->negset, fp)) + return -EINVAL; + + buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(t->flags); + rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp); + if (rc) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + static int write_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node *node, void *fp) { @@ -2754,6 +2868,12 @@ static int write_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node *node, rc = ebitmap_write(&e->names, fp); if (rc) return rc; + if (p->policyvers >= + POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) { + rc = type_set_write(e->type_names, fp); + if (rc) + return rc; + } break; default: break; @@ -2832,6 +2952,23 @@ static int class_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr) if (rc) return rc; + if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) { + buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_user); + buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_role); + buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_range); + + rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 3, fp); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) { + buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_type); + rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + return 0; } @@ -3156,9 +3293,8 @@ static int range_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr) static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp) { - size_t nel; __le32 buf[1]; - int rc; + int rc, nel; struct policy_data pd; pd.p = p; @@ -3202,10 +3338,10 @@ static int filename_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr) if (rc) return rc; - buf[0] = ft->stype; - buf[1] = ft->ttype; - buf[2] = ft->tclass; - buf[3] = otype->otype; + buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ft->stype); + buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ft->ttype); + buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(ft->tclass); + buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(otype->otype); rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp); if (rc) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h index b846c038718..725d5945a97 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h @@ -60,6 +60,20 @@ struct class_datum { struct symtab permissions; /* class-specific permission symbol table */ struct constraint_node *constraints; /* constraints on class permissions */ struct constraint_node *validatetrans; /* special transition rules */ +/* Options how a new object user, role, and type should be decided */ +#define DEFAULT_SOURCE 1 +#define DEFAULT_TARGET 2 + char default_user; + char default_role; + char default_type; +/* Options how a new object range should be decided */ +#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW 1 +#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH 2 +#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH 3 +#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW 4 +#define DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH 5 +#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH 6 + char default_range; }; /* Role attributes */ @@ -140,6 +154,17 @@ struct cond_bool_datum { struct cond_node; /* + * type set preserves data needed to determine constraint info from + * policy source. This is not used by the kernel policy but allows + * utilities such as audit2allow to determine constraint denials. + */ +struct type_set { + struct ebitmap types; + struct ebitmap negset; + u32 flags; +}; + +/* * The configuration data includes security contexts for * initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems, TCP and UDP port numbers, * network interfaces, and nodes. This structure stores the diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 185f849a26f..4bca49414a4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ int selinux_policycap_netpeer; int selinux_policycap_openperm; +int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork; static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock); @@ -1018,9 +1019,11 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3 if (context->len) { *scontext_len = context->len; - *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!(*scontext)) - return -ENOMEM; + if (scontext) { + *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!(*scontext)) + return -ENOMEM; + } return 0; } @@ -1229,6 +1232,10 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, struct context context; int rc = 0; + /* An empty security context is never valid. */ + if (!scontext_len) + return -EINVAL; + if (!ss_initialized) { int i; @@ -1282,16 +1289,18 @@ out: * @scontext: security context * @scontext_len: length in bytes * @sid: security identifier, SID + * @gfp: context for the allocation * * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that * has the string representation specified by @scontext. * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient * memory is available, or 0 on success. */ -int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid) +int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, + gfp_t gfp) { return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len, - sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 0); + sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0); } /** @@ -1389,6 +1398,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, u32 *out_sid, bool kern) { + struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL; struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext; struct role_trans *roletr = NULL; struct avtab_key avkey; @@ -1437,12 +1447,20 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, goto out_unlock; } + if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim) + cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; + /* Set the user identity. */ switch (specified) { case AVTAB_TRANSITION: case AVTAB_CHANGE: - /* Use the process user identity. */ - newcontext.user = scontext->user; + if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) { + newcontext.user = tcontext->user; + } else { + /* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */ + /* Use the process user identity. */ + newcontext.user = scontext->user; + } break; case AVTAB_MEMBER: /* Use the related object owner. */ @@ -1450,16 +1468,31 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, break; } - /* Set the role and type to default values. */ - if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) { - /* Use the current role and type of process. */ + /* Set the role to default values. */ + if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) { newcontext.role = scontext->role; - newcontext.type = scontext->type; + } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) { + newcontext.role = tcontext->role; } else { - /* Use the well-defined object role. */ - newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL; - /* Use the type of the related object. */ + if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) + newcontext.role = scontext->role; + else + newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL; + } + + /* Set the type to default values. */ + if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) { + newcontext.type = scontext->type; + } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) { newcontext.type = tcontext->type; + } else { + if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) { + /* Use the type of process. */ + newcontext.type = scontext->type; + } else { + /* Use the type of the related object. */ + newcontext.type = tcontext->type; + } } /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */ @@ -1786,6 +1819,8 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void) POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER); selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM); + selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, + POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK); } static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p); @@ -1802,7 +1837,7 @@ static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p); */ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) { - struct policydb oldpolicydb, newpolicydb; + struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb; struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab; struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL; struct convert_context_args args; @@ -1811,12 +1846,19 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) int rc = 0; struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file; + oldpolicydb = kzalloc(2 * sizeof(*oldpolicydb), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!oldpolicydb) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1; + if (!ss_initialized) { avtab_cache_init(); rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp); if (rc) { avtab_cache_destroy(); - return rc; + goto out; } policydb.len = len; @@ -1826,14 +1868,14 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) if (rc) { policydb_destroy(&policydb); avtab_cache_destroy(); - return rc; + goto out; } rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab); if (rc) { policydb_destroy(&policydb); avtab_cache_destroy(); - return rc; + goto out; } security_load_policycaps(); @@ -1845,36 +1887,36 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno); selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); - return 0; + goto out; } #if 0 sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids"); #endif - rc = policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp); + rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp); if (rc) - return rc; + goto out; - newpolicydb.len = len; + newpolicydb->len = len; /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */ - if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb.mls_enabled) + if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled) printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n"); - else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb.mls_enabled) + else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled) printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n"); - rc = policydb_load_isids(&newpolicydb, &newsidtab); + rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab); if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n"); - policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb); - return rc; + policydb_destroy(newpolicydb); + goto out; } - rc = selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size); + rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size); if (rc) goto err; - rc = security_preserve_bools(&newpolicydb); + rc = security_preserve_bools(newpolicydb); if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n"); goto err; @@ -1892,7 +1934,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) * in the new SID table. */ args.oldp = &policydb; - args.newp = &newpolicydb; + args.newp = newpolicydb; rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args); if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to convert the internal" @@ -1902,12 +1944,12 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) } /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */ - memcpy(&oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb); + memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof(policydb)); sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab); /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */ write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock); - memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb); + memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(policydb)); sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab); security_load_policycaps(); oldmap = current_mapping; @@ -1917,7 +1959,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock); /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */ - policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb); + policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb); sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab); kfree(oldmap); @@ -1927,14 +1969,17 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); - return 0; + rc = 0; + goto out; err: kfree(map); sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab); - policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb); - return rc; + policydb_destroy(newpolicydb); +out: + kfree(oldpolicydb); + return rc; } size_t security_policydb_len(void) @@ -2297,17 +2342,14 @@ out: /** * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem. - * @fstype: filesystem type - * @behavior: labeling behavior - * @sid: SID for filesystem (superblock) + * @sb: superblock in question */ -int security_fs_use( - const char *fstype, - unsigned int *behavior, - u32 *sid) +int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb) { int rc = 0; struct ocontext *c; + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; + const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name; read_lock(&policy_rwlock); @@ -2319,21 +2361,21 @@ int security_fs_use( } if (c) { - *behavior = c->v.behavior; + sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior; if (!c->sid[0]) { rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]); if (rc) goto out; } - *sid = c->sid[0]; + sbsec->sid = c->sid[0]; } else { - rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid); + rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid); if (rc) { - *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE; + sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE; rc = 0; } else { - *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS; + sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS; } } @@ -2414,7 +2456,7 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values) sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), !!values[i], policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state, - audit_get_loginuid(current), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); } if (values[i]) @@ -2912,25 +2954,21 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule; int match = 0; - if (!rule) { - audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, - "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n"); + if (unlikely(!rule)) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n"); return -ENOENT; } read_lock(&policy_rwlock); if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) { - audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, - "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n"); match = -ESTALE; goto out; } ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid); - if (!ctxt) { - audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, - "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n", + if (unlikely(!ctxt)) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n", sid); match = -ENOENT; goto out; @@ -3018,8 +3056,7 @@ out: static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules; -static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained) +static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event) { int err = 0; @@ -3032,8 +3069,7 @@ static int __init aurule_init(void) { int err; - err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, - SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0); + err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET); if (err) panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err); diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index 48665ecd119..98b042630a9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0); /* - * Returns true if an LSM/SELinux context + * Returns true if the context is an LSM/SELinux context. */ static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) { @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) } /* - * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux + * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux. */ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x) { @@ -74,48 +74,112 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x) } /* - * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use - * a xfrm policy rule. + * Allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates it using the supplied security + * xfrm_user_sec_ctx context. */ -int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) +static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, + gfp_t gfp) { int rc; - u32 sel_sid; + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL; + u32 str_len; - /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */ - if (ctx) { - if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx)) - return -EINVAL; - - sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; - } else - /* - * All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an - * otherwise applicable "non-labeled" policy. This - * would prevent inadvertent "leaks". - */ - return 0; + if (ctxp == NULL || uctx == NULL || + uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM || + uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX) + return -EINVAL; + + str_len = uctx->ctx_len; + if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, gfp); + if (!ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + + ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM; + ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX; + ctx->ctx_len = str_len; + memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len); + ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0'; + rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp); + if (rc) + goto err; - rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, - ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, - NULL); + rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, + SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL); + if (rc) + goto err; - if (rc == -EACCES) - return -ESRCH; + *ctxp = ctx; + atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); + return 0; +err: + kfree(ctx); return rc; } /* + * Free the xfrm_sec_ctx structure. + */ +static void selinux_xfrm_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (!ctx) + return; + + atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); + kfree(ctx); +} + +/* + * Authorize the deletion of a labeled SA or policy rule. + */ +static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) +{ + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); + + if (!ctx) + return 0; + + return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, + SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, + NULL); +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use a xfrm policy + * rule. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) +{ + int rc; + + /* All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an otherwise applicable + * "non-labeled" policy. This would prevent inadvertent "leaks". */ + if (!ctx) + return 0; + + /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */ + if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx)) + return -EINVAL; + + rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid, + SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL); + return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc); +} + +/* * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches * the given policy, flow combo. */ - -int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp, - const struct flowi *fl) +int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_policy *xp, + const struct flowi *fl) { u32 state_sid; - int rc; if (!xp->security) if (x->security) @@ -138,186 +202,112 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy * if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid) return 0; - rc = avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, - ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, - NULL)? 0:1; - - /* - * We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check - * since the SA is now of the same label as the flow and - * a flow Vs. policy polmatch check had already happened - * in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. - */ - - return rc; + /* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA + * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch + * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */ + return (avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid, + SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, + NULL) ? 0 : 1); } -/* - * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the - * incoming packet. - */ - -int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall) +static u32 selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(struct sk_buff *skb) { - struct sec_path *sp; + struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb); + struct xfrm_state *x; - *sid = SECSID_NULL; + if (dst == NULL) + return SECSID_NULL; + x = dst->xfrm; + if (x == NULL || !selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) + return SECSID_NULL; - if (skb == NULL) - return 0; + return x->security->ctx_sid; +} + +static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb, + u32 *sid, int ckall) +{ + u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL; + struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp; - sp = skb->sp; if (sp) { - int i, sid_set = 0; + int i; - for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) { + for (i = sp->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) { struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i]; if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) { struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; - if (!sid_set) { - *sid = ctx->ctx_sid; - sid_set = 1; - + if (sid_session == SECSID_NULL) { + sid_session = ctx->ctx_sid; if (!ckall) - break; - } else if (*sid != ctx->ctx_sid) + goto out; + } else if (sid_session != ctx->ctx_sid) { + *sid = SECSID_NULL; return -EINVAL; + } } } } +out: + *sid = sid_session; return 0; } /* - * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state - * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input + * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the + * incoming packet. */ -static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, u32 sid) +int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall) { - int rc = 0; - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); - struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL; - char *ctx_str = NULL; - u32 str_len; - - BUG_ON(uctx && sid); - - if (!uctx) - goto not_from_user; - - if (uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX) - return -EINVAL; - - str_len = uctx->ctx_len; - if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE) - return -ENOMEM; - - *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + - str_len + 1, - GFP_KERNEL); - - if (!ctx) - return -ENOMEM; - - ctx->ctx_doi = uctx->ctx_doi; - ctx->ctx_len = str_len; - ctx->ctx_alg = uctx->ctx_alg; - - memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, - uctx+1, - str_len); - ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = 0; - rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, - str_len, - &ctx->ctx_sid); - - if (rc) - goto out; - - /* - * Does the subject have permission to set security context? - */ - rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, - SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, - ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL); - if (rc) - goto out; - - return rc; - -not_from_user: - rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &ctx_str, &str_len); - if (rc) - goto out; - - *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + - str_len, - GFP_ATOMIC); - - if (!ctx) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto out; + if (skb == NULL) { + *sid = SECSID_NULL; + return 0; } + return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, ckall); +} - ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM; - ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX; - ctx->ctx_sid = sid; - ctx->ctx_len = str_len; - memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, - ctx_str, - str_len); +int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid) +{ + int rc; - goto out2; + rc = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, 0); + if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECSID_NULL) + *sid = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(skb); -out: - *ctxp = NULL; - kfree(ctx); -out2: - kfree(ctx_str); return rc; } /* - * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to - * xfrm_policy. + * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy. */ int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, + gfp_t gfp) { - int err; - - BUG_ON(!uctx); - - err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(ctxp, uctx, 0); - if (err == 0) - atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); - - return err; + return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx, gfp); } - /* - * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to - * new for policy cloning. + * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to new + * for policy cloning. */ int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) { struct xfrm_sec_ctx *new_ctx; - if (old_ctx) { - new_ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!new_ctx) - return -ENOMEM; + if (!old_ctx) + return 0; + + new_ctx = kmemdup(old_ctx, sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len, + GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!new_ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); + *new_ctxp = new_ctx; - memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*new_ctx)); - memcpy(new_ctx->ctx_str, old_ctx->ctx_str, new_ctx->ctx_len); - *new_ctxp = new_ctx; - } return 0; } @@ -326,7 +316,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, */ void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) { - kfree(ctx); + selinux_xfrm_free(ctx); } /* @@ -334,35 +324,58 @@ void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) */ int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); - int rc = 0; - - if (ctx) { - rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, - SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, - ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL); - if (rc == 0) - atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); - } + return selinux_xfrm_delete(ctx); +} - return rc; +/* + * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state, populates it using + * the supplied security context, and assigns it to the xfrm_state. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) +{ + return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx, GFP_KERNEL); } /* - * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to - * xfrm_state. + * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates based + * on a secid. */ -int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, - u32 secid) +int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) { - int err; + int rc; + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx; + char *ctx_str = NULL; + int str_len; + + if (!polsec) + return 0; - BUG_ON(!x); + if (secid == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + rc = security_sid_to_context(secid, &ctx_str, &str_len); + if (rc) + return rc; + + ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!ctx) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM; + ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX; + ctx->ctx_sid = secid; + ctx->ctx_len = str_len; + memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len); - err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, secid); - if (err == 0) - atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); - return err; + x->security = ctx; + atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); +out: + kfree(ctx_str); + return rc; } /* @@ -370,28 +383,15 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uct */ void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) { - struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; - kfree(ctx); + selinux_xfrm_free(x->security); } - /* - * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs. - */ +/* + * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs. + */ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); - struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; - int rc = 0; - - if (ctx) { - rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, - SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, - ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL); - if (rc == 0) - atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); - } - - return rc; + return selinux_xfrm_delete(x->security); } /* @@ -401,14 +401,12 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have * gone thru the IPSec process. */ -int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct common_audit_data *ad) +int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct common_audit_data *ad) { - int i, rc = 0; - struct sec_path *sp; - u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; - - sp = skb->sp; + int i; + struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp; + u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; if (sp) { for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) { @@ -416,23 +414,17 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) { struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; - sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; + peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; break; } } } - /* - * This check even when there's no association involved is - * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a - * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless - * explicitly allowed by policy. - */ - - rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, - ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad); - - return rc; + /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended, + * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in + * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */ + return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, + SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad); } /* @@ -442,49 +434,38 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above. */ -int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto) +int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto) { struct dst_entry *dst; - int rc = 0; - - dst = skb_dst(skb); - - if (dst) { - struct dst_entry *dst_test; - - for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != NULL; - dst_test = dst_test->child) { - struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm; - - if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) - goto out; - } - } switch (proto) { case IPPROTO_AH: case IPPROTO_ESP: case IPPROTO_COMP: - /* - * We should have already seen this packet once before - * it underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the - * unlabeled check. - */ - goto out; + /* We should have already seen this packet once before it + * underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the unlabeled + * check. */ + return 0; default: break; } - /* - * This check even when there's no association involved is - * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a - * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless - * explicitly allowed by policy. - */ + dst = skb_dst(skb); + if (dst) { + struct dst_entry *iter; + + for (iter = dst; iter != NULL; iter = iter->child) { + struct xfrm_state *x = iter->xfrm; - rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, - ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad); -out: - return rc; + if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) + return 0; + } + } + + /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended, + * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in + * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */ + return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, + SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad); } |