1 files changed, 245 insertions, 346 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 675b995a67c..98b042630a9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@
  *   2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines
  *   3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt
  */
-#include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
@@ -39,6 +38,7 @@
 #include <linux/netfilter.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/ip.h>
 #include <linux/tcp.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
@@ -46,15 +46,17 @@
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
 #include <net/checksum.h>
 #include <net/udp.h>
-#include <asm/semaphore.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
 
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
 #include "xfrm.h"
 
+/* Labeled XFRM instance counter */
+atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 
 /*
- * Returns true if an LSM/SELinux context
+ * Returns true if the context is an LSM/SELinux context.
  */
 static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
@@ -64,7 +66,7 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 }
 
 /*
- * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux
+ * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux.
  */
 static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
@@ -72,436 +74,324 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
 }
 
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use
- * a xfrm policy rule.
+ * Allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates it using the supplied security
+ * xfrm_user_sec_ctx context.
  */
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
+static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+				   struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+				   gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	int rc;
-	u32 sel_sid;
-	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+	u32 str_len;
 
-	/* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
-	if ((ctx = xp->security)) {
-		if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
-			return -EINVAL;
+	if (ctxp == NULL || uctx == NULL ||
+	    uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM ||
+	    uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
-		sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
-	}
-	else
-		/*
-		 * All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an
-		 * otherwise applicable "non-labeled" policy. This
-		 * would prevent inadvertent "leaks".
-		 */
-		return 0;
+	str_len = uctx->ctx_len;
+	if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, gfp);
+	if (!ctx)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
+	ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
+	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
+	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len);
+	ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0';
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-			  ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
-			  NULL);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+			  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
 
-	if (rc == -EACCES)
-		rc = -ESRCH;
+	*ctxp = ctx;
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+	return 0;
 
+err:
+	kfree(ctx);
 	return rc;
 }
 
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
- * the given policy, flow combo.
+ * Free the xfrm_sec_ctx structure.
  */
+static void selinux_xfrm_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (!ctx)
+		return;
+
+	atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+	kfree(ctx);
+}
 
-int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
-			struct flowi *fl)
+/*
+ * Authorize the deletion of a labeled SA or policy rule.
+ */
+static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	u32 state_sid;
-	u32 pol_sid;
-	int err;
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
 
-	if (xp->security) {
-		if (!x->security)
-			/* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
-			return 0;
-		else
-			state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
-		pol_sid = xp->security->ctx_sid;
-	} else
-		if (x->security)
-			/* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */
-			return 0;
-		else
-			/* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */
-			return 1;
+	if (!ctx)
+		return 0;
 
-	err = avc_has_perm(state_sid, pol_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-			  ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
-			  NULL);
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT,
+			    NULL);
+}
 
-	if (err)
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use a xfrm policy
+ * rule.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	/* All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an otherwise applicable
+	 * "non-labeled" policy. This would prevent inadvertent "leaks". */
+	if (!ctx)
 		return 0;
 
-	err = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-			  ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
-			  NULL)? 0:1;
+	/* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
+	if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return err;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+			  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL);
+	return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc);
 }
 
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a particular outgoing flow
- * can use a given security association.
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
+ * the given policy, flow combo.
  */
-
-int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm,
-				  struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				      struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+				      const struct flowi *fl)
 {
-	int rc = 0;
-	u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
+	u32 state_sid;
 
 	if (!xp->security)
-		if (!xfrm->security)
-			return 1;
-		else
+		if (x->security)
+			/* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */
 			return 0;
+		else
+			/* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */
+			return 1;
 	else
-		if (!xfrm->security)
-			return 0;
-
-	/* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
-	if ((ctx = xfrm->security)) {
-		if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
+		if (!x->security)
+			/* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
 			return 0;
+		else
+			if (!selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+				/* Not a SELinux-labeled SA */
+				return 0;
 
-		sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
-	}
+	state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-			  ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
-			  NULL)? 0:1;
+	if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid)
+		return 0;
 
-	return rc;
+	/* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA
+	 * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch
+	 * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */
+	return (avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid,
+			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
+			    NULL) ? 0 : 1);
 }
 
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that determines the sid for the session.
- */
-
-int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
+static u32 selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	struct sec_path *sp;
+	struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
+	struct xfrm_state *x;
 
-	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	if (dst == NULL)
+		return SECSID_NULL;
+	x = dst->xfrm;
+	if (x == NULL || !selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+		return SECSID_NULL;
 
-	if (skb == NULL)
-		return 0;
+	return x->security->ctx_sid;
+}
+
+static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					u32 *sid, int ckall)
+{
+	u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL;
+	struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
 
-	sp = skb->sp;
 	if (sp) {
-		int i, sid_set = 0;
+		int i;
 
-		for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
+		for (i = sp->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
 			struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
 			if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
 				struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
 
-				if (!sid_set) {
-					*sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
-					sid_set = 1;
-
+				if (sid_session == SECSID_NULL) {
+					sid_session = ctx->ctx_sid;
 					if (!ckall)
-						break;
-				}
-				else if (*sid != ctx->ctx_sid)
+						goto out;
+				} else if (sid_session != ctx->ctx_sid) {
+					*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 					return -EINVAL;
+				}
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
+out:
+	*sid = sid_session;
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
- * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
- * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
+ * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
+ * incoming packet.
  */
-static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
-	struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 sid)
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
 {
-	int rc = 0;
-	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
-	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
-	char *ctx_str = NULL;
-	u32 str_len;
-	u32 ctx_sid;
-
-	BUG_ON(uctx && pol);
-
-	if (!uctx)
-		goto not_from_user;
-
-	if (uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (uctx->ctx_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	*ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
-			      uctx->ctx_len,
-			      GFP_KERNEL);
-
-	if (!ctx)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	ctx->ctx_doi = uctx->ctx_doi;
-	ctx->ctx_len = uctx->ctx_len;
-	ctx->ctx_alg = uctx->ctx_alg;
-
-	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
-	       uctx+1,
-	       ctx->ctx_len);
-	rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str,
-				     ctx->ctx_len,
-				     &ctx->ctx_sid);
-
-	if (rc)
-		goto out;
-
-	/*
-	 * Does the subject have permission to set security context?
-	 */
-	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
-			  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-			  ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
-	if (rc)
-		goto out;
-
-	return rc;
-
-not_from_user:
-	if (pol) {
-		rc = security_sid_mls_copy(pol->ctx_sid, sid, &ctx_sid);
-		if (rc)
-			goto out;
-	}
-	else
-		ctx_sid = sid;
-
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(ctx_sid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
-	if (rc)
-		goto out;
-
-	*ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
-			      str_len,
-			      GFP_ATOMIC);
-
-	if (!ctx) {
-		rc = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out;
+	if (skb == NULL) {
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+		return 0;
 	}
+	return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, ckall);
+}
 
-	ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
-	ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
-	ctx->ctx_sid = ctx_sid;
-	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
-	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
-	       ctx_str,
-	       str_len);
+int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
 
-	goto out2;
+	rc = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, 0);
+	if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECSID_NULL)
+		*sid = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(skb);
 
-out:
-	*ctxp = NULL;
-	kfree(ctx);
-out2:
-	kfree(ctx_str);
 	return rc;
 }
 
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to
- * xfrm_policy.
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy.
  */
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp,
-		struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, struct sock *sk)
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+			      gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	int err;
-	u32 sid;
-
-	BUG_ON(!xp);
-	BUG_ON(uctx && sk);
-
-	if (sk) {
-		struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
-		sid = ssec->sid;
-	}
-	else
-		sid = SECSID_NULL;
-
-	err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, NULL, sid);
-	return err;
+	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx, gfp);
 }
 
-
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to
- * new for policy cloning.
+ * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to new
+ * for policy cloning.
  */
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new)
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+			      struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
 {
-	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, *new_ctx;
-
-	old_ctx = old->security;
+	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *new_ctx;
 
-	if (old_ctx) {
-		new_ctx = new->security = kmalloc(sizeof(*new_ctx) +
-						  old_ctx->ctx_len,
-						  GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!old_ctx)
+		return 0;
 
-		if (!new_ctx)
-			return -ENOMEM;
+	new_ctx = kmemdup(old_ctx, sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len,
+			  GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!new_ctx)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+	*new_ctxp = new_ctx;
 
-		memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*new_ctx));
-		memcpy(new_ctx->ctx_str, old_ctx->ctx_str, new_ctx->ctx_len);
-	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_policy security information.
+ * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_sec_ctx security information.
  */
-void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
-	if (ctx)
-		kfree(ctx);
+	selinux_xfrm_free(ctx);
 }
 
 /*
  * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled policies.
  */
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
-{
-	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
-	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
-	int rc = 0;
-
-	if (ctx)
-		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
-				  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-				  ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
-
-	return rc;
-}
-
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to
- * xfrm_state.
- */
-int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
-		struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 secid)
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	int err;
-
-	BUG_ON(!x);
-
-	err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, pol, secid);
-	return err;
+	return selinux_xfrm_delete(ctx);
 }
 
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_state security information.
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state, populates it using
+ * the supplied security context, and assigns it to the xfrm_state.
  */
-void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
+			     struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
 {
-	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
-	if (ctx)
-		kfree(ctx);
+	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx, GFP_KERNEL);
 }
 
 /*
- * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a connected
- * (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket based on its security
- * association used to connect to the remote socket.
- *
- * Retrieve via getsockopt SO_PEERSEC.
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates based
+ * on a secid.
  */
-u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				     struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
 {
-	struct dst_entry *dst, *dst_test;
-	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	int rc;
+	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
+	char *ctx_str = NULL;
+	int str_len;
 
-	if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
-		goto out;
+	if (!polsec)
+		return 0;
 
-	dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
-	if (!dst)
-		goto out;
+	if (secid == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
- 	for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
-      	     dst_test = dst_test->child) {
-		struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(secid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
- 		if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
-	 	 	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
-			peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
-			break;
-		}
+	ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!ctx) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
 	}
-	dst_release(dst);
 
+	ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
+	ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
+	ctx->ctx_sid = secid;
+	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
+	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len);
+
+	x->security = ctx;
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
 out:
-	return peer_sid;
+	kfree(ctx_str);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /*
- * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a UDP packet
- * based on its security association used to connect to the remote socket.
- *
- * Retrieve via setsockopt IP_PASSSEC and recvmsg with control message
- * type SCM_SECURITY.
+ * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_state security information.
  */
-u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
+void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
-	struct sec_path *sp;
-
-	if (skb == NULL)
-		return SECSID_NULL;
-
-	if (skb->sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP)
-		return SECSID_NULL;
-
-	sp = skb->sp;
-	if (sp) {
-		int i;
-
-		for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
-			struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
-			if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
-				struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
-				return ctx->ctx_sid;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	return SECSID_NULL;
+	selinux_xfrm_free(x->security);
 }
 
- /*
-  * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
-  */
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
+ */
 int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
-	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
-	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
-	int rc = 0;
-
-	if (ctx)
-		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
-				  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-				  ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
-
-	return rc;
+	return selinux_xfrm_delete(x->security);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -511,14 +401,12 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
  * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
  * gone thru the IPSec process.
  */
-int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-				struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+			      struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
-	int i, rc = 0;
-	struct sec_path *sp;
-	u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-
-	sp = skb->sp;
+	int i;
+	struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
+	u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 
 	if (sp) {
 		for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
@@ -526,16 +414,17 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 			if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
 				struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
-				sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+				peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
 				break;
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-			  ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
-
-	return rc;
+	/* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
+	 * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
+	 * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
+	return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
+			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -543,30 +432,40 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
  * If we have no security association, then we need to determine
  * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination.
  * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
- * checked in xfrm_policy_lookup hook.
+ * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
  */
-int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-					struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 {
 	struct dst_entry *dst;
-	int rc = 0;
 
-	dst = skb->dst;
+	switch (proto) {
+	case IPPROTO_AH:
+	case IPPROTO_ESP:
+	case IPPROTO_COMP:
+		/* We should have already seen this packet once before it
+		 * underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the unlabeled
+		 * check. */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
 
+	dst = skb_dst(skb);
 	if (dst) {
-		struct dst_entry *dst_test;
+		struct dst_entry *iter;
 
-		for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
-		     dst_test = dst_test->child) {
-			struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
+		for (iter = dst; iter != NULL; iter = iter->child) {
+			struct xfrm_state *x = iter->xfrm;
 
 			if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
-				goto out;
+				return 0;
 		}
 	}
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-			  ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
-out:
-	return rc;
+	/* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
+	 * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
+	 * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
+	return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
 }