diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/avc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/avc.c | 525 |
1 files changed, 176 insertions, 349 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index b2ab6085983..a18f1fa6440 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -31,54 +31,14 @@ #include <net/ipv6.h> #include "avc.h" #include "avc_ss.h" - -static const struct av_perm_to_string av_perm_to_string[] = { -#define S_(c, v, s) { c, v, s }, -#include "av_perm_to_string.h" -#undef S_ -}; - -static const char *class_to_string[] = { -#define S_(s) s, -#include "class_to_string.h" -#undef S_ -}; - -#define TB_(s) static const char *s[] = { -#define TE_(s) }; -#define S_(s) s, -#include "common_perm_to_string.h" -#undef TB_ -#undef TE_ -#undef S_ - -static const struct av_inherit av_inherit[] = { -#define S_(c, i, b) { .tclass = c,\ - .common_pts = common_##i##_perm_to_string,\ - .common_base = b }, -#include "av_inherit.h" -#undef S_ -}; - -const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm = { - .av_perm_to_string = av_perm_to_string, - .av_pts_len = ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string), - .class_to_string = class_to_string, - .cts_len = ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string), - .av_inherit = av_inherit, - .av_inherit_len = ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit) -}; +#include "classmap.h" #define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS 512 #define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD 512 #define AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM 16 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS -#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) \ -do { \ - per_cpu(avc_cache_stats, get_cpu()).field++; \ - put_cpu(); \ -} while (0) +#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) this_cpu_inc(avc_cache_stats.field) #else #define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) do {} while (0) #endif @@ -105,14 +65,8 @@ struct avc_cache { }; struct avc_callback_node { - int (*callback) (u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 perms, - u32 *out_retained); + int (*callback) (u32 event); u32 events; - u32 ssid; - u32 tsid; - u16 tclass; - u32 perms; struct avc_callback_node *next; }; @@ -137,54 +91,30 @@ static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) * @tclass: target security class * @av: access vector */ -void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av) +static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av) { - const char **common_pts = NULL; - u32 common_base = 0; - int i, i2, perm; + const char **perms; + int i, perm; if (av == 0) { audit_log_format(ab, " null"); return; } - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit); i++) { - if (av_inherit[i].tclass == tclass) { - common_pts = av_inherit[i].common_pts; - common_base = av_inherit[i].common_base; - break; - } - } + perms = secclass_map[tclass-1].perms; audit_log_format(ab, " {"); i = 0; perm = 1; - while (perm < common_base) { - if (perm & av) { - audit_log_format(ab, " %s", common_pts[i]); + while (i < (sizeof(av) * 8)) { + if ((perm & av) && perms[i]) { + audit_log_format(ab, " %s", perms[i]); av &= ~perm; } i++; perm <<= 1; } - while (i < sizeof(av) * 8) { - if (perm & av) { - for (i2 = 0; i2 < ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string); i2++) { - if ((av_perm_to_string[i2].tclass == tclass) && - (av_perm_to_string[i2].value == perm)) - break; - } - if (i2 < ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string)) { - audit_log_format(ab, " %s", - av_perm_to_string[i2].name); - av &= ~perm; - } - } - i++; - perm <<= 1; - } - if (av) audit_log_format(ab, " 0x%x", av); @@ -219,8 +149,8 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla kfree(scontext); } - BUG_ON(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string) || !class_to_string[tclass]); - audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", class_to_string[tclass]); + BUG_ON(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map)); + audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[tclass-1].name); } /** @@ -258,11 +188,9 @@ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page) for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) { head = &avc_cache.slots[i]; if (!hlist_empty(head)) { - struct hlist_node *next; - slots_used++; chain_len = 0; - hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list) + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list) chain_len++; if (chain_len > max_chain_len) max_chain_len = chain_len; @@ -311,7 +239,6 @@ static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void) int hvalue, try, ecx; unsigned long flags; struct hlist_head *head; - struct hlist_node *next; spinlock_t *lock; for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) { @@ -323,7 +250,7 @@ static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void) continue; rcu_read_lock(); - hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list) { + hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list) { avc_node_delete(node); avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims); ecx++; @@ -344,11 +271,10 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void) { struct avc_node *node; - node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC); + node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC); if (!node) goto out; - INIT_RCU_HEAD(&node->rhead); INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list); avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations); @@ -372,11 +298,10 @@ static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL; int hvalue; struct hlist_head *head; - struct hlist_node *next; hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass); head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue]; - hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list) { + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list) { if (ssid == node->ae.ssid && tclass == node->ae.tclass && tsid == node->ae.tsid) { @@ -397,7 +322,7 @@ static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) * Look up an AVC entry that is valid for the * (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions * based on @tclass. If a valid AVC entry exists, - * then this function return the avc_node. + * then this function returns the avc_node. * Otherwise, this function returns NULL. */ static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) @@ -408,11 +333,10 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass); if (node) - avc_cache_stats_incr(hits); - else - avc_cache_stats_incr(misses); + return node; - return node; + avc_cache_stats_incr(misses); + return NULL; } static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert) @@ -466,7 +390,6 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_dec node = avc_alloc_node(); if (node) { struct hlist_head *head; - struct hlist_node *next; spinlock_t *lock; hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass); @@ -476,7 +399,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_dec lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue]; spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag); - hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) { + hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) { if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid && pos->ae.tsid == tsid && pos->ae.tclass == tclass) { @@ -492,230 +415,95 @@ out: return node; } -static inline void avc_print_ipv6_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, - struct in6_addr *addr, __be16 port, - char *name1, char *name2) -{ - if (!ipv6_addr_any(addr)) - audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI6", name1, addr); - if (port) - audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port)); -} - -static inline void avc_print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr, - __be16 port, char *name1, char *name2) +/** + * avc_audit_pre_callback - SELinux specific information + * will be called by generic audit code + * @ab: the audit buffer + * @a: audit_data + */ +static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) { - if (addr) - audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI4", name1, &addr); - if (port) - audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port)); + struct common_audit_data *ad = a; + audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ", + ad->selinux_audit_data->denied ? "denied" : "granted"); + avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass, + ad->selinux_audit_data->audited); + audit_log_format(ab, " for "); } /** - * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions. - * @ssid: source security identifier - * @tsid: target security identifier - * @tclass: target security class - * @requested: requested permissions - * @avd: access vector decisions - * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit - * @a: auxiliary audit data - * - * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance - * with the policy. This function is typically called by - * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be - * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit() - * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing. - * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must - * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released - * before calling the auditing code. + * avc_audit_post_callback - SELinux specific information + * will be called by generic audit code + * @ab: the audit buffer + * @a: audit_data */ -void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *a) +static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) { - struct task_struct *tsk = current; - struct inode *inode = NULL; - u32 denied, audited; - struct audit_buffer *ab; - - denied = requested & ~avd->allowed; - if (denied) { - audited = denied; - if (!(audited & avd->auditdeny)) - return; - } else if (result) { - audited = denied = requested; - } else { - audited = requested; - if (!(audited & avd->auditallow)) - return; + struct common_audit_data *ad = a; + audit_log_format(ab, " "); + avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid, + ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid, + ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass); + if (ad->selinux_audit_data->denied) { + audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u", + ad->selinux_audit_data->result ? 0 : 1); } +} - ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_AVC); - if (!ab) - return; /* audit_panic has been called */ - audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ", denied ? "denied" : "granted"); - avc_dump_av(ab, tclass, audited); - audit_log_format(ab, " for "); - if (a && a->tsk) - tsk = a->tsk; - if (tsk && tsk->pid) { - audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm); - } - if (a) { - switch (a->type) { - case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_IPC: - audit_log_format(ab, " key=%d", a->u.ipc_id); - break; - case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_CAP: - audit_log_format(ab, " capability=%d", a->u.cap); - break; - case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS: - if (a->u.fs.path.dentry) { - struct dentry *dentry = a->u.fs.path.dentry; - if (a->u.fs.path.mnt) { - audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", - &a->u.fs.path); - } else { - audit_log_format(ab, " name="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name); - } - inode = dentry->d_inode; - } else if (a->u.fs.inode) { - struct dentry *dentry; - inode = a->u.fs.inode; - dentry = d_find_alias(inode); - if (dentry) { - audit_log_format(ab, " name="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name); - dput(dentry); - } - } - if (inode) - audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu", - inode->i_sb->s_id, - inode->i_ino); - break; - case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET: - if (a->u.net.sk) { - struct sock *sk = a->u.net.sk; - struct unix_sock *u; - int len = 0; - char *p = NULL; - - switch (sk->sk_family) { - case AF_INET: { - struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); - - avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->rcv_saddr, - inet->sport, - "laddr", "lport"); - avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->daddr, - inet->dport, - "faddr", "fport"); - break; - } - case AF_INET6: { - struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); - struct ipv6_pinfo *inet6 = inet6_sk(sk); - - avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->rcv_saddr, - inet->sport, - "laddr", "lport"); - avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->daddr, - inet->dport, - "faddr", "fport"); - break; - } - case AF_UNIX: - u = unix_sk(sk); - if (u->dentry) { - struct path path = { - .dentry = u->dentry, - .mnt = u->mnt - }; - audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", - &path); - break; - } - if (!u->addr) - break; - len = u->addr->len-sizeof(short); - p = &u->addr->name->sun_path[0]; - audit_log_format(ab, " path="); - if (*p) - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p); - else - audit_log_n_hex(ab, p, len); - break; - } - } +/* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */ +noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, + u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result, + struct common_audit_data *a, + unsigned flags) +{ + struct common_audit_data stack_data; + struct selinux_audit_data sad; - switch (a->u.net.family) { - case AF_INET: - avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.saddr, - a->u.net.sport, - "saddr", "src"); - avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.daddr, - a->u.net.dport, - "daddr", "dest"); - break; - case AF_INET6: - avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.saddr, - a->u.net.sport, - "saddr", "src"); - avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.daddr, - a->u.net.dport, - "daddr", "dest"); - break; - } - if (a->u.net.netif > 0) { - struct net_device *dev; - - /* NOTE: we always use init's namespace */ - dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, - a->u.net.netif); - if (dev) { - audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s", - dev->name); - dev_put(dev); - } - } - break; - } + if (!a) { + a = &stack_data; + a->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; } - audit_log_format(ab, " "); - avc_dump_query(ab, ssid, tsid, tclass); - audit_log_end(ab); + + /* + * When in a RCU walk do the audit on the RCU retry. This is because + * the collection of the dname in an inode audit message is not RCU + * safe. Note this may drop some audits when the situation changes + * during retry. However this is logically just as if the operation + * happened a little later. + */ + if ((a->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE) && + (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK)) + return -ECHILD; + + sad.tclass = tclass; + sad.requested = requested; + sad.ssid = ssid; + sad.tsid = tsid; + sad.audited = audited; + sad.denied = denied; + sad.result = result; + + a->selinux_audit_data = &sad; + + common_lsm_audit(a, avc_audit_pre_callback, avc_audit_post_callback); + return 0; } /** * avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events. * @callback: callback function * @events: security events - * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD - * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD - * @tclass: target security class - * @perms: permissions * - * Register a callback function for events in the set @events - * related to the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) and - * and the permissions @perms, interpreting - * @perms based on @tclass. Returns %0 on success or - * -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory exists to add the callback. + * Register a callback function for events in the set @events. + * Returns %0 on success or -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory + * exists to add the callback. */ -int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 perms, - u32 *out_retained), - u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 perms) +int __init avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events) { struct avc_callback_node *c; int rc = 0; - c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_ATOMIC); + c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL); if (!c) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; @@ -723,9 +511,6 @@ int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, c->callback = callback; c->events = events; - c->ssid = ssid; - c->tsid = tsid; - c->perms = perms; c->next = avc_callbacks; avc_callbacks = c; out: @@ -746,7 +531,7 @@ static inline int avc_sidcmp(u32 x, u32 y) * * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT. * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM. - * otherwise, this function update the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object + * otherwise, this function updates the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object * will release later by RCU. */ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, @@ -756,7 +541,6 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, unsigned long flag; struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL; struct hlist_head *head; - struct hlist_node *next; spinlock_t *lock; node = avc_alloc_node(); @@ -773,7 +557,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag); - hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) { + hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) { if (ssid == pos->ae.ssid && tsid == pos->ae.tsid && tclass == pos->ae.tclass && @@ -824,18 +608,15 @@ out: } /** - * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions. - * @seqno: policy sequence number + * avc_flush - Flush the cache */ -int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno) +static void avc_flush(void) { - struct avc_callback_node *c; - int i, rc = 0, tmprc; - unsigned long flag; - struct avc_node *node; struct hlist_head *head; - struct hlist_node *next; + struct avc_node *node; spinlock_t *lock; + unsigned long flag; + int i; for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) { head = &avc_cache.slots[i]; @@ -847,16 +628,27 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno) * prevent RCU grace periods from ending. */ rcu_read_lock(); - hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list) + hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list) avc_node_delete(node); rcu_read_unlock(); spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag); } +} + +/** + * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions. + * @seqno: policy sequence number + */ +int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno) +{ + struct avc_callback_node *c; + int rc = 0, tmprc; + + avc_flush(); for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) { if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { - tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, - 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL); + tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET); /* save the first error encountered for the return value and continue processing the callbacks */ if (!rc) @@ -868,6 +660,41 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno) return rc; } +/* + * Slow-path helper function for avc_has_perm_noaudit, + * when the avc_node lookup fails. We get called with + * the RCU read lock held, and need to return with it + * still held, but drop if for the security compute. + * + * Don't inline this, since it's the slow-path and just + * results in a bigger stack frame. + */ +static noinline struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd) +{ + rcu_read_unlock(); + security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd); + rcu_read_lock(); + return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd); +} + +static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, u32 requested, + unsigned flags, + struct av_decision *avd) +{ + if (flags & AVC_STRICT) + return -EACCES; + + if (selinux_enforcing && !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE)) + return -EACCES; + + avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid, + tsid, tclass, avd->seqno); + return 0; +} + + /** * avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing. * @ssid: source security identifier @@ -888,13 +715,12 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno) * auditing, e.g. in cases where a lock must be held for the check but * should be released for the auditing. */ -int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, +inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, unsigned flags, - struct av_decision *in_avd) + struct av_decision *avd) { struct avc_node *node; - struct av_decision avd_entry, *avd; int rc = 0; u32 denied; @@ -903,39 +729,18 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, rcu_read_lock(); node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass); - if (!node) { - rcu_read_unlock(); - - if (in_avd) - avd = in_avd; - else - avd = &avd_entry; - - rc = security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd); - if (rc) - goto out; - rcu_read_lock(); - node = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd); + if (unlikely(!node)) { + node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd); } else { - if (in_avd) - memcpy(in_avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*in_avd)); + memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd)); avd = &node->ae.avd; } denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed); - - if (denied) { - if (flags & AVC_STRICT) - rc = -EACCES; - else if (!selinux_enforcing || (avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE)) - avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid, - tsid, tclass, avd->seqno); - else - rc = -EACCES; - } + if (unlikely(denied)) + rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, flags, avd); rcu_read_unlock(); -out: return rc; } @@ -956,13 +761,16 @@ out: * another -errno upon other errors. */ int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, - u32 requested, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata) + u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata) { struct av_decision avd; - int rc; + int rc, rc2; rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd); - avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata); + + rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata); + if (rc2) + return rc2; return rc; } @@ -970,3 +778,22 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void) { return avc_cache.latest_notif; } + +void avc_disable(void) +{ + /* + * If you are looking at this because you have realized that we are + * not destroying the avc_node_cachep it might be easy to fix, but + * I don't know the memory barrier semantics well enough to know. It's + * possible that some other task dereferenced security_ops when + * it still pointed to selinux operations. If that is the case it's + * possible that it is about to use the avc and is about to need the + * avc_node_cachep. I know I could wrap the security.c security_ops call + * in an rcu_lock, but seriously, it's not worth it. Instead I just flush + * the cache and get that memory back. + */ + if (avc_node_cachep) { + avc_flush(); + /* kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep); */ + } +} |
