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Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/avc.c')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c170
1 files changed, 43 insertions, 127 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 1a70fa26da7..a18f1fa6440 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -65,14 +65,8 @@ struct avc_cache {
};
struct avc_callback_node {
- int (*callback) (u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 perms,
- u32 *out_retained);
+ int (*callback) (u32 event);
u32 events;
- u32 ssid;
- u32 tsid;
- u16 tclass;
- u32 perms;
struct avc_callback_node *next;
};
@@ -194,11 +188,9 @@ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
if (!hlist_empty(head)) {
- struct hlist_node *next;
-
slots_used++;
chain_len = 0;
- hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list)
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list)
chain_len++;
if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
max_chain_len = chain_len;
@@ -247,7 +239,6 @@ static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void)
int hvalue, try, ecx;
unsigned long flags;
struct hlist_head *head;
- struct hlist_node *next;
spinlock_t *lock;
for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) {
@@ -259,7 +250,7 @@ static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void)
continue;
rcu_read_lock();
- hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list) {
avc_node_delete(node);
avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
ecx++;
@@ -280,7 +271,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
{
struct avc_node *node;
- node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
if (!node)
goto out;
@@ -307,11 +298,10 @@ static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL;
int hvalue;
struct hlist_head *head;
- struct hlist_node *next;
hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
- hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list) {
if (ssid == node->ae.ssid &&
tclass == node->ae.tclass &&
tsid == node->ae.tsid) {
@@ -400,7 +390,6 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_dec
node = avc_alloc_node();
if (node) {
struct hlist_head *head;
- struct hlist_node *next;
spinlock_t *lock;
hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
@@ -410,7 +399,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_dec
lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
- hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) {
if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
@@ -436,9 +425,9 @@ static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
{
struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ",
- ad->selinux_audit_data.denied ? "denied" : "granted");
- avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass,
- ad->selinux_audit_data.audited);
+ ad->selinux_audit_data->denied ? "denied" : "granted");
+ avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass,
+ ad->selinux_audit_data->audited);
audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
}
@@ -452,22 +441,27 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
{
struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
audit_log_format(ab, " ");
- avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.ssid,
- ad->selinux_audit_data.tsid,
- ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass);
+ avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid,
+ ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid,
+ ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass);
+ if (ad->selinux_audit_data->denied) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u",
+ ad->selinux_audit_data->result ? 0 : 1);
+ }
}
/* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */
-static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
- u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied,
- struct av_decision *avd, struct common_audit_data *a,
+noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
+ struct common_audit_data *a,
unsigned flags)
{
struct common_audit_data stack_data;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad;
if (!a) {
a = &stack_data;
- COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE);
+ a->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
}
/*
@@ -481,104 +475,35 @@ static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
(flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK))
return -ECHILD;
- a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
- a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
- a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid;
- a->selinux_audit_data.tsid = tsid;
- a->selinux_audit_data.audited = audited;
- a->selinux_audit_data.denied = denied;
- a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback;
- a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback;
- common_lsm_audit(a);
- return 0;
-}
+ sad.tclass = tclass;
+ sad.requested = requested;
+ sad.ssid = ssid;
+ sad.tsid = tsid;
+ sad.audited = audited;
+ sad.denied = denied;
+ sad.result = result;
-/**
- * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
- * @ssid: source security identifier
- * @tsid: target security identifier
- * @tclass: target security class
- * @requested: requested permissions
- * @avd: access vector decisions
- * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
- * @a: auxiliary audit data
- * @flags: VFS walk flags
- *
- * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
- * with the policy. This function is typically called by
- * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be
- * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit()
- * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing.
- * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must
- * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
- * before calling the auditing code.
- */
-inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a,
- unsigned flags)
-{
- u32 denied, audited;
- denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
- if (unlikely(denied)) {
- audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
- /*
- * a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in
- * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if
- * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that
- * permission. Take notice that this is unrelated to the
- * actual permissions that were denied. As an example lets
- * assume:
- *
- * denied == READ
- * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule)
- * selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
- *
- * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied
- * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for
- * ACCESS
- */
- if (a &&
- a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny &&
- !(a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
- audited = 0;
- } else if (result)
- audited = denied = requested;
- else
- audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
- if (likely(!audited))
- return 0;
-
- return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
- requested, audited, denied,
- avd, a, flags);
+ a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+
+ common_lsm_audit(a, avc_audit_pre_callback, avc_audit_post_callback);
+ return 0;
}
/**
* avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events.
* @callback: callback function
* @events: security events
- * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD
- * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD
- * @tclass: target security class
- * @perms: permissions
*
- * Register a callback function for events in the set @events
- * related to the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid)
- * and the permissions @perms, interpreting
- * @perms based on @tclass. Returns %0 on success or
- * -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory exists to add the callback.
+ * Register a callback function for events in the set @events.
+ * Returns %0 on success or -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory
+ * exists to add the callback.
*/
-int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 perms,
- u32 *out_retained),
- u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 perms)
+int __init avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events)
{
struct avc_callback_node *c;
int rc = 0;
- c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!c) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
@@ -586,9 +511,6 @@ int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
c->callback = callback;
c->events = events;
- c->ssid = ssid;
- c->tsid = tsid;
- c->perms = perms;
c->next = avc_callbacks;
avc_callbacks = c;
out:
@@ -619,7 +541,6 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
unsigned long flag;
struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL;
struct hlist_head *head;
- struct hlist_node *next;
spinlock_t *lock;
node = avc_alloc_node();
@@ -636,7 +557,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
- hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) {
if (ssid == pos->ae.ssid &&
tsid == pos->ae.tsid &&
tclass == pos->ae.tclass &&
@@ -692,7 +613,6 @@ out:
static void avc_flush(void)
{
struct hlist_head *head;
- struct hlist_node *next;
struct avc_node *node;
spinlock_t *lock;
unsigned long flag;
@@ -708,7 +628,7 @@ static void avc_flush(void)
* prevent RCU grace periods from ending.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
- hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list)
+ hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list)
avc_node_delete(node);
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
@@ -728,8 +648,7 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
- tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
- 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+ tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
/* save the first error encountered for the return
value and continue processing the callbacks */
if (!rc)
@@ -832,7 +751,6 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
* @tclass: target security class
* @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
* @auditdata: auxiliary audit data
- * @flags: VFS walk flags
*
* Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
* for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
@@ -842,17 +760,15 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
* permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
* another -errno upon other errors.
*/
-int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
- u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
- unsigned flags)
+int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
{
struct av_decision avd;
int rc, rc2;
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
- rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata,
- flags);
+ rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata);
if (rc2)
return rc2;
return rc;