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Diffstat (limited to 'security/keys/keyctl.c')
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c153
1 files changed, 85 insertions, 68 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 0f5b3f02729..cd5bd0cef25 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -46,6 +47,9 @@ static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type,
* Extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a
* new key to the specified keyring or update a matching key in that keyring.
*
+ * If the description is NULL or an empty string, the key type is asked to
+ * generate one from the payload.
+ *
* The keyring must be writable so that we can attach the key to it.
*
* If successful, the new key's serial number is returned, otherwise an error
@@ -72,10 +76,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
- if (IS_ERR(description)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(description);
- goto error;
+ description = NULL;
+ if (_description) {
+ description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (IS_ERR(description)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(description);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (!*description) {
+ kfree(description);
+ description = NULL;
+ }
}
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
@@ -100,7 +111,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
}
/* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error3;
@@ -184,7 +195,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
dest_ref = NULL;
if (destringid) {
dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
- KEY_WRITE);
+ KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
goto error3;
@@ -242,7 +253,7 @@ long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
long ret;
lflags = create ? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE : 0;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_SEARCH);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
@@ -323,7 +334,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
}
/* find the target key (which must be writable) */
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error2;
@@ -354,12 +365,12 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
key_ref_t key_ref;
long ret;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
if (ret != -EACCES)
goto error;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SETATTR);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
@@ -390,7 +401,7 @@ long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
kenter("%d", id);
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
@@ -417,7 +428,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
key_ref_t keyring_ref;
long ret;
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
@@ -459,13 +470,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
long ret;
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error;
}
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_LINK);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_LINK);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error2;
@@ -494,7 +505,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
long ret;
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error;
@@ -537,7 +548,7 @@ long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
char *tmpbuf;
long ret;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
/* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
* authorisation token handy */
@@ -569,8 +580,8 @@ okay:
ret = snprintf(tmpbuf, PAGE_SIZE - 1,
"%s;%d;%d;%08x;%s",
key->type->name,
- key->uid,
- key->gid,
+ from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), key->uid),
+ from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), key->gid),
key->perm,
key->description ?: "");
@@ -628,7 +639,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
}
/* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error2;
@@ -638,7 +649,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
dest_ref = NULL;
if (destringid) {
dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
- KEY_WRITE);
+ KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
goto error3;
@@ -665,7 +676,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
/* link the resulting key to the destination keyring if we can */
if (dest_ref) {
- ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_LINK);
+ ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_LINK);
if (ret < 0)
goto error6;
@@ -716,7 +727,7 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
/* see if we can read it directly */
- ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_READ);
+ ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ);
if (ret == 0)
goto can_read_key;
if (ret != -EACCES)
@@ -766,19 +777,29 @@ error:
*
* If successful, 0 will be returned.
*/
-long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
{
struct key_user *newowner, *zapowner = NULL;
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
long ret;
+ kuid_t uid;
+ kgid_t gid;
+
+ uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), user);
+ gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), group);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if ((user != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid))
+ goto error;
+ if ((group != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid))
+ goto error;
ret = 0;
- if (uid == (uid_t) -1 && gid == (gid_t) -1)
+ if (user == (uid_t) -1 && group == (gid_t) -1)
goto error;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
- KEY_SETATTR);
+ KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
@@ -792,27 +813,27 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
- if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && key->uid != uid)
+ if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(key->uid, uid))
goto error_put;
/* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
* than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
- if (gid != (gid_t) -1 && gid != key->gid && !in_group_p(gid))
+ if (group != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(gid, key->gid) && !in_group_p(gid))
goto error_put;
}
/* change the UID */
- if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && uid != key->uid) {
+ if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(uid, key->uid)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
- newowner = key_user_lookup(uid, current_user_ns());
+ newowner = key_user_lookup(uid);
if (!newowner)
goto error_put;
/* transfer the quota burden to the new user */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
- unsigned maxkeys = (uid == 0) ?
+ unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
- unsigned maxbytes = (uid == 0) ?
+ unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
spin_lock(&newowner->lock);
@@ -846,7 +867,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
}
/* change the GID */
- if (gid != (gid_t) -1)
+ if (group != (gid_t) -1)
key->gid = gid;
ret = 0;
@@ -884,7 +905,7 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
goto error;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
- KEY_SETATTR);
+ KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
@@ -897,7 +918,7 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
down_write(&key->sem);
/* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
- if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current_fsuid()) {
+ if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid())) {
key->perm = perm;
ret = 0;
}
@@ -926,7 +947,7 @@ static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid,
/* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
if (ringid > 0) {
- dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+ dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(dkref))
return PTR_ERR(dkref);
*_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref);
@@ -1106,18 +1127,18 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id,
struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
long ret;
- if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0)
+ if (!_payload_iov || !ioc)
goto no_payload;
ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov);
if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ goto err;
if (ret == 0)
goto no_payload_free;
ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, ioc, ret, ringid);
-
+err:
if (iov != iovstack)
kfree(iov);
return ret;
@@ -1294,7 +1315,7 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
long ret;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
- KEY_SETATTR);
+ KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
/* setting the timeout on a key under construction is permitted
* if we have the authorisation token handy */
@@ -1397,7 +1418,7 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
char *context;
long ret;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
@@ -1456,29 +1477,28 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
{
struct task_struct *me, *parent;
const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
- struct task_work *newwork, *oldwork;
+ struct callback_head *newwork, *oldwork;
key_ref_t keyring_r;
struct cred *cred;
int ret;
- keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK);
+ keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_NEED_LINK);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
ret = -ENOMEM;
- newwork = kmalloc(sizeof(struct task_work), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!newwork)
- goto error_keyring;
/* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
* and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
* our parent */
cred = cred_alloc_blank();
if (!cred)
- goto error_newwork;
+ goto error_keyring;
+ newwork = &cred->rcu;
- cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
- init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring, cred);
+ cred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
+ keyring_r = NULL;
+ init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring);
me = current;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -1501,25 +1521,25 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
mycred = current_cred();
pcred = __task_cred(parent);
if (mycred == pcred ||
- mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring) {
+ mycred->session_keyring == pcred->session_keyring) {
ret = 0;
goto unlock;
}
/* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
* SUID/SGID */
- if (pcred->uid != mycred->euid ||
- pcred->euid != mycred->euid ||
- pcred->suid != mycred->euid ||
- pcred->gid != mycred->egid ||
- pcred->egid != mycred->egid ||
- pcred->sgid != mycred->egid)
+ if (!uid_eq(pcred->uid, mycred->euid) ||
+ !uid_eq(pcred->euid, mycred->euid) ||
+ !uid_eq(pcred->suid, mycred->euid) ||
+ !gid_eq(pcred->gid, mycred->egid) ||
+ !gid_eq(pcred->egid, mycred->egid) ||
+ !gid_eq(pcred->sgid, mycred->egid))
goto unlock;
/* the keyrings must have the same UID */
- if ((pcred->tgcred->session_keyring &&
- pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) ||
- mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid)
+ if ((pcred->session_keyring &&
+ !uid_eq(pcred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid)) ||
+ !uid_eq(mycred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid))
goto unlock;
/* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */
@@ -1533,18 +1553,12 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
unlock:
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
- if (oldwork) {
- put_cred(oldwork->data);
- kfree(oldwork);
- }
- if (newwork) {
- put_cred(newwork->data);
- kfree(newwork);
- }
+ if (oldwork)
+ put_cred(container_of(oldwork, struct cred, rcu));
+ if (newwork)
+ put_cred(cred);
return ret;
-error_newwork:
- kfree(newwork);
error_keyring:
key_ref_put(keyring_r);
return ret;
@@ -1653,6 +1667,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE:
return keyctl_invalidate_key((key_serial_t) arg2);
+ case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT:
+ return keyctl_get_persistent((uid_t)arg2, (key_serial_t)arg3);
+
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}