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-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c483
1 files changed, 216 insertions, 267 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index a89f44d5e03..09baa335ebc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -14,315 +14,233 @@
*
* File: ima_main.c
* implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
- * and ima_path_check.
+ * and ima_file_check.
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include "ima.h"
int ima_initialized;
-char *ima_hash = "sha1";
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
+int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
+#else
+int ima_appraise;
+#endif
+
+int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+static int hash_setup_done;
+
static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
{
- if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
- ima_hash = "md5";
- return 1;
-}
-__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
+ struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
+ int i;
-struct ima_imbalance {
- struct hlist_node node;
- unsigned long fsmagic;
-};
+ if (hash_setup_done)
+ return 1;
-/*
- * ima_limit_imbalance - emit one imbalance message per filesystem type
- *
- * Maintain list of filesystem types that do not measure files properly.
- * Return false if unknown, true if known.
- */
-static bool ima_limit_imbalance(struct file *file)
-{
- static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ima_imbalance_lock);
- static HLIST_HEAD(ima_imbalance_list);
-
- struct super_block *sb = file->f_dentry->d_sb;
- struct ima_imbalance *entry;
- struct hlist_node *node;
- bool found = false;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, node, &ima_imbalance_list, node) {
- if (entry->fsmagic == sb->s_magic) {
- found = true;
+ if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
+ if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0)
+ ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+ else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
+ ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(str, hash_algo_name[i]) == 0) {
+ ima_hash_algo = i;
break;
}
}
- rcu_read_unlock();
- if (found)
- goto out;
-
- entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_NOFS);
- if (!entry)
- goto out;
- entry->fsmagic = sb->s_magic;
- spin_lock(&ima_imbalance_lock);
- /*
- * we could have raced and something else might have added this fs
- * to the list, but we don't really care
- */
- hlist_add_head_rcu(&entry->node, &ima_imbalance_list);
- spin_unlock(&ima_imbalance_lock);
- printk(KERN_INFO "IMA: unmeasured files on fsmagic: %lX\n",
- entry->fsmagic);
out:
- return found;
+ hash_setup_done = 1;
+ return 1;
}
+__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
/*
- * Update the counts given an fmode_t
+ * ima_rdwr_violation_check
+ *
+ * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
+ * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
+ * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
+ * - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
+ * could result in a file measurement error.
+ *
*/
-static void ima_inc_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, fmode_t mode)
+static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
{
- BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&iint->mutex));
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
+ bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
+ char *pathbuf = NULL;
+ const char *pathname;
- iint->opencount++;
- if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
- iint->readcount++;
- if (mode & FMODE_WRITE)
- iint->writecount++;
-}
+ if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized)
+ return;
-/*
- * Decrement ima counts
- */
-static void ima_dec_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
- struct file *file)
-{
- mode_t mode = file->f_mode;
- BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&iint->mutex));
+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); /* file metadata: permissions, xattr */
- iint->opencount--;
- if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
- iint->readcount--;
if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
- iint->writecount--;
- if (iint->writecount == 0) {
- if (iint->version != inode->i_version)
- iint->flags &= ~IMA_MEASURED;
+ if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) {
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+ /* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */
+ if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
+ send_tomtou = true;
}
+ } else {
+ if ((atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) &&
+ ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK))
+ send_writers = true;
}
- if (((iint->opencount < 0) ||
- (iint->readcount < 0) ||
- (iint->writecount < 0)) &&
- !ima_limit_imbalance(file)) {
- printk(KERN_INFO "%s: open/free imbalance (r:%ld w:%ld o:%ld)\n",
- __FUNCTION__, iint->readcount, iint->writecount,
- iint->opencount);
- dump_stack();
+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+
+ if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
+ return;
+
+ pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
+
+ if (send_tomtou)
+ ima_add_violation(file, pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
+ if (send_writers)
+ ima_add_violation(file, pathname,
+ "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
+ kfree(pathbuf);
+}
+
+static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
+
+ if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
+ return;
+
+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
+ iint->version != inode->i_version) {
+ iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
+ ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
}
+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
}
/**
* ima_file_free - called on __fput()
* @file: pointer to file structure being freed
*
- * Flag files that changed, based on i_version;
- * and decrement the iint readcount/writecount.
+ * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
*/
void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
{
- struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
- struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
- if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return;
- iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
+
+ iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
if (!iint)
return;
- mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
- ima_dec_counts(iint, inode, file);
- mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
- kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
+ ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
}
-/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR.
- *
- * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write,
- * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error.
- *
- * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results
- * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
- *
- * In either case invalidate the PCR.
- */
-enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS };
-static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error,
- struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
- struct inode *inode,
- const unsigned char *filename)
-{
- switch (error) {
- case TOMTOU:
- if (iint->readcount > 0)
- ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
- "ToMToU");
- break;
- case OPEN_WRITERS:
- if (iint->writecount > 0)
- ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
- "open_writers");
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
- const unsigned char *filename)
-{
- int rc = 0;
-
- ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode);
-
- rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
- if (!rc)
- ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename);
- return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
- * @path: contains a pointer to the path to be measured
- * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
- *
- * Measure the file being open for readonly, based on the
- * ima_must_measure() policy decision.
- *
- * Keep read/write counters for all files, but only
- * invalidate the PCR for measured files:
- * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
- * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
- * - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
- * could result in a file measurement error.
- *
- * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
- * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
- */
-int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
+static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
+ int mask, int function)
{
- struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
- struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
- struct file *file = NULL;
- int rc;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
+ char *pathbuf = NULL;
+ const char *pathname = NULL;
+ int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise, _func;
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL, **xattr_ptr = NULL;
+ int xattr_len = 0;
if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 0;
- iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
- if (!iint)
+
+ /* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action
+ * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
+ * Included is the appraise submask.
+ */
+ action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, function);
+ if (!action)
return 0;
- mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+ must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
- rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK);
- if (rc < 0)
- goto out;
+ /* Is the appraise rule hook specific? */
+ _func = (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE) ? FILE_CHECK : function;
- if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0))
- ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode,
- path->dentry->d_name.name);
+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
- if ((mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)) != MAY_READ)
+ iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+ if (!iint)
goto out;
- ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode,
- path->dentry->d_name.name);
- if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) {
- struct dentry *dentry = dget(path->dentry);
- struct vfsmount *mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
-
- file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY | O_LARGEFILE,
- current_cred());
- if (IS_ERR(file)) {
- int audit_info = 0;
-
- integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
- dentry->d_name.name,
- "add_measurement",
- "dentry_open failed",
- 1, audit_info);
- file = NULL;
- goto out;
- }
- rc = get_path_measurement(iint, file, dentry->d_name.name);
+ /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
+ * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
+ * IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
+ */
+ iint->flags |= action;
+ action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
+ action &= ~((iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK) >> 1);
+
+ /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
+ if (!action) {
+ if (must_appraise)
+ rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, _func);
+ goto out_digsig;
}
-out:
- mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
- if (file)
- fput(file);
- kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
- return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_path_check);
-static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
- int mask, int function)
-{
- struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
- struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
- int rc;
-
- if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
- return 0;
- iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
- if (!iint)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
- rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, mask, function);
- if (rc != 0)
- goto out;
+ if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
+ if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+ xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
+ } else
+ xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
+
+ rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
+ if (rc != 0) {
+ if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
+ rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
+ goto out_digsig;
+ }
- rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
- if (!rc)
- ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename);
+ pathname = filename ?: ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
+
+ if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
+ ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
+ xattr_value, xattr_len);
+ if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+ rc = ima_appraise_measurement(_func, iint, file, pathname,
+ xattr_value, xattr_len);
+ if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
+ ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
+ kfree(pathbuf);
+out_digsig:
+ if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG))
+ rc = -EACCES;
out:
- mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
- kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
- return rc;
-}
-
-/*
- * ima_counts_get - increment file counts
- *
- * - for IPC shm and shmat file.
- * - for nfsd exported files.
- *
- * Increment the counts for these files to prevent unnecessary
- * imbalance messages.
- */
-void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
-{
- struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
- struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
-
- if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
- return;
- iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
- if (!iint)
- return;
- mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
- ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode);
- mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
-
- kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ kfree(xattr_value);
+ if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+ return -EACCES;
+ return 0;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_counts_get);
/**
* ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
@@ -332,18 +250,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_counts_get);
* Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
* policy decision.
*
- * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
- * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
+ * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- int rc;
-
- if (!file)
- return 0;
- if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
- rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
- MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP);
+ if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC))
+ return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
return 0;
}
@@ -357,33 +270,69 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
* So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
* what is being executed.
*
- * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
- * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
+ * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
*/
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- int rc;
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file,
+ (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
+ bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
+ MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+}
- rc = process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->filename,
- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
- return 0;
+/**
+ * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured
+ * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
+ *
+ * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
+ *
+ * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ ima_rdwr_violation_check(file);
+ return process_measurement(file, NULL,
+ mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
+ FILE_CHECK);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
+
+/**
+ * ima_module_check - based on policy, collect/store/appraise measurement.
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised
+ *
+ * Measure/appraise kernel modules based on policy.
+ *
+ * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
+{
+ if (!file) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
+ if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
+ (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+#endif
+ return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */
+ }
+ return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK);
}
static int __init init_ima(void)
{
int error;
- ima_iintcache_init();
+ hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
error = ima_init();
- ima_initialized = 1;
+ if (!error)
+ ima_initialized = 1;
return error;
}
-static void __exit cleanup_ima(void)
-{
- ima_cleanup();
-}
-
late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture");