diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/evm')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 52 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/Makefile | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 53 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 262 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 485 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c | 27 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 104 |
7 files changed, 990 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d606f3d12d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +config EVM + boolean "EVM support" + depends on SECURITY + select KEYS + select ENCRYPTED_KEYS + select CRYPTO_HMAC + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + default n + help + EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against + integrity attacks. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + +if EVM + +menu "EVM options" + +config EVM_ATTR_FSUUID + bool "FSUUID (version 2)" + default y + depends on EVM + help + Include filesystem UUID for HMAC calculation. + + Default value is 'selected', which is former version 2. + if 'not selected', it is former version 1 + + WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding + additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM + labeled file systems to be relabeled. + +config EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS + bool "Additional SMACK xattrs" + depends on EVM && SECURITY_SMACK + default n + help + Include additional SMACK xattrs for HMAC calculation. + + In addition to the original security xattrs (eg. security.selinux, + security.SMACK64, security.capability, and security.ima) included + in the HMAC calculation, enabling this option includes newly defined + Smack xattrs: security.SMACK64EXEC, security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE and + security.SMACK64MMAP. + + WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding + additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM + labeled file systems to be relabeled. + +endmenu + +endif diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Makefile b/security/integrity/evm/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7393c415a06 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/evm/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +# +# Makefile for building the Extended Verification Module(EVM) +# +obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm.o + +evm-y := evm_main.o evm_crypto.o evm_secfs.o +evm-$(CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL) += evm_posix_acl.o diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..88bfe77efa1 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation + * + * Authors: + * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + * + * File: evm.h + * + */ + +#ifndef __INTEGRITY_EVM_H +#define __INTEGRITY_EVM_H + +#include <linux/xattr.h> +#include <linux/security.h> + +#include "../integrity.h" + +extern int evm_initialized; +extern char *evm_hmac; +extern char *evm_hash; + +#define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID 0x0001 + +extern int evm_hmac_attrs; + +extern struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm; +extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm; + +/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */ +extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[]; + +int evm_init_key(void); +int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, + size_t req_xattr_value_len); +int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); +int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); +int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr, + char *hmac_val); +int evm_init_secfs(void); + +#endif diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..5e9687f02e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,262 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation + * + * Authors: + * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + * + * File: evm_crypto.c + * Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <linux/xattr.h> +#include <keys/encrypted-type.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include "evm.h" + +#define EVMKEY "evm-key" +#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128 +static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE]; +static int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE; + +struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm; +struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm; + +static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex); + +static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type) +{ + long rc; + char *algo; + struct crypto_shash **tfm; + struct shash_desc *desc; + + if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) { + tfm = &hmac_tfm; + algo = evm_hmac; + } else { + tfm = &hash_tfm; + algo = evm_hash; + } + + if (*tfm == NULL) { + mutex_lock(&mutex); + if (*tfm) + goto out; + *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm); + pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc); + *tfm = NULL; + mutex_unlock(&mutex); + return ERR_PTR(rc); + } + if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) { + rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len); + if (rc) { + crypto_free_shash(*tfm); + *tfm = NULL; + mutex_unlock(&mutex); + return ERR_PTR(rc); + } + } +out: + mutex_unlock(&mutex); + } + + desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!desc) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + desc->tfm = *tfm; + desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + rc = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (rc) { + kfree(desc); + return ERR_PTR(rc); + } + return desc; +} + +/* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode + * specific info. + * + * (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete + * protection.) + */ +static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, + char *digest) +{ + struct h_misc { + unsigned long ino; + __u32 generation; + uid_t uid; + gid_t gid; + umode_t mode; + } hmac_misc; + + memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc)); + hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; + hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; + hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid); + hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); + hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; + crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc)); + if (evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) + crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, + sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid)); + crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); +} + +/* + * Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs. + * + * Instead of retrieving the requested xattr, for performance, calculate + * the hmac using the requested xattr value. Don't alloc/free memory for + * each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory. + */ +static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, + size_t req_xattr_value_len, + char type, char *digest) +{ + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + struct shash_desc *desc; + char **xattrname; + size_t xattr_size = 0; + char *xattr_value = NULL; + int error; + int size; + + if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + desc = init_desc(type); + if (IS_ERR(desc)) + return PTR_ERR(desc); + + error = -ENODATA; + for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) { + if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value) + && !strcmp(*xattrname, req_xattr_name)) { + error = 0; + crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value, + req_xattr_value_len); + continue; + } + size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, *xattrname, + &xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS); + if (size == -ENOMEM) { + error = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + if (size < 0) + continue; + + error = 0; + xattr_size = size; + crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size); + } + hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, digest); + +out: + kfree(xattr_value); + kfree(desc); + return error; +} + +int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len, + char *digest) +{ + return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value, + req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest); +} + +int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len, + char *digest) +{ + return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value, + req_xattr_value_len, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST, digest); +} + +/* + * Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr + * + * Expects to be called with i_mutex locked. + */ +int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, + const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) +{ + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data; + int rc = 0; + + rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest); + if (rc == 0) { + xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; + rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, + &xattr_data, + sizeof(xattr_data), 0); + } else if (rc == -ENODATA && inode->i_op->removexattr) { + rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM); + } + return rc; +} + +int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, + char *hmac_val) +{ + struct shash_desc *desc; + + desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC); + if (IS_ERR(desc)) { + pr_info("init_desc failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(desc); + } + + crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len); + hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, hmac_val); + kfree(desc); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC + */ +int evm_init_key(void) +{ + struct key *evm_key; + struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp; + int rc = 0; + + evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(evm_key)) + return -ENOENT; + + down_read(&evm_key->sem); + ekp = evm_key->payload.data; + if (ekp->decrypted_datalen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(evmkey, ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen); +out: + /* burn the original key contents */ + memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen); + up_read(&evm_key->sem); + key_put(evm_key); + return rc; +} diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3bcb80df4d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,485 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation + * + * Author: + * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + * + * File: evm_main.c + * implements evm_inode_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr, + * evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/xattr.h> +#include <linux/integrity.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include "evm.h" + +int evm_initialized; + +static char *integrity_status_msg[] = { + "pass", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown" +}; +char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)"; +char *evm_hash = "sha1"; +int evm_hmac_attrs; + +char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = { +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX + XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK + XATTR_NAME_SMACK, +#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS + XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, + XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, + XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, +#endif +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE + XATTR_NAME_IMA, +#endif + XATTR_NAME_CAPS, + NULL +}; + +static int evm_fixmode; +static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str) +{ + if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) + evm_fixmode = 1; + return 0; +} +__setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode); + +static void __init evm_init_config(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID + evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID; +#endif + pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs); +} + +static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + char **xattr; + int error; + int count = 0; + + if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + for (xattr = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattr != NULL; xattr++) { + error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, *xattr, NULL, 0); + if (error < 0) { + if (error == -ENODATA) + continue; + return error; + } + count++; + } + + return count; +} + +/* + * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr + * + * Compute the HMAC on the dentry's protected set of extended attributes + * and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr. + * + * For performance: + * - use the previoulsy retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the + * HMAC.) + * - cache the verification result in the iint, when available. + * + * Returns integrity status + */ +static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name, + char *xattr_value, + size_t xattr_value_len, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) +{ + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; + struct evm_ima_xattr_data calc; + enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; + int rc, xattr_len; + + if (iint && iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) + return iint->evm_status; + + /* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */ + + /* first need to know the sig type */ + rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0, + GFP_NOFS); + if (rc <= 0) { + if (rc == 0) + evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; /* empty */ + else if (rc == -ENODATA) { + rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry); + if (rc > 0) + evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; + else if (rc == 0) + evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */ + } + goto out; + } + + xattr_len = rc; + + /* check value type */ + switch (xattr_data->type) { + case EVM_XATTR_HMAC: + rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_len, calc.digest); + if (rc) + break; + rc = memcmp(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest, + sizeof(calc.digest)); + if (rc) + rc = -EINVAL; + break; + case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: + rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_len, calc.digest); + if (rc) + break; + rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, + (const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len, + calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest)); + if (!rc) { + /* we probably want to replace rsa with hmac here */ + evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_len); + } + break; + default: + rc = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + if (rc) + evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA) ? + INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL; +out: + if (iint) + iint->evm_status = evm_status; + kfree(xattr_data); + return evm_status; +} + +static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name) +{ + char **xattrname; + int namelen; + int found = 0; + + namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name); + for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) { + if ((strlen(*xattrname) == namelen) + && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, *xattrname, namelen) == 0)) { + found = 1; + break; + } + if (strncmp(req_xattr_name, + *xattrname + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN, + strlen(req_xattr_name)) == 0) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + return found; +} + +/** + * evm_verifyxattr - verify the integrity of the requested xattr + * @dentry: object of the verify xattr + * @xattr_name: requested xattr + * @xattr_value: requested xattr value + * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length + * + * Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored + * security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length + * previously retrieved to calculate the HMAC. + * + * Returns the xattr integrity status. + * + * This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it + * is executed. + */ +enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name, + void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) +{ + if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) + return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + + if (!iint) { + iint = integrity_iint_find(dentry->d_inode); + if (!iint) + return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + } + return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_len, iint); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr); + +/* + * evm_verify_current_integrity - verify the dentry's metadata integrity + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * + * Verify and return the dentry's metadata integrity. The exceptions are + * before EVM is initialized or in 'fix' mode. + */ +static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + + if (!evm_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode) + return 0; + return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); +} + +/* + * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute + * + * Prevent security.evm from being modified or removed without the + * necessary permissions or when the existing value is invalid. + * + * The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not + * affect security.evm. An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr + * acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm. + * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently + * doesn't exist, to be updated. + */ +static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) +{ + enum integrity_status evm_status; + + if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) { + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + } else if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) { + if (!posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)) + return 0; + evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); + if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) + return 0; + goto out; + } + evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); +out: + if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode, + dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", + integrity_status_msg[evm_status], + -EPERM, 0); + return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM; +} + +/** + * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name + * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value + * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length + * + * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated, + * verify the existing value is valid. As only the kernel should have + * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent + * userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires + * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. + */ +int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) +{ + const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value; + + if ((strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) + && (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC)) + return -EPERM; + return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_len); +} + +/** + * evm_inode_removexattr - protect the EVM extended attribute + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name + * + * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that + * the current value is valid. + */ +int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) +{ + return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); +} + +/** + * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name + * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value + * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length + * + * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change. + * + * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from + * __vfs_setxattr_noperm(). The caller of which has taken the inode's + * i_mutex lock. + */ +void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) +{ + if (!evm_initialized || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) + && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))) + return; + + evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); + return; +} + +/** + * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name + * + * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr. + */ +void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) +{ + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + + if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) + return; + + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); + evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); + mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); + return; +} + +/** + * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + */ +int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +{ + unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; + enum integrity_status evm_status; + + if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))) + return 0; + evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); + if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) + return 0; + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode, + dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", + integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0); + return -EPERM; +} + +/** + * evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status + * + * For now, update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect UID/GID + * changes. + * + * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller + * to lock the inode's i_mutex. + */ +void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) +{ + if (!evm_initialized) + return; + + if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) + evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0); + return; +} + +/* + * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm + */ +int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, + const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, + struct xattr *evm_xattr) +{ + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data; + int rc; + + if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) + return 0; + + xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); + if (!xattr_data) + return -ENOMEM; + + xattr_data->type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; + rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest); + if (rc < 0) + goto out; + + evm_xattr->value = xattr_data; + evm_xattr->value_len = sizeof(*xattr_data); + evm_xattr->name = XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX; + return 0; +out: + kfree(xattr_data); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security); + +static int __init init_evm(void) +{ + int error; + + evm_init_config(); + + error = evm_init_secfs(); + if (error < 0) { + pr_info("Error registering secfs\n"); + goto err; + } + + return 0; +err: + return error; +} + +/* + * evm_display_config - list the EVM protected security extended attributes + */ +static int __init evm_display_config(void) +{ + char **xattrname; + + for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) + pr_info("%s\n", *xattrname); + return 0; +} + +pure_initcall(evm_display_config); +late_initcall(init_evm); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Extended Verification Module"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..46408b9e62e --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2011 IBM Corporation + * + * Author: + * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + */ + +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/xattr.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> + +int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattr) +{ + int xattr_len = strlen(xattr); + + if ((strlen(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS) == xattr_len) + && (strncmp(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS, xattr, xattr_len) == 0)) + return 1; + if ((strlen(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == xattr_len) + && (strncmp(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT, xattr, xattr_len) == 0)) + return 1; + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..cf12a04717d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation + * + * Authors: + * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + * + * File: evm_secfs.c + * - Used to signal when key is on keyring + * - Get the key and enable EVM + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include "evm.h" + +static struct dentry *evm_init_tpm; + +/** + * evm_read_key - read() for <securityfs>/evm + * + * @filp: file pointer, not actually used + * @buf: where to put the result + * @count: maximum to send along + * @ppos: where to start + * + * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate + */ +static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char temp[80]; + ssize_t rc; + + if (*ppos != 0) + return 0; + + sprintf(temp, "%d", evm_initialized); + rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp)); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * evm_write_key - write() for <securityfs>/evm + * @file: file pointer, not actually used + * @buf: where to get the data from + * @count: bytes sent + * @ppos: where to start + * + * Used to signal that key is on the kernel key ring. + * - get the integrity hmac key from the kernel key ring + * - create list of hmac protected extended attributes + * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate + */ +static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char temp[80]; + int i, error; + + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || evm_initialized) + return -EPERM; + + if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0) + return -EFAULT; + + temp[count] = '\0'; + + if ((sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1) || (i != 1)) + return -EINVAL; + + error = evm_init_key(); + if (!error) { + evm_initialized = 1; + pr_info("initialized\n"); + } else + pr_err("initialization failed\n"); + return count; +} + +static const struct file_operations evm_key_ops = { + .read = evm_read_key, + .write = evm_write_key, +}; + +int __init evm_init_secfs(void) +{ + int error = 0; + + evm_init_tpm = securityfs_create_file("evm", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, + NULL, NULL, &evm_key_ops); + if (!evm_init_tpm || IS_ERR(evm_init_tpm)) + error = -EFAULT; + return error; +} |