diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 147 |
1 files changed, 68 insertions, 79 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index d244a23ab8d..ae0e616a7ca 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -23,9 +23,8 @@ * See the GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License - * along with GNU CC; see the file COPYING. If not, write to - * the Free Software Foundation, 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, - * Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. + * along with GNU CC; see the file COPYING. If not, see + * <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. * * Please send any bug reports or fixes you make to the * email address(es): @@ -79,6 +78,8 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, gfp_t gfp); static void *sctp_addto_param(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, int len, const void *data); +static void *sctp_addto_chunk_fixed(struct sctp_chunk *, int len, + const void *data); /* Control chunk destructor */ static void sctp_control_release_owner(struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -218,6 +219,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc, gfp_t gfp, int vparam_len) { struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk); + struct sctp_endpoint *ep = asoc->ep; sctp_inithdr_t init; union sctp_params addrs; size_t chunksize; @@ -277,7 +279,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc, chunksize += vparam_len; /* Account for AUTH related parameters */ - if (net->sctp.auth_enable) { + if (ep->auth_enable) { /* Add random parameter length*/ chunksize += sizeof(asoc->c.auth_random); @@ -362,7 +364,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc, } /* Add SCTP-AUTH chunks to the parameter list */ - if (net->sctp.auth_enable) { + if (ep->auth_enable) { sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(asoc->c.auth_random), asoc->c.auth_random); if (auth_hmacs) @@ -1297,6 +1299,13 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_auth(const struct sctp_association *asoc) /* Turn an skb into a chunk. * FIXME: Eventually move the structure directly inside the skb->cb[]. + * + * sctpimpguide-05.txt Section 2.8.2 + * M1) Each time a new DATA chunk is transmitted + * set the 'TSN.Missing.Report' count for that TSN to 0. The + * 'TSN.Missing.Report' count will be used to determine missing chunks + * and when to fast retransmit. + * */ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_chunkify(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sctp_association *asoc, @@ -1314,29 +1323,9 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_chunkify(struct sk_buff *skb, INIT_LIST_HEAD(&retval->list); retval->skb = skb; retval->asoc = (struct sctp_association *)asoc; - retval->has_tsn = 0; - retval->has_ssn = 0; - retval->rtt_in_progress = 0; - retval->sent_at = 0; retval->singleton = 1; - retval->end_of_packet = 0; - retval->ecn_ce_done = 0; - retval->pdiscard = 0; - - /* sctpimpguide-05.txt Section 2.8.2 - * M1) Each time a new DATA chunk is transmitted - * set the 'TSN.Missing.Report' count for that TSN to 0. The - * 'TSN.Missing.Report' count will be used to determine missing chunks - * and when to fast retransmit. - */ - retval->tsn_missing_report = 0; - retval->tsn_gap_acked = 0; - retval->fast_retransmit = SCTP_CAN_FRTX; - /* If this is a fragmented message, track all fragments - * of the message (for SEND_FAILED). - */ - retval->msg = NULL; + retval->fast_retransmit = SCTP_CAN_FRTX; /* Polish the bead hole. */ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&retval->transmitted_list); @@ -1433,8 +1422,8 @@ static void sctp_chunk_destroy(struct sctp_chunk *chunk) BUG_ON(!list_empty(&chunk->list)); list_del_init(&chunk->transmitted_list); - /* Free the chunk skb data and the SCTP_chunk stub itself. */ - dev_kfree_skb(chunk->skb); + consume_skb(chunk->skb); + consume_skb(chunk->auth_chunk); SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(chunk); kmem_cache_free(sctp_chunk_cachep, chunk); @@ -1489,8 +1478,8 @@ void *sctp_addto_chunk(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, int len, const void *data) /* Append bytes to the end of a chunk. Returns NULL if there isn't sufficient * space in the chunk */ -void *sctp_addto_chunk_fixed(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, - int len, const void *data) +static void *sctp_addto_chunk_fixed(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, + int len, const void *data) { if (skb_tailroom(chunk->skb) >= len) return sctp_addto_chunk(chunk, len, data); @@ -1793,7 +1782,7 @@ no_hmac: else kt = ktime_get(); - if (!asoc && ktime_compare(bear_cookie->expiration, kt) < 0) { + if (!asoc && ktime_before(bear_cookie->expiration, kt)) { /* * Section 3.3.10.3 Stale Cookie Error (3) * @@ -1981,13 +1970,13 @@ static int sctp_verify_ext_param(struct net *net, union sctp_params param) for (i = 0; i < num_ext; i++) { switch (param.ext->chunks[i]) { - case SCTP_CID_AUTH: - have_auth = 1; - break; - case SCTP_CID_ASCONF: - case SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK: - have_asconf = 1; - break; + case SCTP_CID_AUTH: + have_auth = 1; + break; + case SCTP_CID_ASCONF: + case SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK: + have_asconf = 1; + break; } } @@ -2014,25 +2003,24 @@ static void sctp_process_ext_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, for (i = 0; i < num_ext; i++) { switch (param.ext->chunks[i]) { - case SCTP_CID_FWD_TSN: - if (net->sctp.prsctp_enable && - !asoc->peer.prsctp_capable) + case SCTP_CID_FWD_TSN: + if (net->sctp.prsctp_enable && !asoc->peer.prsctp_capable) asoc->peer.prsctp_capable = 1; - break; - case SCTP_CID_AUTH: - /* if the peer reports AUTH, assume that he - * supports AUTH. - */ - if (net->sctp.auth_enable) - asoc->peer.auth_capable = 1; - break; - case SCTP_CID_ASCONF: - case SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK: - if (net->sctp.addip_enable) - asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 1; - break; - default: - break; + break; + case SCTP_CID_AUTH: + /* if the peer reports AUTH, assume that he + * supports AUTH. + */ + if (asoc->ep->auth_enable) + asoc->peer.auth_capable = 1; + break; + case SCTP_CID_ASCONF: + case SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK: + if (net->sctp.addip_enable) + asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 1; + break; + default: + break; } } } @@ -2115,6 +2103,7 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_process_unk_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc, * SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR - continue with the chunk */ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(struct net *net, + const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, const struct sctp_association *asoc, union sctp_params param, sctp_cid_t cid, @@ -2165,7 +2154,7 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(struct net *net, goto fallthrough; case SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM: - if (!net->sctp.auth_enable) + if (!ep->auth_enable) goto fallthrough; /* SCTP-AUTH: Secion 6.1 @@ -2182,7 +2171,7 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(struct net *net, break; case SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS: - if (!net->sctp.auth_enable) + if (!ep->auth_enable) goto fallthrough; /* SCTP-AUTH: Section 3.2 @@ -2198,7 +2187,7 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(struct net *net, break; case SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO: - if (!net->sctp.auth_enable) + if (!ep->auth_enable) goto fallthrough; hmacs = (struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *)param.p; @@ -2233,10 +2222,9 @@ fallthrough: } /* Verify the INIT packet before we process it. */ -int sctp_verify_init(struct net *net, const struct sctp_association *asoc, - sctp_cid_t cid, - sctp_init_chunk_t *peer_init, - struct sctp_chunk *chunk, +int sctp_verify_init(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_association *asoc, sctp_cid_t cid, + sctp_init_chunk_t *peer_init, struct sctp_chunk *chunk, struct sctp_chunk **errp) { union sctp_params param; @@ -2265,7 +2253,7 @@ int sctp_verify_init(struct net *net, const struct sctp_association *asoc, * VIOLATION error. We build the ERROR chunk here and let the normal * error handling code build and send the packet. */ - if (param.v != (void*)chunk->chunk_end) + if (param.v != (void *)chunk->chunk_end) return sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p, chunk, errp); /* The only missing mandatory param possible today is @@ -2277,17 +2265,17 @@ int sctp_verify_init(struct net *net, const struct sctp_association *asoc, /* Verify all the variable length parameters */ sctp_walk_params(param, peer_init, init_hdr.params) { - - result = sctp_verify_param(net, asoc, param, cid, chunk, errp); + result = sctp_verify_param(net, ep, asoc, param, cid, + chunk, errp); switch (result) { - case SCTP_IERROR_ABORT: - case SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM: - return 0; - case SCTP_IERROR_ERROR: - return 1; - case SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR: - default: - break; + case SCTP_IERROR_ABORT: + case SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM: + return 0; + case SCTP_IERROR_ERROR: + return 1; + case SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR: + default: + break; } } /* for (loop through all parameters) */ @@ -2322,7 +2310,7 @@ int sctp_process_init(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sctp_chunk *chunk, * added as the primary transport. The source address seems to * be a a better choice than any of the embedded addresses. */ - if(!sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, peer_addr, gfp, SCTP_ACTIVE)) + if (!sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, peer_addr, gfp, SCTP_ACTIVE)) goto nomem; if (sctp_cmp_addr_exact(sctp_source(chunk), peer_addr)) @@ -2510,6 +2498,7 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sctp_af *af; union sctp_addr_param *addr_param; struct sctp_transport *t; + struct sctp_endpoint *ep = asoc->ep; /* We maintain all INIT parameters in network byte order all the * time. This allows us to not worry about whether the parameters @@ -2649,7 +2638,7 @@ do_addr_param: goto fall_through; case SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM: - if (!net->sctp.auth_enable) + if (!ep->auth_enable) goto fall_through; /* Save peer's random parameter */ @@ -2662,7 +2651,7 @@ do_addr_param: break; case SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO: - if (!net->sctp.auth_enable) + if (!ep->auth_enable) goto fall_through; /* Save peer's HMAC list */ @@ -2678,7 +2667,7 @@ do_addr_param: break; case SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS: - if (!net->sctp.auth_enable) + if (!ep->auth_enable) goto fall_through; asoc->peer.peer_chunks = kmemdup(param.p, @@ -3348,7 +3337,7 @@ static __be16 sctp_get_asconf_response(struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack, while (asconf_ack_len > 0) { if (asconf_ack_param->crr_id == asconf_param->crr_id) { - switch(asconf_ack_param->param_hdr.type) { + switch (asconf_ack_param->param_hdr.type) { case SCTP_PARAM_SUCCESS_REPORT: return SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR; case SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE: |
