diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sctp/endpointola.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/endpointola.c | 339 |
1 files changed, 227 insertions, 112 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c index 96984f7a2d6..9da76ba4d10 100644 --- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c +++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* SCTP kernel reference Implementation +/* SCTP kernel implementation * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Cisco, Inc. * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Motorola, Inc. * Copyright (c) 2001-2002 International Business Machines, Corp. @@ -6,37 +6,29 @@ * Copyright (c) 2001 Nokia, Inc. * Copyright (c) 2001 La Monte H.P. Yarroll * - * This file is part of the SCTP kernel reference Implementation + * This file is part of the SCTP kernel implementation * * This abstraction represents an SCTP endpoint. * - * This file is part of the implementation of the add-IP extension, - * based on <draft-ietf-tsvwg-addip-sctp-02.txt> June 29, 2001, - * for the SCTP kernel reference Implementation. - * - * The SCTP reference implementation is free software; + * The SCTP implementation is free software; * you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of * the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) * any later version. * - * The SCTP reference implementation is distributed in the hope that it + * The SCTP implementation is distributed in the hope that it * will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied * ************************ * warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. * See the GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License - * along with GNU CC; see the file COPYING. If not, write to - * the Free Software Foundation, 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, - * Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. + * along with GNU CC; see the file COPYING. If not, see + * <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. * * Please send any bug reports or fixes you make to the * email address(es): - * lksctp developers <lksctp-developers@lists.sourceforge.net> - * - * Or submit a bug report through the following website: - * http://www.sf.net/projects/lksctp + * lksctp developers <linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org> * * Written or modified by: * La Monte H.P. Yarroll <piggy@acm.org> @@ -44,13 +36,9 @@ * Jon Grimm <jgrimm@austin.ibm.com> * Daisy Chang <daisyc@us.ibm.com> * Dajiang Zhang <dajiang.zhang@nokia.com> - * - * Any bugs reported given to us we will try to fix... any fixes shared will - * be incorporated into the next SCTP release. */ #include <linux/types.h> -#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/in.h> #include <linux/random.h> /* get_random_bytes() */ @@ -61,7 +49,7 @@ #include <net/sctp/sm.h> /* Forward declarations for internal helpers. */ -static void sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(struct sctp_endpoint *ep); +static void sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(struct work_struct *work); /* * Initialize the base fields of the endpoint structure. @@ -70,8 +58,56 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_init(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk, gfp_t gfp) { - struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk); - memset(ep, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_endpoint)); + struct net *net = sock_net(sk); + struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *auth_hmacs = NULL; + struct sctp_chunks_param *auth_chunks = NULL; + struct sctp_shared_key *null_key; + int err; + + ep->digest = kzalloc(SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE, gfp); + if (!ep->digest) + return NULL; + + ep->auth_enable = net->sctp.auth_enable; + if (ep->auth_enable) { + /* Allocate space for HMACS and CHUNKS authentication + * variables. There are arrays that we encode directly + * into parameters to make the rest of the operations easier. + */ + auth_hmacs = kzalloc(sizeof(sctp_hmac_algo_param_t) + + sizeof(__u16) * SCTP_AUTH_NUM_HMACS, gfp); + if (!auth_hmacs) + goto nomem; + + auth_chunks = kzalloc(sizeof(sctp_chunks_param_t) + + SCTP_NUM_CHUNK_TYPES, gfp); + if (!auth_chunks) + goto nomem; + + /* Initialize the HMACS parameter. + * SCTP-AUTH: Section 3.3 + * Every endpoint supporting SCTP chunk authentication MUST + * support the HMAC based on the SHA-1 algorithm. + */ + auth_hmacs->param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO; + auth_hmacs->param_hdr.length = + htons(sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t) + 2); + auth_hmacs->hmac_ids[0] = htons(SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1); + + /* Initialize the CHUNKS parameter */ + auth_chunks->param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS; + auth_chunks->param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t)); + + /* If the Add-IP functionality is enabled, we must + * authenticate, ASCONF and ASCONF-ACK chunks + */ + if (net->sctp.addip_enable) { + auth_chunks->chunks[0] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF; + auth_chunks->chunks[1] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK; + auth_chunks->param_hdr.length = + htons(sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t) + 2); + } + } /* Initialize the base structure. */ /* What type of endpoint are we? */ @@ -79,19 +115,16 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_init(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, /* Initialize the basic object fields. */ atomic_set(&ep->base.refcnt, 1); - ep->base.dead = 0; - ep->base.malloced = 1; + ep->base.dead = false; /* Create an input queue. */ sctp_inq_init(&ep->base.inqueue); /* Set its top-half handler */ - sctp_inq_set_th_handler(&ep->base.inqueue, - (void (*)(void *))sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv, ep); + sctp_inq_set_th_handler(&ep->base.inqueue, sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv); /* Initialize the bind addr area */ sctp_bind_addr_init(&ep->base.bind_addr, 0); - rwlock_init(&ep->base.addr_lock); /* Remember who we are attached to. */ ep->base.sk = sk; @@ -100,39 +133,49 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_init(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, /* Create the lists of associations. */ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ep->asocs); - /* Set up the base timeout information. */ - ep->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_NONE] = 0; - ep->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_COOKIE] = - msecs_to_jiffies(sp->rtoinfo.srto_initial); - ep->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_INIT] = - msecs_to_jiffies(sp->rtoinfo.srto_initial); - ep->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T2_SHUTDOWN] = - msecs_to_jiffies(sp->rtoinfo.srto_initial); - ep->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T3_RTX] = 0; - ep->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T4_RTO] = 0; - - /* sctpimpguide-05 Section 2.12.2 - * If the 'T5-shutdown-guard' timer is used, it SHOULD be set to the - * recommended value of 5 times 'RTO.Max'. - */ - ep->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T5_SHUTDOWN_GUARD] - = 5 * msecs_to_jiffies(sp->rtoinfo.srto_max); - - ep->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_HEARTBEAT] = 0; - ep->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_SACK] = sctp_sack_timeout; - ep->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_AUTOCLOSE] = sp->autoclose * HZ; - /* Use SCTP specific send buffer space queues. */ - ep->sndbuf_policy = sctp_sndbuf_policy; + ep->sndbuf_policy = net->sctp.sndbuf_policy; + + sk->sk_data_ready = sctp_data_ready; sk->sk_write_space = sctp_write_space; sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_USE_WRITE_QUEUE); + /* Get the receive buffer policy for this endpoint */ + ep->rcvbuf_policy = net->sctp.rcvbuf_policy; + /* Initialize the secret key used with cookie. */ - get_random_bytes(&ep->secret_key[0], SCTP_SECRET_SIZE); - ep->last_key = ep->current_key = 0; - ep->key_changed_at = jiffies; + get_random_bytes(ep->secret_key, sizeof(ep->secret_key)); + + /* SCTP-AUTH extensions*/ + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ep->endpoint_shared_keys); + null_key = sctp_auth_shkey_create(0, gfp); + if (!null_key) + goto nomem; + + list_add(&null_key->key_list, &ep->endpoint_shared_keys); + + /* Allocate and initialize transorms arrays for supported HMACs. */ + err = sctp_auth_init_hmacs(ep, gfp); + if (err) + goto nomem_hmacs; + + /* Add the null key to the endpoint shared keys list and + * set the hmcas and chunks pointers. + */ + ep->auth_hmacs_list = auth_hmacs; + ep->auth_chunk_list = auth_chunks; return ep; + +nomem_hmacs: + sctp_auth_destroy_keys(&ep->endpoint_shared_keys); +nomem: + /* Free all allocations */ + kfree(auth_hmacs); + kfree(auth_chunks); + kfree(ep->digest); + return NULL; + } /* Create a sctp_endpoint with all that boring stuff initialized. @@ -143,12 +186,13 @@ struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_new(struct sock *sk, gfp_t gfp) struct sctp_endpoint *ep; /* Build a local endpoint. */ - ep = t_new(struct sctp_endpoint, gfp); + ep = kzalloc(sizeof(*ep), gfp); if (!ep) goto fail; + if (!sctp_endpoint_init(ep, sk, gfp)) goto fail_init; - ep->base.malloced = 1; + SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_INC(ep); return ep; @@ -164,6 +208,13 @@ void sctp_endpoint_add_asoc(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, { struct sock *sk = ep->base.sk; + /* If this is a temporary association, don't bother + * since we'll be removing it shortly and don't + * want anyone to find it anyway. + */ + if (asoc->temp) + return; + /* Now just add it to our list of asocs */ list_add_tail(&asoc->asocs, &ep->asocs); @@ -177,40 +228,57 @@ void sctp_endpoint_add_asoc(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, */ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) { - ep->base.dead = 1; + ep->base.dead = true; + + ep->base.sk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_CLOSED; + + /* Unlink this endpoint, so we can't find it again! */ + sctp_unhash_endpoint(ep); + sctp_endpoint_put(ep); } /* Final destructor for endpoint. */ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) { - SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return); + struct sock *sk; - ep->base.sk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_CLOSED; + if (unlikely(!ep->base.dead)) { + WARN(1, "Attempt to destroy undead endpoint %p!\n", ep); + return; + } - /* Unlink this endpoint, so we can't find it again! */ - sctp_unhash_endpoint(ep); + /* Free the digest buffer */ + kfree(ep->digest); - /* Free up the HMAC transform. */ - sctp_crypto_free_tfm(sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac); + /* SCTP-AUTH: Free up AUTH releated data such as shared keys + * chunks and hmacs arrays that were allocated + */ + sctp_auth_destroy_keys(&ep->endpoint_shared_keys); + kfree(ep->auth_hmacs_list); + kfree(ep->auth_chunk_list); + + /* AUTH - Free any allocated HMAC transform containers */ + sctp_auth_destroy_hmacs(ep->auth_hmacs); /* Cleanup. */ sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue); sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr); - /* Remove and free the port */ - if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash) - sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk); + memset(ep->secret_key, 0, sizeof(ep->secret_key)); /* Give up our hold on the sock. */ - if (ep->base.sk) - sock_put(ep->base.sk); + sk = ep->base.sk; + if (sk != NULL) { + /* Remove and free the port */ + if (sctp_sk(sk)->bind_hash) + sctp_put_port(sk); - /* Finally, free up our memory. */ - if (ep->base.malloced) { - kfree(ep); - SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(ep); + sock_put(sk); } + + kfree(ep); + SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(ep); } /* Hold a reference to an endpoint. */ @@ -230,23 +298,18 @@ void sctp_endpoint_put(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) /* Is this the endpoint we are looking for? */ struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_is_match(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + struct net *net, const union sctp_addr *laddr) { - struct sctp_endpoint *retval; + struct sctp_endpoint *retval = NULL; - sctp_read_lock(&ep->base.addr_lock); - if (ep->base.bind_addr.port == laddr->v4.sin_port) { + if ((htons(ep->base.bind_addr.port) == laddr->v4.sin_port) && + net_eq(sock_net(ep->base.sk), net)) { if (sctp_bind_addr_match(&ep->base.bind_addr, laddr, - sctp_sk(ep->base.sk))) { + sctp_sk(ep->base.sk))) retval = ep; - goto out; - } } - retval = NULL; - -out: - sctp_read_unlock(&ep->base.addr_lock); return retval; } @@ -259,26 +322,43 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc( const union sctp_addr *paddr, struct sctp_transport **transport) { + struct sctp_association *asoc = NULL; + struct sctp_association *tmp; + struct sctp_transport *t = NULL; + struct sctp_hashbucket *head; + struct sctp_ep_common *epb; + int hash; int rport; - struct sctp_association *asoc; - struct list_head *pos; - - rport = paddr->v4.sin_port; - list_for_each(pos, &ep->asocs) { - asoc = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_association, asocs); - if (rport == asoc->peer.port) { - sctp_read_lock(&asoc->base.addr_lock); - *transport = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, paddr); - sctp_read_unlock(&asoc->base.addr_lock); + *transport = NULL; - if (*transport) - return asoc; + /* If the local port is not set, there can't be any associations + * on this endpoint. + */ + if (!ep->base.bind_addr.port) + goto out; + + rport = ntohs(paddr->v4.sin_port); + + hash = sctp_assoc_hashfn(sock_net(ep->base.sk), ep->base.bind_addr.port, + rport); + head = &sctp_assoc_hashtable[hash]; + read_lock(&head->lock); + sctp_for_each_hentry(epb, &head->chain) { + tmp = sctp_assoc(epb); + if (tmp->ep != ep || rport != tmp->peer.port) + continue; + + t = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(tmp, paddr); + if (t) { + asoc = tmp; + *transport = t; + break; } } - - *transport = NULL; - return NULL; + read_unlock(&head->lock); +out: + return asoc; } /* Lookup association on an endpoint based on a peer address. BH-safe. */ @@ -289,9 +369,9 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc( { struct sctp_association *asoc; - sctp_local_bh_disable(); + local_bh_disable(); asoc = __sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc(ep, paddr, transport); - sctp_local_bh_enable(); + local_bh_enable(); return asoc; } @@ -302,20 +382,18 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc( int sctp_endpoint_is_peeled_off(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, const union sctp_addr *paddr) { - struct list_head *pos; struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *addr; struct sctp_bind_addr *bp; + struct net *net = sock_net(ep->base.sk); - sctp_read_lock(&ep->base.addr_lock); bp = &ep->base.bind_addr; - list_for_each(pos, &bp->address_list) { - addr = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_sockaddr_entry, list); - if (sctp_has_association(&addr->a, paddr)) { - sctp_read_unlock(&ep->base.addr_lock); + /* This function is called with the socket lock held, + * so the address_list can not change. + */ + list_for_each_entry(addr, &bp->address_list, list) { + if (sctp_has_association(net, &addr->a, paddr)) return 1; - } } - sctp_read_unlock(&ep->base.addr_lock); return 0; } @@ -323,16 +401,21 @@ int sctp_endpoint_is_peeled_off(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, /* Do delayed input processing. This is scheduled by sctp_rcv(). * This may be called on BH or task time. */ -static void sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) +static void sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(struct work_struct *work) { + struct sctp_endpoint *ep = + container_of(work, struct sctp_endpoint, + base.inqueue.immediate); struct sctp_association *asoc; struct sock *sk; + struct net *net; struct sctp_transport *transport; struct sctp_chunk *chunk; struct sctp_inq *inqueue; sctp_subtype_t subtype; sctp_state_t state; int error = 0; + int first_time = 1; /* is this the first time through the loop */ if (ep->base.dead) return; @@ -340,10 +423,34 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) asoc = NULL; inqueue = &ep->base.inqueue; sk = ep->base.sk; + net = sock_net(sk); while (NULL != (chunk = sctp_inq_pop(inqueue))) { subtype = SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type); + /* If the first chunk in the packet is AUTH, do special + * processing specified in Section 6.3 of SCTP-AUTH spec + */ + if (first_time && (subtype.chunk == SCTP_CID_AUTH)) { + struct sctp_chunkhdr *next_hdr; + + next_hdr = sctp_inq_peek(inqueue); + if (!next_hdr) + goto normal; + + /* If the next chunk is COOKIE-ECHO, skip the AUTH + * chunk while saving a pointer to it so we can do + * Authentication later (during cookie-echo + * processing). + */ + if (next_hdr->type == SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ECHO) { + chunk->auth_chunk = skb_clone(chunk->skb, + GFP_ATOMIC); + chunk->auth = 1; + continue; + } + } +normal: /* We might have grown an association since last we * looked, so try again. * @@ -359,20 +466,25 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) } state = asoc ? asoc->state : SCTP_STATE_CLOSED; + if (sctp_auth_recv_cid(subtype.chunk, asoc) && !chunk->auth) + continue; /* Remember where the last DATA chunk came from so we * know where to send the SACK. */ if (asoc && sctp_chunk_is_data(chunk)) asoc->peer.last_data_from = chunk->transport; - else - SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_INCTRLCHUNKS); + else { + SCTP_INC_STATS(sock_net(ep->base.sk), SCTP_MIB_INCTRLCHUNKS); + if (asoc) + asoc->stats.ictrlchunks++; + } if (chunk->transport) - chunk->transport->last_time_heard = jiffies; + chunk->transport->last_time_heard = ktime_get(); - error = sctp_do_sm(SCTP_EVENT_T_CHUNK, subtype, state, - ep, asoc, chunk, GFP_ATOMIC); + error = sctp_do_sm(net, SCTP_EVENT_T_CHUNK, subtype, state, + ep, asoc, chunk, GFP_ATOMIC); if (error && chunk) chunk->pdiscard = 1; @@ -382,5 +494,8 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) */ if (!sctp_sk(sk)->ep) break; + + if (first_time) + first_time = 0; } } |
