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-rw-r--r--net/sctp/endpointola.c315
1 files changed, 225 insertions, 90 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
index 67bd53070ee..9da76ba4d10 100644
--- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* SCTP kernel reference Implementation
+/* SCTP kernel implementation
* Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Cisco, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Motorola, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2002 International Business Machines, Corp.
@@ -6,37 +6,29 @@
* Copyright (c) 2001 Nokia, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2001 La Monte H.P. Yarroll
*
- * This file is part of the SCTP kernel reference Implementation
+ * This file is part of the SCTP kernel implementation
*
* This abstraction represents an SCTP endpoint.
*
- * This file is part of the implementation of the add-IP extension,
- * based on <draft-ietf-tsvwg-addip-sctp-02.txt> June 29, 2001,
- * for the SCTP kernel reference Implementation.
- *
- * The SCTP reference implementation is free software;
+ * The SCTP implementation is free software;
* you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of
* the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
* any later version.
*
- * The SCTP reference implementation is distributed in the hope that it
+ * The SCTP implementation is distributed in the hope that it
* will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
* ************************
* warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
* See the GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with GNU CC; see the file COPYING. If not, write to
- * the Free Software Foundation, 59 Temple Place - Suite 330,
- * Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
+ * along with GNU CC; see the file COPYING. If not, see
+ * <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
* Please send any bug reports or fixes you make to the
* email address(es):
- * lksctp developers <lksctp-developers@lists.sourceforge.net>
- *
- * Or submit a bug report through the following website:
- * http://www.sf.net/projects/lksctp
+ * lksctp developers <linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org>
*
* Written or modified by:
* La Monte H.P. Yarroll <piggy@acm.org>
@@ -44,13 +36,9 @@
* Jon Grimm <jgrimm@austin.ibm.com>
* Daisy Chang <daisyc@us.ibm.com>
* Dajiang Zhang <dajiang.zhang@nokia.com>
- *
- * Any bugs reported given to us we will try to fix... any fixes shared will
- * be incorporated into the next SCTP release.
*/
#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/random.h> /* get_random_bytes() */
@@ -61,7 +49,7 @@
#include <net/sctp/sm.h>
/* Forward declarations for internal helpers. */
-static void sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(struct sctp_endpoint *ep);
+static void sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(struct work_struct *work);
/*
* Initialize the base fields of the endpoint structure.
@@ -70,7 +58,56 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_init(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
struct sock *sk,
gfp_t gfp)
{
- memset(ep, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_endpoint));
+ struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+ struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *auth_hmacs = NULL;
+ struct sctp_chunks_param *auth_chunks = NULL;
+ struct sctp_shared_key *null_key;
+ int err;
+
+ ep->digest = kzalloc(SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE, gfp);
+ if (!ep->digest)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ep->auth_enable = net->sctp.auth_enable;
+ if (ep->auth_enable) {
+ /* Allocate space for HMACS and CHUNKS authentication
+ * variables. There are arrays that we encode directly
+ * into parameters to make the rest of the operations easier.
+ */
+ auth_hmacs = kzalloc(sizeof(sctp_hmac_algo_param_t) +
+ sizeof(__u16) * SCTP_AUTH_NUM_HMACS, gfp);
+ if (!auth_hmacs)
+ goto nomem;
+
+ auth_chunks = kzalloc(sizeof(sctp_chunks_param_t) +
+ SCTP_NUM_CHUNK_TYPES, gfp);
+ if (!auth_chunks)
+ goto nomem;
+
+ /* Initialize the HMACS parameter.
+ * SCTP-AUTH: Section 3.3
+ * Every endpoint supporting SCTP chunk authentication MUST
+ * support the HMAC based on the SHA-1 algorithm.
+ */
+ auth_hmacs->param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO;
+ auth_hmacs->param_hdr.length =
+ htons(sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t) + 2);
+ auth_hmacs->hmac_ids[0] = htons(SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1);
+
+ /* Initialize the CHUNKS parameter */
+ auth_chunks->param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS;
+ auth_chunks->param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t));
+
+ /* If the Add-IP functionality is enabled, we must
+ * authenticate, ASCONF and ASCONF-ACK chunks
+ */
+ if (net->sctp.addip_enable) {
+ auth_chunks->chunks[0] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF;
+ auth_chunks->chunks[1] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK;
+ auth_chunks->param_hdr.length =
+ htons(sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t) + 2);
+ }
+ }
/* Initialize the base structure. */
/* What type of endpoint are we? */
@@ -78,19 +115,16 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_init(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
/* Initialize the basic object fields. */
atomic_set(&ep->base.refcnt, 1);
- ep->base.dead = 0;
- ep->base.malloced = 1;
+ ep->base.dead = false;
/* Create an input queue. */
sctp_inq_init(&ep->base.inqueue);
/* Set its top-half handler */
- sctp_inq_set_th_handler(&ep->base.inqueue,
- (void (*)(void *))sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv, ep);
+ sctp_inq_set_th_handler(&ep->base.inqueue, sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv);
/* Initialize the bind addr area */
sctp_bind_addr_init(&ep->base.bind_addr, 0);
- rwlock_init(&ep->base.addr_lock);
/* Remember who we are attached to. */
ep->base.sk = sk;
@@ -100,19 +134,48 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_init(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ep->asocs);
/* Use SCTP specific send buffer space queues. */
- ep->sndbuf_policy = sctp_sndbuf_policy;
+ ep->sndbuf_policy = net->sctp.sndbuf_policy;
+
+ sk->sk_data_ready = sctp_data_ready;
sk->sk_write_space = sctp_write_space;
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_USE_WRITE_QUEUE);
/* Get the receive buffer policy for this endpoint */
- ep->rcvbuf_policy = sctp_rcvbuf_policy;
+ ep->rcvbuf_policy = net->sctp.rcvbuf_policy;
/* Initialize the secret key used with cookie. */
- get_random_bytes(&ep->secret_key[0], SCTP_SECRET_SIZE);
- ep->last_key = ep->current_key = 0;
- ep->key_changed_at = jiffies;
+ get_random_bytes(ep->secret_key, sizeof(ep->secret_key));
+
+ /* SCTP-AUTH extensions*/
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ep->endpoint_shared_keys);
+ null_key = sctp_auth_shkey_create(0, gfp);
+ if (!null_key)
+ goto nomem;
+
+ list_add(&null_key->key_list, &ep->endpoint_shared_keys);
+
+ /* Allocate and initialize transorms arrays for supported HMACs. */
+ err = sctp_auth_init_hmacs(ep, gfp);
+ if (err)
+ goto nomem_hmacs;
+
+ /* Add the null key to the endpoint shared keys list and
+ * set the hmcas and chunks pointers.
+ */
+ ep->auth_hmacs_list = auth_hmacs;
+ ep->auth_chunk_list = auth_chunks;
return ep;
+
+nomem_hmacs:
+ sctp_auth_destroy_keys(&ep->endpoint_shared_keys);
+nomem:
+ /* Free all allocations */
+ kfree(auth_hmacs);
+ kfree(auth_chunks);
+ kfree(ep->digest);
+ return NULL;
+
}
/* Create a sctp_endpoint with all that boring stuff initialized.
@@ -123,12 +186,13 @@ struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_new(struct sock *sk, gfp_t gfp)
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
/* Build a local endpoint. */
- ep = t_new(struct sctp_endpoint, gfp);
+ ep = kzalloc(sizeof(*ep), gfp);
if (!ep)
goto fail;
+
if (!sctp_endpoint_init(ep, sk, gfp))
goto fail_init;
- ep->base.malloced = 1;
+
SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_INC(ep);
return ep;
@@ -144,6 +208,13 @@ void sctp_endpoint_add_asoc(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
{
struct sock *sk = ep->base.sk;
+ /* If this is a temporary association, don't bother
+ * since we'll be removing it shortly and don't
+ * want anyone to find it anyway.
+ */
+ if (asoc->temp)
+ return;
+
/* Now just add it to our list of asocs */
list_add_tail(&asoc->asocs, &ep->asocs);
@@ -157,40 +228,57 @@ void sctp_endpoint_add_asoc(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
*/
void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
{
- ep->base.dead = 1;
+ ep->base.dead = true;
+
+ ep->base.sk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_CLOSED;
+
+ /* Unlink this endpoint, so we can't find it again! */
+ sctp_unhash_endpoint(ep);
+
sctp_endpoint_put(ep);
}
/* Final destructor for endpoint. */
static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
{
- SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return);
+ struct sock *sk;
- ep->base.sk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_CLOSED;
+ if (unlikely(!ep->base.dead)) {
+ WARN(1, "Attempt to destroy undead endpoint %p!\n", ep);
+ return;
+ }
- /* Unlink this endpoint, so we can't find it again! */
- sctp_unhash_endpoint(ep);
+ /* Free the digest buffer */
+ kfree(ep->digest);
+
+ /* SCTP-AUTH: Free up AUTH releated data such as shared keys
+ * chunks and hmacs arrays that were allocated
+ */
+ sctp_auth_destroy_keys(&ep->endpoint_shared_keys);
+ kfree(ep->auth_hmacs_list);
+ kfree(ep->auth_chunk_list);
- /* Free up the HMAC transform. */
- sctp_crypto_free_tfm(sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac);
+ /* AUTH - Free any allocated HMAC transform containers */
+ sctp_auth_destroy_hmacs(ep->auth_hmacs);
/* Cleanup. */
sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue);
sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr);
- /* Remove and free the port */
- if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash)
- sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk);
+ memset(ep->secret_key, 0, sizeof(ep->secret_key));
/* Give up our hold on the sock. */
- if (ep->base.sk)
- sock_put(ep->base.sk);
+ sk = ep->base.sk;
+ if (sk != NULL) {
+ /* Remove and free the port */
+ if (sctp_sk(sk)->bind_hash)
+ sctp_put_port(sk);
- /* Finally, free up our memory. */
- if (ep->base.malloced) {
- kfree(ep);
- SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(ep);
+ sock_put(sk);
}
+
+ kfree(ep);
+ SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(ep);
}
/* Hold a reference to an endpoint. */
@@ -210,23 +298,18 @@ void sctp_endpoint_put(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
/* Is this the endpoint we are looking for? */
struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_is_match(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+ struct net *net,
const union sctp_addr *laddr)
{
- struct sctp_endpoint *retval;
+ struct sctp_endpoint *retval = NULL;
- sctp_read_lock(&ep->base.addr_lock);
- if (ep->base.bind_addr.port == laddr->v4.sin_port) {
+ if ((htons(ep->base.bind_addr.port) == laddr->v4.sin_port) &&
+ net_eq(sock_net(ep->base.sk), net)) {
if (sctp_bind_addr_match(&ep->base.bind_addr, laddr,
- sctp_sk(ep->base.sk))) {
+ sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)))
retval = ep;
- goto out;
- }
}
- retval = NULL;
-
-out:
- sctp_read_unlock(&ep->base.addr_lock);
return retval;
}
@@ -239,26 +322,43 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc(
const union sctp_addr *paddr,
struct sctp_transport **transport)
{
+ struct sctp_association *asoc = NULL;
+ struct sctp_association *tmp;
+ struct sctp_transport *t = NULL;
+ struct sctp_hashbucket *head;
+ struct sctp_ep_common *epb;
+ int hash;
int rport;
- struct sctp_association *asoc;
- struct list_head *pos;
- rport = paddr->v4.sin_port;
-
- list_for_each(pos, &ep->asocs) {
- asoc = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_association, asocs);
- if (rport == asoc->peer.port) {
- sctp_read_lock(&asoc->base.addr_lock);
- *transport = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, paddr);
- sctp_read_unlock(&asoc->base.addr_lock);
+ *transport = NULL;
- if (*transport)
- return asoc;
+ /* If the local port is not set, there can't be any associations
+ * on this endpoint.
+ */
+ if (!ep->base.bind_addr.port)
+ goto out;
+
+ rport = ntohs(paddr->v4.sin_port);
+
+ hash = sctp_assoc_hashfn(sock_net(ep->base.sk), ep->base.bind_addr.port,
+ rport);
+ head = &sctp_assoc_hashtable[hash];
+ read_lock(&head->lock);
+ sctp_for_each_hentry(epb, &head->chain) {
+ tmp = sctp_assoc(epb);
+ if (tmp->ep != ep || rport != tmp->peer.port)
+ continue;
+
+ t = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(tmp, paddr);
+ if (t) {
+ asoc = tmp;
+ *transport = t;
+ break;
}
}
-
- *transport = NULL;
- return NULL;
+ read_unlock(&head->lock);
+out:
+ return asoc;
}
/* Lookup association on an endpoint based on a peer address. BH-safe. */
@@ -269,9 +369,9 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc(
{
struct sctp_association *asoc;
- sctp_local_bh_disable();
+ local_bh_disable();
asoc = __sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc(ep, paddr, transport);
- sctp_local_bh_enable();
+ local_bh_enable();
return asoc;
}
@@ -282,20 +382,18 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc(
int sctp_endpoint_is_peeled_off(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const union sctp_addr *paddr)
{
- struct list_head *pos;
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *addr;
struct sctp_bind_addr *bp;
+ struct net *net = sock_net(ep->base.sk);
- sctp_read_lock(&ep->base.addr_lock);
bp = &ep->base.bind_addr;
- list_for_each(pos, &bp->address_list) {
- addr = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_sockaddr_entry, list);
- if (sctp_has_association(&addr->a, paddr)) {
- sctp_read_unlock(&ep->base.addr_lock);
+ /* This function is called with the socket lock held,
+ * so the address_list can not change.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(addr, &bp->address_list, list) {
+ if (sctp_has_association(net, &addr->a, paddr))
return 1;
- }
}
- sctp_read_unlock(&ep->base.addr_lock);
return 0;
}
@@ -303,16 +401,21 @@ int sctp_endpoint_is_peeled_off(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
/* Do delayed input processing. This is scheduled by sctp_rcv().
* This may be called on BH or task time.
*/
-static void sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
+static void sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(struct work_struct *work)
{
+ struct sctp_endpoint *ep =
+ container_of(work, struct sctp_endpoint,
+ base.inqueue.immediate);
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sock *sk;
+ struct net *net;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
struct sctp_inq *inqueue;
sctp_subtype_t subtype;
sctp_state_t state;
int error = 0;
+ int first_time = 1; /* is this the first time through the loop */
if (ep->base.dead)
return;
@@ -320,10 +423,34 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
asoc = NULL;
inqueue = &ep->base.inqueue;
sk = ep->base.sk;
+ net = sock_net(sk);
while (NULL != (chunk = sctp_inq_pop(inqueue))) {
subtype = SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type);
+ /* If the first chunk in the packet is AUTH, do special
+ * processing specified in Section 6.3 of SCTP-AUTH spec
+ */
+ if (first_time && (subtype.chunk == SCTP_CID_AUTH)) {
+ struct sctp_chunkhdr *next_hdr;
+
+ next_hdr = sctp_inq_peek(inqueue);
+ if (!next_hdr)
+ goto normal;
+
+ /* If the next chunk is COOKIE-ECHO, skip the AUTH
+ * chunk while saving a pointer to it so we can do
+ * Authentication later (during cookie-echo
+ * processing).
+ */
+ if (next_hdr->type == SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ECHO) {
+ chunk->auth_chunk = skb_clone(chunk->skb,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ chunk->auth = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+normal:
/* We might have grown an association since last we
* looked, so try again.
*
@@ -339,20 +466,25 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
}
state = asoc ? asoc->state : SCTP_STATE_CLOSED;
+ if (sctp_auth_recv_cid(subtype.chunk, asoc) && !chunk->auth)
+ continue;
/* Remember where the last DATA chunk came from so we
* know where to send the SACK.
*/
if (asoc && sctp_chunk_is_data(chunk))
asoc->peer.last_data_from = chunk->transport;
- else
- SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_INCTRLCHUNKS);
+ else {
+ SCTP_INC_STATS(sock_net(ep->base.sk), SCTP_MIB_INCTRLCHUNKS);
+ if (asoc)
+ asoc->stats.ictrlchunks++;
+ }
if (chunk->transport)
- chunk->transport->last_time_heard = jiffies;
+ chunk->transport->last_time_heard = ktime_get();
- error = sctp_do_sm(SCTP_EVENT_T_CHUNK, subtype, state,
- ep, asoc, chunk, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ error = sctp_do_sm(net, SCTP_EVENT_T_CHUNK, subtype, state,
+ ep, asoc, chunk, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (error && chunk)
chunk->pdiscard = 1;
@@ -362,5 +494,8 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
*/
if (!sctp_sk(sk)->ep)
break;
+
+ if (first_time)
+ first_time = 0;
}
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 (git 2.46.0) at 2025-12-05 21:41:43 +0000