diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/mac80211/wpa.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/wpa.c | 170 |
1 files changed, 142 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c index c9edfcb7a13..9b3dcc20114 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast - * frames in the BSS. ( + * frames in the BSS. */ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } @@ -301,22 +301,15 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) } -static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch, - int encrypted) +static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad) { __le16 mask_fc; int a4_included, mgmt; u8 qos_tid; - u8 *b_0, *aad; - u16 data_len, len_a; + u16 len_a; unsigned int hdrlen; struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; - memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - - b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE; - aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE; - /* * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt) * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected @@ -338,20 +331,21 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch, else qos_tid = 0; - data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; - if (encrypted) - data_len -= IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN; + /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC + * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived + * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the + * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take + * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting + * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs. + */ + b_0[0] = 0x1; - /* First block, b_0 */ - b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */ /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7) */ b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4); memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); - /* l(m) */ - put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]); /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */ @@ -407,11 +401,15 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) u8 *pos; u8 pn[6]; u64 pn64; - u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; if (info->control.hw_key && !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && - !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) { + !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) && + !((info->control.hw_key->flags & + IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) && + ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) { /* * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP * header or MIC fields @@ -460,9 +458,9 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) return 0; pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; - ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 0); - ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, pos, len, - pos, skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN)); + ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad); + ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len, + skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN)); return 0; } @@ -499,7 +497,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) && - !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(hdr)) + !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb)) return RX_CONTINUE; data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN - @@ -525,16 +523,16 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) } if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { - u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ - ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 1); + ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad); if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt( - key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, + key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len, - skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN, - skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN)) + skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } @@ -549,6 +547,106 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) return RX_CONTINUE; } +static ieee80211_tx_result +ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; + struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; + struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); + const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = key->sta->cipher_scheme; + int hdrlen; + u8 *pos; + + if (info->control.hw_key && + !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) { + /* hwaccel has no need for preallocated head room */ + return TX_CONTINUE; + } + + if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < cs->hdr_len && + pskb_expand_head(skb, cs->hdr_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC))) + return TX_DROP; + + hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); + + pos = skb_push(skb, cs->hdr_len); + memmove(pos, pos + cs->hdr_len, hdrlen); + skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + cs->hdr_len); + + return TX_CONTINUE; +} + +static inline int ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(u8 *pn1, u8 *pn2, int len) +{ + int i; + + /* pn is little endian */ + for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + if (pn1[i] < pn2[i]) + return -1; + else if (pn1[i] > pn2[i]) + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static ieee80211_rx_result +ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) +{ + struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; + const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = NULL; + int hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); + struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb); + int data_len; + u8 *rx_pn; + u8 *skb_pn; + u8 qos_tid; + + if (!rx->sta || !rx->sta->cipher_scheme || + !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + + if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control)) + return RX_CONTINUE; + + cs = rx->sta->cipher_scheme; + + data_len = rx->skb->len - hdrlen - cs->hdr_len; + + if (data_len < 0) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + + if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) + qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK; + else + qos_tid = 0; + + if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + + hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; + + rx_pn = key->u.gen.rx_pn[qos_tid]; + skb_pn = rx->skb->data + hdrlen + cs->pn_off; + + if (ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(skb_pn, rx_pn, cs->pn_len) <= 0) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + + memcpy(rx_pn, skb_pn, cs->pn_len); + + /* remove security header and MIC */ + if (pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - cs->mic_len)) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + + memmove(rx->skb->data + cs->hdr_len, rx->skb->data, hdrlen); + skb_pull(rx->skb, cs->hdr_len); + + return RX_CONTINUE; +} static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad) { @@ -689,6 +787,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) { struct sk_buff *skb; struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL; + ieee80211_tx_result res; skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); @@ -696,9 +795,24 @@ ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) /* handle hw-only algorithm */ if (!info->control.hw_key) return TX_DROP; + + if (tx->key->sta->cipher_scheme) { + res = ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(tx, skb); + if (res != TX_CONTINUE) + return res; + } } ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); return TX_CONTINUE; } + +ieee80211_rx_result +ieee80211_crypto_hw_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) +{ + if (rx->sta->cipher_scheme) + return ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(rx); + + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; +} |
