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Diffstat (limited to 'net/mac80211/wpa.c')
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/wpa.c233
1 files changed, 175 insertions, 58 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index c175ee866ff..9b3dcc20114 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
if (!info->control.hw_key)
- tail += TKIP_ICV_LEN;
+ tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
- skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
+ skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN))
return TX_DROP;
key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
* APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
* errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
* group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
- * frames in the BSS. (
+ * frames in the BSS.
*/
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
@@ -181,7 +181,6 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
- unsigned long flags;
unsigned int hdrlen;
int len, tail;
u8 *pos;
@@ -199,15 +198,16 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (info->control.hw_key)
tail = 0;
else
- tail = TKIP_ICV_LEN;
+ tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
- skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
+ skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN))
return -1;
- pos = skb_push(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
- memmove(pos, pos + TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
- skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + TKIP_IV_LEN);
+ pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
+ memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
+ skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) +
+ IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
pos += hdrlen;
/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
@@ -216,19 +216,19 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0;
/* Increase IV for the frame */
- spin_lock_irqsave(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
+ spin_lock(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++;
if (key->u.tkip.tx.iv16 == 0)
key->u.tkip.tx.iv32++;
pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
+ spin_unlock(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
/* hwaccel - with software IV */
if (info->control.hw_key)
return 0;
/* Add room for ICV */
- skb_put(skb, TKIP_ICV_LEN);
+ skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
key, skb, pos, len);
@@ -291,32 +291,25 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
/* Trim ICV */
- skb_trim(skb, skb->len - TKIP_ICV_LEN);
+ skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
/* Remove IV */
- memmove(skb->data + TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
- skb_pull(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
+ memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
+ skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
-static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
- int encrypted)
+static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
{
__le16 mask_fc;
int a4_included, mgmt;
u8 qos_tid;
- u8 *b_0, *aad;
- u16 data_len, len_a;
+ u16 len_a;
unsigned int hdrlen;
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
- memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-
- b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-
/*
* Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
* Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
@@ -338,20 +331,21 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
else
qos_tid = 0;
- data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN;
- if (encrypted)
- data_len -= CCMP_MIC_LEN;
+ /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
+ * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
+ * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
+ * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
+ * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
+ * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
+ */
+ b_0[0] = 0x1;
- /* First block, b_0 */
- b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */
/* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
* Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
*/
b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
- memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
- /* l(m) */
- put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]);
+ memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
* FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
@@ -407,11 +401,15 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
u8 *pos;
u8 pn[6];
u64 pn64;
- u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
if (info->control.hw_key &&
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
- !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
+ !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
+ !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
+ IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
+ ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
/*
* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
* header or MIC fields
@@ -425,15 +423,16 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (info->control.hw_key)
tail = 0;
else
- tail = CCMP_MIC_LEN;
+ tail = IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
- skb_headroom(skb) < CCMP_HDR_LEN))
+ skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
return -1;
- pos = skb_push(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
- memmove(pos, pos + CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
- skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + CCMP_HDR_LEN);
+ pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
+ memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
+ skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) +
+ IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
if (info->control.hw_key &&
@@ -458,10 +457,10 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (info->control.hw_key)
return 0;
- pos += CCMP_HDR_LEN;
- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 0);
- ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, pos, len,
- pos, skb_put(skb, CCMP_MIC_LEN));
+ pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
+ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
+ ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
+ skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN));
return 0;
}
@@ -491,22 +490,23 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
- u8 pn[CCMP_PN_LEN];
+ u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
int data_len;
int queue;
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
- !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(hdr))
+ !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
return RX_CONTINUE;
- data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN - CCMP_MIC_LEN;
+ data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN -
+ IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
- if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
+ if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
} else {
if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
@@ -517,35 +517,136 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
queue = rx->security_idx;
- if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
+ if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
key->u.ccmp.replays++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
- u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 1);
+ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
- key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch,
- skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len,
- skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN,
- skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
+ key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
+ skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
+ data_len,
+ skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
- memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
+ memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
/* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
- if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN))
+ if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
- memmove(skb->data + CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
- skb_pull(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
+ memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
+ skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
+static ieee80211_tx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+ struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
+ struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+ const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = key->sta->cipher_scheme;
+ int hdrlen;
+ u8 *pos;
+
+ if (info->control.hw_key &&
+ !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
+ /* hwaccel has no need for preallocated head room */
+ return TX_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < cs->hdr_len &&
+ pskb_expand_head(skb, cs->hdr_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)))
+ return TX_DROP;
+
+ hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+
+ pos = skb_push(skb, cs->hdr_len);
+ memmove(pos, pos + cs->hdr_len, hdrlen);
+ skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + cs->hdr_len);
+
+ return TX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static inline int ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(u8 *pn1, u8 *pn2, int len)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* pn is little endian */
+ for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (pn1[i] < pn2[i])
+ return -1;
+ else if (pn1[i] > pn2[i])
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ieee80211_rx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+{
+ struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
+ const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = NULL;
+ int hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+ struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb);
+ int data_len;
+ u8 *rx_pn;
+ u8 *skb_pn;
+ u8 qos_tid;
+
+ if (!rx->sta || !rx->sta->cipher_scheme ||
+ !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+ if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
+ return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+ cs = rx->sta->cipher_scheme;
+
+ data_len = rx->skb->len - hdrlen - cs->hdr_len;
+
+ if (data_len < 0)
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+ if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
+ qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) &
+ IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
+ else
+ qos_tid = 0;
+
+ if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
+
+ rx_pn = key->u.gen.rx_pn[qos_tid];
+ skb_pn = rx->skb->data + hdrlen + cs->pn_off;
+
+ if (ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(skb_pn, rx_pn, cs->pn_len) <= 0)
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+ memcpy(rx_pn, skb_pn, cs->pn_len);
+
+ /* remove security header and MIC */
+ if (pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - cs->mic_len))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+ memmove(rx->skb->data + cs->hdr_len, rx->skb->data, hdrlen);
+ skb_pull(rx->skb, cs->hdr_len);
+
+ return RX_CONTINUE;
+}
static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
{
@@ -686,6 +787,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL;
+ ieee80211_tx_result res;
skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
@@ -693,9 +795,24 @@ ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
/* handle hw-only algorithm */
if (!info->control.hw_key)
return TX_DROP;
+
+ if (tx->key->sta->cipher_scheme) {
+ res = ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(tx, skb);
+ if (res != TX_CONTINUE)
+ return res;
+ }
}
ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
+
+ieee80211_rx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_hw_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+{
+ if (rx->sta->cipher_scheme)
+ return ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(rx);
+
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 (git 2.46.0) at 2025-11-09 14:12:37 +0000