diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/capability.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/capability.c | 191 |
1 files changed, 159 insertions, 32 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 2f05303715a..a5cf13c018c 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -7,13 +7,16 @@ * 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net> */ +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/mm.h> -#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> /* @@ -21,12 +24,7 @@ */ const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set = CAP_EMPTY_SET; -const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set = CAP_FULL_SET; -const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET; - EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set); int file_caps_enabled = 1; @@ -45,15 +43,10 @@ __setup("no_file_caps", file_caps_disable); static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void) { - static int warned; - if (!warned) { - char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; - - printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities" - " (legacy support in use)\n", - get_task_comm(name, current)); - warned = 1; - } + char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; + + pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities (legacy support in use)\n", + get_task_comm(name, current)); } /* @@ -74,16 +67,10 @@ static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void) static void warn_deprecated_v2(void) { - static int warned; - - if (!warned) { - char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; + char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; - printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' uses deprecated v2" - " capabilities in a way that may be insecure.\n", - get_task_comm(name, current)); - warned = 1; - } + pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses deprecated v2 capabilities in a way that may be insecure\n", + get_task_comm(name, current)); } /* @@ -201,7 +188,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr) * * An alternative would be to return an error here * (-ERANGE), but that causes legacy applications to - * unexpectidly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts + * unexpectedly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts * before modification is attempted and the application * fails. */ @@ -280,7 +267,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data) if (ret < 0) goto error; - audit_log_capset(pid, new, current_cred()); + audit_log_capset(new, current_cred()); return commit_creds(new); @@ -290,7 +277,88 @@ error: } /** - * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect + * has_ns_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns + * @t: The task in question + * @ns: target user namespace + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability + * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not. + * + * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. + */ +bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) +{ + int ret; + + rcu_read_lock(); + ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return (ret == 0); +} + +/** + * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns + * @t: The task in question + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability + * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not. + * + * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. + */ +bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap) +{ + return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap); +} + +/** + * has_ns_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) + * in a specific user ns. + * @t: The task in question + * @ns: target user namespace + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability + * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not. + * Do not write an audit message for the check. + * + * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. + */ +bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) +{ + int ret; + + rcu_read_lock(); + ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return (ret == 0); +} + +/** + * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) in the + * initial user ns + * @t: The task in question + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability + * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not. Don't write an + * audit message for the check. + * + * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. + */ +bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) +{ + return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap); +} + +/** + * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect + * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in * @cap: The capability to be tested for * * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently @@ -299,17 +367,76 @@ error: * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the * assumption that it's about to be used. */ -int capable(int cap) +bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) { - printk(KERN_CRIT "capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap); + pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap); BUG(); } - if (security_capable(cap) == 0) { + if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) { current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; - return 1; + return true; } - return 0; + return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); + +/** + * file_ns_capable - Determine if the file's opener had a capability in effect + * @file: The file we want to check + * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if task that opened the file had a capability in effect + * when the file was opened. + * + * This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV because the caller may not + * actually be privileged. + */ +bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap) +{ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap))) + return false; + + if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap) == 0) + return true; + + return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable); + +/** + * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently + * available for use, false if not. + * + * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the + * assumption that it's about to be used. + */ +bool capable(int cap) +{ + return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); + +/** + * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped + * @inode: The inode in question + * @cap: The capability in question + * + * Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at + * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are + * mapped into the current user namespace. + */ +bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap) +{ + struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); + + return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) && + kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid); |