diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/cifs/sess.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/cifs/sess.c | 965 |
1 files changed, 965 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/cifs/sess.c b/fs/cifs/sess.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e87387dbf39 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/cifs/sess.c @@ -0,0 +1,965 @@ +/* + * fs/cifs/sess.c + * + * SMB/CIFS session setup handling routines + * + * Copyright (c) International Business Machines Corp., 2006, 2009 + * Author(s): Steve French (sfrench@us.ibm.com) + * + * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published + * by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See + * the GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License + * along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#include "cifspdu.h" +#include "cifsglob.h" +#include "cifsproto.h" +#include "cifs_unicode.h" +#include "cifs_debug.h" +#include "ntlmssp.h" +#include "nterr.h" +#include <linux/utsname.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include "cifs_spnego.h" + +static __u32 cifs_ssetup_hdr(struct cifs_ses *ses, SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB) +{ + __u32 capabilities = 0; + + /* init fields common to all four types of SessSetup */ + /* Note that offsets for first seven fields in req struct are same */ + /* in CIFS Specs so does not matter which of 3 forms of struct */ + /* that we use in next few lines */ + /* Note that header is initialized to zero in header_assemble */ + pSMB->req.AndXCommand = 0xFF; + pSMB->req.MaxBufferSize = cpu_to_le16(min_t(u32, + CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE - 4, + USHRT_MAX)); + pSMB->req.MaxMpxCount = cpu_to_le16(ses->server->maxReq); + pSMB->req.VcNumber = __constant_cpu_to_le16(1); + + /* Now no need to set SMBFLG_CASELESS or obsolete CANONICAL PATH */ + + /* BB verify whether signing required on neg or just on auth frame + (and NTLM case) */ + + capabilities = CAP_LARGE_FILES | CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_LEVEL_II_OPLOCKS | + CAP_LARGE_WRITE_X | CAP_LARGE_READ_X; + + if (ses->server->sign) + pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE; + + if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) { + pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_UNICODE; + capabilities |= CAP_UNICODE; + } + if (ses->capabilities & CAP_STATUS32) { + pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_ERR_STATUS; + capabilities |= CAP_STATUS32; + } + if (ses->capabilities & CAP_DFS) { + pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_DFS; + capabilities |= CAP_DFS; + } + if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNIX) + capabilities |= CAP_UNIX; + + return capabilities; +} + +static void +unicode_oslm_strings(char **pbcc_area, const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area; + int bytes_ret = 0; + + /* Copy OS version */ + bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)bcc_ptr, "Linux version ", 32, + nls_cp); + bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret; + bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, init_utsname()->release, + 32, nls_cp); + bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret; + bcc_ptr += 2; /* trailing null */ + + bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS, + 32, nls_cp); + bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret; + bcc_ptr += 2; /* trailing null */ + + *pbcc_area = bcc_ptr; +} + +static void unicode_domain_string(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area; + int bytes_ret = 0; + + /* copy domain */ + if (ses->domainName == NULL) { + /* Sending null domain better than using a bogus domain name (as + we did briefly in 2.6.18) since server will use its default */ + *bcc_ptr = 0; + *(bcc_ptr+1) = 0; + bytes_ret = 0; + } else + bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, ses->domainName, + CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN, nls_cp); + bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret; + bcc_ptr += 2; /* account for null terminator */ + + *pbcc_area = bcc_ptr; +} + + +static void unicode_ssetup_strings(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area; + int bytes_ret = 0; + + /* BB FIXME add check that strings total less + than 335 or will need to send them as arrays */ + + /* unicode strings, must be word aligned before the call */ +/* if ((long) bcc_ptr % 2) { + *bcc_ptr = 0; + bcc_ptr++; + } */ + /* copy user */ + if (ses->user_name == NULL) { + /* null user mount */ + *bcc_ptr = 0; + *(bcc_ptr+1) = 0; + } else { + bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, ses->user_name, + CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN, nls_cp); + } + bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret; + bcc_ptr += 2; /* account for null termination */ + + unicode_domain_string(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp); + unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, nls_cp); + + *pbcc_area = bcc_ptr; +} + +static void ascii_ssetup_strings(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area; + + /* copy user */ + /* BB what about null user mounts - check that we do this BB */ + /* copy user */ + if (ses->user_name != NULL) { + strncpy(bcc_ptr, ses->user_name, CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN); + bcc_ptr += strnlen(ses->user_name, CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN); + } + /* else null user mount */ + *bcc_ptr = 0; + bcc_ptr++; /* account for null termination */ + + /* copy domain */ + if (ses->domainName != NULL) { + strncpy(bcc_ptr, ses->domainName, CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN); + bcc_ptr += strnlen(ses->domainName, CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN); + } /* else we will send a null domain name + so the server will default to its own domain */ + *bcc_ptr = 0; + bcc_ptr++; + + /* BB check for overflow here */ + + strcpy(bcc_ptr, "Linux version "); + bcc_ptr += strlen("Linux version "); + strcpy(bcc_ptr, init_utsname()->release); + bcc_ptr += strlen(init_utsname()->release) + 1; + + strcpy(bcc_ptr, CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS); + bcc_ptr += strlen(CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS) + 1; + + *pbcc_area = bcc_ptr; +} + +static void +decode_unicode_ssetup(char **pbcc_area, int bleft, struct cifs_ses *ses, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + int len; + char *data = *pbcc_area; + + cifs_dbg(FYI, "bleft %d\n", bleft); + + kfree(ses->serverOS); + ses->serverOS = cifs_strndup_from_utf16(data, bleft, true, nls_cp); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "serverOS=%s\n", ses->serverOS); + len = (UniStrnlen((wchar_t *) data, bleft / 2) * 2) + 2; + data += len; + bleft -= len; + if (bleft <= 0) + return; + + kfree(ses->serverNOS); + ses->serverNOS = cifs_strndup_from_utf16(data, bleft, true, nls_cp); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "serverNOS=%s\n", ses->serverNOS); + len = (UniStrnlen((wchar_t *) data, bleft / 2) * 2) + 2; + data += len; + bleft -= len; + if (bleft <= 0) + return; + + kfree(ses->serverDomain); + ses->serverDomain = cifs_strndup_from_utf16(data, bleft, true, nls_cp); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "serverDomain=%s\n", ses->serverDomain); + + return; +} + +static void decode_ascii_ssetup(char **pbcc_area, __u16 bleft, + struct cifs_ses *ses, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + int len; + char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area; + + cifs_dbg(FYI, "decode sessetup ascii. bleft %d\n", bleft); + + len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft); + if (len >= bleft) + return; + + kfree(ses->serverOS); + + ses->serverOS = kzalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (ses->serverOS) + strncpy(ses->serverOS, bcc_ptr, len); + if (strncmp(ses->serverOS, "OS/2", 4) == 0) + cifs_dbg(FYI, "OS/2 server\n"); + + bcc_ptr += len + 1; + bleft -= len + 1; + + len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft); + if (len >= bleft) + return; + + kfree(ses->serverNOS); + + ses->serverNOS = kzalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (ses->serverNOS) + strncpy(ses->serverNOS, bcc_ptr, len); + + bcc_ptr += len + 1; + bleft -= len + 1; + + len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft); + if (len > bleft) + return; + + /* No domain field in LANMAN case. Domain is + returned by old servers in the SMB negprot response */ + /* BB For newer servers which do not support Unicode, + but thus do return domain here we could add parsing + for it later, but it is not very important */ + cifs_dbg(FYI, "ascii: bytes left %d\n", bleft); +} + +int decode_ntlmssp_challenge(char *bcc_ptr, int blob_len, + struct cifs_ses *ses) +{ + unsigned int tioffset; /* challenge message target info area */ + unsigned int tilen; /* challenge message target info area length */ + + CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *pblob = (CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *)bcc_ptr; + + if (blob_len < sizeof(CHALLENGE_MESSAGE)) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "challenge blob len %d too small\n", blob_len); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (memcmp(pblob->Signature, "NTLMSSP", 8)) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "blob signature incorrect %s\n", + pblob->Signature); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (pblob->MessageType != NtLmChallenge) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Incorrect message type %d\n", + pblob->MessageType); + return -EINVAL; + } + + memcpy(ses->ntlmssp->cryptkey, pblob->Challenge, CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE); + /* BB we could decode pblob->NegotiateFlags; some may be useful */ + /* In particular we can examine sign flags */ + /* BB spec says that if AvId field of MsvAvTimestamp is populated then + we must set the MIC field of the AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE */ + ses->ntlmssp->server_flags = le32_to_cpu(pblob->NegotiateFlags); + tioffset = le32_to_cpu(pblob->TargetInfoArray.BufferOffset); + tilen = le16_to_cpu(pblob->TargetInfoArray.Length); + if (tioffset > blob_len || tioffset + tilen > blob_len) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "tioffset + tilen too high %u + %u", + tioffset, tilen); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (tilen) { + ses->auth_key.response = kmemdup(bcc_ptr + tioffset, tilen, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ses->auth_key.response) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Challenge target info alloc failure"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + ses->auth_key.len = tilen; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* BB Move to ntlmssp.c eventually */ + +/* We do not malloc the blob, it is passed in pbuffer, because + it is fixed size, and small, making this approach cleaner */ +void build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer, + struct cifs_ses *ses) +{ + NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob = (NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *)pbuffer; + __u32 flags; + + memset(pbuffer, 0, sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE)); + memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8); + sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmNegotiate; + + /* BB is NTLMV2 session security format easier to use here? */ + flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 | NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE | + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC; + if (ses->server->sign) { + flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN; + if (!ses->server->session_estab || + ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess) + flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH; + } + + sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags); + + sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = 0; + sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0; + sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0; + + /* Domain name is sent on the Challenge not Negotiate NTLMSSP request */ + sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = 0; + sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0; + sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0; +} + +/* We do not malloc the blob, it is passed in pbuffer, because its + maximum possible size is fixed and small, making this approach cleaner. + This function returns the length of the data in the blob */ +int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer, + u16 *buflen, + struct cifs_ses *ses, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + int rc; + AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob = (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *)pbuffer; + __u32 flags; + unsigned char *tmp; + + memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8); + sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate; + + flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 | + NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO | + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE | + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC; + if (ses->server->sign) { + flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN; + if (!ses->server->session_estab || + ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess) + flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH; + } + + tmp = pbuffer + sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE); + sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags); + + sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.BufferOffset = + cpu_to_le32(sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE)); + sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.Length = 0; + sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0; + + sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer); + rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, nls_cp); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMSSP authentication\n", rc); + goto setup_ntlmv2_ret; + } + memcpy(tmp, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, + ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + tmp += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE; + + sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length = + cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = + cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + + if (ses->domainName == NULL) { + sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer); + sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0; + sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0; + tmp += 2; + } else { + int len; + len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->domainName, + CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN, nls_cp); + len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */ + sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer); + sec_blob->DomainName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len); + sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len); + tmp += len; + } + + if (ses->user_name == NULL) { + sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer); + sec_blob->UserName.Length = 0; + sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = 0; + tmp += 2; + } else { + int len; + len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->user_name, + CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN, nls_cp); + len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */ + sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer); + sec_blob->UserName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len); + sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len); + tmp += len; + } + + sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer); + sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0; + sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0; + tmp += 2; + + if (((ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH) || + (ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC)) + && !calc_seckey(ses)) { + memcpy(tmp, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE); + sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer); + sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE); + sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = + cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE); + tmp += CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE; + } else { + sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer); + sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = 0; + sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = 0; + } + +setup_ntlmv2_ret: + *buflen = tmp - pbuffer; + return rc; +} + +enum securityEnum +select_sectype(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, enum securityEnum requested) +{ + switch (server->negflavor) { + case CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED: + switch (requested) { + case Kerberos: + case RawNTLMSSP: + return requested; + case Unspecified: + if (server->sec_ntlmssp && + (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP)) + return RawNTLMSSP; + if ((server->sec_kerberos || server->sec_mskerberos) && + (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5)) + return Kerberos; + /* Fallthrough */ + default: + return Unspecified; + } + case CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_UNENCAP: + switch (requested) { + case NTLM: + case NTLMv2: + return requested; + case Unspecified: + if (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2) + return NTLMv2; + if (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM) + return NTLM; + default: + /* Fallthrough to attempt LANMAN authentication next */ + break; + } + case CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_LANMAN: + switch (requested) { + case LANMAN: + return requested; + case Unspecified: + if (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_LANMAN) + return LANMAN; + /* Fallthrough */ + default: + return Unspecified; + } + default: + return Unspecified; + } +} + +int +CIFS_SessSetup(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + int rc = 0; + int wct; + struct smb_hdr *smb_buf; + char *bcc_ptr; + char *str_area; + SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB; + __u32 capabilities; + __u16 count; + int resp_buf_type; + struct kvec iov[3]; + enum securityEnum type; + __u16 action, bytes_remaining; + struct key *spnego_key = NULL; + __le32 phase = NtLmNegotiate; /* NTLMSSP, if needed, is multistage */ + u16 blob_len; + char *ntlmsspblob = NULL; + + if (ses == NULL) { + WARN(1, "%s: ses == NULL!", __func__); + return -EINVAL; + } + + type = select_sectype(ses->server, ses->sectype); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "sess setup type %d\n", type); + if (type == Unspecified) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, + "Unable to select appropriate authentication method!"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (type == RawNTLMSSP) { + /* if memory allocation is successful, caller of this function + * frees it. + */ + ses->ntlmssp = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ntlmssp_auth), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ses->ntlmssp) + return -ENOMEM; + ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess = false; + + } + +ssetup_ntlmssp_authenticate: + if (phase == NtLmChallenge) + phase = NtLmAuthenticate; /* if ntlmssp, now final phase */ + + if (type == LANMAN) { +#ifndef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH + /* LANMAN and plaintext are less secure and off by default. + So we make this explicitly be turned on in kconfig (in the + build) and turned on at runtime (changed from the default) + in proc/fs/cifs or via mount parm. Unfortunately this is + needed for old Win (e.g. Win95), some obscure NAS and OS/2 */ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +#endif + wct = 10; /* lanman 2 style sessionsetup */ + } else if ((type == NTLM) || (type == NTLMv2)) { + /* For NTLMv2 failures eventually may need to retry NTLM */ + wct = 13; /* old style NTLM sessionsetup */ + } else /* same size: negotiate or auth, NTLMSSP or extended security */ + wct = 12; + + rc = small_smb_init_no_tc(SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX, wct, ses, + (void **)&smb_buf); + if (rc) + return rc; + + pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)smb_buf; + + capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, pSMB); + + /* we will send the SMB in three pieces: + a fixed length beginning part, an optional + SPNEGO blob (which can be zero length), and a + last part which will include the strings + and rest of bcc area. This allows us to avoid + a large buffer 17K allocation */ + iov[0].iov_base = (char *)pSMB; + iov[0].iov_len = be32_to_cpu(smb_buf->smb_buf_length) + 4; + + /* setting this here allows the code at the end of the function + to free the request buffer if there's an error */ + resp_buf_type = CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER; + + /* 2000 big enough to fit max user, domain, NOS name etc. */ + str_area = kmalloc(2000, GFP_KERNEL); + if (str_area == NULL) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto ssetup_exit; + } + bcc_ptr = str_area; + + iov[1].iov_base = NULL; + iov[1].iov_len = 0; + + if (type == LANMAN) { +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH + char lnm_session_key[CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE]; + + pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 &= ~SMBFLG2_UNICODE; + + /* no capabilities flags in old lanman negotiation */ + + pSMB->old_req.PasswordLength = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE); + + /* Calculate hash with password and copy into bcc_ptr. + * Encryption Key (stored as in cryptkey) gets used if the + * security mode bit in Negottiate Protocol response states + * to use challenge/response method (i.e. Password bit is 1). + */ + + rc = calc_lanman_hash(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey, + ses->server->sec_mode & SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT ? + true : false, lnm_session_key); + + memcpy(bcc_ptr, (char *)lnm_session_key, CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE); + bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE; + + /* can not sign if LANMAN negotiated so no need + to calculate signing key? but what if server + changed to do higher than lanman dialect and + we reconnected would we ever calc signing_key? */ + + cifs_dbg(FYI, "Negotiating LANMAN setting up strings\n"); + /* Unicode not allowed for LANMAN dialects */ + ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp); +#endif + } else if (type == NTLM) { + pSMB->req_no_secext.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities); + pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength = + cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE); + pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength = + cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE); + + /* calculate ntlm response and session key */ + rc = setup_ntlm_response(ses, nls_cp); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLM authentication\n", + rc); + goto ssetup_exit; + } + + /* copy ntlm response */ + memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, + CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE); + bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE; + memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, + CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE); + bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE; + + if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) { + /* unicode strings must be word aligned */ + if (iov[0].iov_len % 2) { + *bcc_ptr = 0; + bcc_ptr++; + } + unicode_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp); + } else + ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp); + } else if (type == NTLMv2) { + pSMB->req_no_secext.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities); + + /* LM2 password would be here if we supported it */ + pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength = 0; + + /* calculate nlmv2 response and session key */ + rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, nls_cp); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMv2 authentication\n", + rc); + goto ssetup_exit; + } + memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, + ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + bcc_ptr += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE; + + /* set case sensitive password length after tilen may get + * assigned, tilen is 0 otherwise. + */ + pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength = + cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + + if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) { + if (iov[0].iov_len % 2) { + *bcc_ptr = 0; + bcc_ptr++; + } + unicode_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp); + } else + ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp); + } else if (type == Kerberos) { +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL + struct cifs_spnego_msg *msg; + + spnego_key = cifs_get_spnego_key(ses); + if (IS_ERR(spnego_key)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(spnego_key); + spnego_key = NULL; + goto ssetup_exit; + } + + msg = spnego_key->payload.data; + /* check version field to make sure that cifs.upcall is + sending us a response in an expected form */ + if (msg->version != CIFS_SPNEGO_UPCALL_VERSION) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "incorrect version of cifs.upcall " + "expected %d but got %d)", + CIFS_SPNEGO_UPCALL_VERSION, msg->version); + rc = -EKEYREJECTED; + goto ssetup_exit; + } + + ses->auth_key.response = kmemdup(msg->data, msg->sesskey_len, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ses->auth_key.response) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, + "Kerberos can't allocate (%u bytes) memory", + msg->sesskey_len); + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto ssetup_exit; + } + ses->auth_key.len = msg->sesskey_len; + + pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC; + capabilities |= CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY; + pSMB->req.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities); + iov[1].iov_base = msg->data + msg->sesskey_len; + iov[1].iov_len = msg->secblob_len; + pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16(iov[1].iov_len); + + if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) { + /* unicode strings must be word aligned */ + if ((iov[0].iov_len + iov[1].iov_len) % 2) { + *bcc_ptr = 0; + bcc_ptr++; + } + unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, nls_cp); + unicode_domain_string(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp); + } else + /* BB: is this right? */ + ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp); +#else /* ! CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL */ + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Kerberos negotiated but upcall support disabled!\n"); + rc = -ENOSYS; + goto ssetup_exit; +#endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL */ + } else if (type == RawNTLMSSP) { + if ((pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) == 0) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "NTLMSSP requires Unicode support\n"); + rc = -ENOSYS; + goto ssetup_exit; + } + + cifs_dbg(FYI, "ntlmssp session setup phase %d\n", phase); + pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC; + capabilities |= CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY; + pSMB->req.Capabilities |= cpu_to_le32(capabilities); + switch(phase) { + case NtLmNegotiate: + build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob( + pSMB->req.SecurityBlob, ses); + iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE); + iov[1].iov_base = pSMB->req.SecurityBlob; + pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength = + cpu_to_le16(sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE)); + break; + case NtLmAuthenticate: + /* + * 5 is an empirical value, large enough to hold + * authenticate message plus max 10 of av paris, + * domain, user, workstation names, flags, etc. + */ + ntlmsspblob = kzalloc( + 5*sizeof(struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ntlmsspblob) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto ssetup_exit; + } + + rc = build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(ntlmsspblob, + &blob_len, ses, nls_cp); + if (rc) + goto ssetup_exit; + iov[1].iov_len = blob_len; + iov[1].iov_base = ntlmsspblob; + pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16(blob_len); + /* + * Make sure that we tell the server that we are using + * the uid that it just gave us back on the response + * (challenge) + */ + smb_buf->Uid = ses->Suid; + break; + default: + cifs_dbg(VFS, "invalid phase %d\n", phase); + rc = -ENOSYS; + goto ssetup_exit; + } + /* unicode strings must be word aligned */ + if ((iov[0].iov_len + iov[1].iov_len) % 2) { + *bcc_ptr = 0; + bcc_ptr++; + } + unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, nls_cp); + } else { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "secType %d not supported!\n", type); + rc = -ENOSYS; + goto ssetup_exit; + } + + iov[2].iov_base = str_area; + iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr - (long) str_area; + + count = iov[1].iov_len + iov[2].iov_len; + smb_buf->smb_buf_length = + cpu_to_be32(be32_to_cpu(smb_buf->smb_buf_length) + count); + + put_bcc(count, smb_buf); + + rc = SendReceive2(xid, ses, iov, 3 /* num_iovecs */, &resp_buf_type, + CIFS_LOG_ERROR); + /* SMB request buf freed in SendReceive2 */ + + pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)iov[0].iov_base; + smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)iov[0].iov_base; + + if ((type == RawNTLMSSP) && (resp_buf_type != CIFS_NO_BUFFER) && + (smb_buf->Status.CifsError == + cpu_to_le32(NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED))) { + if (phase != NtLmNegotiate) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Unexpected more processing error\n"); + goto ssetup_exit; + } + /* NTLMSSP Negotiate sent now processing challenge (response) */ + phase = NtLmChallenge; /* process ntlmssp challenge */ + rc = 0; /* MORE_PROC rc is not an error here, but expected */ + } + if (rc) + goto ssetup_exit; + + if ((smb_buf->WordCount != 3) && (smb_buf->WordCount != 4)) { + rc = -EIO; + cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad word count %d\n", smb_buf->WordCount); + goto ssetup_exit; + } + action = le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.Action); + if (action & GUEST_LOGIN) + cifs_dbg(FYI, "Guest login\n"); /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */ + ses->Suid = smb_buf->Uid; /* UID left in wire format (le) */ + cifs_dbg(FYI, "UID = %llu\n", ses->Suid); + /* response can have either 3 or 4 word count - Samba sends 3 */ + /* and lanman response is 3 */ + bytes_remaining = get_bcc(smb_buf); + bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buf); + + if (smb_buf->WordCount == 4) { + blob_len = le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.SecurityBlobLength); + if (blob_len > bytes_remaining) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad security blob length %d\n", + blob_len); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto ssetup_exit; + } + if (phase == NtLmChallenge) { + rc = decode_ntlmssp_challenge(bcc_ptr, blob_len, ses); + /* now goto beginning for ntlmssp authenticate phase */ + if (rc) + goto ssetup_exit; + } + bcc_ptr += blob_len; + bytes_remaining -= blob_len; + } + + /* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */ + if (bytes_remaining == 0) { + /* no string area to decode, do nothing */ + } else if (smb_buf->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) { + /* unicode string area must be word-aligned */ + if (((unsigned long) bcc_ptr - (unsigned long) smb_buf) % 2) { + ++bcc_ptr; + --bytes_remaining; + } + decode_unicode_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses, nls_cp); + } else { + decode_ascii_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses, nls_cp); + } + +ssetup_exit: + if (spnego_key) { + key_invalidate(spnego_key); + key_put(spnego_key); + } + kfree(str_area); + kfree(ntlmsspblob); + ntlmsspblob = NULL; + if (resp_buf_type == CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER) { + cifs_dbg(FYI, "ssetup freeing small buf %p\n", iov[0].iov_base); + cifs_small_buf_release(iov[0].iov_base); + } else if (resp_buf_type == CIFS_LARGE_BUFFER) + cifs_buf_release(iov[0].iov_base); + + /* if ntlmssp, and negotiate succeeded, proceed to authenticate phase */ + if ((phase == NtLmChallenge) && (rc == 0)) + goto ssetup_ntlmssp_authenticate; + + if (!rc) { + mutex_lock(&ses->server->srv_mutex); + if (!ses->server->session_estab) { + if (ses->server->sign) { + ses->server->session_key.response = + kmemdup(ses->auth_key.response, + ses->auth_key.len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ses->server->session_key.response) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex); + goto keycp_exit; + } + ses->server->session_key.len = + ses->auth_key.len; + } + ses->server->sequence_number = 0x2; + ses->server->session_estab = true; + } + mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex); + + cifs_dbg(FYI, "CIFS session established successfully\n"); + spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock); + ses->status = CifsGood; + ses->need_reconnect = false; + spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock); + } + +keycp_exit: + kfree(ses->auth_key.response); + ses->auth_key.response = NULL; + kfree(ses->ntlmssp); + + return rc; +} |