1 files changed, 507 insertions, 233 deletions

diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
index 7ac0056294c..4934347321d 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  *   fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
  *
- *   Copyright (C) International Business Machines  Corp., 2005,2006
+ *   Copyright (C) International Business Machines  Corp., 2005,2013
  *   Author(s): Steve French (sfrench@us.ibm.com)
  *
  *   This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
@@ -24,87 +24,88 @@
 #include "cifspdu.h"
 #include "cifsglob.h"
 #include "cifs_debug.h"
-#include "md5.h"
 #include "cifs_unicode.h"
 #include "cifsproto.h"
 #include "ntlmssp.h"
 #include <linux/ctype.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
 
-/* Calculate and return the CIFS signature based on the mac key and SMB PDU */
-/* the 16 byte signature must be allocated by the caller  */
-/* Note we only use the 1st eight bytes */
-/* Note that the smb header signature field on input contains the
-	sequence number before this function is called */
-
-extern void mdfour(unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, int n);
-extern void E_md4hash(const unsigned char *passwd, unsigned char *p16);
-extern void SMBencrypt(unsigned char *passwd, const unsigned char *c8,
-		       unsigned char *p24);
-
-static int cifs_calculate_signature(const struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu,
-				const struct session_key *key, char *signature)
+static int
+cifs_crypto_shash_md5_allocate(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
 {
-	struct	MD5Context context;
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int size;
 
-	if ((cifs_pdu == NULL) || (signature == NULL) || (key == NULL))
-		return -EINVAL;
+	if (server->secmech.sdescmd5 != NULL)
+		return 0; /* already allocated */
 
-	cifs_MD5_init(&context);
-	cifs_MD5_update(&context, (char *)&key->data, key->len);
-	cifs_MD5_update(&context, cifs_pdu->Protocol, cifs_pdu->smb_buf_length);
+	server->secmech.md5 = crypto_alloc_shash("md5", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(server->secmech.md5)) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto md5\n");
+		rc = PTR_ERR(server->secmech.md5);
+		server->secmech.md5 = NULL;
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
+			crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.md5);
+	server->secmech.sdescmd5 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!server->secmech.sdescmd5) {
+		crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.md5);
+		server->secmech.md5 = NULL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash.tfm = server->secmech.md5;
+	server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash.flags = 0x0;
 
-	cifs_MD5_final(signature, &context);
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int cifs_sign_smb(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
-		  __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number)
+/*
+ * Calculate and return the CIFS signature based on the mac key and SMB PDU.
+ * The 16 byte signature must be allocated by the caller. Note we only use the
+ * 1st eight bytes and that the smb header signature field on input contains
+ * the sequence number before this function is called. Also, this function
+ * should be called with the server->srv_mutex held.
+ */
+static int cifs_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
+			struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *signature)
 {
-	int rc = 0;
-	char smb_signature[20];
+	int i;
+	int rc;
+	struct kvec *iov = rqst->rq_iov;
+	int n_vec = rqst->rq_nvec;
 
-	if ((cifs_pdu == NULL) || (server == NULL))
+	if (iov == NULL || signature == NULL || server == NULL)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if ((cifs_pdu->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE) == 0)
-		return rc;
-
-	spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
-	cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.SequenceNumber =
-			cpu_to_le32(server->sequence_number);
-	cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0;
-
-	*pexpected_response_sequence_number = server->sequence_number++;
-	server->sequence_number++;
-	spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
-
-	rc = cifs_calculate_signature(cifs_pdu, &server->session_key,
-				      smb_signature);
-	if (rc)
-		memset(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 0, 8);
-	else
-		memcpy(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, smb_signature, 8);
-
-	return rc;
-}
+	if (!server->secmech.sdescmd5) {
+		rc = cifs_crypto_shash_md5_allocate(server);
+		if (rc) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Can't alloc md5 crypto\n", __func__);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
 
-static int cifs_calc_signature2(const struct kvec *iov, int n_vec,
-				const struct session_key *key, char *signature)
-{
-	struct  MD5Context context;
-	int i;
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init md5\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
 
-	if ((iov == NULL) || (signature == NULL) || (key == NULL))
-		return -EINVAL;
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash,
+		server->session_key.response, server->session_key.len);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
 
-	cifs_MD5_init(&context);
-	cifs_MD5_update(&context, (char *)&key->data, key->len);
 	for (i = 0; i < n_vec; i++) {
 		if (iov[i].iov_len == 0)
 			continue;
 		if (iov[i].iov_base == NULL) {
-			cERROR(1, "null iovec entry");
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "null iovec entry\n");
 			return -EIO;
 		}
 		/* The first entry includes a length field (which does not get
@@ -112,42 +113,66 @@ static int cifs_calc_signature2(const struct kvec *iov, int n_vec,
 		if (i == 0) {
 			if (iov[0].iov_len <= 8) /* cmd field at offset 9 */
 				break; /* nothing to sign or corrupt header */
-			cifs_MD5_update(&context, iov[0].iov_base+4,
-				  iov[0].iov_len-4);
-		} else
-			cifs_MD5_update(&context, iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len);
+			rc =
+			crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash,
+				iov[i].iov_base + 4, iov[i].iov_len - 4);
+		} else {
+			rc =
+			crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash,
+				iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len);
+		}
+		if (rc) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with payload\n",
+				 __func__);
+			return rc;
+		}
 	}
 
-	cifs_MD5_final(signature, &context);
+	/* now hash over the rq_pages array */
+	for (i = 0; i < rqst->rq_npages; i++) {
+		struct kvec p_iov;
 
-	return 0;
-}
+		cifs_rqst_page_to_kvec(rqst, i, &p_iov);
+		crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash,
+					p_iov.iov_base, p_iov.iov_len);
+		kunmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]);
+	}
 
+	rc = crypto_shash_final(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash, signature);
+	if (rc)
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
 
-int cifs_sign_smb2(struct kvec *iov, int n_vec, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* must be called with server->srv_mutex held */
+int cifs_sign_rqst(struct smb_rqst *rqst, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
 		   __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	char smb_signature[20];
-	struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = iov[0].iov_base;
+	struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base;
 
 	if ((cifs_pdu == NULL) || (server == NULL))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if ((cifs_pdu->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE) == 0)
+	if (!(cifs_pdu->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE) ||
+	    server->tcpStatus == CifsNeedNegotiate)
 		return rc;
 
-	spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
+	if (!server->session_estab) {
+		memcpy(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, "BSRSPYL", 8);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
 	cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.SequenceNumber =
 				cpu_to_le32(server->sequence_number);
 	cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0;
 
-	*pexpected_response_sequence_number = server->sequence_number++;
-	server->sequence_number++;
-	spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
+	*pexpected_response_sequence_number = ++server->sequence_number;
+	++server->sequence_number;
 
-	rc = cifs_calc_signature2(iov, n_vec, &server->session_key,
-				      smb_signature);
+	rc = cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, smb_signature);
 	if (rc)
 		memset(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 0, 8);
 	else
@@ -156,18 +181,41 @@ int cifs_sign_smb2(struct kvec *iov, int n_vec, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu,
-			  const struct session_key *session_key,
+int cifs_sign_smbv(struct kvec *iov, int n_vec, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+		   __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence)
+{
+	struct smb_rqst rqst = { .rq_iov = iov,
+				 .rq_nvec = n_vec };
+
+	return cifs_sign_rqst(&rqst, server, pexpected_response_sequence);
+}
+
+/* must be called with server->srv_mutex held */
+int cifs_sign_smb(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+		  __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number)
+{
+	struct kvec iov;
+
+	iov.iov_base = cifs_pdu;
+	iov.iov_len = be32_to_cpu(cifs_pdu->smb_buf_length) + 4;
+
+	return cifs_sign_smbv(&iov, 1, server,
+			      pexpected_response_sequence_number);
+}
+
+int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
+			  struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
 			  __u32 expected_sequence_number)
 {
 	unsigned int rc;
 	char server_response_sig[8];
 	char what_we_think_sig_should_be[20];
+	struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base;
 
-	if (cifs_pdu == NULL || session_key == NULL)
+	if (cifs_pdu == NULL || server == NULL)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (cifs_pdu->Command == SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE)
+	if (!server->session_estab)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (cifs_pdu->Command == SMB_COM_LOCKING_ANDX) {
@@ -182,8 +230,8 @@ int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu,
 
 	/* Do not need to verify session setups with signature "BSRSPYL "  */
 	if (memcmp(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, "BSRSPYL ", 8) == 0)
-		cFYI(1, "dummy signature received for smb command 0x%x",
-			cifs_pdu->Command);
+		cifs_dbg(FYI, "dummy signature received for smb command 0x%x\n",
+			 cifs_pdu->Command);
 
 	/* save off the origiginal signature so we can modify the smb and check
 		its signature against what the server sent */
@@ -193,8 +241,9 @@ int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu,
 					cpu_to_le32(expected_sequence_number);
 	cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0;
 
-	rc = cifs_calculate_signature(cifs_pdu, session_key,
-		what_we_think_sig_should_be);
+	mutex_lock(&server->srv_mutex);
+	rc = cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, what_we_think_sig_should_be);
+	mutex_unlock(&server->srv_mutex);
 
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -209,26 +258,51 @@ int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu,
 
 }
 
-/* We fill in key by putting in 40 byte array which was allocated by caller */
-int cifs_calculate_session_key(struct session_key *key, const char *rn,
-			   const char *password)
+/* first calculate 24 bytes ntlm response and then 16 byte session key */
+int setup_ntlm_response(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
 {
-	char temp_key[16];
-	if ((key == NULL) || (rn == NULL))
+	int rc = 0;
+	unsigned int temp_len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
+	char temp_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE];
+
+	if (!ses)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	E_md4hash(password, temp_key);
-	mdfour(key->data.ntlm, temp_key, 16);
-	memcpy(key->data.ntlm+16, rn, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
-	key->len = 40;
-	return 0;
+	ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(temp_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ses->auth_key.response)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ses->auth_key.len = temp_len;
+
+	rc = SMBNTencrypt(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey,
+			ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, nls_cp);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NTLM response, error: %d\n",
+			 __func__, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = E_md4hash(ses->password, temp_key, nls_cp);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NT hash, error: %d\n",
+			 __func__, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = mdfour(ses->auth_key.response, temp_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	if (rc)
+		cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NTLM session key, error: %d\n",
+			 __func__, rc);
+
+	return rc;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
-void calc_lanman_hash(const char *password, const char *cryptkey, bool encrypt,
+int calc_lanman_hash(const char *password, const char *cryptkey, bool encrypt,
 			char *lnm_session_key)
 {
 	int i;
+	int rc;
 	char password_with_pad[CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE];
 
 	memset(password_with_pad, 0, CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE);
@@ -236,10 +310,9 @@ void calc_lanman_hash(const char *password, const char *cryptkey, bool encrypt,
 		strncpy(password_with_pad, password, CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE);
 
 	if (!encrypt && global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_PLNTXT) {
-		memset(lnm_session_key, 0, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
 		memcpy(lnm_session_key, password_with_pad,
 			CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE);
-		return;
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	/* calculate old style session key */
@@ -256,10 +329,9 @@ void calc_lanman_hash(const char *password, const char *cryptkey, bool encrypt,
 	for (i = 0; i < CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE; i++)
 		password_with_pad[i] = toupper(password_with_pad[i]);
 
-	SMBencrypt(password_with_pad, cryptkey, lnm_session_key);
+	rc = SMBencrypt(password_with_pad, cryptkey, lnm_session_key);
 
-	/* clear password before we return/free memory */
-	memset(password_with_pad, 0, CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE);
+	return rc;
 }
 #endif /* CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH */
 
@@ -269,12 +341,10 @@ void calc_lanman_hash(const char *password, const char *cryptkey, bool encrypt,
  * Allocate domain name which gets freed when session struct is deallocated.
  */
 static int
-build_avpair_blob(struct cifsSesInfo *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+build_avpair_blob(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
 {
 	unsigned int dlen;
-	unsigned int wlen;
-	unsigned int size = 6 * sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
-	__le64  curtime;
+	unsigned int size = 2 * sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
 	char *defdmname = "WORKGROUP";
 	unsigned char *blobptr;
 	struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
@@ -286,62 +356,31 @@ build_avpair_blob(struct cifsSesInfo *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
 	}
 
 	dlen = strlen(ses->domainName);
-	wlen = strlen(ses->server->hostname);
 
-	/* The length of this blob is a size which is
-	 * six times the size of a structure which holds name/size +
-	 * two times the unicode length of a domain name +
-	 * two times the unicode length of a server name +
-	 * size of a timestamp (which is 8 bytes).
+	/*
+	 * The length of this blob is two times the size of a
+	 * structure (av pair) which holds name/size
+	 * ( for NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME followed by NTLMSSP_AV_EOL ) +
+	 * unicode length of a netbios domain name
 	 */
-	ses->tilen = size + 2 * (2 * dlen) + 2 * (2 * wlen) + 8;
-	ses->tiblob = kzalloc(ses->tilen, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!ses->tiblob) {
-		ses->tilen = 0;
-		cERROR(1, "Challenge target info allocation failure");
+	ses->auth_key.len = size + 2 * dlen;
+	ses->auth_key.response = kzalloc(ses->auth_key.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
+		ses->auth_key.len = 0;
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	blobptr = ses->tiblob;
+	blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
 	attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
 
+	/*
+	 * As defined in MS-NTLM 3.3.2, just this av pair field
+	 * is sufficient as part of the temp
+	 */
 	attrptr->type = cpu_to_le16(NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME);
 	attrptr->length = cpu_to_le16(2 * dlen);
 	blobptr = (unsigned char *)attrptr + sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
-	cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)blobptr, ses->domainName, dlen, nls_cp);
-
-	blobptr += 2 * dlen;
-	attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
-
-	attrptr->type = cpu_to_le16(NTLMSSP_AV_NB_COMPUTER_NAME);
-	attrptr->length = cpu_to_le16(2 * wlen);
-	blobptr = (unsigned char *)attrptr + sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
-	cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)blobptr, ses->server->hostname, wlen, nls_cp);
-
-	blobptr += 2 * wlen;
-	attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
-
-	attrptr->type = cpu_to_le16(NTLMSSP_AV_DNS_DOMAIN_NAME);
-	attrptr->length = cpu_to_le16(2 * dlen);
-	blobptr = (unsigned char *)attrptr + sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
-	cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)blobptr, ses->domainName, dlen, nls_cp);
-
-	blobptr += 2 * dlen;
-	attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
-
-	attrptr->type = cpu_to_le16(NTLMSSP_AV_DNS_COMPUTER_NAME);
-	attrptr->length = cpu_to_le16(2 * wlen);
-	blobptr = (unsigned char *)attrptr + sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
-	cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)blobptr, ses->server->hostname, wlen, nls_cp);
-
-	blobptr += 2 * wlen;
-	attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
-
-	attrptr->type = cpu_to_le16(NTLMSSP_AV_TIMESTAMP);
-	attrptr->length = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(__le64));
-	blobptr = (unsigned char *)attrptr + sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
-	curtime = cpu_to_le64(cifs_UnixTimeToNT(CURRENT_TIME));
-	memcpy(blobptr, &curtime, sizeof(__le64));
+	cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)blobptr, ses->domainName, dlen, nls_cp);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -357,7 +396,7 @@ build_avpair_blob(struct cifsSesInfo *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
  * about target string i.e. for some, just user name might suffice.
  */
 static int
-find_domain_name(struct cifsSesInfo *ses)
+find_domain_name(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
 {
 	unsigned int attrsize;
 	unsigned int type;
@@ -366,11 +405,11 @@ find_domain_name(struct cifsSesInfo *ses)
 	unsigned char *blobend;
 	struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
 
-	if (!ses->tilen || !ses->tiblob)
+	if (!ses->auth_key.len || !ses->auth_key.response)
 		return 0;
 
-	blobptr = ses->tiblob;
-	blobend = ses->tiblob + ses->tilen;
+	blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
+	blobend = blobptr + ses->auth_key.len;
 
 	while (blobptr + onesize < blobend) {
 		attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
@@ -383,19 +422,16 @@ find_domain_name(struct cifsSesInfo *ses)
 		if (blobptr + attrsize > blobend)
 			break;
 		if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME) {
-			if (!attrsize)
+			if (!attrsize || attrsize >= CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN)
 				break;
 			if (!ses->domainName) {
-				struct nls_table *default_nls;
 				ses->domainName =
 					kmalloc(attrsize + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 				if (!ses->domainName)
 						return -ENOMEM;
-				default_nls = load_nls_default();
-				cifs_from_ucs2(ses->domainName,
+				cifs_from_utf16(ses->domainName,
 					(__le16 *)blobptr, attrsize, attrsize,
-					default_nls, false);
-				unload_nls(default_nls);
+					nls_cp, false);
 				break;
 			}
 		}
@@ -405,136 +441,374 @@ find_domain_name(struct cifsSesInfo *ses)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
+static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash,
 			    const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	int len;
-	char nt_hash[16];
-	struct HMACMD5Context *pctxt;
-	wchar_t *user;
+	char nt_hash[CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE];
+	__le16 *user;
 	wchar_t *domain;
+	wchar_t *server;
 
-	pctxt = kmalloc(sizeof(struct HMACMD5Context), GFP_KERNEL);
-
-	if (pctxt == NULL)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (!ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n", __func__);
+		return -1;
+	}
 
 	/* calculate md4 hash of password */
-	E_md4hash(ses->password, nt_hash);
+	E_md4hash(ses->password, nt_hash, nls_cp);
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5, nt_hash,
+				CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NT Hash as a key\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
 
-	/* convert Domainname to unicode and uppercase */
-	hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(nt_hash, 16, pctxt);
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
 
-	/* convert ses->userName to unicode and uppercase */
-	len = strlen(ses->userName);
+	/* convert ses->user_name to unicode */
+	len = ses->user_name ? strlen(ses->user_name) : 0;
 	user = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (user == NULL)
-		goto calc_exit_2;
-	len = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)user, ses->userName, len, nls_cp);
-	UniStrupr(user);
-	hmac_md5_update((char *)user, 2*len, pctxt);
+	if (user == NULL) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (len) {
+		len = cifs_strtoUTF16(user, ses->user_name, len, nls_cp);
+		UniStrupr(user);
+	} else {
+		memset(user, '\0', 2);
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+				(char *)user, 2 * len);
+	kfree(user);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with user\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
 
 	/* convert ses->domainName to unicode and uppercase */
 	if (ses->domainName) {
 		len = strlen(ses->domainName);
 
 		domain = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (domain == NULL)
-			goto calc_exit_1;
-		len = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)domain, ses->domainName, len,
+		if (domain == NULL) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			return rc;
+		}
+		len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)domain, ses->domainName, len,
+				      nls_cp);
+		rc =
+		crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+					(char *)domain, 2 * len);
+		kfree(domain);
+		if (rc) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with domain\n",
+				 __func__);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	} else if (ses->serverName) {
+		len = strlen(ses->serverName);
+
+		server = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (server == NULL) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			return rc;
+		}
+		len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)server, ses->serverName, len,
 					nls_cp);
-		/* the following line was removed since it didn't work well
-		   with lower cased domain name that passed as an option.
-		   Maybe converting the domain name earlier makes sense */
-		/* UniStrupr(domain); */
+		rc =
+		crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+					(char *)server, 2 * len);
+		kfree(server);
+		if (rc) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with server\n",
+				 __func__);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
 
-		hmac_md5_update((char *)domain, 2*len, pctxt);
+	rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+					ntlmv2_hash);
+	if (rc)
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
 
-		kfree(domain);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+CalcNTLMv2_response(const struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2 = (struct ntlmv2_resp *)
+	    (ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	unsigned int hash_len;
+
+	/* The MD5 hash starts at challenge_key.key */
+	hash_len = ses->auth_key.len - (CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE +
+		offsetof(struct ntlmv2_resp, challenge.key[0]));
+
+	if (!ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n", __func__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+				 ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n",
+			 __func__);
+		return rc;
 	}
-calc_exit_1:
-	kfree(user);
-calc_exit_2:
-	/* BB FIXME what about bytes 24 through 40 of the signing key?
-	   compare with the NTLM example */
-	hmac_md5_final(ses->ntlmv2_hash, pctxt);
 
-	kfree(pctxt);
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (ses->server->negflavor == CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED)
+		memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key,
+		       ses->ntlmssp->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
+	else
+		memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key,
+		       ses->server->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+				 ntlmv2->challenge.key, hash_len);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* Note that the MD5 digest over writes anon.challenge_key.key */
+	rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+				ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash);
+	if (rc)
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
+
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int
-setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifsSesInfo *ses, char *resp_buf,
-		      const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+static int crypto_hmacmd5_alloc(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
 {
 	int rc;
-	struct ntlmv2_resp *buf = (struct ntlmv2_resp *)resp_buf;
-	struct HMACMD5Context context;
+	unsigned int size;
+
+	/* check if already allocated */
+	if (server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5)
+		return 0;
+
+	server->secmech.hmacmd5 = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(md5)", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(server->secmech.hmacmd5)) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto hmacmd5\n");
+		rc = PTR_ERR(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+		server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL;
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
+			crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+	server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) {
+		crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+		server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash.tfm = server->secmech.hmacmd5;
+	server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash.flags = 0x0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
 
-	buf->blob_signature = cpu_to_le32(0x00000101);
-	buf->reserved = 0;
-	buf->time = cpu_to_le64(cifs_UnixTimeToNT(CURRENT_TIME));
-	get_random_bytes(&buf->client_chal, sizeof(buf->client_chal));
-	buf->reserved2 = 0;
+int
+setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	int baselen;
+	unsigned int tilen;
+	struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2;
+	char ntlmv2_hash[16];
+	unsigned char *tiblob = NULL; /* target info blob */
 
-	if (ses->server->secType == RawNTLMSSP) {
+	if (ses->server->negflavor == CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED) {
 		if (!ses->domainName) {
-			rc = find_domain_name(ses);
+			rc = find_domain_name(ses, nls_cp);
 			if (rc) {
-				cERROR(1, "error %d finding domain name", rc);
+				cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d finding domain name\n",
+					 rc);
 				goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
 			}
 		}
 	} else {
 		rc = build_avpair_blob(ses, nls_cp);
 		if (rc) {
-			cERROR(1, "error %d building av pair blob", rc);
-			return rc;
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d building av pair blob\n", rc);
+			goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
 		}
 	}
 
-	/* calculate buf->ntlmv2_hash */
-	rc = calc_ntlmv2_hash(ses, nls_cp);
+	baselen = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp);
+	tilen = ses->auth_key.len;
+	tiblob = ses->auth_key.response;
+
+	ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(baselen + tilen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
+		rc = ENOMEM;
+		ses->auth_key.len = 0;
+		goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+	}
+	ses->auth_key.len += baselen;
+
+	ntlmv2 = (struct ntlmv2_resp *)
+			(ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	ntlmv2->blob_signature = cpu_to_le32(0x00000101);
+	ntlmv2->reserved = 0;
+	/* Must be within 5 minutes of the server */
+	ntlmv2->time = cpu_to_le64(cifs_UnixTimeToNT(CURRENT_TIME));
+	get_random_bytes(&ntlmv2->client_chal, sizeof(ntlmv2->client_chal));
+	ntlmv2->reserved2 = 0;
+
+	memcpy(ses->auth_key.response + baselen, tiblob, tilen);
+
+	rc = crypto_hmacmd5_alloc(ses->server);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not crypto alloc hmacmd5 rc %d\n", rc);
+		goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+	}
+
+	/* calculate ntlmv2_hash */
+	rc = calc_ntlmv2_hash(ses, ntlmv2_hash, nls_cp);
 	if (rc) {
-		cERROR(1, "could not get v2 hash rc %d", rc);
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not get v2 hash rc %d\n", rc);
+		goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+	}
+
+	/* calculate first part of the client response (CR1) */
+	rc = CalcNTLMv2_response(ses, ntlmv2_hash);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "Could not calculate CR1 rc: %d\n", rc);
 		goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
 	}
-	CalcNTLMv2_response(ses, resp_buf);
 
 	/* now calculate the session key for NTLMv2 */
-	hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(ses->ntlmv2_hash, 16, &context);
-	hmac_md5_update(resp_buf, 16, &context);
-	hmac_md5_final(ses->auth_key.data.ntlmv2.key, &context);
+	rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+		ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n",
+			 __func__);
+		goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+	}
 
-	memcpy(&ses->auth_key.data.ntlmv2.resp, resp_buf,
-	       sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp));
-	ses->auth_key.len = 16 + sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp);
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
+		goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+	}
 
-	return 0;
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+		ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash,
+		CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
+		goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+		ses->auth_key.response);
+	if (rc)
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
 
 setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret:
-	kfree(ses->tiblob);
-	ses->tiblob = NULL;
-	ses->tilen = 0;
+	kfree(tiblob);
 
 	return rc;
 }
 
-void CalcNTLMv2_response(const struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
-			 char *v2_session_response)
+int
+calc_seckey(struct cifs_ses *ses)
 {
-	struct HMACMD5Context context;
-	/* rest of v2 struct already generated */
-	memcpy(v2_session_response + 8, ses->cryptKey, 8);
-	hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(ses->ntlmv2_hash, 16, &context);
+	int rc;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_arc4;
+	struct scatterlist sgin, sgout;
+	struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+	unsigned char sec_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE]; /* a nonce */
+
+	get_random_bytes(sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
 
-	hmac_md5_update(v2_session_response+8,
-			sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp) - 8, &context);
+	tfm_arc4 = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm_arc4)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(tfm_arc4);
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto API arc4\n");
+		return rc;
+	}
 
-	if (ses->tilen)
-		hmac_md5_update(ses->tiblob, ses->tilen, &context);
+	desc.tfm = tfm_arc4;
+
+	rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm_arc4, ses->auth_key.response,
+					CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set response as a key\n",
+			 __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	sg_init_one(&sgin, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	sg_init_one(&sgout, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
+
+	rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sgout, &sgin, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not encrypt session key rc: %d\n", rc);
+		crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_arc4);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* make secondary_key/nonce as session key */
+	memcpy(ses->auth_key.response, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	/* and make len as that of session key only */
+	ses->auth_key.len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
+
+	crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_arc4);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+void
+cifs_crypto_shash_release(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
+{
+	if (server->secmech.cmacaes) {
+		crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.cmacaes);
+		server->secmech.cmacaes = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (server->secmech.hmacsha256) {
+		crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacsha256);
+		server->secmech.hmacsha256 = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (server->secmech.md5) {
+		crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.md5);
+		server->secmech.md5 = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (server->secmech.hmacmd5) {
+		crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+		server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL;
+	}
 
-	hmac_md5_final(v2_session_response, &context);
-/*	cifs_dump_mem("v2_sess_rsp: ", v2_session_response, 32); */
+	kfree(server->secmech.sdesccmacaes);
+	server->secmech.sdesccmacaes = NULL;
+	kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256);
+	server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256 = NULL;
+	kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5);
+	server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5 = NULL;
+	kfree(server->secmech.sdescmd5);
+	server->secmech.sdescmd5 = NULL;
 }