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Diffstat (limited to 'fs/binfmt_aout.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/binfmt_aout.c104
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 59 deletions
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_aout.c b/fs/binfmt_aout.c
index d146e181d10..ca0ba15a730 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_aout.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_aout.c
@@ -30,33 +30,10 @@
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/a.out-core.h>
-static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *, struct pt_regs * regs);
+static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *);
static int load_aout_library(struct file*);
-static int aout_core_dump(struct coredump_params *cprm);
-
-static struct linux_binfmt aout_format = {
- .module = THIS_MODULE,
- .load_binary = load_aout_binary,
- .load_shlib = load_aout_library,
- .core_dump = aout_core_dump,
- .min_coredump = PAGE_SIZE
-};
-
-#define BAD_ADDR(x) ((unsigned long)(x) >= TASK_SIZE)
-
-static int set_brk(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
-{
- start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
- end = PAGE_ALIGN(end);
- if (end > start) {
- unsigned long addr;
- addr = vm_brk(start, end - start);
- if (BAD_ADDR(addr))
- return addr;
- }
- return 0;
-}
+#ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP
/*
* Routine writes a core dump image in the current directory.
* Currently only a stub-function.
@@ -66,10 +43,8 @@ static int set_brk(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
* field, which also makes sure the core-dumps won't be recursive if the
* dumping of the process results in another error..
*/
-
static int aout_core_dump(struct coredump_params *cprm)
{
- struct file *file = cprm->file;
mm_segment_t fs;
int has_dumped = 0;
void __user *dump_start;
@@ -86,10 +61,9 @@ static int aout_core_dump(struct coredump_params *cprm)
fs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
has_dumped = 1;
- current->flags |= PF_DUMPCORE;
strncpy(dump.u_comm, current->comm, sizeof(dump.u_comm));
dump.u_ar0 = offsetof(struct user, regs);
- dump.signal = cprm->signr;
+ dump.signal = cprm->siginfo->si_signo;
aout_dump_thread(cprm->regs, &dump);
/* If the size of the dump file exceeds the rlimit, then see what would happen
@@ -110,10 +84,10 @@ static int aout_core_dump(struct coredump_params *cprm)
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
/* struct user */
- if (!dump_write(file, &dump, sizeof(dump)))
+ if (!dump_emit(cprm, &dump, sizeof(dump)))
goto end_coredump;
/* Now dump all of the user data. Include malloced stuff as well */
- if (!dump_seek(cprm->file, PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(dump)))
+ if (!dump_skip(cprm, PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(dump)))
goto end_coredump;
/* now we start writing out the user space info */
set_fs(USER_DS);
@@ -121,20 +95,46 @@ static int aout_core_dump(struct coredump_params *cprm)
if (dump.u_dsize != 0) {
dump_start = START_DATA(dump);
dump_size = dump.u_dsize << PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (!dump_write(file, dump_start, dump_size))
+ if (!dump_emit(cprm, dump_start, dump_size))
goto end_coredump;
}
/* Now prepare to dump the stack area */
if (dump.u_ssize != 0) {
dump_start = START_STACK(dump);
dump_size = dump.u_ssize << PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (!dump_write(file, dump_start, dump_size))
+ if (!dump_emit(cprm, dump_start, dump_size))
goto end_coredump;
}
end_coredump:
set_fs(fs);
return has_dumped;
}
+#else
+#define aout_core_dump NULL
+#endif
+
+static struct linux_binfmt aout_format = {
+ .module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .load_binary = load_aout_binary,
+ .load_shlib = load_aout_library,
+ .core_dump = aout_core_dump,
+ .min_coredump = PAGE_SIZE
+};
+
+#define BAD_ADDR(x) ((unsigned long)(x) >= TASK_SIZE)
+
+static int set_brk(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
+{
+ start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
+ end = PAGE_ALIGN(end);
+ if (end > start) {
+ unsigned long addr;
+ addr = vm_brk(start, end - start);
+ if (BAD_ADDR(addr))
+ return addr;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
/*
* create_aout_tables() parses the env- and arg-strings in new user
@@ -199,8 +199,9 @@ static unsigned long __user *create_aout_tables(char __user *p, struct linux_bin
* libraries. There is no binary dependent code anywhere else.
*/
-static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm, struct pt_regs * regs)
+static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
{
+ struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
struct exec ex;
unsigned long error;
unsigned long fd_offset;
@@ -211,7 +212,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm, struct pt_regs * regs)
if ((N_MAGIC(ex) != ZMAGIC && N_MAGIC(ex) != OMAGIC &&
N_MAGIC(ex) != QMAGIC && N_MAGIC(ex) != NMAGIC) ||
N_TRSIZE(ex) || N_DRSIZE(ex) ||
- i_size_read(bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) < ex.a_text+ex.a_data+N_SYMSIZE(ex)+N_TXTOFF(ex)) {
+ i_size_read(file_inode(bprm->file)) < ex.a_text+ex.a_data+N_SYMSIZE(ex)+N_TXTOFF(ex)) {
return -ENOEXEC;
}
@@ -219,7 +220,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm, struct pt_regs * regs)
* Requires a mmap handler. This prevents people from using a.out
* as part of an exploit attack against /proc-related vulnerabilities.
*/
- if (!bprm->file->f_op || !bprm->file->f_op->mmap)
+ if (!bprm->file->f_op->mmap)
return -ENOEXEC;
fd_offset = N_TXTOFF(ex);
@@ -253,8 +254,6 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm, struct pt_regs * regs)
(current->mm->start_data = N_DATADDR(ex));
current->mm->brk = ex.a_bss +
(current->mm->start_brk = N_BSSADDR(ex));
- current->mm->free_area_cache = current->mm->mmap_base;
- current->mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
retval = setup_arg_pages(bprm, STACK_TOP, EXSTACK_DEFAULT);
if (retval < 0) {
@@ -284,15 +283,12 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm, struct pt_regs * regs)
return error;
}
- error = bprm->file->f_op->read(bprm->file,
- (char __user *)text_addr,
- ex.a_text+ex.a_data, &pos);
+ error = read_code(bprm->file, text_addr, pos,
+ ex.a_text+ex.a_data);
if ((signed long)error < 0) {
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
return error;
}
-
- flush_icache_range(text_addr, text_addr+ex.a_text+ex.a_data);
} else {
if ((ex.a_text & 0xfff || ex.a_data & 0xfff) &&
(N_MAGIC(ex) != NMAGIC) && printk_ratelimit())
@@ -308,14 +304,9 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm, struct pt_regs * regs)
}
if (!bprm->file->f_op->mmap||((fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0)) {
- loff_t pos = fd_offset;
vm_brk(N_TXTADDR(ex), ex.a_text+ex.a_data);
- bprm->file->f_op->read(bprm->file,
- (char __user *)N_TXTADDR(ex),
- ex.a_text+ex.a_data, &pos);
- flush_icache_range((unsigned long) N_TXTADDR(ex),
- (unsigned long) N_TXTADDR(ex) +
- ex.a_text+ex.a_data);
+ read_code(bprm->file, N_TXTADDR(ex), fd_offset,
+ ex.a_text + ex.a_data);
goto beyond_if;
}
@@ -364,7 +355,7 @@ static int load_aout_library(struct file *file)
int retval;
struct exec ex;
- inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ inode = file_inode(file);
retval = -ENOEXEC;
error = kernel_read(file, 0, (char *) &ex, sizeof(ex));
@@ -382,7 +373,7 @@ static int load_aout_library(struct file *file)
* Requires a mmap handler. This prevents people from using a.out
* as part of an exploit attack against /proc-related vulnerabilities.
*/
- if (!file->f_op || !file->f_op->mmap)
+ if (!file->f_op->mmap)
goto out;
if (N_FLAGS(ex))
@@ -394,8 +385,6 @@ static int load_aout_library(struct file *file)
start_addr = ex.a_entry & 0xfffff000;
if ((N_TXTOFF(ex) & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0) {
- loff_t pos = N_TXTOFF(ex);
-
if (printk_ratelimit())
{
printk(KERN_WARNING
@@ -404,11 +393,8 @@ static int load_aout_library(struct file *file)
}
vm_brk(start_addr, ex.a_text + ex.a_data + ex.a_bss);
- file->f_op->read(file, (char __user *)start_addr,
- ex.a_text + ex.a_data, &pos);
- flush_icache_range((unsigned long) start_addr,
- (unsigned long) start_addr + ex.a_text + ex.a_data);
-
+ read_code(file, start_addr, N_TXTOFF(ex),
+ ex.a_text + ex.a_data);
retval = 0;
goto out;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 (git 2.46.0) at 2025-11-10 13:09:48 +0000