diff options
author | Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> | 2014-05-28 23:09:58 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2014-06-16 13:44:09 -0700 |
commit | e015cef70226c6b94ee575895fde595d925b42c0 (patch) | |
tree | 6f791683761c399653defb0591bbdbfc6448c13b /kernel/auditsc.c | |
parent | 4e358517b2810788777196f038f5a0b3b9936a6a (diff) |
auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking
commit a3c54931199565930d6d84f4c3456f6440aefd41 upstream.
Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded
audit rules. This bug has been around since before git. Wow...
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditsc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditsc.c | 27 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index f251a5e8d17..21eae3c05ec 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -728,6 +728,22 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; } +static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val) +{ + int word, bit; + + if (val > 0xffffffff) + return false; + + word = AUDIT_WORD(val); + if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE) + return false; + + bit = AUDIT_BIT(val); + + return rule->mask[word] & bit; +} + /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit @@ -745,11 +761,8 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, rcu_read_lock(); if (!list_empty(list)) { - int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); - int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { - if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && + if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, &state, false)) { rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -769,20 +782,16 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_names *n, struct audit_context *ctx) { - int word, bit; int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; struct audit_entry *e; enum audit_state state; - word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); - bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); - if (list_empty(list)) return 0; list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { - if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && + if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) { ctx->current_state = state; return 1; |