From 5fb9149b0ee4c106fc73923a3751047bdb860993 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tomas Hozza Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2012 10:53:29 +0100 Subject: tools: hv: Netlink source address validation allows DoS commit 95a69adab9acfc3981c504737a2b6578e4d846ef upstream. The source code without this patch caused hypervkvpd to exit when it processed a spoofed Netlink packet which has been sent from an untrusted local user. Now Netlink messages with a non-zero nl_pid source address are ignored and a warning is printed into the syslog. Signed-off-by: Tomas Hozza Acked-by: K. Y. Srinivasan Cc: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'tools/hv') diff --git a/tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c b/tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c index 2984ffb7bac..60a8e29c4fa 100644 --- a/tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c +++ b/tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c @@ -727,13 +727,19 @@ int main(void) len = recvfrom(fd, kvp_recv_buffer, sizeof(kvp_recv_buffer), 0, addr_p, &addr_l); - if (len < 0 || addr.nl_pid) { + if (len < 0) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "recvfrom failed; pid:%u error:%d %s", addr.nl_pid, errno, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return -1; } + if (addr.nl_pid) { + syslog(LOG_WARNING, "Received packet from untrusted pid:%u", + addr.nl_pid); + continue; + } + incoming_msg = (struct nlmsghdr *)kvp_recv_buffer; incoming_cn_msg = (struct cn_msg *)NLMSG_DATA(incoming_msg); hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)incoming_cn_msg->data; -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258