From 423b9788023263364ea5de04189f02bd9b6a12db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Mon, 21 May 2012 12:32:13 +0100 Subject: KEYS: Fix some sparse warnings Fix some sparse warnings in the keyrings code: (1) compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov() should be static. (2) There were a couple of places where a pointer was being compared against integer 0 rather than NULL. (3) keyctl_instantiate_key_common() should not take a __user-labelled iovec pointer as the caller must have copied the iovec to kernel space. (4) __key_link_begin() takes and __key_link_end() releases keyring_serialise_link_sem under some circumstances and so this should be declared. Note that adding __acquires() and __releases() for this doesn't help cure the warnings messages - something only commenting out both helps. Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/keys/compat.c | 4 ++-- security/keys/internal.h | 2 +- security/keys/keyctl.c | 2 +- security/keys/keyring.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c index fab4f8dda6c..e35ae1d208a 100644 --- a/security/keys/compat.c +++ b/security/keys/compat.c @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ * * If successful, 0 will be returned. */ -long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov( +static long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov( key_serial_t id, const struct compat_iovec __user *_payload_iov, unsigned ioc, @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov( struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack; long ret; - if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0) + if (!_payload_iov || !ioc) goto no_payload; ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc, diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index f711b094ed4..f173be2ce3e 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t, extern long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t); extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t, - const struct iovec __user *, + const struct iovec *, unsigned, size_t, key_serial_t); /* diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index ddb3e05bc5f..b61c063888b 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id, struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack; long ret; - if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0) + if (!_payload_iov || !ioc) goto no_payload; ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc, diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 7445875f681..81e7852d281 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -751,6 +751,7 @@ static void keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu) int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type, const char *description, unsigned long *_prealloc) __acquires(&keyring->sem) + __acquires(&keyring_serialise_link_sem) { struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist; unsigned long prealloc; @@ -960,6 +961,7 @@ void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *type, unsigned long prealloc) __releases(&keyring->sem) + __releases(&keyring_serialise_link_sem) { BUG_ON(type == NULL); BUG_ON(type->name == NULL); -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From 659b5e76521c10331495cbd9acb7217e38ff9750 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Mundt Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2012 14:34:11 +0900 Subject: security: Fix nommu build. The security + nommu configuration presently blows up with an undefined reference to BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP: security/security.c: In function 'mmap_prot': security/security.c:687:36: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type security/security.c:688:16: error: 'BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP' undeclared (first use in this function) security/security.c:688:16: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in include backing-dev.h directly to fix it up. Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/security.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 3efc9b12aef..860aeb349cb 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From 08e1b76ae399a010c0d0916b125d75aed6961d16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2012 09:32:55 -0400 Subject: ima: use full pathnames in measurement list The IMA measurement list contains filename hints, which can be ambigious without the full pathname. This patch replaces the filename hint with the full pathname, simplifying for userspace the correlating of file hash measurements with files. Change log v1: - Revert to short filenames, when full pathname is longer than IMA measurement buffer size. (Based on Dmitry's review) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 4 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 88a2788b981..032ff03ad90 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -175,7 +175,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, } memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template)); memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); - strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX); + strcpy(entry->template.file_name, + (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ? + file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename); result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode); if (!result || result == -EEXIST) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index b17be79b9cf..a0e631a1905 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file) fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; int rc; bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false; + unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL; if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized) return; @@ -75,12 +76,27 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file) out: mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); + if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers) + return; + + /* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */ + pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL); + if (pathbuf) { + pathname = d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11); + if (IS_ERR(pathname)) + pathname = NULL; + else if (strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) + pathname = NULL; + } if (send_tomtou) - ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr", - "ToMToU"); + ima_add_violation(inode, + !pathname ? dentry->d_name.name : pathname, + "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU"); if (send_writers) - ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr", - "open_writers"); + ima_add_violation(inode, + !pathname ? dentry->d_name.name : pathname, + "invalid_pcr", "open_writers"); + kfree(pathbuf); } static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, @@ -123,6 +139,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, { struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL; int rc = 0; if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) @@ -147,8 +164,21 @@ retry: goto out; rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file); - if (!rc) - ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename); + if (rc != 0) + goto out; + + if (function != BPRM_CHECK) { + /* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */ + pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL); + if (pathbuf) { + pathname = + d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11); + if (IS_ERR(pathname)) + pathname = NULL; + } + } + ima_store_measurement(iint, file, !pathname ? filename : pathname); + kfree(pathbuf); out: mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); return rc; -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From 0ea4f8ae416a9e8d15f4e20680879358f620e8b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Kasatkin Date: Sun, 29 Jan 2012 19:19:08 -0500 Subject: ima: free securityfs violations file On ima_fs_init() error, free securityfs violations file. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index e1aa2b482dd..3fccc065a0f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -367,6 +367,7 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) return 0; out: + securityfs_remove(violations); securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count); securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements); securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements); -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From c7de7adc18241a0eb10a6e1fed7cb1e01f53c85a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Kasatkin Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 12:18:10 +0300 Subject: ima: remove unused cleanup functions IMA cannot be used as module and does not need __exit functions. Removed them. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 10 ---------- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 5 ----- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 5 ----- 3 files changed, 20 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 3fccc065a0f..38477c9c341 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -375,13 +375,3 @@ out: securityfs_remove(ima_policy); return -1; } - -void __exit ima_fs_cleanup(void) -{ - securityfs_remove(violations); - securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count); - securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements); - securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements); - securityfs_remove(ima_dir); - securityfs_remove(ima_policy); -} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 17f1f060306..b5dfd534f13 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -90,8 +90,3 @@ int __init ima_init(void) return ima_fs_init(); } - -void __exit ima_cleanup(void) -{ - ima_fs_cleanup(); -} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index a0e631a1905..5b0548d7556 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -262,11 +262,6 @@ static int __init init_ima(void) return error; } -static void __exit cleanup_ima(void) -{ - ima_cleanup(); -} - late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture"); -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From 8445d64dd761440fb5c73a2abba25009f4bf0e4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Kasatkin Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 12:18:09 +0300 Subject: ima: add policy for pseudo fs Exclude DEVPTS and BINFMT filesystems from the measurement policy. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index d8edff209bf..1a9583008aa 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC, -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From 7ff2267af595e642f1009198ab49e86a239148fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Kasatkin Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 12:18:11 +0300 Subject: ima: ima_initialized is set only if successful Set ima_initialized only if initialization was successful. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 5b0548d7556..be8294915cf 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ static int __init init_ima(void) int error; error = ima_init(); - ima_initialized = 1; + if (!error) + ima_initialized = 1; return error; } -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From 417c6c8ee2eb6975f357d8975af94ba5fbeaf82d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Kasatkin Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 12:18:21 +0300 Subject: ima: audit is compiled only when enabled IMA auditing code was compiled even when CONFIG_AUDIT was not enabled. This patch compiles auditing code only when possible and enabled. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 3 ++- security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 3 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 9 +++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c | 3 --- 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 35664fe6daa..b9c1219924f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -38,8 +38,9 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX measurement list. If unsure, use the default 10. config IMA_AUDIT - bool + bool "Enables auditing support" depends on IMA + depends on AUDIT default y help This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index 5690c021de8..5f740f6971e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -6,4 +6,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ - ima_policy.o ima_audit.o + ima_policy.o +ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 3ccf7acac6d..e7c99fd0d22 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -61,10 +61,19 @@ struct ima_queue_entry { }; extern struct list_head ima_measurements; /* list of all measurements */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT /* declarations */ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, const char *cause, int result, int info); +#else +static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *fname, + const char *op, const char *cause, + int result, int info) +{ +} +#endif /* Internal IMA function definitions */ int ima_init(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c index 21e96bf188d..7a57f6769e9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c @@ -17,8 +17,6 @@ static int ima_audit; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT - /* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */ static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str) { @@ -29,7 +27,6 @@ static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str) return 1; } __setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup); -#endif void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From eb982cb4cf6405b97ea1f9e1d10864981f269d46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 17:46:58 -0700 Subject: Smack: fix smack_new_inode bogosities In January of 2012 Al Viro pointed out three bits of code that he titled "new_inode_smack bogosities". This patch repairs these errors. 1. smack_sb_kern_mount() included a NULL check that is impossible. The check and NULL case are removed. 2. smack_kb_kern_mount() included pointless locking. The locking is removed. Since this is the only place that lock was used the lock is removed from the superblock_smack structure. 3. smk_fill_super() incorrectly and unnecessarily set the Smack label for the smackfs root inode. The assignment has been removed. Targeted for git://gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- security/smack/smack.h | 1 - security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 ++------ security/smack/smackfs.c | 1 - 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index cc361b8f3d1..76feb31eb82 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ struct superblock_smack { char *smk_hat; char *smk_default; int smk_initialized; - spinlock_t smk_sblock; /* for initialization */ }; struct socket_smack { diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index ee0bb5735f3..29bb4e7fa5e 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -251,7 +251,6 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) sbsp->smk_floor = smack_known_floor.smk_known; sbsp->smk_hat = smack_known_hat.smk_known; sbsp->smk_initialized = 0; - spin_lock_init(&sbsp->smk_sblock); sb->s_security = sbsp; @@ -332,13 +331,10 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) char *commap; char *nsp; - spin_lock(&sp->smk_sblock); - if (sp->smk_initialized != 0) { - spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock); + if (sp->smk_initialized != 0) return 0; - } + sp->smk_initialized = 1; - spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock); for (op = data; op != NULL; op = commap) { commap = strchr(op, ','); diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index 1810c9a4ed4..3686db7e2c6 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -2051,7 +2051,6 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) } root_inode = sb->s_root->d_inode; - root_inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known); return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From 1880eff77e7a7cb46c68fae7cfa33f72f0a6e70e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Tue, 5 Jun 2012 15:28:30 -0700 Subject: Smack: onlycap limits on CAP_MAC_ADMIN Smack is integrated with the POSIX capabilities scheme, using the capabilities CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_MAC_ADMIN to determine if a process is allowed to ignore Smack checks or change Smack related data respectively. Smack provides an additional restriction that if an onlycap value is set by writing to /smack/onlycap only tasks with that Smack label are allowed to use CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE. This change adds CAP_MAC_ADMIN as a capability that is affected by the onlycap mechanism. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- security/smack/smack.h | 13 +++++++++++++ security/smack/smack_access.c | 9 ++------- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 17 +++++++++-------- security/smack/smackfs.c | 21 ++++++++++----------- 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 76feb31eb82..99b36124f71 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -282,6 +282,19 @@ static inline char *smk_of_current(void) return smk_of_task(current_security()); } +/* + * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged + * by the onlycap rule. + */ +static inline int smack_privileged(int cap) +{ + if (!capable(cap)) + return 0; + if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == smk_of_current()) + return 1; + return 0; +} + /* * logging functions */ diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index 9f3705e9271..db14689a21e 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -220,14 +220,9 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a) } /* - * Return if a specific label has been designated as the - * only one that gets privilege and current does not - * have that label. + * Allow for priviliged to override policy. */ - if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp) - goto out_audit; - - if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) rc = 0; out_audit: diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 29bb4e7fa5e..8221514cc99 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file) int rc = 0; char *sp = smk_of_current(); - if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known) @@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; /* * check label validity here so import wont fail on @@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, smk_import(value, size) == NULL) rc = -EINVAL; } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE || strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0) @@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; } else rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); @@ -1716,7 +1716,8 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) * state into account in the decision as well as * the smack value. */ - if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || + has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) rc = 0; /* we log only if we didn't get overriden */ out_log: @@ -2717,7 +2718,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, if (p != current) return -EPERM; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL) @@ -2780,7 +2781,7 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other); #endif - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); /* @@ -2816,7 +2817,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk); #endif - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); return rc; diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index 3686db7e2c6..21529658662 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -595,13 +595,12 @@ static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - /* * Must have privilege. * No partial writes. * Enough data must be present. */ - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL, @@ -787,7 +786,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, * No partial writes. * Enough data must be present. */ - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (*ppos != 0) return -EINVAL; @@ -1090,7 +1089,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, * "