From 328fc47ea0bcc27d9afa69c3ad6e52431cadd76c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vlad Yasevich Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2008 16:08:54 -0700 Subject: sctp: correct bounds check in sctp_setsockopt_auth_key The bonds check to prevent buffer overlflow was not exactly right. It still allowed overflow of up to 8 bytes which is sizeof(struct sctp_authkey). Since optlen is already checked against the size of that struct, we are guaranteed not to cause interger overflow either. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/socket.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/sctp') diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index afa952e726d..9b9b2c31dd1 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -3144,7 +3144,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(struct sock *sk, goto out; } - if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen) { + if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen - sizeof(struct sctp_authkey)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258