From a706d965dcfdff73bf2bad1c300f8119900714c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Ahern Date: Fri, 28 Dec 2012 19:56:07 -0700 Subject: perf x86: revert 20b279 - require exclude_guest to use PEBS - kernel side This patch is brought to you by the letter 'H'. Commit 20b279 breaks compatiblity with older perf binaries when run with precise modifier (:p or :pp) by requiring the exclude_guest attribute to be set. Older binaries default exclude_guest to 0 (ie., wanting guest-based samples) unless host only profiling is requested (:H modifier). The workaround for older binaries is to add H to the modifier list (e.g., -e cycles:ppH - toggles exclude_guest to 1). This was deemed unacceptable by Linus: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/12/12/570 Between family in town and the fresh snow in Breckenridge there is no time left to be working on the proper fix for this over the holidays. In the New Year I have more pressing problems to resolve -- like some memory leaks in perf which are proving to be elusive -- although the aforementioned snow is probably why they are proving to be elusive. Either way I do not have any spare time to work on this and from the time I have managed to spend on it the solution is more difficult than just moving to a new exclude_guest flag (does not work) or flipping the logic to include_guest (which is not as trivial as one would think). So, two options: silently force exclude_guest on as suggested by Gleb which means no impact to older perf binaries or revert the original patch which caused the breakage. This patch does the latter -- reverts the original patch that introduced the regression. The problem can be revisited in the future as time allows. Signed-off-by: David Ahern Cc: Avi Kivity Cc: Gleb Natapov Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Robert Richter Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1356749767-17322-1-git-send-email-dsahern@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c index 4428fd178bc..6774c17a557 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c @@ -340,9 +340,6 @@ int x86_setup_perfctr(struct perf_event *event) /* BTS is currently only allowed for user-mode. */ if (!attr->exclude_kernel) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - - if (!attr->exclude_guest) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; } hwc->config |= config; @@ -385,9 +382,6 @@ int x86_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event *event) if (event->attr.precise_ip) { int precise = 0; - if (!event->attr.exclude_guest) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - /* Support for constant skid */ if (x86_pmu.pebs_active && !x86_pmu.pebs_broken) { precise++; -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From d55bf532d72b3cfdfe84e696ace995067324c96c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 22:40:26 -0500 Subject: Revert "xen/smp: Fix CPU online/offline bug triggering a BUG: scheduling while atomic." This reverts commit 41bd956de3dfdc3a43708fe2e0c8096c69064a1e. The fix is incorrect and not appropiate for the latest kernels. In fact it _causes_ the BUG: scheduling while atomic while doing vCPU hotplug. Suggested-by: Wei Liu Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk --- arch/x86/xen/smp.c | 7 ------- 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/smp.c b/arch/x86/xen/smp.c index 4f7d2599b48..34bc4cee888 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/smp.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp.c @@ -432,13 +432,6 @@ static void __cpuinit xen_play_dead(void) /* used only with HOTPLUG_CPU */ play_dead_common(); HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op(VCPUOP_down, smp_processor_id(), NULL); cpu_bringup(); - /* - * Balance out the preempt calls - as we are running in cpu_idle - * loop which has been called at bootup from cpu_bringup_and_idle. - * The cpucpu_bringup_and_idle called cpu_bringup which made a - * preempt_disable() So this preempt_enable will balance it out. - */ - preempt_enable(); } #else /* !CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */ -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From 9174adbee4a9a49d0139f5d71969852b36720809 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Cooper Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2013 12:00:55 +0000 Subject: xen: Fix stack corruption in xen_failsafe_callback for 32bit PVOPS guests. This fixes CVE-2013-0190 / XSA-40 There has been an error on the xen_failsafe_callback path for failed iret, which causes the stack pointer to be wrong when entering the iret_exc error path. This can result in the kernel crashing. In the classic kernel case, the relevant code looked a little like: popl %eax # Error code from hypervisor jz 5f addl $16,%esp jmp iret_exc # Hypervisor said iret fault 5: addl $16,%esp # Hypervisor said segment selector fault Here, there are two identical addls on either option of a branch which appears to have been optimised by hoisting it above the jz, and converting it to an lea, which leaves the flags register unaffected. In the PVOPS case, the code looks like: popl_cfi %eax # Error from the hypervisor lea 16(%esp),%esp # Add $16 before choosing fault path CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -16 jz 5f addl $16,%esp # Incorrectly adjust %esp again jmp iret_exc It is possible unprivileged userspace applications to cause this behaviour, for example by loading an LDT code selector, then changing the code selector to be not-present. At this point, there is a race condition where it is possible for the hypervisor to return back to userspace from an interrupt, fault on its own iret, and inject a failsafe_callback into the kernel. This bug has been present since the introduction of Xen PVOPS support in commit 5ead97c84 (xen: Core Xen implementation), in 2.6.23. Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk --- arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S index 88b725aa1d5..cf8639b4dcf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S @@ -1084,7 +1084,6 @@ ENTRY(xen_failsafe_callback) lea 16(%esp),%esp CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -16 jz 5f - addl $16,%esp jmp iret_exc 5: pushl_cfi $-1 /* orig_ax = -1 => not a system call */ SAVE_ALL -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From b8f2c21db390273c3eaf0e5308faeaeb1e233840 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nathan Zimmer Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2013 09:02:43 -0600 Subject: efi, x86: Pass a proper identity mapping in efi_call_phys_prelog Update efi_call_phys_prelog to install an identity mapping of all available memory. This corrects a bug on very large systems with more then 512 GB in which bios would not be able to access addresses above not in the mapping. The result is a crash that looks much like this. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000effd870020 IP: [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU 0 Pid: 0, comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 3.8.0-rc1-next-20121224-medusa_ntz+ #2 Intel Corp. Stoutland Platform RIP: 0010:[<0000000078bce331>] [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 RSP: 0000:ffffffff81601d28 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000078b80e18 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: 0000000078bcf958 RSI: 0000000000002400 RDI: 8000000000000000 RBP: 0000000078bcf760 R08: 000000effd870000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000000c3 R12: 0000000000000030 R13: 000000effd870000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88effd870000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88effe400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000effd870020 CR3: 000000000160c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, threadinfo ffffffff81600000, task ffffffff81614400) Stack: 0000000078b80d18 0000000000000004 0000000078bced7b ffff880078b81fff 0000000000000000 0000000000000082 0000000078bce3a8 0000000000002400 0000000060000202 0000000078b80da0 0000000078bce45d ffffffff8107cb5a Call Trace: [] ? on_each_cpu+0x77/0x83 [] ? change_page_attr_set_clr+0x32f/0x3ed [] ? efi_call4+0x46/0x80 [] ? efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1f5/0x305 [] ? start_kernel+0x34a/0x3d2 [] ? repair_env_string+0x60/0x60 [] ? x86_64_start_reservations+0xba/0xc1 [] ? early_idt_handlers+0x120/0x120 [] ? x86_64_start_kernel+0x154/0x163 Code: Bad RIP value. RIP [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 RSP CR2: 000000effd870020 ---[ end trace ead828934fef5eab ]--- Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Signed-off-by: Nathan Zimmer Signed-off-by: Robin Holt Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming --- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c index 95fd505dfeb..2b200386061 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ #include #include -static pgd_t save_pgd __initdata; +static pgd_t *save_pgd __initdata; static unsigned long efi_flags __initdata; static void __init early_code_mapping_set_exec(int executable) @@ -61,12 +61,20 @@ static void __init early_code_mapping_set_exec(int executable) void __init efi_call_phys_prelog(void) { unsigned long vaddress; + int pgd; + int n_pgds; early_code_mapping_set_exec(1); local_irq_save(efi_flags); - vaddress = (unsigned long)__va(0x0UL); - save_pgd = *pgd_offset_k(0x0UL); - set_pgd(pgd_offset_k(0x0UL), *pgd_offset_k(vaddress)); + + n_pgds = DIV_ROUND_UP((max_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT), PGDIR_SIZE); + save_pgd = kmalloc(n_pgds * sizeof(pgd_t), GFP_KERNEL); + + for (pgd = 0; pgd < n_pgds; pgd++) { + save_pgd[pgd] = *pgd_offset_k(pgd * PGDIR_SIZE); + vaddress = (unsigned long)__va(pgd * PGDIR_SIZE); + set_pgd(pgd_offset_k(pgd * PGDIR_SIZE), *pgd_offset_k(vaddress)); + } __flush_tlb_all(); } @@ -75,7 +83,11 @@ void __init efi_call_phys_epilog(void) /* * After the lock is released, the original page table is restored. */ - set_pgd(pgd_offset_k(0x0UL), save_pgd); + int pgd; + int n_pgds = DIV_ROUND_UP((max_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) , PGDIR_SIZE); + for (pgd = 0; pgd < n_pgds; pgd++) + set_pgd(pgd_offset_k(pgd * PGDIR_SIZE), save_pgd[pgd]); + kfree(save_pgd); __flush_tlb_all(); local_irq_restore(efi_flags); early_code_mapping_set_exec(0); -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From 9899d11f654474d2d54ea52ceaa2a1f4db3abd68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Nesterov Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2013 20:48:00 +0100 Subject: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee does SAVE_REST again. set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the logic. As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace() call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths. Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before access_process_vm(). While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state(). Reported-by: Salman Qazi Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/x86/kernel/step.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/step.c b/arch/x86/kernel/step.c index cd3b2438a98..9b4d51d0c0d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/step.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/step.c @@ -165,10 +165,11 @@ void set_task_blockstep(struct task_struct *task, bool on) * Ensure irq/preemption can't change debugctl in between. * Note also that both TIF_BLOCKSTEP and debugctl should * be changed atomically wrt preemption. - * FIXME: this means that set/clear TIF_BLOCKSTEP is simply - * wrong if task != current, SIGKILL can wakeup the stopped - * tracee and set/clear can play with the running task, this - * can confuse the next __switch_to_xtra(). + * + * NOTE: this means that set/clear TIF_BLOCKSTEP is only safe if + * task is current or it can't be running, otherwise we can race + * with __switch_to_xtra(). We rely on ptrace_freeze_traced() but + * PTRACE_KILL is not safe. */ local_irq_disable(); debugctl = get_debugctlmsr(); -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From bc754790f932f3466ec521ee792da2791e7003ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Beulich Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2013 12:35:14 +0000 Subject: x86, efi: fix 32-bit warnings in setup_efi_pci() Fix four similar build warnings on 32-bit (casts between different size pointers and integers). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Stefan Hasko Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c index 18e329ca108..3f3d36f5a80 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c @@ -256,10 +256,10 @@ static efi_status_t setup_efi_pci(struct boot_params *params) int i; struct setup_data *data; - data = (struct setup_data *)params->hdr.setup_data; + data = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)params->hdr.setup_data; while (data && data->next) - data = (struct setup_data *)data->next; + data = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)data->next; status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->boottime->locate_handle, EFI_LOCATE_BY_PROTOCOL, &pci_proto, @@ -345,9 +345,9 @@ static efi_status_t setup_efi_pci(struct boot_params *params) memcpy(rom->romdata, pci->romimage, pci->romsize); if (data) - data->next = (uint64_t)rom; + data->next = (unsigned long)rom; else - params->hdr.setup_data = (uint64_t)rom; + params->hdr.setup_data = (unsigned long)rom; data = (struct setup_data *)rom; -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From 712ba9e9afc4b3d3d6fa81565ca36fe518915c01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Fleming Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2013 10:07:25 +0000 Subject: x86, efi: Set runtime_version to the EFI spec revision efi.runtime_version is erroneously being set to the value of the vendor's firmware revision instead of that of the implemented EFI specification. We can't deduce which EFI functions are available based on the revision of the vendor's firmware since the version scheme is likely to be unique to each vendor. What we really need to know is the revision of the implemented EFI specification, which is available in the EFI System Table header. Cc: Seiji Aguchi Cc: Matthew Garrett Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.7.x Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming --- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c index ad4439145f8..35682489f6d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c @@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ void __init efi_enter_virtual_mode(void) * * Call EFI services through wrapper functions. */ - efi.runtime_version = efi_systab.fw_revision; + efi.runtime_version = efi_systab.hdr.revision; efi.get_time = virt_efi_get_time; efi.set_time = virt_efi_set_time; efi.get_wakeup_time = virt_efi_get_wakeup_time; -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From 65315d4889d403ea025081d8ca85ddf7b9c10f39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cong Ding Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2013 17:13:35 +0000 Subject: x86/boot: Fix minor fd leakage in tools/relocs.c The opened file should be closed. Signed-off-by: Cong Ding Cc: Kusanagi Kouichi Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Matt Fleming Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1358183628-27784-1-git-send-email-dinggnu@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/tools/relocs.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/tools/relocs.c b/arch/x86/tools/relocs.c index 5a1847d6193..79d67bd507f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/tools/relocs.c +++ b/arch/x86/tools/relocs.c @@ -814,12 +814,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) read_relocs(fp); if (show_absolute_syms) { print_absolute_symbols(); - return 0; + goto out; } if (show_absolute_relocs) { print_absolute_relocs(); - return 0; + goto out; } emit_relocs(as_text, use_real_mode); +out: + fclose(fp); return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 From 09c205afde70c15f20ca76ba0a57409dad175fd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Sun, 27 Jan 2013 10:43:28 -0800 Subject: x86, boot: Define the 2.12 bzImage boot protocol Define the 2.12 bzImage boot protocol: add xloadflags and additional fields to allow the command line, initramfs and struct boot_params to live above the 4 GiB mark. The xloadflags now communicates if this is a 64-bit kernel with the legacy 64-bit entry point and which of the EFI handover entry points are supported. Avoid adding new read flags to loadflags because of claimed bootloaders testing the whole byte for == 1 to determine bzImageness at least until the issue can be researched further. This is based on patches by Yinghai Lu and David Woodhouse. Originally-by: Yinghai Lu Originally-by: David Woodhouse Acked-by: Yinghai Lu Acked-by: David Woodhouse Acked-by: Matt Fleming Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1359058816-7615-26-git-send-email-yinghai@kernel.org Cc: Rob Landley Cc: Gokul Caushik Cc: Josh Triplett Cc: Joe Millenbach --- arch/x86/boot/header.S | 39 ++++++++++++++++------ arch/x86/boot/setup.ld | 2 +- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 3 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/header.S b/arch/x86/boot/header.S index 8c132a625b9..944ce595f76 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/header.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/header.S @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "boot.h" #include "voffset.h" #include "zoffset.h" @@ -255,6 +256,9 @@ section_table: # header, from the old boot sector. .section ".header", "a" + .globl sentinel +sentinel: .byte 0xff, 0xff /* Used to detect broken loaders */ + .globl hdr hdr: setup_sects: .byte 0 /* Filled in by build.c */ @@ -279,7 +283,7 @@ _start: # Part 2 of the header, from the old setup.S .ascii "HdrS" # header signature - .word 0x020b # header version number (>= 0x0105) + .word 0x020c # header version number (>= 0x0105) # or else old loadlin-1.5 will fail) .globl realmode_swtch realmode_swtch: .word 0, 0 # default_switch, SETUPSEG @@ -297,13 +301,7 @@ type_of_loader: .byte 0 # 0 means ancient bootloader, newer # flags, unused bits must be zero (RFU) bit within loadflags loadflags: -LOADED_HIGH = 1 # If set, the kernel is loaded high -CAN_USE_HEAP = 0x80 # If set, the loader also has set - # heap_end_ptr to tell how much - # space behind setup.S can be used for - # heap purposes. - # Only the loader knows what is free - .byte LOADED_HIGH + .byte LOADED_HIGH # The kernel is to be loaded high setup_move_size: .word 0x8000 # size to move, when setup is not # loaded at 0x90000. We will move setup @@ -369,7 +367,23 @@ relocatable_kernel: .byte 1 relocatable_kernel: .byte 0 #endif min_alignment: .byte MIN_KERNEL_ALIGN_LG2 # minimum alignment -pad3: .word 0 + +xloadflags: +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +# define XLF0 XLF_KERNEL_64 /* 64-bit kernel */ +#else +# define XLF0 0 +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB +# ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +# define XLF23 XLF_EFI_HANDOVER_64 /* 64-bit EFI handover ok */ +# else +# define XLF23 XLF_EFI_HANDOVER_32 /* 32-bit EFI handover ok */ +# endif +#else +# define XLF23 0 +#endif + .word XLF0 | XLF23 cmdline_size: .long COMMAND_LINE_SIZE-1 #length of the command line, #added with boot protocol @@ -397,8 +411,13 @@ pref_address: .quad LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR # preferred load addr #define INIT_SIZE VO_INIT_SIZE #endif init_size: .long INIT_SIZE # kernel initialization size -handover_offset: .long 0x30 # offset to the handover +handover_offset: +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB + .long 0x30 # offset to the handover # protocol entry point +#else + .long 0 +#endif # End of setup header ##################################################### diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/setup.ld b/arch/x86/boot/setup.ld index 03c0683636b..96a6c756353 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/setup.ld +++ b/arch/x86/boot/setup.ld @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ SECTIONS .bstext : { *(.bstext) } .bsdata : { *(.bsdata) } - . = 497; + . = 495; .header : { *(.header) } .entrytext : { *(.entrytext) } .inittext : { *(.inittext) } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h index 92862cd9020..c15ddaf9071 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h @@ -1,6 +1,31 @@ #ifndef _ASM_X86_BOOTPARAM_H #define _ASM_X86_BOOTPARAM_H +/* setup_data types */ +#define SETUP_NONE 0 +#define SETUP_E820_EXT 1 +#define SETUP_DTB 2 +#define SETUP_PCI 3 + +/* ram_size flags */ +#define RAMDISK_IMAGE_START_MASK 0x07FF +#define RAMDISK_PROMPT_FLAG 0x8000 +#define RAMDISK_LOAD_FLAG 0x4000 + +/* loadflags */ +#define LOADED_HIGH (1<<0) +#define QUIET_FLAG (1<<5) +#define KEEP_SEGMENTS (1<<6) +#define CAN_USE_HEAP (1<<7) + +/* xloadflags */ +#define XLF_KERNEL_64 (1<<0) +#define XLF_CAN_BE_LOADED_ABOVE_4G (1<<1) +#define XLF_EFI_HANDOVER_32 (1<<2) +#define XLF_EFI_HANDOVER_64 (1<<3) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + #include #include #include @@ -9,12 +34,6 @@ #include #include