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audit_log_d_path() is a d_path() wrapper that is used by the audit code. To
use a struct path in audit_log_d_path() I need to embed it into struct
avc_audit_data.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good
reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects
that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata.
Together with the other patches of this series
- it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on
<dentry,vfsmount> pairs
- it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a
struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed
- it reduces the overall code size:
without patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5321639 858418 715768 6895825 6938d1 vmlinux
with patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5320026 858418 715768 6894212 693284 vmlinux
This patch:
Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Fix SELinux to handle 64-bit capabilities correctly, and to catch
future extensions of capabilities beyond 64 bits to ensure that SELinux
is properly updated.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function
return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters
instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized
buffer.
Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the
release_secctx LSM hook. This alleviates the problem of the caller having to
guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be
used elsewhere for Labeled NFS.
The patch also removed the unused err parameter. The conversion is similar to
the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook.
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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selinux_set_mnt_opts() can become static.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Currently network traffic can be sliently dropped due to non-avc errors which
can lead to much confusion when trying to debug the problem. This patch adds
warning messages so that when these events occur there is a user visible
notification.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This patch implements packet ingress/egress controls for SELinux which allow
SELinux security policy to control the flow of all IPv4 and IPv6 packets into
and out of the system. Currently SELinux does not have proper control over
forwarded packets and this patch corrects this problem.
Special thanks to Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com> whose earlier
work on this topic eventually led to this patch.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Now that the SELinux NetLabel "base SID" is always the netmsg initial SID we
can do a big optimization - caching the SID and not just the MLS attributes.
This not only saves a lot of per-packet memory allocations and copies but it
has a nice side effect of removing a chunk of code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This patch introduces a mechanism for checking when labeled IPsec or SECMARK
are in use by keeping introducing a configuration reference counter for each
subsystem. In the case of labeled IPsec, whenever a labeled SA or SPD entry
is created the labeled IPsec/XFRM reference count is increased and when the
entry is removed it is decreased. In the case of SECMARK, when a SECMARK
target is created the reference count is increased and later decreased when the
target is removed. These reference counters allow SELinux to quickly determine
if either of these subsystems are enabled.
NetLabel already has a similar mechanism which provides the netlbl_enabled()
function.
This patch also renames the selinux_relabel_packet_permission() function to
selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission() as the original name and
description were misleading in that they referenced a single packet label which
is not the case.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Rework the handling of network peer labels so that the different peer labeling
subsystems work better together. This includes moving both subsystems to a
single "peer" object class which involves not only changes to the permission
checks but an improved method of consolidating multiple packet peer labels.
As part of this work the inbound packet permission check code has been heavily
modified to handle both the old and new behavior in as sane a fashion as
possible.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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functions
This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar to the
sel_netif_*() functions. The node SID queries in the SELinux hooks files are
also modified to take advantage of this new functionality. In addition, remove
the address length information from the sk_buff parsing routines as it is
redundant since we already have the address family.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Instead of storing the packet's network interface name store the ifindex. This
allows us to defer the need to lookup the net_device structure until the audit
record is generated meaning that in the majority of cases we never need to
bother with this at all.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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The current SELinux netif code requires the caller have a valid net_device
struct pointer to lookup network interface information. However, we don't
always have a valid net_device pointer so convert the netif code to use
the ifindex values we always have as part of the sk_buff. This patch also
removes the default message SID from the network interface record, it is
not being used and therefore is "dead code".
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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function
In order to do any sort of IP header inspection of incoming packets we need to
know which address family, AF_INET/AF_INET6/etc., it belongs to and since the
sk_buff structure does not store this information we need to pass along the
address family separate from the packet itself.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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The IPv4 and IPv6 hook values are identical, yet some code tries to figure
out the "correct" value by looking at the address family. Introduce NF_INET_*
values for both IPv4 and IPv6. The old values are kept in a #ifndef __KERNEL__
section for userspace compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
secid_to_secctx() LSM hook. This patch also includes the SELinux
implementation for this hook.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and
security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow
filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they
so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so
it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future.
Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of
them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with
SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume
future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use
text mount data and thus must make use of this interface.
An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time
options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no
mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops
take care of things.
An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in
security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would
need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This
is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to
understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in
the FS which owns the options.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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When checking if we can wait on a child we were looking at
p->exit_signal and trying to make the decision based on if the signal
would eventually be allowed. One big flaw is that p->exit_signal is -1
for NPTL threads and so aignal_to_av was not actually checking SIGCHLD
which is what would have been sent. Even is exit_signal was set to
something strange it wouldn't change the fact that the child was there
and needed to be waited on. This patch just assumes wait is based on
SIGCHLD. Specific permission checks are made when the child actually
attempts to send a signal.
This resolves the problem of things like using GDB on confined domains
such as in RH BZ 232371. The confined domain did not have permission to
send a generic signal (exit_signal == -1) back to the unconfined GDB.
With this patch the GDB wait works and since the actual signal sent is
allowed everything functions as it should.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This patch contains the following cleanups that are now possible:
- remove the unused security_operations->inode_xattr_getsuffix
- remove the no longer used security_operations->unregister_security
- remove some no longer required exit code
- remove a bunch of no longer used exports
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security
module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the
overall security architecture.
Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API
abuse.
Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified
at boot.
The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.
In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface
is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree
modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and
dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix]
[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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It reduces the selinux overhead on read/write by only revalidating
permissions in selinux_file_permission if the task or inode labels have
changed or the policy has changed since the open-time check. A new LSM
hook, security_dentry_open, is added to capture the necessary state at open
time to allow this optimization.
(see http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=118972995207740&w=2)
Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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They take a "struct sk_buff *" instead of a "struct sk_buff **" now.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Expansion of original idea from Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Add robustness and locking to the local_port_range sysctl.
1. Enforce that low < high when setting.
2. Use seqlock to ensure atomic update.
The locking might seem like overkill, but there are
cases where sysadmin might want to change value in the
middle of a DoS attack.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Given an illegal selinux option it was possible for match_token to work in
random memory at the end of the match_table_t array.
Note that privilege is required to perform a context mount, so this issue is
effectively limited to root only.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Clear parent death signal on SID transitions to prevent unauthorized
signaling between SIDs.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@localhost.localdomain>
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The new exec code inserts an accounted vma into an mm struct which is not
current->mm. The existing memory check code has a hard coded assumption
that this does not happen as does the security code.
As the correct mm is known we pass the mm to the security method and the
helper function. A new security test is added for the case where we need
to pass the mm and the existing one is modified to pass current->mm to
avoid the need to change large amounts of code.
(Thanks to Tobias for fixing rejects and testing)
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Cc: WU Fengguang <wfg@mail.ustc.edu.cn>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Cc: Tobias Diedrich <ranma+kernel@tdiedrich.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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We don't need to check for NULL pointers before calling kfree().
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Slab destructors were no longer supported after Christoph's
c59def9f222d44bb7e2f0a559f2906191a0862d7 change. They've been
BUGs for both slab and slub, and slob never supported them
either.
This rips out support for the dtor pointer from kmem_cache_create()
completely and fixes up every single callsite in the kernel (there were
about 224, not including the slab allocator definitions themselves,
or the documentation references).
Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
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These changes will make NetLabel behave like labeled IPsec where there is an
access check for both labeled and unlabeled packets as well as providing the
ability to restrict domains to receiving only labeled packets when NetLabel is
in use. The changes to the policy are straight forward with the following
necessary to receive labeled traffic (with SECINITSID_NETMSG defined as
"netlabel_peer_t"):
allow mydom_t netlabel_peer_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom;
The policy for unlabeled traffic would be:
allow mydom_t unlabeled_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom;
These policy changes, as well as more general NetLabel support, are included in
the latest SELinux Reference Policy release 20070629 or later. Users who make
use of NetLabel are strongly encouraged to upgrade their policy to avoid
network problems. Users who do not make use of NetLabel will not notice any
difference.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Introduce is_owner_or_cap() macro in fs.h, and convert over relevant
users to it. This is done because we want to avoid bugs in the future
where we check for only effective fsuid of the current task against a
file's owning uid, without simultaneously checking for CAP_FOWNER as
well, thus violating its semantics.
[ XFS uses special macros and structures, and in general looked ...
untouchable, so we leave it alone -- but it has been looked over. ]
The (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) check in generic_permission() and
exec_permission_lite() is left alone, because those operations are
covered by CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH. Similarly operations
falling under the purview of CAP_CHOWN and CAP_LEASE are also left alone.
Signed-off-by: Satyam Sharma <ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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NetLabel"
This reverts commit 9faf65fb6ee2b4e08325ba2d69e5ccf0c46453d0.
It bit people like Michal Piotrowski:
"My system is too secure, I can not login :)"
because it changed how CONFIG_NETLABEL worked, and broke older SElinux
policies.
As a result, quoth James Morris:
"Can you please revert this patch?
We thought it only affected people running MLS, but it will affect others.
Sorry for the hassle."
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Michal Piotrowski <michal.k.k.piotrowski@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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These changes will make NetLabel behave like labeled IPsec where there is an
access check for both labeled and unlabeled packets as well as providing the
ability to restrict domains to receiving only labeled packets when NetLabel
is in use. The changes to the policy are straight forward with the
following necessary to receive labeled traffic (with SECINITSID_NETMSG
defined as "netlabel_peer_t"):
allow mydom_t netlabel_peer_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom;
The policy for unlabeled traffic would be:
allow mydom_t unlabeled_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom;
These policy changes, as well as more general NetLabel support, are included
in the SELinux Reference Policy SVN tree, r2352 or later. Users who enable
NetLabel support in the kernel are strongly encouraged to upgrade their
policy to avoid network problems.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Add a new security check on mmap operations to see if the user is attempting
to mmap to low area of the address space. The amount of space protected is
indicated by the new proc tunable /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr and defaults to
0, preserving existing behavior.
This patch uses a new SELinux security class "memprotect." Policy already
contains a number of allow rules like a_t self:process * (unconfined_t being
one of them) which mean that putting this check in the process class (its
best current fit) would make it useless as all user processes, which we also
want to protect against, would be allowed. By taking the memprotect name of
the new class it will also make it possible for us to move some of the other
memory protect permissions out of 'process' and into the new class next time
we bump the policy version number (which I also think is a good future idea)
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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In security_get_user_sids, move the transition permission checks
outside of the section holding the policy rdlock, and use the AVC to
perform the checks, calling cond_resched after each one. These
changes should allow preemption between the individual checks and
enable caching of the results. It may however increase the overall
time spent in the function in some cases, particularly in the cache
miss case.
The long term fix will be to take much of this logic to userspace by
exporting additional state via selinuxfs, and ultimately deprecating
and eliminating this interface from the kernel.
Tested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove includes of <linux/smp_lock.h> where it is not used/needed.
Suggested by Al Viro.
Builds cleanly on x86_64, i386, alpha, ia64, powerpc, sparc,
sparc64, and arm (all 59 defconfigs).
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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While researching the tty layer pid leaks I found a weird case in selinux when
we drop a controlling tty because of inadequate permissions we don't do the
normal hangup processing. Which is a problem if it happens the session leader
has exec'd something that can no longer access the tty.
We already have code in the kernel to handle this case in the form of the
TIOCNOTTY ioctl. So this patch factors out a helper function that is the
essence of that ioctl and calls it from the selinux code.
This removes the inconsistency in handling dropping of a controlling tty and
who knows it might even make some part of user space happy because it received
a SIGHUP it was expecting.
In addition since this removes the last user of proc_set_tty outside of
tty_io.c proc_set_tty is made static and removed from tty.h
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
selinux: preserve boolean values across policy reloads
selinux: change numbering of boolean directory inodes in selinuxfs
selinux: remove unused enumeration constant from selinuxfs
selinux: explicitly number all selinuxfs inodes
selinux: export initial SID contexts via selinuxfs
selinux: remove userland security class and permission definitions
SELinux: move security_skb_extlbl_sid() out of the security server
MAINTAINERS: update selinux entry
SELinux: rename selinux_netlabel.h to netlabel.h
SELinux: extract the NetLabel SELinux support from the security server
NetLabel: convert a BUG_ON in the CIPSO code to a runtime check
NetLabel: cleanup and document CIPSO constants
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As suggested, move the security_skb_extlbl_sid() function out of the security
server and into the SELinux hooks file.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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In the beginning I named the file selinux_netlabel.h to avoid potential
namespace colisions. However, over time I have realized that there are several
other similar cases of multiple header files with the same name so I'm changing
the name to something which better fits with existing naming conventions.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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For the common "(struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data" sequence, so that we reduce the
number of direct accesses to skb->data and for consistency with all the other
cast skb member helpers.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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For the quite common 'skb->nh.raw - skb->data' sequence.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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have it return the buffer it had allocated
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Below is a patch which demotes many printk lines to KERN_DEBUG from
KERN_INFO. It should help stop the spamming of logs with messages in
which users are not interested nor is there any action that users should
take. It also promotes some KERN_INFO to KERN_ERR such as when there
are improper attempts to register/unregister security modules.
A similar patch was discussed a while back on list:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?t=116656343500003&r=1&w=2
This patch addresses almost all of the issues raised. I believe the
only advice not taken was in the demoting of messages related to
undefined permissions and classes.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 6 +++---
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Hmmm...turns out to not be quite enough, as the /proc/sys inodes aren't truly
private to the fs, so we can run into them in a variety of security hooks
beyond just the inode hooks, such as security_file_permission (when reading
and writing them via the vfs helpers), security_sb_mount (when mounting other
filesystems on directories in proc like binfmt_misc), and deeper within the
security module itself (as in flush_unauthorized_files upon inheritance across
execve). So I think we have to add an IS_PRIVATE() guard within SELinux, as
below. Note however that the use of the private flag here could be confusing,
as these inodes are _not_ private to the fs, are exposed to userspace, and
security modules must implement the sysctl hook to get any access control over
them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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I goofed and when reenabling the fine grained selinux labels for
sysctls and forgot to add the "/sys" prefix before consulting
the policy database. When computing the same path using
proc_dir_entries we got the "/sys" for free as it was part
of the tree, but it isn't true for clt_table trees.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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It isn't needed anymore, all of the users are gone, and all of the ctl_table
initializers have been converted to use explicit names of the fields they are
initializing.
[akpm@osdl.org: NTFS fix]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Replace a small number of expressions with a call to the "container_of()"
macro.
Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Replace appropriate pairs of "kmem_cache_alloc()" + "memset(0)" with the
corresponding "kmem_cache_zalloc()" call.
Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@steeleye.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <Joel.Becker@oracle.com>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Currently, each fdtable supports three dynamically-sized arrays of data: the
fdarray and two fdsets. The code allows the number of fds supported by the
fdarray (fdtable->max_fds) to differ from the number of fds supported by each
of the fdsets (fdtable->max_fdset).
In practice, it is wasteful for these two sizes to differ: whenever we hit a
limit on the smaller-capacity structure, we will reallocate the entire fdtable
and all the dynamic arrays within it, so any delta in the memory used by the
larger-capacity structure will never be touched at all.
Rather than hogging this excess, we shouldn't even allocate it in the first
place, and keep the capacities of the fdarray and the fdsets equal. This
patch removes fdtable->max_fdset. As an added bonus, most of the supporting
code becomes simpler.
Signed-off-by: Vadim Lobanov <vlobanov@speakeasy.net>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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