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2013-07-28vlan: fix a race in egress prio managementEric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 3e3aac497513c669e1c62c71e1d552ea85c1d974 ] egress_priority_map[] hash table updates are protected by rtnl, and we never remove elements until device is dismantled. We have to make sure that before inserting an new element in hash table, all its fields are committed to memory or else another cpu could find corrupt values and crash. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-289p: fix off by one causing access violations and memory corruptionSasha Levin
[ Upstream commit 110ecd69a9feea82a152bbf9b12aba57e6396883 ] p9_release_pages() would attempt to dereference one value past the end of pages[]. This would cause the following crashes: [ 6293.171817] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff8807c96f3000 [ 6293.174146] IP: [<ffffffff8412793b>] p9_release_pages+0x3b/0x60 [ 6293.176447] PGD 79c5067 PUD 82c1e3067 PMD 82c197067 PTE 80000007c96f3060 [ 6293.180060] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [ 6293.180060] Modules linked in: [ 6293.180060] CPU: 62 PID: 174043 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 3.10.0-next-20130710-sasha #3954 [ 6293.180060] task: ffff8807b803b000 ti: ffff880787dde000 task.ti: ffff880787dde000 [ 6293.180060] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8412793b>] [<ffffffff8412793b>] p9_release_pages+0x3b/0x60 [ 6293.214316] RSP: 0000:ffff880787ddfc28 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 6293.214316] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff8807c96f2ff8 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 6293.222017] RDX: ffff8807b803b000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffea001c7e3d40 [ 6293.222017] RBP: ffff880787ddfc48 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 6293.222017] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 6293.222017] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8807cc50c070 R15: ffff8807cc50c070 [ 6293.222017] FS: 00007f572641d700(0000) GS:ffff8807f3600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6293.256784] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 6293.256784] CR2: ffff8807c96f3000 CR3: 00000007c8e81000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 6293.256784] Stack: [ 6293.256784] ffff880787ddfcc8 ffff880787ddfcc8 0000000000000000 ffff880787ddfcc8 [ 6293.256784] ffff880787ddfd48 ffffffff84128be8 ffff880700000002 0000000000000001 [ 6293.256784] ffff8807b803b000 ffff880787ddfce0 0000100000000000 0000000000000000 [ 6293.256784] Call Trace: [ 6293.256784] [<ffffffff84128be8>] p9_virtio_zc_request+0x598/0x630 [ 6293.256784] [<ffffffff8115c610>] ? wake_up_bit+0x40/0x40 [ 6293.256784] [<ffffffff841209b1>] p9_client_zc_rpc+0x111/0x3a0 [ 6293.256784] [<ffffffff81174b78>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x108/0x120 [ 6293.256784] [<ffffffff84122a21>] p9_client_read+0xe1/0x2c0 [ 6293.256784] [<ffffffff81708a90>] v9fs_file_read+0x90/0xc0 [ 6293.256784] [<ffffffff812bd073>] vfs_read+0xc3/0x130 [ 6293.256784] [<ffffffff811a78bd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 6293.256784] [<ffffffff812bd5a2>] SyS_read+0x62/0xa0 [ 6293.256784] [<ffffffff841a1a00>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 [ 6293.256784] Code: 66 90 48 89 fb 41 89 f5 48 8b 3f 48 85 ff 74 29 85 f6 74 25 45 31 e4 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e8 eb 14 12 fd 41 ff c4 49 63 c4 <48> 8b 3c c3 48 85 ff 74 05 45 39 e5 75 e7 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c [ 6293.256784] RIP [<ffffffff8412793b>] p9_release_pages+0x3b/0x60 [ 6293.256784] RSP <ffff880787ddfc28> [ 6293.256784] CR2: ffff8807c96f3000 [ 6293.256784] ---[ end trace 50822ee72cd360fc ]--- Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28ipv6: in case of link failure remove route directly instead of letting it expireHannes Frederic Sowa
[ Upstream commit 1eb4f758286884e7566627164bca4c4a16952a83 ] We could end up expiring a route which is part of an ecmp route set. Doing so would invalidate the rt->rt6i_nsiblings calculations and could provoke the following panic: [ 80.144667] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 80.145172] kernel BUG at net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:733! [ 80.145172] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 80.145172] Modules linked in: 8021q nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ipt_MASQUERADE ip6table_mangle ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat iptable_mangle nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables +snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_timer virtio_balloon snd soundcore i2c_piix4 i2c_core virtio_net virtio_blk [ 80.145172] CPU: 1 PID: 786 Comm: ping6 Not tainted 3.10.0+ #118 [ 80.145172] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 80.145172] task: ffff880117fa0000 ti: ffff880118770000 task.ti: ffff880118770000 [ 80.145172] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815f3b5d>] [<ffffffff815f3b5d>] fib6_add+0x75d/0x830 [ 80.145172] RSP: 0018:ffff880118771798 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 80.145172] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88011350e480 [ 80.145172] RDX: ffff88011350e238 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88011350f738 [ 80.145172] RBP: ffff880118771848 R08: ffff880117903280 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 80.145172] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88011350f680 [ 80.145172] R13: ffff880117903280 R14: ffff880118771890 R15: ffff88011350ef90 [ 80.145172] FS: 00007f02b5127740(0000) GS:ffff88011fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 80.145172] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 80.145172] CR2: 00007f981322a000 CR3: 00000001181b1000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 80.145172] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 80.145172] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 80.145172] Stack: [ 80.145172] 0000000000000001 ffff880100000000 ffff880100000000 ffff880117903280 [ 80.145172] 0000000000000000 ffff880119a4cf00 0000000000000400 00000000000007fa [ 80.145172] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff88011350f680 [ 80.145172] Call Trace: [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815eeceb>] ? rt6_bind_peer+0x4b/0x90 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815ed985>] __ip6_ins_rt+0x45/0x70 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815eee35>] ip6_ins_rt+0x35/0x40 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815ef1e4>] ip6_pol_route.isra.44+0x3a4/0x4b0 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815ef34a>] ip6_pol_route_output+0x2a/0x30 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff81616077>] fib6_rule_action+0xd7/0x210 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815ef320>] ? ip6_pol_route_input+0x30/0x30 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff81553026>] fib_rules_lookup+0xc6/0x140 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff81616374>] fib6_rule_lookup+0x44/0x80 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815ef320>] ? ip6_pol_route_input+0x30/0x30 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815edea3>] ip6_route_output+0x73/0xb0 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815dfdf3>] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x2c3/0x2e0 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff813007b1>] ? list_del+0x11/0x40 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff81082a4c>] ? remove_wait_queue+0x3c/0x50 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815dfe4d>] ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x3d/0xa0 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815fda77>] rawv6_sendmsg+0x267/0xc20 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815a8a83>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff8128eb93>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815218d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff81524a68>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff8109825c>] ? update_curr+0xec/0x170 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff81041d09>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff810afd1e>] ? __getnstimeofday+0x3e/0xd0 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff8152509e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [ 80.145172] [<ffffffff8164efd9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 80.145172] Code: fe ff ff 41 f6 45 2a 06 0f 85 ca fe ff ff 49 8b 7e 08 4c 89 ee e8 94 ef ff ff e9 b9 fe ff ff 48 8b 82 28 05 00 00 e9 01 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 49 8b 54 24 30 0d 00 00 40 00 89 83 14 01 00 00 48 89 53 [ 80.145172] RIP [<ffffffff815f3b5d>] fib6_add+0x75d/0x830 [ 80.145172] RSP <ffff880118771798> [ 80.387413] ---[ end trace 02f20b7a8b81ed95 ]--- [ 80.390154] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28ipv6: ip6_append_data_mtu did not care about pmtudisc and frag_sizeHannes Frederic Sowa
[ Upstream commit 75a493e60ac4bbe2e977e7129d6d8cbb0dd236be ] If the socket had an IPV6_MTU value set, ip6_append_data_mtu lost track of this when appending the second frame on a corked socket. This results in the following splat: [37598.993962] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [37598.994008] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2064! [37598.994008] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [37598.994008] Modules linked in: tcp_lp uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_core videodev media vfat fat usb_storage fuse ebtable_nat xt_CHECKSUM bridge stp llc ipt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ip6table_mangle ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 iptable_nat +nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat iptable_mangle nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i cxgb3 mdio libcxgbi ib_iser rdma_cm ib_addr iw_cm ib_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi +scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm bnep iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_codec_conexant arc4 iwldvm mac80211 snd_hda_intel acpi_cpufreq mperf coretemp snd_hda_codec microcode cdc_wdm cdc_acm [37598.994008] snd_hwdep cdc_ether snd_seq snd_seq_device usbnet mii joydev btusb snd_pcm bluetooth i2c_i801 e1000e lpc_ich mfd_core ptp iwlwifi pps_core snd_page_alloc mei cfg80211 snd_timer thinkpad_acpi snd tpm_tis soundcore rfkill tpm tpm_bios vhost_net tun macvtap macvlan kvm_intel kvm uinput binfmt_misc +dm_crypt i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm i2c_core wmi video [37598.994008] CPU 0 [37598.994008] Pid: 27320, comm: t2 Not tainted 3.9.6-200.fc18.x86_64 #1 LENOVO 27744PG/27744PG [37598.994008] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815443a5>] [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330 [37598.994008] RSP: 0018:ffff88003670da18 EFLAGS: 00010202 [37598.994008] RAX: ffff88018105c018 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00000000000006c0 [37598.994008] RDX: ffff88018105a6c0 RSI: ffff88018105a000 RDI: ffff8801e1b0aa00 [37598.994008] RBP: ffff88003670da78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88018105c040 [37598.994008] R10: ffff8801e1b0aa00 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000fff8 [37598.994008] R13: 00000000000004fc R14: 00000000ffff0504 R15: 0000000000000000 [37598.994008] FS: 00007f28eea59740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [37598.994008] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [37598.994008] CR2: 0000003d935789e0 CR3: 00000000365cb000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [37598.994008] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [37598.994008] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [37598.994008] Process t2 (pid: 27320, threadinfo ffff88003670c000, task ffff88022c162ee0) [37598.994008] Stack: [37598.994008] ffff88022e098a00 ffff88020f973fc0 0000000000000008 00000000000004c8 [37598.994008] ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4 ffff88003670da78 ffff8801e1b0a200 [37598.994008] 0000000000000018 00000000000004c8 ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4 [37598.994008] Call Trace: [37598.994008] [<ffffffff815fc21f>] ip6_append_data+0xccf/0xfe0 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff8158d9f0>] ? ip_copy_metadata+0x1a0/0x1a0 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff81661f66>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x16/0x40 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff8161548d>] udpv6_sendmsg+0x1ed/0xc10 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2845>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff815c3693>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2973>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153a450>] sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xe0 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff810135d1>] ? __switch_to+0x181/0x4a0 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153d97d>] sys_sendto+0x12d/0x180 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff810dfb64>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x94/0xf0 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff81020ed1>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x231/0x240 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff8166a7e7>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 [37598.994008] Code: fe 07 00 00 48 c7 c7 04 28 a6 81 89 45 a0 4c 89 4d b8 44 89 5d a8 e8 1b ac b1 ff 44 8b 5d a8 4c 8b 4d b8 8b 45 a0 e9 cf fe ff ff <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 48 [37598.994008] RIP [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330 [37598.994008] RSP <ffff88003670da18> [37599.007323] ---[ end trace d69f6a17f8ac8eee ]--- While there, also check if path mtu discovery is activated for this socket. The logic was adapted from ip6_append_data when first writing on the corked socket. This bug was introduced with commit 0c1833797a5a6ec23ea9261d979aa18078720b74 ("ipv6: fix incorrect ipsec fragment"). v2: a) Replace IPV6_PMTU_DISC_DO with IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE. b) Don't pass ipv6_pinfo to ip6_append_data_mtu (suggestion by Gao feng, thanks!). c) Change mtu to unsigned int, else we get a warning about non-matching types because of the min()-macro type-check. Acked-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28ipv6: call udp_push_pending_frames when uncorking a socket with AF_INET ↵Hannes Frederic Sowa
pending data [ Upstream commit 8822b64a0fa64a5dd1dfcf837c5b0be83f8c05d1 ] We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following splat (from Dave Jones): skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth +netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37 task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>] [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65 RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006 RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520 RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800 R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800 FS: 00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 Stack: ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4 ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6 ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40 [<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0 [<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140 [<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0 [<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20 [<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0 [<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40 [<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20 [<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0 [<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 RIP [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65 RSP <ffff8801e6431de8> This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames if that is the case. This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity. (Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if not strictly necessary.) Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28l2tp: add missing .owner to struct pppox_protoWei Yongjun
[ Upstream commit e1558a93b61962710733dc8c11a2bc765607f1cd ] Add missing .owner of struct pppox_proto. This prevents the module from being removed from underneath its users. Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28ipv6,mcast: always hold idev->lock before mca_lockAmerigo Wang
[ Upstream commit 8965779d2c0e6ab246c82a405236b1fb2adae6b2, with some bits from commit b7b1bfce0bb68bd8f6e62a28295922785cc63781 ("ipv6: split duplicate address detection and router solicitation timer") to get the __ipv6_get_lladdr() used by this patch. ] dingtianhong reported the following deadlock detected by lockdep: ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.4.24.05-0.1-default #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- ksoftirqd/0/3 is trying to acquire lock: (&ndev->lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8147f804>] ipv6_get_lladdr+0x74/0x120 but task is already holding lock: (&mc->mca_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8149d130>] mld_send_report+0x40/0x150 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&mc->mca_lock){+.+...}: [<ffffffff810a8027>] validate_chain+0x637/0x730 [<ffffffff810a8417>] __lock_acquire+0x2f7/0x500 [<ffffffff810a8734>] lock_acquire+0x114/0x150 [<ffffffff814f691a>] rt_spin_lock+0x4a/0x60 [<ffffffff8149e4bb>] igmp6_group_added+0x3b/0x120 [<ffffffff8149e5d8>] ipv6_mc_up+0x38/0x60 [<ffffffff81480a4d>] ipv6_find_idev+0x3d/0x80 [<ffffffff81483175>] addrconf_notify+0x3d5/0x4b0 [<ffffffff814fae3f>] notifier_call_chain+0x3f/0x80 [<ffffffff81073471>] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x11/0x20 [<ffffffff813d8722>] call_netdevice_notifiers+0x32/0x60 [<ffffffff813d92d4>] __dev_notify_flags+0x34/0x80 [<ffffffff813d9360>] dev_change_flags+0x40/0x70 [<ffffffff813ea627>] do_setlink+0x237/0x8a0 [<ffffffff813ebb6c>] rtnl_newlink+0x3ec/0x600 [<ffffffff813eb4d0>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x160/0x310 [<ffffffff814040b9>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x89/0xb0 [<ffffffff813eb357>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x27/0x40 [<ffffffff81403e20>] netlink_unicast+0x140/0x180 [<ffffffff81404a9e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x33e/0x380 [<ffffffff813c4252>] sock_sendmsg+0x112/0x130 [<ffffffff813c537e>] __sys_sendmsg+0x44e/0x460 [<ffffffff813c5544>] sys_sendmsg+0x44/0x70 [<ffffffff814feab9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (&ndev->lock){+.+...}: [<ffffffff810a798e>] check_prev_add+0x3de/0x440 [<ffffffff810a8027>] validate_chain+0x637/0x730 [<ffffffff810a8417>] __lock_acquire+0x2f7/0x500 [<ffffffff810a8734>] lock_acquire+0x114/0x150 [<ffffffff814f6c82>] rt_read_lock+0x42/0x60 [<ffffffff8147f804>] ipv6_get_lladdr+0x74/0x120 [<ffffffff8149b036>] mld_newpack+0xb6/0x160 [<ffffffff8149b18b>] add_grhead+0xab/0xc0 [<ffffffff8149d03b>] add_grec+0x3ab/0x460 [<ffffffff8149d14a>] mld_send_report+0x5a/0x150 [<ffffffff8149f99e>] igmp6_timer_handler+0x4e/0xb0 [<ffffffff8105705a>] call_timer_fn+0xca/0x1d0 [<ffffffff81057b9f>] run_timer_softirq+0x1df/0x2e0 [<ffffffff8104e8c7>] handle_pending_softirqs+0xf7/0x1f0 [<ffffffff8104ea3b>] __do_softirq_common+0x7b/0xf0 [<ffffffff8104f07f>] __thread_do_softirq+0x1af/0x210 [<ffffffff8104f1c1>] run_ksoftirqd+0xe1/0x1f0 [<ffffffff8106c7de>] kthread+0xae/0xc0 [<ffffffff814fff74>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 actually we can just hold idev->lock before taking pmc->mca_lock, and avoid taking idev->lock again when iterating idev->addr_list, since the upper callers of mld_newpack() already take read_lock_bh(&idev->lock). Reported-by: dingtianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com> Cc: dingtianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com> Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Tested-by: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com> Tested-by: Chen Weilong <chenweilong@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28x25: Fix broken locking in ioctl error paths.Dave Jones
[ Upstream commit 4ccb93ce7439b63c31bc7597bfffd13567fa483d ] Two of the x25 ioctl cases have error paths that break out of the function without unlocking the socket, leading to this warning: ================================================ [ BUG: lock held when returning to user space! ] 3.10.0-rc7+ #36 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------ trinity-child2/31407 is leaving the kernel with locks still held! 1 lock held by trinity-child2/31407: #0: (sk_lock-AF_X25){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa024b6da>] x25_ioctl+0x8a/0x740 [x25] Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28neighbour: fix a race in neigh_destroy()Eric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit c9ab4d85de222f3390c67aedc9c18a50e767531e ] There is a race in neighbour code, because neigh_destroy() uses skb_queue_purge(&neigh->arp_queue) without holding neighbour lock, while other parts of the code assume neighbour rwlock is what protects arp_queue Convert all skb_queue_purge() calls to the __skb_queue_purge() variant Use __skb_queue_head_init() instead of skb_queue_head_init() to make clear we do not use arp_queue.lock And hold neigh->lock in neigh_destroy() to close the race. Reported-by: Joe Jin <joe.jin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28af_key: fix info leaks in notify messagesMathias Krause
[ Upstream commit a5cc68f3d63306d0d288f31edfc2ae6ef8ecd887 ] key_notify_sa_flush() and key_notify_policy_flush() miss to initialize the sadb_msg_reserved member of the broadcasted message and thereby leak 2 bytes of heap memory to listeners. Fix that. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28ipv6: ip6_sk_dst_check() must not assume ipv6 dstEric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit a963a37d384d71ad43b3e9e79d68d42fbe0901f3 ] It's possible to use AF_INET6 sockets and to connect to an IPv4 destination. After this, socket dst cache is a pointer to a rtable, not rt6_info. ip6_sk_dst_check() should check the socket dst cache is IPv6, or else various corruptions/crashes can happen. Dave Jones can reproduce immediate crash with trinity -q -l off -n -c sendmsg -c connect With help from Hannes Frederic Sowa Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28ipv6: don't call addrconf_dst_alloc again when enable loGao feng
[ Upstream commit a881ae1f625c599b460cc8f8a7fcb1c438f699ad ] If we disable all of the net interfaces, and enable un-lo interface before lo interface, we already allocated the addrconf dst in ipv6_add_addr. So we shouldn't allocate it again when we enable lo interface. Otherwise the message below will be triggered. unregister_netdevice: waiting for sit1 to become free. Usage count = 1 This problem is introduced by commit 25fb6ca4ed9cad72f14f61629b68dc03c0d9713f "net IPv6 : Fix broken IPv6 routing table after loopback down-up" Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28ipv4: Fixed MD5 key lookups when adding/ removing MD5 to/ from TCP sockets.Aydin Arik
[ Upstream commit c0353c7b5da4cbd2ab8227e84bbc9c79890f24ce ] MD5 key lookups on a given TCP socket were being performed incorrectly. This fix alters parameter inputs to the MD5 lookup function tcp_md5_do_lookup, which is called by functions tcp_md5_do_add and tcp_md5_do_del. Specifically, the change now inputs the correct address and address family required to make a proper lookup. Signed-off-by: Aydin Arik <aydin.arik@alliedtelesis.co.nz> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28bridge: fix switched interval for MLD Query typesLinus Lüssing
[ Upstream commit 32de868cbc6bee010d2cee95b5071b25ecbec8c3 ] General Queries (the one with the Multicast Address field set to zero / '::') are supposed to have a Maximum Response Delay of [Query Response Interval], while for Multicast-Address-Specific Queries it is [Last Listener Query Interval] - not the other way round. (see RFC2710, section 7.3+7.8) Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@web.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-13libceph: Fix NULL pointer dereference in auth client codeTyler Hicks
commit 2cb33cac622afde897aa02d3dcd9fbba8bae839e upstream. A malicious monitor can craft an auth reply message that could cause a NULL function pointer dereference in the client's kernel. To prevent this, the auth_none protocol handler needs an empty ceph_auth_client_ops->build_request() function. CVE-2013-1059 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reported-by: Chanam Park <chanam.park@hkpco.kr> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-03Bluetooth: Fix crash in l2cap_build_cmd() with small MTUAnderson Lizardo
commit 300b962e5244a1ea010df7e88595faa0085b461d upstream. If a too small MTU value is set with ioctl(HCISETACLMTU) or by a bogus controller, memory corruption happens due to a memcpy() call with negative length. Fix this crash on either incoming or outgoing connections with a MTU smaller than L2CAP_HDR_SIZE + L2CAP_CMD_HDR_SIZE: [ 46.885433] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at f56ad000 [ 46.888037] IP: [<c03d94cd>] memcpy+0x1d/0x40 [ 46.888037] *pdpt = 0000000000ac3001 *pde = 00000000373f8067 *pte = 80000000356ad060 [ 46.888037] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [ 46.888037] Modules linked in: hci_vhci bluetooth virtio_balloon i2c_piix4 uhci_hcd usbcore usb_common [ 46.888037] CPU: 0 PID: 1044 Comm: kworker/u3:0 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc1+ #12 [ 46.888037] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007 [ 46.888037] Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work [bluetooth] [ 46.888037] task: f59b15b0 ti: f55c4000 task.ti: f55c4000 [ 46.888037] EIP: 0060:[<c03d94cd>] EFLAGS: 00010212 CPU: 0 [ 46.888037] EIP is at memcpy+0x1d/0x40 [ 46.888037] EAX: f56ac1c0 EBX: fffffff8 ECX: 3ffffc6e EDX: f55c5cf2 [ 46.888037] ESI: f55c6b32 EDI: f56ad000 EBP: f55c5c68 ESP: f55c5c5c [ 46.888037] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 [ 46.888037] CR0: 8005003b CR2: f56ad000 CR3: 3557d000 CR4: 000006f0 [ 46.888037] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 [ 46.888037] DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 [ 46.888037] Stack: [ 46.888037] fffffff8 00000010 00000003 f55c5cac f8c6a54c ffffffff f8c69eb2 00000000 [ 46.888037] f4783cdc f57f0070 f759c590 1001c580 00000003 0200000a 00000000 f5a88560 [ 46.888037] f5ba2600 f5a88560 00000041 00000000 f55c5d90 f8c6f4c7 00000008 f55c5cf2 [ 46.888037] Call Trace: [ 46.888037] [<f8c6a54c>] l2cap_send_cmd+0x1cc/0x230 [bluetooth] [ 46.888037] [<f8c69eb2>] ? l2cap_global_chan_by_psm+0x152/0x1a0 [bluetooth] [ 46.888037] [<f8c6f4c7>] l2cap_connect+0x3f7/0x540 [bluetooth] [ 46.888037] [<c019b37b>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0x10 [ 46.888037] [<c01a0ff8>] ? mark_held_locks+0x68/0x110 [ 46.888037] [<c064ad20>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x280/0x360 [ 46.888037] [<c064b9d9>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xa9/0x150 [ 46.888037] [<c01a118c>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xec/0x1b0 [ 46.888037] [<c064ad08>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x268/0x360 [ 46.888037] [<c01a125b>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xb/0x10 [ 46.888037] [<f8c72f8d>] l2cap_recv_frame+0xb2d/0x1d30 [bluetooth] [ 46.888037] [<c01a0ff8>] ? mark_held_locks+0x68/0x110 [ 46.888037] [<c064b9d9>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xa9/0x150 [ 46.888037] [<c01a118c>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xec/0x1b0 [ 46.888037] [<f8c754f1>] l2cap_recv_acldata+0x2a1/0x320 [bluetooth] [ 46.888037] [<f8c491d8>] hci_rx_work+0x518/0x810 [bluetooth] [ 46.888037] [<f8c48df2>] ? hci_rx_work+0x132/0x810 [bluetooth] [ 46.888037] [<c0158979>] process_one_work+0x1a9/0x600 [ 46.888037] [<c01588fb>] ? process_one_work+0x12b/0x600 [ 46.888037] [<c015922e>] ? worker_thread+0x19e/0x320 [ 46.888037] [<c015922e>] ? worker_thread+0x19e/0x320 [ 46.888037] [<c0159187>] worker_thread+0xf7/0x320 [ 46.888037] [<c0159090>] ? rescuer_thread+0x290/0x290 [ 46.888037] [<c01602f8>] kthread+0xa8/0xb0 [ 46.888037] [<c0656777>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x1b/0x28 [ 46.888037] [<c0160250>] ? flush_kthread_worker+0x120/0x120 [ 46.888037] Code: c3 90 8d 74 26 00 e8 63 fc ff ff eb e8 90 55 89 e5 83 ec 0c 89 5d f4 89 75 f8 89 7d fc 3e 8d 74 26 00 89 cb 89 c7 c1 e9 02 89 d6 <f3> a5 89 d9 83 e1 03 74 02 f3 a4 8b 5d f4 8b 75 f8 8b 7d fc 89 [ 46.888037] EIP: [<c03d94cd>] memcpy+0x1d/0x40 SS:ESP 0068:f55c5c5c [ 46.888037] CR2: 00000000f56ad000 [ 46.888037] ---[ end trace 0217c1f4d78714a9 ]--- Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <anderson.lizardo@openbossa.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-27l2tp: Fix sendmsg() return valueGuillaume Nault
[ Upstream commit a6f79d0f26704214b5b702bbac525cb72997f984 ] PPPoL2TP sockets should comply with the standard send*() return values (i.e. return number of bytes sent instead of 0 upon success). Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-27l2tp: Fix PPP header erasure and memory leakGuillaume Nault
[ Upstream commit 55b92b7a11690bc377b5d373872a6b650ae88e64 ] Copy user data after PPP framing header. This prevents erasure of the added PPP header and avoids leaking two bytes of uninitialised memory at the end of skb's data buffer. Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-27packet: packet_getname_spkt: make sure string is always 0-terminatedDaniel Borkmann
[ Upstream commit 2dc85bf323515e59e15dfa858d1472bb25cad0fe ] uaddr->sa_data is exactly of size 14, which is hard-coded here and passed as a size argument to strncpy(). A device name can be of size IFNAMSIZ (== 16), meaning we might leave the destination string unterminated. Thus, use strlcpy() and also sizeof() while we're at it. We need to memset the data area beforehand, since strlcpy does not padd the remaining buffer with zeroes for user space, so that we do not possibly leak anything. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-27net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in socket destructionDaniel Borkmann
[ Upstream commit 1abd165ed757db1afdefaac0a4bc8a70f97d258c ] While stress testing sctp sockets, I hit the following panic: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 IP: [<ffffffffa0490c4e>] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp] PGD 7cead067 PUD 7ce76067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: sctp(F) libcrc32c(F) [...] CPU: 7 PID: 2950 Comm: acc Tainted: GF 3.10.0-rc2+ #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge T410/0H19HD, BIOS 1.6.3 02/01/2011 task: ffff88007ce0e0c0 ti: ffff88007b568000 task.ti: ffff88007b568000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0490c4e>] [<ffffffffa0490c4e>] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp] RSP: 0018:ffff88007b569e08 EFLAGS: 00010292 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88007db78a00 RCX: dead000000200200 RDX: ffffffffa049fdb0 RSI: ffff8800379baf38 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88007b569e18 R08: ffff88007c230da0 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff880077990d00 R14: 0000000000000084 R15: ffff88007db78a00 FS: 00007fc18ab61700(0000) GS:ffff88007fc60000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000007cf9d000 CR4: 00000000000007e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Stack: ffff88007b569e38 ffff88007db78a00 ffff88007b569e38 ffffffffa049fded ffffffff81abf0c0 ffff88007db78a00 ffff88007b569e58 ffffffff8145b60e 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff88007b569eb8 ffffffff814df36e Call Trace: [<ffffffffa049fded>] sctp_destroy_sock+0x3d/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffff8145b60e>] sk_common_release+0x1e/0xf0 [<ffffffff814df36e>] inet_create+0x2ae/0x350 [<ffffffff81455a6f>] __sock_create+0x11f/0x240 [<ffffffff81455bf0>] sock_create+0x30/0x40 [<ffffffff8145696c>] SyS_socket+0x4c/0xc0 [<ffffffff815403be>] ? do_page_fault+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff8153cb32>] ? page_fault+0x22/0x30 [<ffffffff81544e02>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 0c c9 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e8 fb fe ff ff c9 c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 48 83 ec 08 66 66 66 66 90 <48> 8b 47 20 48 89 fb c6 47 1c 01 c6 40 12 07 e8 9e 68 01 00 48 RIP [<ffffffffa0490c4e>] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp] RSP <ffff88007b569e08> CR2: 0000000000000020 ---[ end trace e0d71ec1108c1dd9 ]--- I did not hit this with the lksctp-tools functional tests, but with a small, multi-threaded test program, that heavily allocates, binds, listens and waits in accept on sctp sockets, and then randomly kills some of them (no need for an actual client in this case to hit this). Then, again, allocating, binding, etc, and then killing child processes. This panic then only occurs when ``echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable'' is set. The cause for that is actually very simple: in sctp_endpoint_init() we enter the path of sctp_auth_init_hmacs(). There, we try to allocate our crypto transforms through crypto_alloc_hash(). In our scenario, it then can happen that crypto_alloc_hash() fails with -EINTR from crypto_larval_wait(), thus we bail out and release the socket via sk_common_release(), sctp_destroy_sock() and hit the NULL pointer dereference as soon as we try to access members in the endpoint during sctp_endpoint_free(), since endpoint at that time is still NULL. Now, if we have that case, we do not need to do any cleanup work and just leave the destruction handler. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-27ipv6: assign rt6_info to inet6_ifaddr in init_loopbackGao feng
[ Upstream commit 534c877928a16ae5f9776436a497109639bf67dc ] Commit 25fb6ca4ed9cad72f14f61629b68dc03c0d9713f "net IPv6 : Fix broken IPv6 routing table after loopback down-up" forgot to assign rt6_info to the inet6_ifaddr. When disable the net device, the rt6_info which allocated in init_loopback will not be destroied in __ipv6_ifa_notify. This will trigger the waring message below [23527.916091] unregister_netdevice: waiting for tap0 to become free. Usage count = 1 Reported-by: Arkadiusz Miskiewicz <a.miskiewicz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-27net: Block MSG_CMSG_COMPAT in send(m)msg and recv(m)msgAndy Lutomirski
[ Upstream commits 1be374a0518a288147c6a7398792583200a67261 and a7526eb5d06b0084ef12d7b168d008fcf516caab ] MSG_CMSG_COMPAT is (AFAIK) not intended to be part of the API -- it's a hack that steals a bit to indicate to other networking code that a compat entry was used. So don't allow it from a non-compat syscall. This prevents an oops when running this code: int main() { int s; struct sockaddr_in addr; struct msghdr *hdr; char *highpage = mmap((void*)(TASK_SIZE_MAX - 4096), 4096, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0); if (highpage == MAP_FAILED) err(1, "mmap"); s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP); if (s == -1) err(1, "socket"); addr.sin_family = AF_INET; addr.sin_port = htons(1); addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK); if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, sizeof(addr)) != 0) err(1, "connect"); void *evil = highpage + 4096 - COMPAT_MSGHDR_SIZE; printf("Evil address is %p\n", evil); if (syscall(__NR_sendmmsg, s, evil, 1, MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) < 0) err(1, "sendmmsg"); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-27ip_tunnel: fix kernel panic with icmp_dest_unreachEric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit a622260254ee481747cceaaa8609985b29a31565 ] Daniel Petre reported crashes in icmp_dst_unreach() with following call graph: Daniel found a similar problem mentioned in http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1007.0/00961.html And indeed this is the root cause : skb->cb[] contains data fooling IP stack. We must clear IPCB in ip_tunnel_xmit() sooner in case dst_link_failure() is called. Or else skb->cb[] might contain garbage from GSO segmentation layer. A similar fix was tested on linux-3.9, but gre code was refactored in linux-3.10. I'll send patches for stable kernels as well. Many thanks to Daniel for providing reports, patches and testing ! Reported-by: Daniel Petre <daniel.petre@rcs-rds.ro> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-27tcp: xps: fix reordering issuesEric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 547669d483e5783d722772af1483fa474da7caf9 ] commit 3853b5841c01a ("xps: Improvements in TX queue selection") introduced ooo_okay flag, but the condition to set it is slightly wrong. In our traces, we have seen ACK packets being received out of order, and RST packets sent in response. We should test if we have any packets still in host queue. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-27tcp: bug fix in proportional rate reduction.Nandita Dukkipati
[ Upstream commit 35f079ebbc860dcd1cca70890c9c8d59c1145525 ] This patch is a fix for a bug triggering newly_acked_sacked < 0 in tcp_ack(.). The bug is triggered by sacked_out decreasing relative to prior_sacked, but packets_out remaining the same as pior_packets. This is because the snapshot of prior_packets is taken after tcp_sacktag_write_queue() while prior_sacked is captured before tcp_sacktag_write_queue(). The problem is: tcp_sacktag_write_queue (tcp_match_skb_to_sack() -> tcp_fragment) adjusts the pcount for packets_out and sacked_out (MSS change or other reason). As a result, this delta in pcount is reflected in (prior_sacked - sacked_out) but not in (prior_packets - packets_out). This patch does the following: 1) initializes prior_packets at the start of tcp_ack() so as to capture the delta in packets_out created by tcp_fragment. 2) introduces a new "previous_packets_out" variable that snapshots packets_out right before tcp_clean_rtx_queue, so pkts_acked can be correctly computed as before. 3) Computes pkts_acked using previous_packets_out, and computes newly_acked_sacked using prior_packets. Signed-off-by: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-27netlabel: improve domain mapping validationPaul Moore
[ Upstream commit 6b21e1b77d1a3d58ebfd513264c885695e8a0ba5 ] The net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c:netlbl_domhsh_add() function does not properly validate new domain hash entries resulting in potential problems when an administrator attempts to add an invalid entry. One such problem, as reported by Vlad Halilov, is a kernel BUG (found in netlabel_domainhash.c:netlbl_domhsh_audit_add()) when adding an IPv6 outbound mapping with a CIPSO configuration. This patch corrects this problem by adding the necessary validation code to netlbl_domhsh_add() via the newly created netlbl_domhsh_validate() function. Ideally this patch should also be pushed to the currently active -stable trees. Reported-by: Vlad Halilov <vlad.halilov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-27ipv6: fix possible crashes in ip6_cork_release()Eric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 284041ef21fdf2e0d216ab6b787bc9072b4eb58a ] commit 0178b695fd6b4 ("ipv6: Copy cork options in ip6_append_data") added some code duplication and bad error recovery, leading to potential crash in ip6_cork_release() as kfree() could be called with garbage. use kzalloc() to make sure this wont happen. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-27tcp: fix tcp_md5_hash_skb_data()Eric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 54d27fcb338bd9c42d1dfc5a39e18f6f9d373c2e ] TCP md5 communications fail [1] for some devices, because sg/crypto code assume page offsets are below PAGE_SIZE. This was discovered using mlx4 driver [2], but I suspect loopback might trigger the same bug now we use order-3 pages in tcp_sendmsg() [1] Failure is giving following messages. huh, entered softirq 3 NET_RX ffffffff806ad230 preempt_count 00000100, exited with 00000101? [2] mlx4 driver uses order-2 pages to allocate RX frags Reported-by: Matt Schnall <mischnal@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Bernhard Beck <bbeck@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-20libceph: wrap auth methods in a mutexSage Weil
commit e9966076cdd952e19f2dd4854cd719be0d7cbebc upstream. The auth code is called from a variety of contexts, include the mon_client (protected by the monc's mutex) and the messenger callbacks (currently protected by nothing). Avoid chaos by protecting all auth state with a mutex. Nothing is blocking, so this should be simple and lightweight. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-20libceph: wrap auth ops in wrapper functionsSage Weil
commit 27859f9773e4a0b2042435b13400ee2c891a61f4 upstream. Use wrapper functions that check whether the auth op exists so that callers do not need a bunch of conditional checks. Simplifies the external interface. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-20libceph: add update_authorizer auth methodSage Weil
commit 0bed9b5c523d577378b6f83eab5835fe30c27208 upstream. Currently the messenger calls out to a get_authorizer con op, which will create a new authorizer if it doesn't yet have one. In the meantime, when we rotate our service keys, the authorizer doesn't get updated. Eventually it will be rejected by the server on a new connection attempt and get invalidated, and we will then rebuild a new authorizer, but this is not ideal. Instead, if we do have an authorizer, call a new update_authorizer op that will verify that the current authorizer is using the latest secret. If it is not, we will build a new one that does. This avoids the transient failure. This fixes one of the sorry sequence of events for bug http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/4282 Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-20libceph: fix authorizer invalidationSage Weil
commit 4b8e8b5d78b8322351d44487c1b76f7e9d3412bc upstream. We were invalidating the authorizer by removing the ticket handler entirely. This was effective in inducing us to request a new authorizer, but in the meantime it mean that any authorizer we generated would get a new and initialized handler with secret_id=0, which would always be rejected by the server side with a confusing error message: auth: could not find secret_id=0 cephx: verify_authorizer could not get service secret for service osd secret_id=0 Instead, simply clear the validity field. This will still induce the auth code to request a new secret, but will let us continue to use the old ticket in the meantime. The messenger code will probably continue to fail, but the exponential backoff will kick in, and eventually the we will get a new (hopefully more valid) ticket from the mon and be able to continue. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-20libceph: clear messenger auth_retry flag when we authenticateSage Weil
commit 20e55c4cc758e4dccdfd92ae8e9588dd624b2cd7 upstream. We maintain a counter of failed auth attempts to allow us to retry once before failing. However, if the second attempt succeeds, the flag isn't cleared, which makes us think auth failed again later when the connection resets for other reasons (like a socket error). This is one part of the sorry sequence of events in bug http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/4282 Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-20Bluetooth: Fix mgmt handling of power on failuresJohan Hedberg
commit 96570ffcca0b872dc8626e97569d2697f374d868 upstream. If hci_dev_open fails we need to ensure that the corresponding mgmt_set_powered command gets an appropriate response. This patch fixes the missing response by adding a new mgmt_set_powered_failed function that's used to indicate a power on failure to mgmt. Since a situation with the device being rfkilled may require special handling in user space the patch uses a new dedicated mgmt status code for this. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-20libceph: must hold mutex for reset_changed_osds()Alex Elder
commit 14d2f38df67fadee34625fcbd282ee22514c4846 upstream. An osd client has a red-black tree describing its osds, and occasionally we would get crashes due to one of these trees tree becoming corrupt somehow. The problem turned out to be that reset_changed_osds() was being called without protection of the osd client request mutex. That function would call __reset_osd() for any osd that had changed, and __reset_osd() would call __remove_osd() for any osd with no outstanding requests, and finally __remove_osd() would remove the corresponding entry from the red-black tree. Thus, the tree was getting modified without having any lock protection, and was vulnerable to problems due to concurrent updates. This appears to be the only osd tree updating path that has this problem. It can be fairly easily fixed by moving the call up a few lines, to just before the request mutex gets dropped in kick_requests(). This resolves: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/5043 Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-07mac80211: close AP_VLAN interfaces before unregistering allJohannes Berg
commit c8aa22db0112f640ac6631347f850879c621840b upstream. Since Eric's commit efe117ab8 ("Speedup ieee80211_remove_interfaces") there's a bug in mac80211 when it unregisters with AP_VLAN interfaces up. If the AP_VLAN interface was registered after the AP it belongs to (which is the typical case) and then we get into this code path, unregister_netdevice_many() will crash because it isn't prepared to deal with interfaces being closed in the middle of it. Exactly this happens though, because we iterate the list, find the AP master this AP_VLAN belongs to and dev_close() the dependent VLANs. After this, unregister_netdevice_many() won't pick up the fact that the AP_VLAN is already down and will do it again, causing a crash. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-19xfrm6: release dev before returning errorCong Wang
[ Upstream commit 84c4a9dfbf430861e7588d95ae3ff61535dca351 ] We forget to call dev_put() on error path in xfrm6_fill_dst(), its caller doesn't handle this. Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-19ipv6: do not clear pinet6 fieldEric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit f77d602124d865c38705df7fa25c03de9c284ad2 ] We have seen multiple NULL dereferences in __inet6_lookup_established() After analysis, I found that inet6_sk() could be NULL while the check for sk_family == AF_INET6 was true. Bug was added in linux-2.6.29 when RCU lookups were introduced in UDP and TCP stacks. Once an IPv6 socket, using SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU is inserted in a hash table, we no longer can clear pinet6 field. This patch extends logic used in commit fcbdf09d9652c891 ("net: fix nulls list corruptions in sk_prot_alloc") TCP/UDP/UDPLite IPv6 protocols provide their own .clear_sk() method to make sure we do not clear pinet6 field. At socket clone phase, we do not really care, as cloning the parent (non NULL) pinet6 is not adding a fatal race. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-19packet: tpacket_v3: do not trigger bug() on wrong header statusDaniel Borkmann
[ Upstream commit 8da3056c04bfc5f69f840ab038a38389e2de8189 ] Jakub reported that it is fairly easy to trigger the BUG() macro from user space with TPACKET_V3's RX_RING by just giving a wrong header status flag. We already had a similar situation in commit 7f5c3e3a80e6654 (``af_packet: remove BUG statement in tpacket_destruct_skb'') where this was the case in the TX_RING side that could be triggered from user space. So really, don't use BUG() or BUG_ON() unless there's really no way out, and i.e. don't use it for consistency checking when there's user space involved, no excuses, especially not if you're slapping the user with WARN + dump_stack + BUG all at once. The two functions are of concern: prb_retire_current_block() [when block status != TP_STATUS_KERNEL] prb_open_block() [when block_status != TP_STATUS_KERNEL] Calls to prb_open_block() are guarded by ealier checks if block_status is really TP_STATUS_KERNEL (racy!), but the first one BUG() is easily triggable from user space. System behaves still stable after they are removed. Also remove that yoda condition entirely, since it's already guarded. Reported-by: Jakub Zawadzki <darkjames-ws@darkjames.pl> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-19bridge: fix race with topology change timerstephen hemminger
[ Upstream commit 83401eb4990ff6af55aeed8f49681558544192e6 ] A bridge should only send topology change notice if it is not the root bridge. It is possible for message age timer to elect itself as a new root bridge, and still have a topology change timer running but waiting for bridge lock on other CPU. Solve the race by checking if we are root bridge before continuing. This was the root cause of the cases where br_send_tcn_bpdu would OOPS. Reported-by: JerryKang <jerry.kang@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-19net: vlan,ethtool: netdev_features_t is more than 32 bitBjørn Mork
[ Upstream commit b29d3145183da4e07d4b570fa8acdd3ac4a5c572 ] Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-19net: use netdev_features_t in skb_needs_linearize()Patrick McHardy
[ Upstream commit 6708c9e5cc9bfc7c9a00ce9c0fdd0b1d4952b3d1 ] Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-19net_sched: act_ipt forward compat with xtablesJamal Hadi Salim
[ Upstream commit 0dcffd09641f3abb21ac5cabc61542ab289d1a3c ] Deal with changes in newer xtables while maintaining backward compatibility. Thanks to Jan Engelhardt for suggestions. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-11ipvs: ip_vs_sip_fill_param() BUG: bad check of return valueHans Schillstrom
commit f7a1dd6e3ad59f0cfd51da29dfdbfd54122c5916 upstream. The reason for this patch is crash in kmemdup caused by returning from get_callid with uniialized matchoff and matchlen. Removing Zero check of matchlen since it's done by ct_sip_get_header() BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880457b5763f IP: [<ffffffff810df7fc>] kmemdup+0x2e/0x35 PGD 27f6067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: xt_state xt_helper nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 ip6table_mangle xt_connmark xt_conntrack ip6_tables nf_conntrack_ftp ip_vs_ftp nf_nat xt_tcpudp iptable_mangle xt_mark ip_tables x_tables ip_vs_rr ip_vs_lblcr ip_vs_pe_sip ip_vs nf_conntrack_sip nf_conntrack bonding igb i2c_algo_bit i2c_core CPU 5 Pid: 0, comm: swapper/5 Not tainted 3.9.0-rc5+ #5 /S1200KP RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810df7fc>] [<ffffffff810df7fc>] kmemdup+0x2e/0x35 RSP: 0018:ffff8803fea03648 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: ffff8803d61063e0 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000003 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffff880457b5763f RDI: ffff8803d61063e0 RBP: ffff8803fea03658 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000011 R10: 0000000000000011 R11: 00ffffffff81a8a3 R12: ffff880457b5763f R13: ffff8803d67f786a R14: ffff8803fea03730 R15: ffffffffa0098e90 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8803fea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff880457b5763f CR3: 0000000001a0c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process swapper/5 (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff8803ee18c000, task ffff8803ee18a480) Stack: ffff8803d822a080 000000000000001c ffff8803fea036c8 ffffffffa000937a ffffffff81f0d8a0 000000038135fdd5 ffff880300000014 ffff880300110000 ffffffff150118ac ffff8803d7e8a000 ffff88031e0118ac 0000000000000000 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffffa000937a>] ip_vs_sip_fill_param+0x13a/0x187 [ip_vs_pe_sip] [<ffffffffa007b209>] ip_vs_sched_persist+0x2c6/0x9c3 [ip_vs] [<ffffffff8107dc53>] ? __lock_acquire+0x677/0x1697 [<ffffffff8100972e>] ? native_sched_clock+0x3c/0x7d [<ffffffff8100972e>] ? native_sched_clock+0x3c/0x7d [<ffffffff810649bc>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x43/0xcf [<ffffffffa007bb1e>] ip_vs_schedule+0x181/0x4ba [ip_vs] ... Signed-off-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans@schillstrom.com> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-07wireless: regulatory: fix channel disabling race conditionJohannes Berg
commit 990de49f74e772b6db5208457b7aa712a5f4db86 upstream. When a full scan 2.4 and 5 GHz scan is scheduled, but then the 2.4 GHz part of the scan disables a 5.2 GHz channel due to, e.g. receiving country or frequency information, that 5.2 GHz channel might already be in the list of channels to scan next. Then, when the driver checks if it should do a passive scan, that will return false and attempt an active scan. This is not only wrong but can also lead to the iwlwifi device firmware crashing since it checks regulatory as well. Fix this by not setting the channel flags to just disabled but rather OR'ing in the disabled flag. That way, even if the race happens, the channel will be scanned passively which is still (mostly) correct. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-01net: drop dst before queueing fragmentsEric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 97599dc792b45b1669c3cdb9a4b365aad0232f65 ] Commit 4a94445c9a5c (net: Use ip_route_input_noref() in input path) added a bug in IP defragmentation handling, as non refcounted dst could escape an RCU protected section. Commit 64f3b9e203bd068 (net: ip_expire() must revalidate route) fixed the case of timeouts, but not the general problem. Tom Parkin noticed crashes in UDP stack and provided a patch, but further analysis permitted us to pinpoint the root cause. Before queueing a packet into a frag list, we must drop its dst, as this dst has limited lifetime (RCU protected) When/if a packet is finally reassembled, we use the dst of the very last skb, still protected by RCU and valid, as the dst of the reassembled packet. Use same logic in IPv6, as there is no need to hold dst references. Reported-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com> Tested-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-01net: fix incorrect credentials passingLinus Torvalds
[ Upstream commit 83f1b4ba917db5dc5a061a44b3403ddb6e783494 ] Commit 257b5358b32f ("scm: Capture the full credentials of the scm sender") changed the credentials passing code to pass in the effective uid/gid instead of the real uid/gid. Obviously this doesn't matter most of the time (since normally they are the same), but it results in differences for suid binaries when the wrong uid/gid ends up being used. This just undoes that (presumably unintentional) part of the commit. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-01net: rate-limit warn-bad-offload splats.Ben Greear
[ Upstream commit c846ad9b880ece01bb4d8d07ba917734edf0324f ] If one does do something unfortunate and allow a bad offload bug into the kernel, this the skb_warn_bad_offload can effectively live-lock the system, filling the logs with the same error over and over. Add rate limitation to this so that box remains otherwise functional in this case. Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-01tcp: call tcp_replace_ts_recent() from tcp_ack()Eric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 12fb3dd9dc3c64ba7d64cec977cca9b5fb7b1d4e ] commit bd090dfc634d (tcp: tcp_replace_ts_recent() should not be called from tcp_validate_incoming()) introduced a TS ecr bug in slow path processing. 1 A > B P. 1:10001(10000) ack 1 <nop,nop,TS val 1001 ecr 200> 2 B < A . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257 <sack 9001:10001,TS val 300 ecr 1001> 3 A > B . 1:1001(1000) ack 1 win 227 <nop,nop,TS val 1002 ecr 200> 4 A > B . 1001:2001(1000) ack 1 win 227 <nop,nop,TS val 1002 ecr 200> (ecr 200 should be ecr 300 in packets 3 & 4) Problem is tcp_ack() can trigger send of new packets (retransmits), reflecting the prior TSval, instead of the TSval contained in the currently processed incoming packet. Fix this by calling tcp_replace_ts_recent() from tcp_ack() after the checks, but before the actions. Reported-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-01net: sctp: sctp_auth_key_put: use kzfree instead of kfreeDaniel Borkmann
[ Upstream commit 586c31f3bf04c290dc0a0de7fc91d20aa9a5ee53 ] For sensitive data like keying material, it is common practice to zero out keys before returning the memory back to the allocator. Thus, use kzfree instead of kfree. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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