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commit f5563318ff1bde15b10e736e97ffce13be08bc1a upstream.
When parsing an invalid radiotap header, the parser can overrun
the buffer that is passed in because it doesn't correctly check
1) the minimum radiotap header size
2) the space for extended bitmaps
The first issue doesn't affect any in-kernel user as they all
check the minimum size before calling the radiotap function.
The second issue could potentially affect the kernel if an skb
is passed in that consists only of the radiotap header with a
lot of extended bitmaps that extend past the SKB. In that case
a read-only buffer overrun by at most 4 bytes is possible.
Fix this by adding the appropriate checks to the parser.
Reported-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c2f17e827b419918c856131f592df9521e1a38e3 ]
Routes need to be probed asynchronous otherwise the call stack gets
exhausted when the kernel attemps to deliver another skb inline, like
e.g. xt_TEE does, and we probe at the same time.
We update neigh->updated still at once, otherwise we would send to
many probes.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 56e42441ed54b092d6c7411138ce60d049e7c731 ]
Now when rt6_nexthop() can return nexthop address we can use it
for proper nexthop comparison of directly connected destinations.
For more information refer to commit bbb5823cf742a7
("netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix rt_gateway checks for H.323 helper").
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 550bab42f83308c9d6ab04a980cc4333cef1c8fa ]
Make sure rt6i_gateway contains nexthop information in
all routes returned from lookup or when routes are directly
attached to skb for generated ICMP packets.
The effect of this patch should be a faster version of
rt6_nexthop() and the consideration of local addresses as
nexthop.
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ This is a simplified -stable version of a set of upstream commits. ]
This is a replacement patch only for stable which does fix the problems
handled by the following two commits in -net:
"ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9)
"ip6_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (c547dbf55d5f8cf615ccc0e7265e98db27d3fb8b)
Three frames are written on a corked udp socket for which the output
netdevice has UFO enabled. If the first and third frame are smaller than
the mtu and the second one is bigger, we enqueue the second frame with
skb_append_datato_frags without initializing the gso fields. This leads
to the third frame appended regulary and thus constructing an invalid skb.
This fixes the problem by always using skb_append_datato_frags as soon
as the first frag got enqueued to the skb without marking the packet
as SKB_GSO_UDP.
The problem with only two frames for ipv6 was fixed by "ipv6: udp
packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO"
(2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47).
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 90c6bd34f884cd9cee21f1d152baf6c18bcac949 ]
In the case of credentials passing in unix stream sockets (dgram
sockets seem not affected), we get a rather sparse race after
commit 16e5726 ("af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default").
We have a stream server on receiver side that requests credential
passing from senders (e.g. nc -U). Since we need to set SO_PASSCRED
on each spawned/accepted socket on server side to 1 first (as it's
not inherited), it can happen that in the time between accept() and
setsockopt() we get interrupted, the sender is being scheduled and
continues with passing data to our receiver. At that time SO_PASSCRED
is neither set on sender nor receiver side, hence in cmsg's
SCM_CREDENTIALS we get eventually pid:0, uid:65534, gid:65534
(== overflow{u,g}id) instead of what we actually would like to see.
On the sender side, here nc -U, the tests in maybe_add_creds()
invoked through unix_stream_sendmsg() would fail, as at that exact
time, as mentioned, the sender has neither SO_PASSCRED on his side
nor sees it on the server side, and we have a valid 'other' socket
in place. Thus, sender believes it would just look like a normal
connection, not needing/requesting SO_PASSCRED at that time.
As reverting 16e5726 would not be an option due to the significant
performance regression reported when having creds always passed,
one way/trade-off to prevent that would be to set SO_PASSCRED on
the listener socket and allow inheriting these flags to the spawned
socket on server side in accept(). It seems also logical to do so
if we'd tell the listener socket to pass those flags onwards, and
would fix the race.
Before, strace:
recvmsg(4, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{"blub\n", 4096}],
msg_controllen=32, {cmsg_len=28, cmsg_level=SOL_SOCKET,
cmsg_type=SCM_CREDENTIALS{pid=0, uid=65534, gid=65534}},
msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
After, strace:
recvmsg(4, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{"blub\n", 4096}],
msg_controllen=32, {cmsg_len=28, cmsg_level=SOL_SOCKET,
cmsg_type=SCM_CREDENTIALS{pid=11580, uid=1000, gid=1000}},
msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d2dbbba77e95dff4b4f901fee236fef6d9552072 ]
IP/IPv6 fragmentation knows how to compute only TCP/UDP checksum.
This causes problems if SCTP packets has to be fragmented and
ipsummed has been set to PARTIAL due to checksum offload support.
This condition can happen when retransmitting after MTU discover,
or when INIT or other control chunks are larger then MTU.
Check for the rare fragmentation condition in SCTP and use software
checksum calculation in this case.
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 27127a82561a2a3ed955ce207048e1b066a80a2a ]
igb/ixgbe have hardware sctp checksum support, when this feature is enabled
and also IPsec is armed to protect sctp traffic, ugly things happened as
xfrm_output checks CHECKSUM_PARTIAL to do checksum operation(sum every thing
up and pack the 16bits result in the checksum field). The result is fail
establishment of sctp communication.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4b6c7879d84ad06a2ac5b964808ed599187a188d ]
Commit be4f154d5ef0ca147ab6bcd38857a774133f5450
bridge: Clamp forward_delay when enabling STP
had a typo when attempting to clamp maximum forward delay.
It is possible to set bridge_forward_delay to be higher then
permitted maximum when STP is off. When turning STP on, the
higher then allowed delay has to be clamed down to max value.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CC: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Reviewed-by: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6865d1e834be84ddd5808d93d5035b492346c64a ]
When filling the netlink message we miss to wipe the pad field,
therefore leak one byte of heap memory to userland. Fix this by
setting pad to 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 455cc32bf128e114455d11ad919321ab89a2c312 ]
François Cachereul made a very nice bug report and suspected
the bh_lock_sock() / bh_unlok_sock() pair used in l2tp_xmit_skb() from
process context was not good.
This problem was added by commit 6af88da14ee284aaad6e4326da09a89191ab6165
("l2tp: Fix locking in l2tp_core.c").
l2tp_eth_dev_xmit() runs from BH context, so we must disable BH
from other l2tp_xmit_skb() users.
[ 452.060011] BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 23s! [accel-pppd:6662]
[ 452.061757] Modules linked in: l2tp_ppp l2tp_netlink l2tp_core pppoe pppox
ppp_generic slhc ipv6 ext3 mbcache jbd virtio_balloon xfs exportfs dm_mod
virtio_blk ata_generic virtio_net floppy ata_piix libata virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]
[ 452.064012] CPU 1
[ 452.080015] BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 23s! [accel-pppd:6643]
[ 452.080015] CPU 2
[ 452.080015]
[ 452.080015] Pid: 6643, comm: accel-pppd Not tainted 3.2.46.mini #1 Bochs Bochs
[ 452.080015] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81059f6c>] [<ffffffff81059f6c>] do_raw_spin_lock+0x17/0x1f
[ 452.080015] RSP: 0018:ffff88007125fc18 EFLAGS: 00000293
[ 452.080015] RAX: 000000000000aba9 RBX: ffffffff811d0703 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 452.080015] RDX: 00000000000000ab RSI: ffff8800711f6896 RDI: ffff8800745c8110
[ 452.080015] RBP: ffff88007125fc18 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 452.080015] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000280 R12: 0000000000000286
[ 452.080015] R13: 0000000000000020 R14: 0000000000000240 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 452.080015] FS: 00007fdc0cc24700(0000) GS:ffff8800b6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 452.080015] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 452.080015] CR2: 00007fdb054899b8 CR3: 0000000074404000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
[ 452.080015] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 452.080015] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 452.080015] Process accel-pppd (pid: 6643, threadinfo ffff88007125e000, task ffff8800b27e6dd0)
[ 452.080015] Stack:
[ 452.080015] ffff88007125fc28 ffffffff81256559 ffff88007125fc98 ffffffffa01b2bd1
[ 452.080015] ffff88007125fc58 000000000000000c 00000000029490d0 0000009c71dbe25e
[ 452.080015] 000000000000005c 000000080000000e 0000000000000000 ffff880071170600
[ 452.080015] Call Trace:
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff81256559>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffffa01b2bd1>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x189/0x4ac [l2tp_core]
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffffa01c2d36>] pppol2tp_sendmsg+0x15e/0x19c [l2tp_ppp]
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff811c7872>] __sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x22/0x24
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff811c83bd>] sock_sendmsg+0xa1/0xb6
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff81254e88>] ? __schedule+0x5c1/0x616
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff8103c7c6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0xb7/0x10c
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff810bbd21>] ? fget_light+0x75/0x89
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff811c8444>] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x20/0x56
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff811c9b34>] sys_sendto+0x10c/0x13b
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff8125cac2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 452.080015] Code: 81 48 89 e5 72 0c 31 c0 48 81 ff 45 66 25 81 0f 92 c0 5d c3 55 b8 00 01 00 00 48 89 e5 f0 66 0f c1 07 0f b6 d4 38 d0 74 06 f3 90 <8a> 07 eb f6 5d c3 90 90 55 48 89 e5 9c 58 0f 1f 44 00 00 5d c3
[ 452.080015] Call Trace:
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff81256559>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffffa01b2bd1>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x189/0x4ac [l2tp_core]
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffffa01c2d36>] pppol2tp_sendmsg+0x15e/0x19c [l2tp_ppp]
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff811c7872>] __sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x22/0x24
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff811c83bd>] sock_sendmsg+0xa1/0xb6
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff81254e88>] ? __schedule+0x5c1/0x616
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff8103c7c6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0xb7/0x10c
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff810bbd21>] ? fget_light+0x75/0x89
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff811c8444>] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x20/0x56
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff811c9b34>] sys_sendto+0x10c/0x13b
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff8125cac2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 452.064012]
[ 452.064012] Pid: 6662, comm: accel-pppd Not tainted 3.2.46.mini #1 Bochs Bochs
[ 452.064012] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81059f6e>] [<ffffffff81059f6e>] do_raw_spin_lock+0x19/0x1f
[ 452.064012] RSP: 0018:ffff8800b6e83ba0 EFLAGS: 00000297
[ 452.064012] RAX: 000000000000aaa9 RBX: ffff8800b6e83b40 RCX: 0000000000000002
[ 452.064012] RDX: 00000000000000aa RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffff8800745c8110
[ 452.064012] RBP: ffff8800b6e83ba0 R08: 000000000000c802 R09: 000000000000001c
[ 452.064012] R10: ffff880071096c4e R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff8800b6e83b18
[ 452.064012] R13: ffffffff8125d51e R14: ffff8800b6e83ba0 R15: ffff880072a589c0
[ 452.064012] FS: 00007fdc0b81e700(0000) GS:ffff8800b6e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 452.064012] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 452.064012] CR2: 0000000000625208 CR3: 0000000074404000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
[ 452.064012] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 452.064012] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 452.064012] Process accel-pppd (pid: 6662, threadinfo ffff88007129a000, task ffff8800744f7410)
[ 452.064012] Stack:
[ 452.064012] ffff8800b6e83bb0 ffffffff81256559 ffff8800b6e83bc0 ffffffff8121c64a
[ 452.064012] ffff8800b6e83bf0 ffffffff8121ec7a ffff880072a589c0 ffff880071096c62
[ 452.064012] 0000000000000011 ffffffff81430024 ffff8800b6e83c80 ffffffff8121f276
[ 452.064012] Call Trace:
[ 452.064012] <IRQ>
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81256559>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121c64a>] spin_lock+0x9/0xb
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121ec7a>] udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x186/0x269
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121f276>] __udp4_lib_rcv+0x297/0x4ae
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121c178>] ? raw_rcv+0xe9/0xf0
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121f4a7>] udp_rcv+0x1a/0x1c
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811fe385>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x12b/0x1a5
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811fe54e>] ip_local_deliver+0x53/0x84
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811fe1d0>] ip_rcv_finish+0x2bc/0x2f3
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811fe78f>] ip_rcv+0x210/0x269
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8101911e>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0xb
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811d88cd>] __netif_receive_skb+0x3a5/0x3f7
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811d8eba>] netif_receive_skb+0x57/0x5e
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811cf30f>] ? __netdev_alloc_skb+0x1f/0x3b
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa0049126>] virtnet_poll+0x4ba/0x5a4 [virtio_net]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811d9417>] net_rx_action+0x73/0x184
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa01b2cc2>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x27a/0x4ac [l2tp_core]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff810343b9>] __do_softirq+0xc3/0x1a8
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81013b56>] ? ack_APIC_irq+0x10/0x12
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81256559>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8125e0ac>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x26
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81003587>] do_softirq+0x45/0x82
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81034667>] irq_exit+0x42/0x9c
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8125e146>] do_IRQ+0x8e/0xa5
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8125676e>] common_interrupt+0x6e/0x6e
[ 452.064012] <EOI>
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff810b82a1>] ? kfree+0x8a/0xa3
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa01b2cc2>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x27a/0x4ac [l2tp_core]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa01b2c25>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x1dd/0x4ac [l2tp_core]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa01c2d36>] pppol2tp_sendmsg+0x15e/0x19c [l2tp_ppp]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811c7872>] __sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x22/0x24
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811c83bd>] sock_sendmsg+0xa1/0xb6
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81254e88>] ? __schedule+0x5c1/0x616
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8103c7c6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0xb7/0x10c
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff810bbd21>] ? fget_light+0x75/0x89
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811c8444>] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x20/0x56
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811c9b34>] sys_sendto+0x10c/0x13b
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8125cac2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 452.064012] Code: 89 e5 72 0c 31 c0 48 81 ff 45 66 25 81 0f 92 c0 5d c3 55 b8 00 01 00 00 48 89 e5 f0 66 0f c1 07 0f b6 d4 38 d0 74 06 f3 90 8a 07 <eb> f6 5d c3 90 90 55 48 89 e5 9c 58 0f 1f 44 00 00 5d c3 55 48
[ 452.064012] Call Trace:
[ 452.064012] <IRQ> [<ffffffff81256559>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121c64a>] spin_lock+0x9/0xb
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121ec7a>] udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x186/0x269
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121f276>] __udp4_lib_rcv+0x297/0x4ae
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121c178>] ? raw_rcv+0xe9/0xf0
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121f4a7>] udp_rcv+0x1a/0x1c
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811fe385>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x12b/0x1a5
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811fe54e>] ip_local_deliver+0x53/0x84
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811fe1d0>] ip_rcv_finish+0x2bc/0x2f3
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811fe78f>] ip_rcv+0x210/0x269
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8101911e>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0xb
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811d88cd>] __netif_receive_skb+0x3a5/0x3f7
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811d8eba>] netif_receive_skb+0x57/0x5e
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811cf30f>] ? __netdev_alloc_skb+0x1f/0x3b
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa0049126>] virtnet_poll+0x4ba/0x5a4 [virtio_net]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811d9417>] net_rx_action+0x73/0x184
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa01b2cc2>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x27a/0x4ac [l2tp_core]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff810343b9>] __do_softirq+0xc3/0x1a8
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81013b56>] ? ack_APIC_irq+0x10/0x12
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81256559>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8125e0ac>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x26
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81003587>] do_softirq+0x45/0x82
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81034667>] irq_exit+0x42/0x9c
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8125e146>] do_IRQ+0x8e/0xa5
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8125676e>] common_interrupt+0x6e/0x6e
[ 452.064012] <EOI> [<ffffffff810b82a1>] ? kfree+0x8a/0xa3
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa01b2cc2>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x27a/0x4ac [l2tp_core]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa01b2c25>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x1dd/0x4ac [l2tp_core]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa01c2d36>] pppol2tp_sendmsg+0x15e/0x19c [l2tp_ppp]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811c7872>] __sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x22/0x24
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811c83bd>] sock_sendmsg+0xa1/0xb6
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81254e88>] ? __schedule+0x5c1/0x616
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8103c7c6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0xb7/0x10c
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff810bbd21>] ? fget_light+0x75/0x89
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811c8444>] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x20/0x56
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811c9b34>] sys_sendto+0x10c/0x13b
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8125cac2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-by: François Cachereul <f.cachereul@alphalink.fr>
Tested-by: François Cachereul <f.cachereul@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7263a5187f9e9de45fcb51349cf0e031142c19a1 ]
This patch fixes and improves the use of vti interfaces (while
lightly changing the way of configuring them).
Currently:
- it is necessary to identify and mark inbound IPsec
packets destined to each vti interface, via netfilter rules in
the mangle table at prerouting hook.
- the vti module cannot retrieve the right tunnel in input since
commit b9959fd3: vti tunnels all have an i_key, but the tunnel lookup
is done with flag TUNNEL_NO_KEY, so there no chance to retrieve them.
- the i_key is used by the outbound processing as a mark to lookup
for the right SP and SA bundle.
This patch uses the o_key to store the vti mark (instead of i_key) and
enables:
- to avoid the need for previously marking the inbound skbuffs via a
netfilter rule.
- to properly retrieve the right tunnel in input, only based on the IPsec
packet outer addresses.
- to properly perform an inbound policy check (using the tunnel o_key
as a mark).
- to properly perform an outbound SPD and SAD lookup (using the tunnel
o_key as a mark).
- to keep the current mark of the skbuff. The skbuff mark is neither
used nor changed by the vti interface. Only the vti interface o_key
is used.
SAs have a wildcard mark.
SPs have a mark equal to the vti interface o_key.
The vti interface must be created as follows (i_key = 0, o_key = mark):
ip link add vti1 mode vti local 1.1.1.1 remote 2.2.2.2 okey 1
The SPs attached to vti1 must be created as follows (mark = vti1 o_key):
ip xfrm policy add dir out mark 1 tmpl src 1.1.1.1 dst 2.2.2.2 \
proto esp mode tunnel
ip xfrm policy add dir in mark 1 tmpl src 2.2.2.2 dst 1.1.1.1 \
proto esp mode tunnel
The SAs are created with the default wildcard mark. There is no
distinction between global vs. vti SAs. Just their addresses will
possibly link them to a vti interface:
ip xfrm state add src 1.1.1.1 dst 2.2.2.2 proto esp spi 1000 mode tunnel \
enc "cbc(aes)" "azertyuiopqsdfgh"
ip xfrm state add src 2.2.2.2 dst 1.1.1.1 proto esp spi 2000 mode tunnel \
enc "cbc(aes)" "sqbdhgqsdjqjsdfh"
To avoid matching "global" (not vti) SPs in vti interfaces, global SPs
should no use the default wildcard mark, but explicitly match mark 0.
To avoid a double SPD lookup in input and output (in global and vti SPDs),
the NOPOLICY and NOXFRM options should be set on the vti interfaces:
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/vti1/disable_policy
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/vti1/disable_xfrm
The outgoing traffic is steered to vti1 by a route via the vti interface:
ip route add 192.168.0.0/16 dev vti1
The incoming IPsec traffic is steered to vti1 because its outer addresses
match the vti1 tunnel configuration.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c33a39c575068c2ea9bffb22fd6de2df19c74b89 ]
This patch fixes the calculation of the nlmsg size, by adding the missing
nla_total_size().
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit cb03db9d0e964568407fb08ea46cc2b6b7f67587 ]
net_secret() is only used when CONFIG_IPV6 or CONFIG_INET are selected.
Building a defconfig with both of these symbols unselected (Using the ARM
at91sam9rl_defconfig, for example) leads to the following build warning:
$ make at91sam9rl_defconfig
#
# configuration written to .config
#
$ make net/core/secure_seq.o
scripts/kconfig/conf --silentoldconfig Kconfig
CHK include/config/kernel.release
CHK include/generated/uapi/linux/version.h
CHK include/generated/utsrelease.h
make[1]: `include/generated/mach-types.h' is up to date.
CALL scripts/checksyscalls.sh
CC net/core/secure_seq.o
net/core/secure_seq.c:17:13: warning: 'net_secret_init' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
Fix this warning by protecting the definition of net_secret() with these
symbols.
Reported-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0a7e22609067ff524fc7bbd45c6951dd08561667 ]
When sending out multicast messages, the source address in inet->mc_addr is
ignored and rewritten by an autoselected one. This is caused by a typo in
commit 813b3b5db831 ("ipv4: Use caller's on-stack flowi as-is in output
route lookups").
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1661bf364ae9c506bc8795fef70d1532931be1e8 ]
We need to cap ->msg_namelen or it leads to a buffer overflow when we
to the memcpy() in __audit_sockaddr(). It requires CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to
exploit this bug.
The call tree is:
___sys_recvmsg()
move_addr_to_user()
audit_sockaddr()
__audit_sockaddr()
Reported-by: Jüri Aedla <juri.aedla@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8d8a51e26a6d415e1470759f2cf5f3ee3ee86196 ]
net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c: In function ‘l2tp_verify_udp_checksum’:
net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:499:22: warning: unused variable ‘tunnel’ [-Wunused-variable]
Create a helper "l2tp_tunnel()" to facilitate this, and as a side
effect get rid of a bunch of unnecessary void pointer casts.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e18503f41f9b12132c95d7c31ca6ee5155e44e5c ]
IPv4 mapped addresses cause kernel panic.
The patch juste check whether the IPv6 address is an IPv4 mapped
address. If so, use IPv4 API instead of IPv6.
[ 940.026915] general protection fault: 0000 [#1]
[ 940.026915] Modules linked in: l2tp_ppp l2tp_netlink l2tp_core pppox ppp_generic slhc loop psmouse
[ 940.026915] CPU: 0 PID: 3184 Comm: memcheck-amd64- Not tainted 3.11.0+ #1
[ 940.026915] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
[ 940.026915] task: ffff880007130e20 ti: ffff88000737e000 task.ti: ffff88000737e000
[ 940.026915] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81333780>] [<ffffffff81333780>] ip6_xmit+0x276/0x326
[ 940.026915] RSP: 0018:ffff88000737fd28 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 940.026915] RAX: c748521a75ceff48 RBX: ffff880000c30800 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 940.026915] RDX: ffff88000075cc4e RSI: 0000000000000028 RDI: ffff8800060e5a40
[ 940.026915] RBP: ffff8800060e5a40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88000075cc90
[ 940.026915] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88000737fda0
[ 940.026915] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000002000 R15: ffff880005d3b580
[ 940.026915] FS: 00007f163dc5e800(0000) GS:ffffffff81623000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 940.026915] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 940.026915] CR2: 00000004032dc940 CR3: 0000000005c25000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 940.026915] Stack:
[ 940.026915] ffff88000075cc4e ffffffff81694e90 ffff880000c30b38 0000000000000020
[ 940.026915] 11000000523c4bac ffff88000737fdb4 0000000000000000 ffff880000c30800
[ 940.026915] ffff880005d3b580 ffff880000c30b38 ffff8800060e5a40 0000000000000020
[ 940.026915] Call Trace:
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffff81356cc3>] ? inet6_csk_xmit+0xa4/0xc4
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffffa0038535>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x503/0x55a [l2tp_core]
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffff812b8d3b>] ? pskb_expand_head+0x161/0x214
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffffa003e91d>] ? pppol2tp_xmit+0xf2/0x143 [l2tp_ppp]
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffffa00292e0>] ? ppp_channel_push+0x36/0x8b [ppp_generic]
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffffa00293fe>] ? ppp_write+0xaf/0xc5 [ppp_generic]
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffff8110ead4>] ? vfs_write+0xa2/0x106
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffff8110edd6>] ? SyS_write+0x56/0x8a
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffff81378ac0>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 940.026915] Code: 00 49 8b 8f d8 00 00 00 66 83 7c 11 02 00 74 60 49
8b 47 58 48 83 e0 fe 48 8b 80 18 01 00 00 48 85 c0 74 13 48 8b 80 78 02
00 00 <48> ff 40 28 41 8b 57 68 48 01 50 30 48 8b 54 24 08 49 c7 c1 51
[ 940.026915] RIP [<ffffffff81333780>] ip6_xmit+0x276/0x326
[ 940.026915] RSP <ffff88000737fd28>
[ 940.057945] ---[ end trace be8aba9a61c8b7f3 ]---
[ 940.058583] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Signed-off-by: François CACHEREUL <f.cachereul@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 80ad1d61e72d626e30ebe8529a0455e660ca4693 ]
commit 3ab5aee7fe84 ("net: Convert TCP & DCCP hash tables to use RCU /
hlist_nulls") incorrectly used sock_put() on TIMEWAIT sockets.
We should instead use inet_twsk_put()
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 031afe4990a7c9dbff41a3a742c44d3e740ea0a1 ]
On receiving an ACK that covers the loss probe sequence, TLP
immediately sets the congestion state to Open, even though some packets
are not recovered and retransmisssion are on the way. The later ACks
may trigger a WARN_ON check in step D of tcp_fastretrans_alert(), e.g.,
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=989251
The fix is to follow the similar procedure in recovery by calling
tcp_try_keep_open(). The sender switches to Open state if no packets
are retransmissted. Otherwise it goes to Disorder and let subsequent
ACKs move the state to Recovery or Open.
Reported-By: Michael Sterrett <michael@sterretts.net>
Tested-By: Dormando <dormando@rydia.net>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5e8a402f831dbe7ee831340a91439e46f0d38acd ]
Yuchung found following problem :
There are bugs in the SACK processing code, merging part in
tcp_shift_skb_data(), that incorrectly resets or ignores the sacked
skbs FIN flag. When a receiver first SACK the FIN sequence, and later
throw away ofo queue (e.g., sack-reneging), the sender will stop
retransmitting the FIN flag, and hangs forever.
Following packetdrill test can be used to reproduce the bug.
$ cat sack-merge-bug.pkt
`sysctl -q net.ipv4.tcp_fack=0`
// Establish a connection and send 10 MSS.
0.000 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3
+.000 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0
+.000 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0
+.000 listen(3, 1) = 0
+.050 < S 0:0(0) win 32792 <mss 1000,sackOK,nop,nop,nop,wscale 7>
+.000 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 6>
+.001 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 1024
+.000 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4
+.100 write(4, ..., 12000) = 12000
+.000 shutdown(4, SHUT_WR) = 0
+.000 > . 1:10001(10000) ack 1
+.050 < . 1:1(0) ack 2001 win 257
+.000 > FP. 10001:12001(2000) ack 1
+.050 < . 1:1(0) ack 2001 win 257 <sack 10001:11001,nop,nop>
+.050 < . 1:1(0) ack 2001 win 257 <sack 10001:12002,nop,nop>
// SACK reneg
+.050 < . 1:1(0) ack 12001 win 257
+0 %{ print "unacked: ",tcpi_unacked }%
+5 %{ print "" }%
First, a typo inverted left/right of one OR operation, then
code forgot to advance end_seq if the merged skb carried FIN.
Bug was added in 2.6.29 by commit 832d11c5cd076ab
("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Acked-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c52e2421f7368fd36cbe330d2cf41b10452e39a9 ]
TCP stack should make sure it owns skbs before mangling them.
We had various crashes using bnx2x, and it turned out gso_size
was cleared right before bnx2x driver was populating TC descriptor
of the _previous_ packet send. TCP stack can sometime retransmit
packets that are still in Qdisc.
Of course we could make bnx2x driver more robust (using
ACCESS_ONCE(shinfo->gso_size) for example), but the bug is TCP stack.
We have identified two points where skb_unclone() was needed.
This patch adds a WARN_ON_ONCE() to warn us if we missed another
fix of this kind.
Kudos to Neal for finding the root cause of this bug. Its visible
using small MSS.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c9eeec26e32e087359160406f96e0949b3cc6f10 ]
When TCP Small Queues was added, we used a sysctl to limit amount of
packets queues on Qdisc/device queues for a given TCP flow.
Problem is this limit is either too big for low rates, or too small
for high rates.
Now TCP stack has rate estimation in sk->sk_pacing_rate, and TSO
auto sizing, it can better control number of packets in Qdisc/device
queues.
New limit is two packets or at least 1 to 2 ms worth of packets.
Low rates flows benefit from this patch by having even smaller
number of packets in queues, allowing for faster recovery,
better RTT estimations.
High rates flows benefit from this patch by allowing more than 2 packets
in flight as we had reports this was a limiting factor to reach line
rate. [ In particular if TX completion is delayed because of coalescing
parameters ]
Example for a single flow on 10Gbp link controlled by FQ/pacing
14 packets in flight instead of 2
$ tc -s -d qd
qdisc fq 8001: dev eth0 root refcnt 32 limit 10000p flow_limit 100p
buckets 1024 quantum 3028 initial_quantum 15140
Sent 1168459366606 bytes 771822841 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0
requeues 6822476)
rate 9346Mbit 771713pps backlog 953820b 14p requeues 6822476
2047 flow, 2046 inactive, 1 throttled, delay 15673 ns
2372 gc, 0 highprio, 0 retrans, 9739249 throttled, 0 flows_plimit
Note that sk_pacing_rate is currently set to twice the actual rate, but
this might be refined in the future when a flow is in congestion
avoidance.
Additional change : skb->destructor should be set to tcp_wfree().
A future patch (for linux 3.13+) might remove tcp_limit_output_bytes
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commits 6d36824e730f247b602c90e8715a792003e3c5a7,
02cf4ebd82ff0ac7254b88e466820a290ed8289a, and parts of
7eec4174ff29cd42f2acfae8112f51c228545d40 ]
After hearing many people over past years complaining against TSO being
bursty or even buggy, we are proud to present automatic sizing of TSO
packets.
One part of the problem is that tcp_tso_should_defer() uses an heuristic
relying on upcoming ACKS instead of a timer, but more generally, having
big TSO packets makes little sense for low rates, as it tends to create
micro bursts on the network, and general consensus is to reduce the
buffering amount.
This patch introduces a per socket sk_pacing_rate, that approximates
the current sending rate, and allows us to size the TSO packets so
that we try to send one packet every ms.
This field could be set by other transports.
Patch has no impact for high speed flows, where having large TSO packets
makes sense to reach line rate.
For other flows, this helps better packet scheduling and ACK clocking.
This patch increases performance of TCP flows in lossy environments.
A new sysctl (tcp_min_tso_segs) is added, to specify the
minimal size of a TSO packet (default being 2).
A follow-up patch will provide a new packet scheduler (FQ), using
sk_pacing_rate as an input to perform optional per flow pacing.
This explains why we chose to set sk_pacing_rate to twice the current
rate, allowing 'slow start' ramp up.
sk_pacing_rate = 2 * cwnd * mss / srtt
v2: Neal Cardwell reported a suspect deferring of last two segments on
initial write of 10 MSS, I had to change tcp_tso_should_defer() to take
into account tp->xmit_size_goal_segs
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Van Jacobson <vanj@google.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2433c8f094a008895e66f25bd1773cdb01c91d01 upstream.
Modify the code to use current_euid(), and in_egroup_p, as in done
in fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:test_perm()
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bf5430360ebe4b2d0c51d91f782e649107b502eb upstream.
We need to let the setup stage complete cleanly even when the HCI device
is rfkilled. Otherwise the HCI device will stay in an undefined state
and never get notified to user space through mgmt (even when it gets
unblocked through rfkill).
This patch makes sure that hci_dev_open() can be called in the HCI_SETUP
stage, that blocking the device doesn't abort the setup stage, and that
the device gets proper powered down as soon as the setup stage completes
in case it was blocked meanwhile.
The bug that this patch fixed can be very easily reproduced using e.g.
the rfkill command line too. By running "rfkill block all" before
inserting a Bluetooth dongle the resulting HCI device goes into a state
where it is never announced over mgmt, not even when "rfkill unblock all"
is run.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5e130367d43ff22836bbae380d197d600fe8ddbb upstream.
This makes it more convenient to check for rfkill (no need to check for
dev->rfkill before calling rfkill_blocked()) and also avoids potential
races if the RFKILL state needs to be checked from within the rfkill
callback.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 89cbb4da0abee2f39d75f67f9fd57f7410c8b65c upstream.
This patch fixes the connection encryption key size information when
the host is playing the peripheral role. We should set conn->enc_key_
size in hci_le_ltk_request_evt, otherwise it is left uninitialized.
Signed-off-by: Andre Guedes <andre.guedes@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f8776218e8546397be64ad2bc0ebf4748522d6e3 upstream.
While playing the peripheral role, the host gets a LE Long Term Key
Request Event from the controller when a connection is established
with a bonded device. The host then informs the LTK which should be
used for the connection. Once the link is encrypted, the host gets
an Encryption Change Event.
Therefore we should set conn->pending_sec_level instead of conn->
sec_level in hci_le_ltk_request_evt. This way, conn->sec_level is
properly updated in hci_encrypt_change_evt.
Moreover, since we have a LTK associated to the device, we have at
least BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM security level.
Signed-off-by: Andre Guedes <andre.guedes@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bb8140947a247b9aa15652cc24dc555ebb0b64b0 ]
rtnl ops where introduced by c075b13098b3 ("ip6tnl: advertise tunnel param via
rtnl"), but I forget to assign rtnl ops to fb tunnels.
Now that it is done, we must remove the explicit call to
unregister_netdevice_queue(), because the fallback tunnel is added to the queue
in ip6_tnl_destroy_tunnels() when checking rtnl_link_ops of all netdevices (this
is valid since commit 0bd8762824e7 ("ip6tnl: add x-netns support")).
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 205983c43700ac3a81e7625273a3fa83cd2759b5 ]
rtnl ops where introduced by ba3e3f50a0e5 ("sit: advertise tunnel param via
rtnl"), but I forget to assign rtnl ops to fb tunnels.
Now that it is done, we must remove the explicit call to
unregister_netdevice_queue(), because the fallback tunnel is added to the queue
in sit_destroy_tunnels() when checking rtnl_link_ops of all netdevices (this
is valid since commit 5e6700b3bf98 ("sit: add support of x-netns")).
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3e08f4a72f689c6296d336c2aab4bddd60c93ae2 ]
We might extend the used aera of a skb beyond the total
headroom when we install the ipip header. Fix this by
calling skb_cow_head() unconditionally.
Bug was introduced with commit c544193214
("GRE: Refactor GRE tunneling code.")
Cc: Pravin Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9260d3e1013701aa814d10c8fc6a9f92bd17d643 ]
It is possible for the timer handlers to run after the call to
ipv6_mc_down so use in6_dev_put instead of __in6_dev_put in the
handler function in order to do proper cleanup when the refcnt
reaches 0. Otherwise, the refcnt can reach zero without the
inet6_dev being destroyed and we end up leaking a reference to
the net_device and see messages like the following,
unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 1
Tested on linux-3.4.43.
Signed-off-by: Salam Noureddine <noureddine@aristanetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e2401654dd0f5f3fb7a8d80dad9554d73d7ca394 ]
It is possible for the timer handlers to run after the call to
ip_mc_down so use in_dev_put instead of __in_dev_put in the handler
function in order to do proper cleanup when the refcnt reaches 0.
Otherwise, the refcnt can reach zero without the in_device being
destroyed and we end up leaking a reference to the net_device and
see messages like the following,
unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 1
Tested on linux-3.4.43.
Signed-off-by: Salam Noureddine <noureddine@aristanetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3da812d860755925da890e8c713f2d2e2d7b1bae ]
gre_hlen already accounts for sizeof(struct ipv6_hdr) + gre header,
so initialize max_headroom to zero. Otherwise the
if (encap_limit >= 0) {
max_headroom += 8;
mtu -= 8;
}
increments an uninitialized variable before max_headroom was reset.
Found with coverity: 728539
Cc: Dmitry Kozlov <xeb@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9a3bab6b05383f1e4c3716b3615500c51285959e ]
A host might need net_secret[] and never open a single socket.
Problem added in commit aebda156a570782
("net: defer net_secret[] initialization")
Based on prior patch from Hannes Frederic Sowa.
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@strressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7df37ff33dc122f7bd0614d707939fe84322d264 ]
When a router is doing DNAT for 6to4/6rd packets the latest
anti-spoofing commit 218774dc ("ipv6: add anti-spoofing checks for
6to4 and 6rd") will drop them because the IPv6 address embedded does
not match the IPv4 destination. This patch will allow them to pass by
testing if we have an address that matches on 6to4/6rd interface. I
have been hit by this problem using Fedora and IPV6TO4_IPV4ADDR.
Also, log the dropped packets (with rate limit).
Signed-off-by: Catalin(ux) M. BOIE <catab@embedromix.ro>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47 ]
In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the already queued up gso-skb via
plain ip6_append_data. This causes random memory corruptions.
In ip6_ufo_append_data we also have to be careful to not queue up the
same skb multiple times. So setup the gso frame only when no first skb
is available.
This also fixes a shortcoming where we add the current packet's length to
cork->length but return early because of a packet > mtu with dontfrag set
(instead of sutracting it again).
Found with trinity.
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 703133de331a7a7df47f31fb9de51dc6f68a9de8 ]
If local fragmentation is allowed, then ip_select_ident() and
ip_select_ident_more() need to generate unique IDs to ensure
correct defragmentation on the peer.
For example, if IPsec (tunnel mode) has to encrypt large skbs
that have local_df bit set, then all IP fragments that belonged
to different ESP datagrams would have used the same identificator.
If one of these IP fragments would get lost or reordered, then
peer could possibly stitch together wrong IP fragments that did
not belong to the same datagram. This would lead to a packet loss
or data corruption.
Signed-off-by: Ansis Atteka <aatteka@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 749154aa56b57652a282cbde57a57abc278d1205 ]
skb->data already points to IP header, but for the sake of
consistency we can also use ip_hdr() to retrieve it.
Signed-off-by: Ansis Atteka <aatteka@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bd784a140712fd06674f2240eecfc4ccae421129 ]
DCCP shouldn't be setting sk_err on redirects as it
isn't an error condition. it should be doing exactly
what tcp is doing and leaving the error handler without
touching the socket.
Signed-off-by: Duan Jiong <duanj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3f96a532113131d5a65ac9e00fc83cfa31b0295f ]
Adapt the same behaviour for SCTP as present in TCP for ICMP redirect
messages. For IPv6, RFC4443, section 2.4. says:
...
(e) An ICMPv6 error message MUST NOT be originated as a result of
receiving the following:
...
(e.2) An ICMPv6 redirect message [IPv6-DISC].
...
Therefore, do not report an error to user space, just invoke dst's redirect
callback and leave, same for IPv4 as done in TCP as well. The implication
w/o having this patch could be that the reception of such packets would
generate a poll notification and in worst case it could even tear down the
whole connection. Therefore, stop updating sk_err on redirects.
Reported-by: Duan Jiong <duanj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Suggested-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0d2ede929f61783aebfb9228e4d32a0546ee4d23 ]
IFLA_IPTUN_LOCAL and IFLA_IPTUN_REMOTE were inverted.
Introduced by c075b13098b3 (ip6tnl: advertise tunnel param via rtnl).
Signed-off-by: Ding Zhi <zhi.ding@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 716ec052d2280d511e10e90ad54a86f5b5d4dcc2 ]
The NULL deref happens when br_handle_frame is called between these
2 lines of del_nbp:
dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_BRIDGE_PORT;
/* --> br_handle_frame is called at this time */
netdev_rx_handler_unregister(dev);
In br_handle_frame the return of br_port_get_rcu(dev) is dereferenced
without check but br_port_get_rcu(dev) returns NULL if:
!(dev->priv_flags & IFF_BRIDGE_PORT)
Eric Dumazet pointed out the testing of IFF_BRIDGE_PORT is not necessary
here since we're in rcu_read_lock and we have synchronize_net() in
netdev_rx_handler_unregister. So remove the testing of IFF_BRIDGE_PORT
and by the previous patch, make sure br_port_get_rcu is called in
bridging code.
Signed-off-by: Hong Zhiguo <zhiguohong@tencent.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1fb1754a8c70d69ab480763c423e0a74369c4a67 ]
current br_port_get_rcu is problematic in bridging path
(NULL deref). Change these calls in netlink path first.
Signed-off-by: Hong Zhiguo <zhiguohong@tencent.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit be4f154d5ef0ca147ab6bcd38857a774133f5450 ]
At some point limits were added to forward_delay. However, the
limits are only enforced when STP is enabled. This created a
scenario where you could have a value outside the allowed range
while STP is disabled, which then stuck around even after STP
is enabled.
This patch fixes this by clamping the value when we enable STP.
I had to move the locking around a bit to ensure that there is
no window where someone could insert a value outside the range
while we're in the middle of enabling STP.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9a0620133ccce9dd35c00a96405c8d80938c2cc0 ]
This changes the message_age_timer calculation to use the BPDU's max age as
opposed to the local bridge's max age. This is in accordance with section
8.6.2.3.2 Step 2 of the 802.1D-1998 sprecification.
With the current implementation, when running with very large bridge
diameters, convergance will not always occur even if a root bridge is
configured to have a longer max age.
Tested successfully on bridge diameters of ~200.
Signed-off-by: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 95ee62083cb6453e056562d91f597552021e6ae7 ]
Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:
SCTP + IPv4:
22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):
SCTP + IPv6:
22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]
Moreover, Alan says:
This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.
In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):
...
0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000 ]p.......}.l....
0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000 ....plaintext...
Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.
SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.
SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.
Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:
SCTP + IPv6:
08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296
This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.
[1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf
Reported-by: Alan Chester <alan.chester@tekelec.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d0fe8c888b1fd1a2f84b9962cabcb98a70988aec ]
I've been hitting a NULL ptr deref while using netconsole because the
np->dev check and the pointer manipulation in netpoll_cleanup are done
without rtnl and the following sequence happens when having a netconsole
over a vlan and we remove the vlan while disabling the netconsole:
CPU 1 CPU2
removes vlan and calls the notifier
enters store_enabled(), calls
netdev_cleanup which checks np->dev
and then waits for rtnl
executes the netconsole netdev
release notifier making np->dev
== NULL and releases rtnl
continues to dereference a member of
np->dev which at this point is == NULL
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b0dd663b60944a3ce86430fa35549fb37968bda0 ]
The received ARP request type in the Ethernet packet head is ETH_P_ARP other than ETH_P_IP.
[ Bug introduced by commit b7394d2429c198b1da3d46ac39192e891029ec0f
("netpoll: prepare for ipv6") ]
Signed-off-by: Sonic Zhang <sonic.zhang@analog.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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