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commit b5a1eeef04cc7859f34dec9b72ea1b28e4aba07c upstream.
Don't write more than the requested number of bytes of an batman-adv icmp
packet to the userspace buffer. Otherwise unrelated userspace memory might get
overridden by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <lindner_marek@yahoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit c00b6856fc642b234895cfabd15b289e76726430 upstream.
Writing a icmp_packet_rr and then reading icmp_packet can lead to kernel
memory corruption, if __user *buf is just below TASK_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Paul Kot <pawlkt@gmail.com>
[sven@narfation.org: made it checkpatch clean]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <lindner_marek@yahoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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When decnet is built as a module a simple:
echo 0.0 >/proc/sys/net/decnet/node_address
results in most of the sysctl entries under /proc/sys/net/decnet and
/proc/sys/net/decnet/conf disappearing.
For more details see http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg226123.html.
This change applies the same workaround used in
net/core/sysctl_net_core.c and net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c of creating
a skeleton of decnet sysctl entries before doing anything else.
The problem first appeared in kernel 2.6.27. The later rewrite of
sysctl in kernel 3.4 restored the previous behavior and eliminated the
need for this workaround.
This patch was heavily inspired by a similar but more complex patch by
Larry Baker.
Reported-by: Larry Baker <baker@usgs.gov>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit a9a6b52ee1baa865283a91eb8d443ee91adfca56 upstream.
If the socket is full, we're better off just waiting until it empties,
or until the connection is broken. The reason why we generally don't
want to time out is that the call to xprt->ops->release_xprt() will
trigger a connection reset, which isn't helpful...
Let's make an exception for soft RPC calls, since they have to provide
timeout guarantees.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 08dcdbf6a7b9d14c2302c5bd0c5390ddf122f664 ]
It looks like its possible to open thousands of TCP IPv6
sessions on a server, all landing in a single slot of TCP hash
table. Incoming packets have to lookup sockets in a very
long list.
We should hash all bits from foreign IPv6 addresses, using
a salt and hash mix, not a simple XOR.
inet6_ehashfn() can also separately use the ports, instead
of xoring them.
Reported-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit b531ed61a2a2a77eeb2f7c88b49aa5ec7d9880d8 ]
We should get 'type' and 'code' from the outer ICMP header.
Signed-off-by: Li Wei <lw@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 547b4e718115eea74087e28d7fa70aec619200db ]
Spanning Tree Protocol packets should have always been marked as
control packets, this causes them to get queued in the high prirority
FIFO. As Radia Perlman mentioned in her LCA talk, STP dies if bridge
gets overloaded and can't communicate. This is a long-standing bug back
to the first versions of Linux bridge.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit e75bafbff2270993926abcc31358361db74a9bc2 upstream.
svc_age_temp_xprts expires xprts in a two-step process: first it takes
the sv_lock and moves the xprts to expire off their server-wide list
(sv_tempsocks or sv_permsocks) to a local list. Then it drops the
sv_lock and enqueues and puts each one.
I see no reason for this: svc_xprt_enqueue() will take sp_lock, but the
sv_lock and sp_lock are not otherwise nested anywhere (and documentation
at the top of this file claims it's correct to nest these with sp_lock
inside.)
Tested-by: Jason Tibbitts <tibbs@math.uh.edu>
Tested-by: Paweł Sikora <pawel.sikora@agmk.net>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 6caab7b0544e83e6c160b5e80f5a4a7dd69545c7 ]
If lower layer driver leaves the ip header in the skb fragment, it needs to
be first pulled into skb->data before inspecting ip header length or ip version
number.
Signed-off-by: Sarveshwar Bandi <sarveshwar.bandi@emulex.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 6731d2095bd4aef18027c72ef845ab1087c3ba63 ]
There are transients during normal FRTO procedure during which
the packets_in_flight can go to zero between write_queue state
updates and firing the resulting segments out. As FRTO processing
occurs during that window the check must be more precise to
not match "spuriously" :-). More specificly, e.g., when
packets_in_flight is zero but FLAG_DATA_ACKED is true the problematic
branch that set cwnd into zero would not be taken and new segments
might be sent out later.
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Tested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 2e5f421211ff76c17130b4597bc06df4eeead24f ]
Commit 9dc274151a548 (tcp: fix ABC in tcp_slow_start())
uncovered a bug in FRTO code :
tcp_process_frto() is setting snd_cwnd to 0 if the number
of in flight packets is 0.
As Neal pointed out, if no packet is in flight we lost our
chance to disambiguate whether a loss timeout was spurious.
We should assume it was a proper loss.
Reported-by: Pasi Kärkkäinen <pasik@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit b5c37fe6e24eec194bb29d22fdd55d73bcc709bf ]
On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material
should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do
with e.g. auth keys when released.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 6ba542a291a5e558603ac51cda9bded347ce7627 ]
In sctp_setsockopt_auth_key, we create a temporary copy of the user
passed shared auth key for the endpoint or association and after
internal setup, we free it right away. Since it's sensitive data, we
should zero out the key before returning the memory back to the
allocator. Thus, use kzfree instead of kfree, just as we do in
sctp_auth_key_put().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 2f94aabd9f6c925d77aecb3ff020f1cc12ed8f86 ]
Jamie Parsons reported a problem recently, in which the re-initalization of an
association (The duplicate init case), resulted in a loss of receive window
space. He tracked down the root cause to sctp_outq_teardown, which discarded
all the data on an outq during a re-initalization of the corresponding
association, but never reset the outq->outstanding_data field to zero. I wrote,
and he tested this fix, which does a proper full re-initalization of the outq,
fixing this problem, and hopefully future proofing us from simmilar issues down
the road.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Jamie Parsons <Jamie.Parsons@metaswitch.com>
Tested-by: Jamie Parsons <Jamie.Parsons@metaswitch.com>
CC: Jamie Parsons <Jamie.Parsons@metaswitch.com>
CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 9665d5d62487e8e7b1f546c00e11107155384b9a ]
When releasing a packet socket, the routine packet_set_ring() is reused
to free rings instead of allocating them. But when calling it for the
first time, it fills req->tp_block_nr with the value of rb->pg_vec_len
which in the second invocation makes it bail out since req->tp_block_nr
is greater zero but req->tp_block_size is zero.
This patch solves the problem by passing a zeroed auto-variable to
packet_set_ring() upon each invocation from packet_release().
As far as I can tell, this issue exists even since 69e3c75 (net: TX_RING
and packet mmap), i.e. the original inclusion of TX ring support into
af_packet, but applies only to sockets with both RX and TX ring
allocated, which is probably why this was unnoticed all the time.
Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter <phil.sutter@viprinet.com>
Cc: Johann Baudy <johann.baudy@gnu-log.net>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit bd30e947207e2ea0ff2c08f5b4a03025ddce48d3 ]
They will be created at output, if ever needed. This avoids creating
empty neighbor entries when TPROXYing/Forwarding packets for addresses
that are not even directly reachable.
Note that IPv4 already handles it this way. No neighbor entries are
created for local input.
Tested by myself and customer.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 604dfd6efc9b79bce432f2394791708d8e8f6efc ]
The return value of pktgen_add_device() is not checked, so
even if we fail to add some device, for example, non-exist one,
we still see "OK:...". This patch fixes it.
After this patch, I got:
# echo "add_device non-exist" > /proc/net/pktgen/kpktgend_0
-bash: echo: write error: No such device
# cat /proc/net/pktgen/kpktgend_0
Running:
Stopped:
Result: ERROR: can not add device non-exist
# echo "add_device eth0" > /proc/net/pktgen/kpktgend_0
# cat /proc/net/pktgen/kpktgend_0
Running:
Stopped: eth0
Result: OK: add_device=eth0
(Candidate for -stable)
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 7efdba5bd9a2f3e2059beeb45c9fa55eefe1bced ]
Commit 299b0767 (ipv6: Fix IPsec slowpath fragmentation problem)
has introduced a error in the header length calculation that
provokes corrupted packets when non-fragmentable extensions
headers (Destination Option or Routing Header Type 2) are used.
rt->rt6i_nfheader_len is the length of the non-fragmentable
extension header, and it should be substracted to
rt->dst.header_len, and not to exthdrlen, as it was done before
commit 299b0767.
This patch reverts to the original and correct behavior. It has
been successfully tested with and without IPsec on packets
that include non-fragmentable extensions headers.
Signed-off-by: Romain Kuntz <r.kuntz@ipflavors.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 85da53bf1c336bb07ac038fb951403ab0478d2c5 ]
The tests on the flags in addrconf_get_prefix_route() does no make
much sense: the 'noflags' parameter contains the set of flags that
must not match with the route flags, so the test must be done
against 'noflags', and not against 'flags'.
Signed-off-by: Romain Kuntz <r.kuntz@ipflavors.com>
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit c9be4a5c49cf51cc70a993f004c5bb30067a65ce ]
A regression is introduced by the following commit:
commit 4d52cfbef6266092d535237ba5a4b981458ab171
Author: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Date: Tue Jun 2 00:42:16 2009 -0700
net: ipv4/ip_sockglue.c cleanups
Pure cleanups
but it is not a pure cleanup...
- if (val != -1 && (val < 1 || val>255))
+ if (val != -1 && (val < 0 || val > 255))
Since there is no reason provided to allow ttl=0, change it back.
Reported-by: nitin padalia <padalia.nitin@gmail.com>
Cc: nitin padalia <padalia.nitin@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit dbccd791a3fbbdac12c33834b73beff3984988e9 upstream.
After sending reset command wait for its command complete event before
sending next command. Some chips sends CC event for command received
before reset if reset was send before chip replied with CC.
This is also required by specification that host shall not send
additional HCI commands before receiving CC for reset.
< HCI Command: Reset (0x03|0x0003) plen 0 [hci0] 18.404612
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 [hci0] 18.405850
Write Extended Inquiry Response (0x03|0x0052) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: Read Local Supported Features (0x04|0x0003) plen 0 [hci0] 18.406079
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 [hci0] 18.407864
Reset (0x03|0x0003) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: Read Local Supported Features (0x04|0x0003) plen 0 [hci0] 18.408062
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 12 [hci0] 18.408835
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@tieto.com>
Acked-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 8cf9fa1240229cbdd888236c0c43fcbad680cf00 upstream.
The conn->smp_chan pointer can be NULL if SMP PDUs arrive at unexpected
moments. To avoid NULL pointer dereferences the code should be checking
for this and disconnect if an unexpected SMP PDU arrives. This patch
fixes the issue by adding a check for conn->smp_chan for all other PDUs
except pairing request and security request (which are are the first
PDUs to come to initialize the SMP context).
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 0a9ab9bdb3e891762553f667066190c1d22ad62b upstream.
The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no
guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing
'\0'.
Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero
bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on
input subsystem:
$ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name
AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af
("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys"
field in struct hid_device due to overflow.)
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <anderson.lizardo@openbossa.org>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 87ed50036b866db2ec2ba16b2a7aec4a2b0b7c39 upstream.
If the rpc_task exits while holding the socket write lock before it has
allocated an rpc slot, then the usual mechanism for releasing the write
lock in xprt_release() is defeated.
The problem occurs if the call to xprt_lock_write() initially fails, so
that the rpc_task is put on the xprt->sending wait queue. If the task
exits after being assigned the lock by __xprt_lock_write_func, but
before it has retried the call to xprt_lock_and_alloc_slot(), then
it calls xprt_release() while holding the write lock, but will
immediately exit due to the test for task->tk_rqstp != NULL.
Reported-by: Chris Perl <chris.perl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit a56f992cdabc63f56b4b142885deebebf936ff76 upstream.
This is a very old bug, but there's nothing that prevents the
timer from running while the module is being removed when we
only do del_timer() instead of del_timer_sync().
The timer should normally not be running at this point, but
it's not clearly impossible (or we could just remove this.)
Tested-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 354e4aa391ed50a4d827ff6fc11e0667d0859b25 ]
RFC 5961 5.2 [Blind Data Injection Attack].[Mitigation]
All TCP stacks MAY implement the following mitigation. TCP stacks
that implement this mitigation MUST add an additional input check to
any incoming segment. The ACK value is considered acceptable only if
it is in the range of ((SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND) <= SEG.ACK <=
SND.NXT). All incoming segments whose ACK value doesn't satisfy the
above condition MUST be discarded and an ACK sent back.
Move tcp_send_challenge_ack() before tcp_ack() to avoid a forward
declaration.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit bd090dfc634ddd711a5fbd0cadc6e0ab4977bcaf ]
We added support for RFC 5961 in latest kernels but TCP fails
to perform exhaustive check of ACK sequence.
We can update our view of peer tsval from a frame that is
later discarded by tcp_ack()
This makes timestamps enabled sessions vulnerable to injection of
a high tsval : peers start an ACK storm, since the victim
sends a dupack each time it receives an ACK from the other peer.
As tcp_validate_incoming() is called before tcp_ack(), we should
not peform tcp_replace_ts_recent() from it, and let callers do it
at the right time.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Cc: H.K. Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com>
Cc: Romain Francoise <romain@orebokech.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit e371589917011efe6ff8c7dfb4e9e81934ac5855 ]
Followup of commit 0c24604b68fc (tcp: implement RFC 5961 4.2)
As reported by Vijay Subramanian, we should send a challenge ACK
instead of a dup ack if a SYN flag is set on a packet received out of
window.
This permits the ratelimiting to work as intended, and to increase
correct SNMP counters.
Suggested-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com>
Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella <kkiran@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 0c24604b68fc7810d429d6c3657b6f148270e528 ]
Implement the RFC 5691 mitigation against Blind
Reset attack using SYN bit.
Section 4.2 of RFC 5961 advises to send a Challenge ACK and drop
incoming packet, instead of resetting the session.
Add a new SNMP counter to count number of challenge acks sent
in response to SYN packets.
(netstat -s | grep TCPSYNChallenge)
Remove obsolete TCPAbortOnSyn, since we no longer abort a TCP session
because of a SYN flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella <kkiran@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 282f23c6ee343126156dd41218b22ece96d747e3 ]
Implement the RFC 5691 mitigation against Blind
Reset attack using RST bit.
Idea is to validate incoming RST sequence,
to match RCV.NXT value, instead of previouly accepted
window : (RCV.NXT <= SEG.SEQ < RCV.NXT+RCV.WND)
If sequence is in window but not an exact match, send
a "challenge ACK", so that the other part can resend an
RST with the appropriate sequence.
Add a new sysctl, tcp_challenge_ack_limit, to limit
number of challenge ACK sent per second.
Add a new SNMP counter to count number of challenge acks sent.
(netstat -s | grep TCPChallengeACK)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella <kkiran@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit d2fe85da52e89b8012ffad010ef352a964725d5f ]
Fixed integer overflow in function htb_dequeue
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hasko <hasko.stevo@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit e337e24d6624e74a558aa69071e112a65f7b5758 ]
If in either of the above functions inet_csk_route_child_sock() or
__inet_inherit_port() fails, the newsk will not be freed:
unreferenced object 0xffff88022e8a92c0 (size 1592):
comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294946244 (age 726.160s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
0a 01 01 01 0a 01 01 02 00 00 00 00 a7 cc 16 00 ................
02 00 03 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff8153d190>] kmemleak_alloc+0x21/0x3e
[<ffffffff810ab3e7>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xb5/0xc5
[<ffffffff8149b65b>] sk_prot_alloc.isra.53+0x2b/0xcd
[<ffffffff8149b784>] sk_clone_lock+0x16/0x21e
[<ffffffff814d711a>] inet_csk_clone_lock+0x10/0x7b
[<ffffffff814ebbc3>] tcp_create_openreq_child+0x21/0x481
[<ffffffff814e8fa5>] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x3a/0x23b
[<ffffffff814ec5ba>] tcp_check_req+0x29f/0x416
[<ffffffff814e8e10>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x161/0x2bc
[<ffffffff814eb917>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x6c9/0x701
[<ffffffff814cea9f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x70/0xc4
[<ffffffff814cec20>] ip_local_deliver+0x4e/0x7f
[<ffffffff814ce9f8>] ip_rcv_finish+0x1fc/0x233
[<ffffffff814cee68>] ip_rcv+0x217/0x267
[<ffffffff814a7bbe>] __netif_receive_skb+0x49e/0x553
[<ffffffff814a7cc3>] netif_receive_skb+0x50/0x82
This happens, because sk_clone_lock initializes sk_refcnt to 2, and thus
a single sock_put() is not enough to free the memory. Additionally, things
like xfrm, memcg, cookie_values,... may have been initialized.
We have to free them properly.
This is fixed by forcing a call to tcp_done(), ending up in
inet_csk_destroy_sock, doing the final sock_put(). tcp_done() is necessary,
because it ends up doing all the cleanup on xfrm, memcg, cookie_values,
xfrm,...
Before calling tcp_done, we have to set the socket to SOCK_DEAD, to
force it entering inet_csk_destroy_sock. To avoid the warning in
inet_csk_destroy_sock, inet_num has to be set to 0.
As inet_csk_destroy_sock does a dec on orphan_count, we first have to
increase it.
Calling tcp_done() allows us to remove the calls to
tcp_clear_xmit_timer() and tcp_cleanup_congestion_control().
A similar approach is taken for dccp by calling dccp_done().
This is in the kernel since 093d282321 (tproxy: fix hash locking issue
when using port redirection in __inet_inherit_port()), thus since
version >= 2.6.37.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 5b632fe85ec82e5c43740b52e74c66df50a37db3 upstream.
Commit f0425beda4d404a6e751439b562100b902ba9c98 "mac80211: retry sending
failed BAR frames later instead of tearing down aggr" caused regression
on rt2x00 hardware (connection hangs). This regression was fixed by
commit be03d4a45c09ee5100d3aaaedd087f19bc20d01 "rt2x00: Don't let
mac80211 send a BAR when an AMPDU subframe fails". But the latter
commit caused yet another problem reported in
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42828#c22
After long discussion in this thread:
http://mid.gmane.org/20121018075615.GA18212@redhat.com
and testing various alternative solutions, which failed on one or other
setup, we have no other good fix for the issues like just revert both
mentioned earlier commits.
To do not affect other hardware which benefit from commit
f0425beda4d404a6e751439b562100b902ba9c98, instead of reverting it,
introduce flag that when used will restore mac80211 behaviour before
the commit.
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
[replaced link with mid.gmane.org that has message-id]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit c6567ed1402c55e19b012e66a8398baec2a726f3 upstream.
This patch ensures that we free the rpc_task after the cleanup callbacks
are done in order to avoid a deadlock problem that can be triggered if
the callback needs to wait for another workqueue item to complete.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 1bf3751ec90cc3174e01f0d701e8449ce163d113 ]
ip_check_defrag() might be called from af_packet within the
RX path where shared SKBs are used, so it must not modify
the input SKB before it has unshared it for defragmentation.
Use skb_copy_bits() to get the IP header and only pull in
everything later.
The same is true for the other caller in macvlan as it is
called from dev->rx_handler which can also get a shared SKB.
Reported-by: Eric Leblond <eric@regit.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 6e51fe7572590d8d86e93b547fab6693d305fd0d ]
Consider the following program, that sets the second argument to the
sendto() syscall incorrectly:
#include <string.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main(void)
{
int fd;
struct sockaddr_in sa;
fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 132 /*IPPROTO_SCTP*/);
if (fd < 0)
return 1;
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
sa.sin_port = htons(11111);
sendto(fd, NULL, 1, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa));
return 0;
}
We get -ENOMEM:
$ strace -e sendto ./demo
sendto(3, NULL, 1, 0, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(11111), sin_addr=inet_addr("127.0.0.1")}, 16) = -1 ENOMEM (Cannot allocate memory)
Propagate the error code from sctp_user_addto_chunk(), so that we will
tell user space what actually went wrong:
$ strace -e sendto ./demo
sendto(3, NULL, 1, 0, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(11111), sin_addr=inet_addr("127.0.0.1")}, 16) = -1 EFAULT (Bad address)
Noticed while running Trinity (the syscall fuzzer).
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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fails
[ Upstream commit be364c8c0f17a3dd42707b5a090b318028538eb9 ]
Trinity (the syscall fuzzer) discovered a memory leak in SCTP,
reproducible e.g. with the sendto() syscall by passing invalid
user space pointer in the second argument:
#include <string.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main(void)
{
int fd;
struct sockaddr_in sa;
fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 132 /*IPPROTO_SCTP*/);
if (fd < 0)
return 1;
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
sa.sin_port = htons(11111);
sendto(fd, NULL, 1, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa));
return 0;
}
As far as I can tell, the leak has been around since ~2003.
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit dc2a0e20fbc85a71c63aa4330b496fda33f6bf80 upstream.
This patch fixes the following report, it happens when accepting rfcomm
connections:
[ 228.165378] =============================================
[ 228.165378] [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
[ 228.165378] 3.7.0-rc1-00536-gc1d5dc4 #120 Tainted: G W
[ 228.165378] ---------------------------------------------
[ 228.165378] bluetoothd/1341 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 228.165378] (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_RFCOMM){+.+...}, at:
[<ffffffffa0000aa0>] bt_accept_dequeue+0xa0/0x180 [bluetooth]
[ 228.165378]
[ 228.165378] but task is already holding lock:
[ 228.165378] (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_RFCOMM){+.+...}, at:
[<ffffffffa0205118>] rfcomm_sock_accept+0x58/0x2d0 [rfcomm]
[ 228.165378]
[ 228.165378] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 228.165378] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 228.165378]
[ 228.165378] CPU0
[ 228.165378] ----
[ 228.165378] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_RFCOMM);
[ 228.165378] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_RFCOMM);
[ 228.165378]
[ 228.165378] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 228.165378]
[ 228.165378] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit b9cdc88df8e63e81c723b82c286fc97f5d0dc325 upstream.
When using a virtio transport, the 9p net device may pass the physical
address of a kernel buffer to userspace via a scatterlist inside a
virtqueue. If the kernel buffer is mapped outside of the linear mapping
(e.g. highmem), then virt_to_page will return a bogus value and we will
populate the scatterlist with junk.
This patch uses kmap_to_page when populating the page array for a kernel
buffer.
Cc: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 81b401100c01d2357031e874689f89bd788d13cd upstream.
Set in the rx_ifindex to pass the correct interface index in the case of a
message timeout detection. Usually the rx_ifindex value is set at receive
time. But when no CAN frame has been received the RX_TIMEOUT notification
did not contain a valid value.
Reported-by: Andre Naujoks <nautsch2@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit b78a4932f5fb11fadf41e69c606a33fa6787574c upstream.
The check whether the IBSS is active and can be removed should be
performed before deinitializing the fields used for the check/search.
Otherwise, the configured BSS will not be found and removed properly.
To make it more clear for the future, rename sdata->u.ibss to the
local pointer ifibss which is used within the checks.
This behaviour was introduced by
f3209bea110cade12e2b133da8b8499689cb0e2e
("mac80211: fix IBSS teardown race")
Cc: Ignacy Gawedzki <i@lri.fr>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <siwu@hrz.tu-chemnitz.de>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit baefa31db2f2b13a05d1b81bdf2d20d487f58b0a ]
In commit c445477d74ab3779 which adds aRFS to the kernel, the CPU
selected for RFS is not set correctly when CPU is changing.
This is causing OOO packets and probably other issues.
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit a652208e0b52c190e57f2a075ffb5e897fe31c3b ]
Check (ha->addr == dev->dev_addr) is always true because dev_addr_init()
sets this. Correct the check to behave properly on addr removal.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit d4596bad2a713fcd0def492b1960e6d899d5baa8 ]
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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[ Upstream commit 0c9f79be295c99ac7e4b569ca493d75fdcc19e4e ]
(1<<optname) is undefined behavior in C with a negative optname or
optname larger than 31. In those cases the result of the shift is
not necessarily zero (e.g., on x86).
This patch simplifies the code with a switch statement on optname.
It also allows the compiler to generate better code (e.g., using a
64-bit mask).
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 38fe36a248ec3228f8e6507955d7ceb0432d2000 upstream.
ICMP tuples have id in src and type/code in dst.
So comparing src.u.all with dst.u.all will always fail here
and ip_xfrm_me_harder() is called for every ICMP packet,
even if there was no NAT.
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weber <ulrich.weber@sophos.com>
[Pablo Neira Ayuso: Backported to.3.0]
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 4a70bbfaef0361d27272629d1a250a937edcafe4 upstream.
We spare nothing by not validating the sequence number of dataless
ACK packets and enabling it makes harder off-path attacks.
See: "Reflection scan: an Off-Path Attack on TCP" by Jan Wrobel,
http://arxiv.org/abs/1201.2074
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 64f509ce71b08d037998e93dd51180c19b2f464c upstream.
Clients should not send such packets. By accepting them, we open
up a hole by wich ephemeral ports can be discovered in an off-path
attack.
See: "Reflection scan: an Off-Path Attack on TCP" by Jan Wrobel,
http://arxiv.org/abs/1201.2074
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 43c771a1963ab461a2f194e3c97fded1d5fe262f upstream.
When in world roaming mode, allow 40 MHz to be used
on channels 12 and 13 so that an AP that is, e.g.,
using HT40+ on channel 9 (in the UK) can be used.
Reported-by: Eddie Chapman <eddie@ehuk.net>
Tested-by: Eddie Chapman <eddie@ehuk.net>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 987c285c2ae2e4e32aca3a9b3252d28171c75711 upstream.
These are accessed without a lock when ending STA PSM. If the
sta_cleanup timer accesses these lists at the same time, we might crash.
This may fix some mysterious crashes we had during
ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arik@wizery.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Yariv <ido@wizery.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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