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2013-01-11Bluetooth: cancel power_on work when unregistering the deviceGustavo Padovan
commit b9b5ef188e5a2222cfc16ef62a4703080750b451 upstream. We need to cancel the hci_power_on work in order to avoid it run when we try to free the hdev. [ 1434.201149] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1434.204998] WARNING: at lib/debugobjects.c:261 debug_print_object+0x8e/0xb0() [ 1434.208324] ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: work_struct hint: hci _power_on+0x0/0x90 [ 1434.210386] Pid: 8564, comm: trinity-child25 Tainted: G W 3.7.0-rc5-next- 20121112-sasha-00018-g2f4ce0e #127 [ 1434.210760] Call Trace: [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff819f3d6e>] ? debug_print_object+0x8e/0xb0 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff8110b887>] warn_slowpath_common+0x87/0xb0 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff8110b911>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x41/0x50 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff819f3d6e>] debug_print_object+0x8e/0xb0 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff8376b750>] ? hci_dev_open+0x310/0x310 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff83bf94e5>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x55/0xa0 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff819f3ee5>] __debug_check_no_obj_freed+0xa5/0x230 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff83785db0>] ? bt_host_release+0x10/0x20 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff819f4d15>] debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x15/0x20 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff8125eee7>] kfree+0x227/0x330 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff83785db0>] bt_host_release+0x10/0x20 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff81e539e5>] device_release+0x65/0xc0 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff819d3975>] kobject_cleanup+0x145/0x190 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff819d39cd>] kobject_release+0xd/0x10 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff819d33cc>] kobject_put+0x4c/0x60 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff81e548b2>] put_device+0x12/0x20 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff8376a334>] hci_free_dev+0x24/0x30 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff82fd8fe1>] vhci_release+0x31/0x60 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff8127be12>] __fput+0x122/0x250 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff811cab0d>] ? rcu_user_exit+0x9d/0xd0 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff8127bf49>] ____fput+0x9/0x10 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff81133402>] task_work_run+0xb2/0xf0 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff8106cfa7>] do_notify_resume+0x77/0xa0 [ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff83bfb0ea>] int_signal+0x12/0x17 [ 1434.210760] ---[ end trace a6d57fefbc8a8cc7 ]--- Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-01-11Bluetooth: Add missing lock nesting notationGustavo Padovan
commit dc2a0e20fbc85a71c63aa4330b496fda33f6bf80 upstream. This patch fixes the following report, it happens when accepting rfcomm connections: [ 228.165378] ============================================= [ 228.165378] [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] [ 228.165378] 3.7.0-rc1-00536-gc1d5dc4 #120 Tainted: G W [ 228.165378] --------------------------------------------- [ 228.165378] bluetoothd/1341 is trying to acquire lock: [ 228.165378] (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_RFCOMM){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa0000aa0>] bt_accept_dequeue+0xa0/0x180 [bluetooth] [ 228.165378] [ 228.165378] but task is already holding lock: [ 228.165378] (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_RFCOMM){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa0205118>] rfcomm_sock_accept+0x58/0x2d0 [rfcomm] [ 228.165378] [ 228.165378] other info that might help us debug this: [ 228.165378] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 228.165378] [ 228.165378] CPU0 [ 228.165378] ---- [ 228.165378] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_RFCOMM); [ 228.165378] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_RFCOMM); [ 228.165378] [ 228.165378] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 228.165378] [ 228.165378] May be due to missing lock nesting notation Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-01-11tcp: RFC 5961 5.2 Blind Data Injection Attack MitigationEric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 354e4aa391ed50a4d827ff6fc11e0667d0859b25 ] RFC 5961 5.2 [Blind Data Injection Attack].[Mitigation] All TCP stacks MAY implement the following mitigation. TCP stacks that implement this mitigation MUST add an additional input check to any incoming segment. The ACK value is considered acceptable only if it is in the range of ((SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND) <= SEG.ACK <= SND.NXT). All incoming segments whose ACK value doesn't satisfy the above condition MUST be discarded and an ACK sent back. Move tcp_send_challenge_ack() before tcp_ack() to avoid a forward declaration. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-01-11tcp: tcp_replace_ts_recent() should not be called from tcp_validate_incoming()Eric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit bd090dfc634ddd711a5fbd0cadc6e0ab4977bcaf ] We added support for RFC 5961 in latest kernels but TCP fails to perform exhaustive check of ACK sequence. We can update our view of peer tsval from a frame that is later discarded by tcp_ack() This makes timestamps enabled sessions vulnerable to injection of a high tsval : peers start an ACK storm, since the victim sends a dupack each time it receives an ACK from the other peer. As tcp_validate_incoming() is called before tcp_ack(), we should not peform tcp_replace_ts_recent() from it, and let callers do it at the right time. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com> Cc: H.K. Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com> Cc: Romain Francoise <romain@orebokech.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-01-11tcp: refine SYN handling in tcp_validate_incomingEric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit e371589917011efe6ff8c7dfb4e9e81934ac5855 ] Followup of commit 0c24604b68fc (tcp: implement RFC 5961 4.2) As reported by Vijay Subramanian, we should send a challenge ACK instead of a dup ack if a SYN flag is set on a packet received out of window. This permits the ratelimiting to work as intended, and to increase correct SNMP counters. Suggested-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella <kkiran@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-01-11tcp: implement RFC 5961 4.2Eric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 0c24604b68fc7810d429d6c3657b6f148270e528 ] Implement the RFC 5691 mitigation against Blind Reset attack using SYN bit. Section 4.2 of RFC 5961 advises to send a Challenge ACK and drop incoming packet, instead of resetting the session. Add a new SNMP counter to count number of challenge acks sent in response to SYN packets. (netstat -s | grep TCPSYNChallenge) Remove obsolete TCPAbortOnSyn, since we no longer abort a TCP session because of a SYN flag. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella <kkiran@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-01-11tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2Eric Dumazet
[ Upstream commit 282f23c6ee343126156dd41218b22ece96d747e3 ] Implement the RFC 5691 mitigation against Blind Reset attack using RST bit. Idea is to validate incoming RST sequence, to match RCV.NXT value, instead of previouly accepted window : (RCV.NXT <= SEG.SEQ < RCV.NXT+RCV.WND) If sequence is in window but not an exact match, send a "challenge ACK", so that the other part can resend an RST with the appropriate sequence. Add a new sysctl, tcp_challenge_ack_limit, to limit number of challenge ACK sent per second. Add a new SNMP counter to count number of challenge acks sent. (netstat -s | grep TCPChallengeACK) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella <kkiran@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-01-11net: sched: integer overflow fixStefan Hasko
[ Upstream commit d2fe85da52e89b8012ffad010ef352a964725d5f ] Fixed integer overflow in function htb_dequeue Signed-off-by: Stefan Hasko <hasko.stevo@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-01-11inet: Fix kmemleak in tcp_v4/6_syn_recv_sock and dccp_v4/6_request_recv_sockChristoph Paasch
[ Upstream commit e337e24d6624e74a558aa69071e112a65f7b5758 ] If in either of the above functions inet_csk_route_child_sock() or __inet_inherit_port() fails, the newsk will not be freed: unreferenced object 0xffff88022e8a92c0 (size 1592): comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294946244 (age 726.160s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 0a 01 01 01 0a 01 01 02 00 00 00 00 a7 cc 16 00 ................ 02 00 03 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<ffffffff8153d190>] kmemleak_alloc+0x21/0x3e [<ffffffff810ab3e7>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xb5/0xc5 [<ffffffff8149b65b>] sk_prot_alloc.isra.53+0x2b/0xcd [<ffffffff8149b784>] sk_clone_lock+0x16/0x21e [<ffffffff814d711a>] inet_csk_clone_lock+0x10/0x7b [<ffffffff814ebbc3>] tcp_create_openreq_child+0x21/0x481 [<ffffffff814e8fa5>] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x3a/0x23b [<ffffffff814ec5ba>] tcp_check_req+0x29f/0x416 [<ffffffff814e8e10>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x161/0x2bc [<ffffffff814eb917>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x6c9/0x701 [<ffffffff814cea9f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x70/0xc4 [<ffffffff814cec20>] ip_local_deliver+0x4e/0x7f [<ffffffff814ce9f8>] ip_rcv_finish+0x1fc/0x233 [<ffffffff814cee68>] ip_rcv+0x217/0x267 [<ffffffff814a7bbe>] __netif_receive_skb+0x49e/0x553 [<ffffffff814a7cc3>] netif_receive_skb+0x50/0x82 This happens, because sk_clone_lock initializes sk_refcnt to 2, and thus a single sock_put() is not enough to free the memory. Additionally, things like xfrm, memcg, cookie_values,... may have been initialized. We have to free them properly. This is fixed by forcing a call to tcp_done(), ending up in inet_csk_destroy_sock, doing the final sock_put(). tcp_done() is necessary, because it ends up doing all the cleanup on xfrm, memcg, cookie_values, xfrm,... Before calling tcp_done, we have to set the socket to SOCK_DEAD, to force it entering inet_csk_destroy_sock. To avoid the warning in inet_csk_destroy_sock, inet_num has to be set to 0. As inet_csk_destroy_sock does a dec on orphan_count, we first have to increase it. Calling tcp_done() allows us to remove the calls to tcp_clear_xmit_timer() and tcp_cleanup_congestion_control(). A similar approach is taken for dccp by calling dccp_done(). This is in the kernel since 093d282321 (tproxy: fix hash locking issue when using port redirection in __inet_inherit_port()), thus since version >= 2.6.37. Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-01-11batman-adv: fix random jitter calculationAkinobu Mita
[ Upstream commit 143cdd8f33909ff5a153e3f02048738c5964ba26 ] batadv_iv_ogm_emit_send_time() attempts to calculates a random integer in the range of 'orig_interval +- BATADV_JITTER' by the below lines. msecs = atomic_read(&bat_priv->orig_interval) - BATADV_JITTER; msecs += (random32() % 2 * BATADV_JITTER); But it actually gets 'orig_interval' or 'orig_interval - BATADV_JITTER' because '%' and '*' have same precedence and associativity is left-to-right. This adds the parentheses at the appropriate position so that it matches original intension. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Acked-by: Antonio Quartulli <ordex@autistici.org> Cc: Marek Lindner <lindner_marek@yahoo.de> Cc: Simon Wunderlich <siwu@hrz.tu-chemnitz.de> Cc: Antonio Quartulli <ordex@autistici.org> Cc: b.a.t.m.a.n@lists.open-mesh.org Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-01-11inet_diag: validate port comparison byte code to prevent unsafe readsNeal Cardwell
[ Upstream commit 5e1f54201cb481f40a04bc47e1bc8c093a189e23 ] Add logic to verify that a port comparison byte code operation actually has the second inet_diag_bc_op from which we read the port for such operations. Previously the code blindly referenced op[1] without first checking whether a second inet_diag_bc_op struct could fit there. So a malicious user could make the kernel read 4 bytes beyond the end of the bytecode array by claiming to have a whole port comparison byte code (2 inet_diag_bc_op structs) when in fact the bytecode was not long enough to hold both. Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-01-11inet_diag: avoid unsafe and nonsensical prefix matches in inet_diag_bc_run()Neal Cardwell
[ Upstream commit f67caec9068cee426ec23cf9005a1dee2ecad187 ] Add logic to check the address family of the user-supplied conditional and the address family of the connection entry. We now do not do prefix matching of addresses from different address families (AF_INET vs AF_INET6), except for the previously existing support for having an IPv4 prefix match an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address (which this commit maintains as-is). This change is needed for two reasons: (1) The addresses are different lengths, so comparing a 128-bit IPv6 prefix match condition to a 32-bit IPv4 connection address can cause us to unwittingly walk off the end of the IPv4 address and read garbage or oops. (2) The IPv4 and IPv6 address spaces are semantically distinct, so a simple bit-wise comparison of the prefixes is not meaningful, and would lead to bogus results (except for the IPv4-mapped IPv6 case, which this commit maintains). Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-01-11inet_diag: validate byte code to prevent oops in inet_diag_bc_run()Neal Cardwell
[ Upstream commit 405c005949e47b6e91359159c24753519ded0c67 ] Add logic to validate INET_DIAG_BC_S_COND and INET_DIAG_BC_D_COND operations. Previously we did not validate the inet_diag_hostcond, address family, address length, and prefix length. So a malicious user could make the kernel read beyond the end of the bytecode array by claiming to have a whole inet_diag_hostcond when the bytecode was not long enough to contain a whole inet_diag_hostcond of the given address family. Or they could make the kernel read up to about 27 bytes beyond the end of a connection address by passing a prefix length that exceeded the length of addresses of the given family. Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-01-11inet_diag: fix oops for IPv4 AF_INET6 TCP SYN-RECV stateNeal Cardwell
[ Upstream commit 1c95df85ca49640576de2f0a850925957b547b84 ] Fix inet_diag to be aware of the fact that AF_INET6 TCP connections instantiated for IPv4 traffic and in the SYN-RECV state were actually created with inet_reqsk_alloc(), instead of inet6_reqsk_alloc(). This means that for such connections inet6_rsk(req) returns a pointer to a random spot in memory up to roughly 64KB beyond the end of the request_sock. With this bug, for a server using AF_INET6 TCP sockets and serving IPv4 traffic, an inet_diag user like `ss state SYN-RECV` would lead to inet_diag_fill_req() causing an oops or the export to user space of 16 bytes of kernel memory as a garbage IPv6 address, depending on where the garbage inet6_rsk(req) pointed. Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-01-11ipv4: ip_check_defrag must not modify skb before unsharingJohannes Berg
[ Upstream commit 1bf3751ec90cc3174e01f0d701e8449ce163d113 ] ip_check_defrag() might be called from af_packet within the RX path where shared SKBs are used, so it must not modify the input SKB before it has unshared it for defragmentation. Use skb_copy_bits() to get the IP header and only pull in everything later. The same is true for the other caller in macvlan as it is called from dev->rx_handler which can also get a shared SKB. Reported-by: Eric Leblond <eric@regit.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-01-11sctp: fix -ENOMEM result with invalid user space pointer in sendto() syscallTommi Rantala
[ Upstream commit 6e51fe7572590d8d86e93b547fab6693d305fd0d ] Consider the following program, that sets the second argument to the sendto() syscall incorrectly: #include <string.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <sys/socket.h> int main(void) { int fd; struct sockaddr_in sa; fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 132 /*IPPROTO_SCTP*/); if (fd < 0) return 1; memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); sa.sin_family = AF_INET; sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); sa.sin_port = htons(11111); sendto(fd, NULL, 1, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)); return 0; } We get -ENOMEM: $ strace -e sendto ./demo sendto(3, NULL, 1, 0, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(11111), sin_addr=inet_addr("127.0.0.1")}, 16) = -1 ENOMEM (Cannot allocate memory) Propagate the error code from sctp_user_addto_chunk(), so that we will tell user space what actually went wrong: $ strace -e sendto ./demo sendto(3, NULL, 1, 0, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(11111), sin_addr=inet_addr("127.0.0.1")}, 16) = -1 EFAULT (Bad address) Noticed while running Trinity (the syscall fuzzer). Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-01-11sctp: fix memory leak in sctp_datamsg_from_user() when copy from user space ↵Tommi Rantala
fails [ Upstream commit be364c8c0f17a3dd42707b5a090b318028538eb9 ] Trinity (the syscall fuzzer) discovered a memory leak in SCTP, reproducible e.g. with the sendto() syscall by passing invalid user space pointer in the second argument: #include <string.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <sys/socket.h> int main(void) { int fd; struct sockaddr_in sa; fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 132 /*IPPROTO_SCTP*/); if (fd < 0) return 1; memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); sa.sin_family = AF_INET; sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); sa.sin_port = htons(11111); sendto(fd, NULL, 1, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)); return 0; } As far as I can tell, the leak has been around since ~2003. Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-12-03NFC: Fix nfc_llcp_local chained list insertionThierry Escande
commit 16a78e9fed5e8baa8480ae3413f4328c4537c599 upstream. list_add was called with swapped parameters Signed-off-by: Thierry Escande <thierry.escande@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-12-03can: bcm: initialize ifindex for timeouts without previous frame receptionOliver Hartkopp
commit 81b401100c01d2357031e874689f89bd788d13cd upstream. Set in the rx_ifindex to pass the correct interface index in the case of a message timeout detection. Usually the rx_ifindex value is set at receive time. But when no CAN frame has been received the RX_TIMEOUT notification did not contain a valid value. Reported-by: Andre Naujoks <nautsch2@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-12-03mac80211: deinitialize ibss-internals after emptiness checkSimon Wunderlich
commit b78a4932f5fb11fadf41e69c606a33fa6787574c upstream. The check whether the IBSS is active and can be removed should be performed before deinitializing the fields used for the check/search. Otherwise, the configured BSS will not be found and removed properly. To make it more clear for the future, rename sdata->u.ibss to the local pointer ifibss which is used within the checks. This behaviour was introduced by f3209bea110cade12e2b133da8b8499689cb0e2e ("mac80211: fix IBSS teardown race") Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <siwu@hrz.tu-chemnitz.de> Cc: Ignacy Gawedzki <i@lri.fr> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-12-03Bluetooth: Fix using uninitialized option in RFCModeSzymon Janc
commit 8f321f853ea33330c7141977cd34804476e2e07e upstream. If remote device sends bogus RFC option with invalid length, undefined options values are used. Fix this by using defaults when remote misbehaves. This also fixes the following warning reported by gcc 4.7.0: net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c: In function 'l2cap_config_rsp': net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:3302:13: warning: 'rfc.max_pdu_size' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:3266:24: note: 'rfc.max_pdu_size' was declared here net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:3298:25: warning: 'rfc.monitor_timeout' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:3266:24: note: 'rfc.monitor_timeout' was declared here net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:3297:25: warning: 'rfc.retrans_timeout' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:3266:24: note: 'rfc.retrans_timeout' was declared here net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:3295:2: warning: 'rfc.mode' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:3266:24: note: 'rfc.mode' was declared here Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: check for invalid mappingSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit d63b77f4c552cc3a20506871046ab0fcbc332609) If we encounter an invalid (e.g., zeroed) mapping, return an error and avoid a divide by zero. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: avoid NULL kref_put when osd reset races with alloc_msgSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 9bd952615a42d7e2ce3fa2c632e808e804637a1a) The ceph_on_in_msg_alloc() method drops con->mutex while it allocates a message. If that races with a timeout that resends a zillion messages and resets the connection, and the ->alloc_msg() method returns a NULL message, it will call ceph_msg_put(NULL) and BUG. Fix by only calling put if msg is non-NULL. Fixes http://tracker.newdream.net/issues/3142 Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26rbd: reset BACKOFF if unable to re-queueAlex Elder
(cherry picked from commit 588377d6199034c36d335e7df5818b731fea072c) If ceph_fault() is unable to queue work after a delay, it sets the BACKOFF connection flag so con_work() will attempt to do so. In con_work(), when BACKOFF is set, if queue_delayed_work() doesn't result in newly-queued work, it simply ignores this condition and proceeds as if no backoff delay were desired. There are two problems with this--one of which is a bug. The first problem is simply that the intended behavior is to back off, and if we aren't able queue the work item to run after a delay we're not doing that. The only reason queue_delayed_work() won't queue work is if the provided work item is already queued. In the messenger, this means that con_work() is already scheduled to be run again. So if we simply set the BACKOFF flag again when this occurs, we know the next con_work() call will again attempt to hold off activity on the connection until after the delay. The second problem--the bug--is a leak of a reference count. If queue_delayed_work() returns 0 in con_work(), con->ops->put() drops the connection reference held on entry to con_work(). However, processing is (was) allowed to continue, and at the end of the function a second con->ops->put() is called. This patch fixes both problems. Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: only kunmap kmapped pagesAlex Elder
(cherry picked from commit 5ce765a540f34d1e2005e1210f49f67fdf11e997) In write_partial_msg_pages(), pages need to be kmapped in order to perform a CRC-32c calculation on them. As an artifact of the way this code used to be structured, the kunmap() call was separated from the kmap() call and both were done conditionally. But the conditions under which the kmap() and kunmap() calls were made differed, so there was a chance a kunmap() call would be done on a page that had not been mapped. The symptom of this was tripping a BUG() in kunmap_high() when pkmap_count[nr] became 0. Reported-by: Bryan K. Wright <bryan@virginia.edu> Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: avoid truncation due to racing bannersJim Schutt
(cherry picked from commit 6d4221b53707486dfad3f5bfe568d2ce7f4c9863) Because the Ceph client messenger uses a non-blocking connect, it is possible for the sending of the client banner to race with the arrival of the banner sent by the peer. When ceph_sock_state_change() notices the connect has completed, it schedules work to process the socket via con_work(). During this time the peer is writing its banner, and arrival of the peer banner races with con_work(). If con_work() calls try_read() before the peer banner arrives, there is nothing for it to do, after which con_work() calls try_write() to send the client's banner. In this case Ceph's protocol negotiation can complete succesfully. The server-side messenger immediately sends its banner and addresses after accepting a connect request, *before* actually attempting to read or verify the banner from the client. As a result, it is possible for the banner from the server to arrive before con_work() calls try_read(). If that happens, try_read() will read the banner and prepare protocol negotiation info via prepare_write_connect(). prepare_write_connect() calls con_out_kvec_reset(), which discards the as-yet-unsent client banner. Next, con_work() calls try_write(), which sends the protocol negotiation info rather than the banner that the peer is expecting. The result is that the peer sees an invalid banner, and the client reports "negotiation failed". Fix this by moving con_out_kvec_reset() out of prepare_write_connect() to its callers at all locations except the one where the banner might still need to be sent. [elder@inktak.com: added note about server-side behavior] Signed-off-by: Jim Schutt <jaschut@sandia.gov> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: delay debugfs initialization until we learn global_idSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit d1c338a509cea5378df59629ad47382810c38623) The debugfs directory includes the cluster fsid and our unique global_id. We need to delay the initialization of the debug entry until we have learned both the fsid and our global_id from the monitor or else the second client can't create its debugfs entry and will fail (and multiple client instances aren't properly reflected in debugfs). Reported by: Yan, Zheng <zheng.z.yan@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Yehuda Sadeh <yehuda@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: fix crypto key null deref, memory leakSylvain Munaut
(cherry picked from commit f0666b1ac875ff32fe290219b150ec62eebbe10e) Avoid crashing if the crypto key payload was NULL, as when it was not correctly allocated and initialized. Also, avoid leaking it. Signed-off-by: Sylvain Munaut <tnt@246tNt.com> Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: recheck con state after allocating incoming messageSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 6139919133377652992a5fe134e22abce3e9c25e) We drop the lock when calling the ->alloc_msg() con op, which means we need to (a) not clobber con->in_msg without the mutex held, and (b) we need to verify that we are still in the OPEN state when we retake it to avoid causing any mayhem. If the state does change, -EAGAIN will get us back to con_work() and loop. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: change ceph_con_in_msg_alloc convention to be less weirdSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 4740a623d20c51d167da7f752b63e2b8714b2543) This function's calling convention is very limiting. In particular, we can't return any error other than ENOMEM (and only implicitly), which is a problem (see next patch). Instead, return an normal 0 or error code, and make the skip a pointer output parameter. Drop the useless in_hdr argument (we have the con pointer). Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: avoid dropping con mutex before faultSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 8636ea672f0c5ab7478c42c5b6705ebd1db7eb6a) The ceph_fault() function takes the con mutex, so we should avoid dropping it before calling it. This fixes a potential race with another thread calling ceph_con_close(), or _open(), or similar (we don't reverify con->state after retaking the lock). Add annotation so that lockdep realizes we will drop the mutex before returning. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: verify state after retaking con lock after dispatchSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 7b862e07b1a4d5c963d19027f10ea78085f27f9b) We drop the con mutex when delivering a message. When we retake the lock, we need to verify we are still in the OPEN state before preparing to read the next tag, or else we risk stepping on a connection that has been closed. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: revoke mon_client messages on session restartSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 4f471e4a9c7db0256834e1b376ea50c82e345c3c) Revoke all mon_client messages when we shut down the old connection. This is mostly moot since we are re-using the same ceph_connection, but it is cleaner. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: fix handling of immediate socket connect failureSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 8007b8d626b49c34fb146ec16dc639d8b10c862f) If the connect() call immediately fails such that sock == NULL, we still need con_close_socket() to reset our socket state to CLOSED. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: clear all flags on con_closeSage Weil
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> (cherry picked from commit 43c7427d100769451601b8a36988ac0528ce0124)
2012-11-26libceph: clean up con flagsSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 4a8616920860920abaa51193146fe36b38ef09aa) Rename flags with CON_FLAG prefix, move the definitions into the c file, and (better) document their meaning. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: replace connection state bits with statesSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 8dacc7da69a491c515851e68de6036f21b5663ce) Use a simple set of 6 enumerated values for the socket states (CON_STATE_*) and use those instead of the state bits. All of the con->state checks are now under the protection of the con mutex, so this is safe. It also simplifies many of the state checks because we can check for anything other than the expected state instead of various bits for races we can think of. This appears to hold up well to stress testing both with and without socket failure injection on the server side. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: drop unnecessary CLOSED check in socket state change callbackSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit d7353dd5aaf22ed611fbcd0d4a4a12fb30659290) If we are CLOSED, the socket is closed and we won't get these. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: close socket directly from ceph_con_close()Sage Weil
(cherry picked from commit ee76e0736db8455e3b11827d6899bd2a4e1d0584) It is simpler to do this immediately, since we already hold the con mutex. It also avoids the need to deal with a not-quite-CLOSED socket in con_work. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: drop gratuitous socket close calls in con_workSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 2e8cb10063820af7ed7638e3fd9013eee21266e7) If the state is CLOSED or OPENING, we shouldn't have a socket. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: move ceph_con_send() closed check under the con mutexSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit a59b55a602b6c741052d79c1e3643f8440cddd27) Take the con mutex before checking whether the connection is closed to avoid racing with someone else closing it. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: move msgr clear_standby under con mutex protectionSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 00650931e52e97fe64096bec167f5a6780dfd94a) Avoid dropping and retaking con->mutex in the ceph_con_send() case by leaving locking up to the caller. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: fix fault locking; close socket on lossy faultSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 3b5ede07b55b52c3be27749d183d87257d032065) If we fault on a lossy connection, we should still close the socket immediately, and do so under the con mutex. We should also take the con mutex before printing out the state bits in the debug output. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: reset connection retry on successfully negotiationSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 85effe183dd45854d1ad1a370b88cddb403c4c91) We exponentially back off when we encounter connection errors. If several errors accumulate, we will eventually wait ages before even trying to reconnect. Fix this by resetting the backoff counter after a successful negotiation/ connection with the remote node. Fixes ceph issue #2802. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Yehuda Sadeh <yehuda@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: protect ceph_con_open() with mutexSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 5469155f2bc83bb2c88b0a0370c3d54d87eed06e) Take the con mutex while we are initiating a ceph open. This is necessary because the may have previously been in use and then closed, which could result in a racing workqueue running con_work(). Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Yehuda Sadeh <yehuda@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: (re)initialize bio_iter on start of message receiveSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit a4107026976f06c9a6ce8cc84a763564ee39d901) Previously, we were opportunistically initializing the bio_iter if it appeared to be uninitialized in the middle of the read path. The problem is that a sequence like: - start reading message - initialize bio_iter - read half a message - messenger fault, reconnect - restart reading message - ** bio_iter now non-NULL, not reinitialized ** - read past end of bio, crash Instead, initialize the bio_iter unconditionally when we allocate/claim the message for read. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Yehuda Sadeh <yehuda@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: resubmit linger ops when pg mapping changesSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 6194ea895e447fdf4adfd23f67873a32bf4f15ae) The linger op registration (i.e., watch) modifies the object state. As such, the OSD will reply with success if it has already applied without doing the associated side-effects (setting up the watch session state). If we lose the ACK and resubmit, we will see success but the watch will not be correctly registered and we won't get notifies. To fix this, always resubmit the linger op with a new tid. We accomplish this by re-registering as a linger (i.e., 'registered') if we are not yet registered. Then the second loop will treat this just like a normal case of re-registering. This mirrors a similar fix on the userland ceph.git, commit 5dd68b95, and ceph bug #2796. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Yehuda Sadeh <yehuda@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: fix mutex coverage for ceph_con_closeSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 8c50c817566dfa4581f82373aac39f3e608a7dc8) Hold the mutex while twiddling all of the state bits to avoid possible races. While we're here, make not of why we cannot close the socket directly. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Yehuda Sadeh <yehuda@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: report socket read/write error messageSage Weil
(cherry picked from commit 3a140a0d5c4b9e35373b016e41dfc85f1e526bdb) We need to set error_msg to something useful before calling ceph_fault(); do so here for try_{read,write}(). This is more informative than libceph: osd0 192.168.106.220:6801 (null) Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Yehuda Sadeh <yehuda@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-11-26libceph: prevent the race of incoming work during teardownGuanjun He
(cherry picked from commit a2a3258417eb6a1799cf893350771428875a8287) Add an atomic variable 'stopping' as flag in struct ceph_messenger, set this flag to 1 in function ceph_destroy_client(), and add the condition code in function ceph_data_ready() to test the flag value, if true(1), just return. Signed-off-by: Guanjun He <gjhe@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 (git 2.32.0) at 2024-11-23 22:10:08 +0000