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It turns out that commit: d3f7d56a7a4671d395e8af87071068a195257bf6 was
applied to the tree twice, which didn't hurt anything, but it's good to
fix this up.
Reported-by: Veaceslav Falico <veaceslav@falico.eu>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Shawn Landden <shawnlandden@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 051a41fa4ee14f5c39668f0980973b9a195de560 upstream.
Multicast frames can't be transmitted as part of an aggregation
session (such a session couldn't even be set up) so don't try to
reorder them. Trying to do so would cause the reorder to stop
working correctly since multicast QoS frames (as transmitted by
the Aruba APs this was found with) would cause sequence number
confusion in the buffer.
Reported-by: Blaise Gassend <blaise@suitabletech.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d3f7d56a7a4671d395e8af87071068a195257bf6 upstream.
Commit 35f9c09fe (tcp: tcp_sendpages() should call tcp_push() once)
added an internal flag MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST, similar to
MSG_MORE.
algif_hash, algif_skcipher, and udp used MSG_MORE from tcp_sendpages()
and need to see the new flag as identical to MSG_MORE.
This fixes sendfile() on AF_ALG.
v3: also fix udp
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Reported-and-tested-by: Shawn Landden <shawnlandden@gmail.com>
Original-patch: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Landden <shawn@churchofgit.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3868204d6b89ea373a273e760609cb08020beb1a ]
commit a553e4a6317b2cfc7659542c10fe43184ffe53da ("[PKTGEN]: IPSEC support")
tried to support IPsec ESP transport transformation for pktgen, but acctually
this doesn't work at all for two reasons(The orignal transformed packet has
bad IPv4 checksum value, as well as wrong auth value, reported by wireshark)
- After transpormation, IPv4 header total length needs update,
because encrypted payload's length is NOT same as that of plain text.
- After transformation, IPv4 checksum needs re-caculate because of payload
has been changed.
With this patch, armmed pktgen with below cofiguration, Wireshark is able to
decrypted ESP packet generated by pktgen without any IPv4 checksum error or
auth value error.
pgset "flag IPSEC"
pgset "flows 1"
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7f88c6b23afbd31545c676dea77ba9593a1a14bf ]
IPv6 stats are 64 bits and thus are protected with a seqlock. By not
disabling bottom-half we could deadlock here if we don't disable bh and
a softirq reentrantly updates the same mib.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f1d8cba61c3c4b1eb88e507249c4cb8d635d9a76 ]
In commit c9e9042994d3 ("ipv4: fix possible seqlock deadlock") I left
another places where IP_INC_STATS_BH() were improperly used.
udp_sendmsg(), ping_v4_sendmsg() and tcp_v4_connect() are called from
process context, not from softirq context.
This was detected by lockdep seqlock support.
Reported-by: jongman heo <jongman.heo@samsung.com>
Fixes: 584bdf8cbdf6 ("[IPV4]: Fix "ipOutNoRoutes" counter error for TCP and UDP")
Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d3f7d56a7a4671d395e8af87071068a195257bf6 ]
Commit 35f9c09fe (tcp: tcp_sendpages() should call tcp_push() once)
added an internal flag MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST, similar to
MSG_MORE.
algif_hash, algif_skcipher, and udp used MSG_MORE from tcp_sendpages()
and need to see the new flag as identical to MSG_MORE.
This fixes sendfile() on AF_ALG.
v3: also fix udp
Reported-and-tested-by: Shawn Landden <shawnlandden@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Original-patch: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Landden <shawn@churchofgit.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ec6f809ff6f19fafba3212f6aff0dda71dfac8e8 ]
Currently we're using plain spin_lock() in prb_shutdown_retire_blk_timer(),
however the timer might fire right in the middle and thus try to re-aquire
the same spinlock, leaving us in a endless loop.
To fix that, use the spin_lock_bh() to block it.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
CC: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
CC: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
CC: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e40526cb20b5ee53419452e1f03d97092f144418 ]
Salam reported a use after free bug in PF_PACKET that occurs when
we're sending out frames on a socket bound device and suddenly the
net device is being unregistered. It appears that commit 827d9780
introduced a possible race condition between {t,}packet_snd() and
packet_notifier(). In the case of a bound socket, packet_notifier()
can drop the last reference to the net_device and {t,}packet_snd()
might end up suddenly sending a packet over a freed net_device.
To avoid reverting 827d9780 and thus introducing a performance
regression compared to the current state of things, we decided to
hold a cached RCU protected pointer to the net device and maintain
it on write side via bind spin_lock protected register_prot_hook()
and __unregister_prot_hook() calls.
In {t,}packet_snd() path, we access this pointer under rcu_read_lock
through packet_cached_dev_get() that holds reference to the device
to prevent it from being freed through packet_notifier() while
we're in send path. This is okay to do as dev_put()/dev_hold() are
per-cpu counters, so this should not be a performance issue. Also,
the code simplifies a bit as we don't need need_rls_dev anymore.
Fixes: 827d978037d7 ("af-packet: Use existing netdev reference for bound sockets.")
Reported-by: Salam Noureddine <noureddine@aristanetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Salam Noureddine <noureddine@aristanetworks.com>
Cc: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f873042093c0b418d2351fe142222b625c740149 ]
When the following commands are executed:
brctl addbr br0
ifconfig br0 hw ether <addr>
rmmod bridge
The calltrace will occur:
[ 563.312114] device eth1 left promiscuous mode
[ 563.312188] br0: port 1(eth1) entered disabled state
[ 563.468190] kmem_cache_destroy bridge_fdb_cache: Slab cache still has objects
[ 563.468197] CPU: 6 PID: 6982 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G O 3.12.0-0.7-default+ #9
[ 563.468199] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
[ 563.468200] 0000000000000880 ffff88010f111e98 ffffffff814d1c92 ffff88010f111eb8
[ 563.468204] ffffffff81148efd ffff88010f111eb8 0000000000000000 ffff88010f111ec8
[ 563.468206] ffffffffa062a270 ffff88010f111ed8 ffffffffa063ac76 ffff88010f111f78
[ 563.468209] Call Trace:
[ 563.468218] [<ffffffff814d1c92>] dump_stack+0x6a/0x78
[ 563.468234] [<ffffffff81148efd>] kmem_cache_destroy+0xfd/0x100
[ 563.468242] [<ffffffffa062a270>] br_fdb_fini+0x10/0x20 [bridge]
[ 563.468247] [<ffffffffa063ac76>] br_deinit+0x4e/0x50 [bridge]
[ 563.468254] [<ffffffff810c7dc9>] SyS_delete_module+0x199/0x2b0
[ 563.468259] [<ffffffff814e0922>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 570.377958] Bridge firewalling registered
--------------------------- cut here -------------------------------
The reason is that when the bridge dev's address is changed, the
br_fdb_change_mac_address() will add new address in fdb, but when
the bridge was removed, the address entry in the fdb did not free,
the bridge_fdb_cache still has objects when destroy the cache, Fix
this by flushing the bridge address entry when removing the bridge.
v2: according to the Toshiaki Makita and Vlad's suggestion, I only
delete the vlan0 entry, it still have a leak here if the vlan id
is other number, so I need to call fdb_delete_by_port(br, NULL, 1)
to flush all entries whose dst is NULL for the bridge.
Suggested-by: Toshiaki Makita <toshiaki.makita1@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d2615bf450694c1302d86b9cc8a8958edfe4c3a4 ]
The following commit:
b6c40d68ff6498b7f63ddf97cf0aa818d748dee7
net: only invoke dev->change_rx_flags when device is UP
tried to fix a problem with VLAN devices and promiscuouse flag setting.
The issue was that VLAN device was setting a flag on an interface that
was down, thus resulting in bad promiscuity count.
This commit blocked flag propagation to any device that is currently
down.
A later commit:
deede2fabe24e00bd7e246eb81cd5767dc6fcfc7
vlan: Don't propagate flag changes on down interfaces
fixed VLAN code to only propagate flags when the VLAN interface is up,
thus fixing the same issue as above, only localized to VLAN.
The problem we have now is that if we have create a complex stack
involving multiple software devices like bridges, bonds, and vlans,
then it is possible that the flags would not propagate properly to
the physical devices. A simple examle of the scenario is the
following:
eth0----> bond0 ----> bridge0 ---> vlan50
If bond0 or eth0 happen to be down at the time bond0 is added to
the bridge, then eth0 will never have promisc mode set which is
currently required for operation as part of the bridge. As a
result, packets with vlan50 will be dropped by the interface.
The only 2 devices that implement the special flag handling are
VLAN and DSA and they both have required code to prevent incorrect
flag propagation. As a result we can remove the generic solution
introduced in b6c40d68ff6498b7f63ddf97cf0aa818d748dee7 and leave
it to the individual devices to decide whether they will block
flag propagation or not.
Reported-by: Stefan Priebe <s.priebe@profihost.ag>
Suggested-by: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1fa4c710b6fe7b0aac9907240291b6fe6aafc3b8 ]
Offenders don't have port numbers, so set it to 0.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit db31c55a6fb245fdbb752a2ca4aefec89afabb06 ]
If kmsg->msg_namelen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) then in the
original code that would lead to memory corruption in the kernel if you
had audit configured. If you didn't have audit configured it was
harmless.
There are some programs such as beta versions of Ruby which use too
large of a buffer and returning an error code breaks them. We should
clamp the ->msg_namelen value instead.
Fixes: 1661bf364ae9 ("net: heap overflow in __audit_sockaddr()")
Reported-by: Eric Wong <normalperson@yhbt.net>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Eric Wong <normalperson@yhbt.net>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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functions
[ Upstream commit 85fbaa75037d0b6b786ff18658ddf0b4014ce2a4 ]
Commit bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69 ("inet: prevent leakage
of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls") conditionally updated
addr_len if the msg_name is written to. The recv_error and rxpmtu
functions relied on the recvmsg functions to set up addr_len before.
As this does not happen any more we have to pass addr_len to those
functions as well and set it to the size of the corresponding sockaddr
length.
This broke traceroute and such.
Fixes: bceaa90240b6 ("inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls")
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Reported-by: Tom Labanowski
Cc: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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sockaddr_storage)
[ Upstream commit 68c6beb373955da0886d8f4f5995b3922ceda4be ]
In that case it is probable that kernel code overwrote part of the
stack. So we should bail out loudly here.
The BUG_ON may be removed in future if we are sure all protocols are
conformant.
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c ]
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69 ]
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c9e9042994d37cbc1ee538c500e9da1bb9d1bcdf ]
ip4_datagram_connect() being called from process context,
it should use IP_INC_STATS() instead of IP_INC_STATS_BH()
otherwise we can deadlock on 32bit arches, or get corruptions of
SNMP counters.
Fixes: 584bdf8cbdf6 ("[IPV4]: Fix "ipOutNoRoutes" counter error for TCP and UDP")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1188f05497e7bd2f2614b99c54adfbe7413d5749 ]
If priority/traffic class field in IPv6 header is set (seen when
using ssh), the uncompression sets the TC and Flow fields incorrectly.
Example:
This is IPv6 header of a sent packet. Note the priority/TC (=1) in
the first byte.
00000000: 61 00 00 00 00 2c 06 40 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000010: 02 02 72 ff fe c6 42 10 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000020: 02 1e ab ff fe 4c 52 57
This gets compressed like this in the sending side
00000000: 72 31 04 06 02 1e ab ff fe 4c 52 57 ec c2 00 16
00000010: aa 2d fe 92 86 4e be c6 ....
In the receiving end, the packet gets uncompressed to this
IPv6 header
00000000: 60 06 06 02 00 2a 1e 40 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000010: 02 02 72 ff fe c6 42 10 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000020: ab ff fe 4c 52 57 ec c2
First four bytes are set incorrectly and we have also lost
two bytes from destination address.
The fix is to switch the case values in switch statement
when checking the TC field.
Signed-off-by: Jukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f104a567e673f382b09542a8dc3500aa689957b4 ]
As the rfc 4191 said, the Router Preference and Lifetime values in a
::/0 Route Information Option should override the preference and lifetime
values in the Router Advertisement header. But when the kernel deals with
a ::/0 Route Information Option, the rt6_get_route_info() always return
NULL, that means that overriding will not happen, because those default
routers were added without flag RTF_ROUTEINFO in rt6_add_dflt_router().
In order to deal with that condition, we should call rt6_get_dflt_router
when the prefix length is 0.
Signed-off-by: Duan Jiong <duanj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 13eb2ab2d33c57ebddc57437a7d341995fc9138c ]
When trying to delete a table >= 256 using iproute2 the local table
will be deleted.
The table id is specified as a netlink attribute when it needs more then
8 bits and iproute2 then sets the table field to RT_TABLE_UNSPEC (0).
Preconditions to matching the table id in the rule delete code
doesn't seem to take the "table id in netlink attribute" into condition
so the frh_get_table helper function never gets to do its job when
matching against current rule.
Use the helper function twice instead of peaking at the table value directly.
Originally reported at: http://bugs.debian.org/724783
Reported-by: Nicolas HICHER <nhicher@avencall.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Henriksson <andreas@fatal.se>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a6b31d18b02ff9d7915c5898c9b5ca41a798cd73 upstream.
The following scenario can cause silent data corruption when doing
NFS writes. It has mainly been observed when doing database writes
using O_DIRECT.
1) The RPC client uses sendpage() to do zero-copy of the page data.
2) Due to networking issues, the reply from the server is delayed,
and so the RPC client times out.
3) The client issues a second sendpage of the page data as part of
an RPC call retransmission.
4) The reply to the first transmission arrives from the server
_before_ the client hardware has emptied the TCP socket send
buffer.
5) After processing the reply, the RPC state machine rules that
the call to be done, and triggers the completion callbacks.
6) The application notices the RPC call is done, and reuses the
pages to store something else (e.g. a new write).
7) The client NIC drains the TCP socket send buffer. Since the
page data has now changed, it reads a corrupted version of the
initial RPC call, and puts it on the wire.
This patch fixes the problem in the following manner:
The ordering guarantees of TCP ensure that when the server sends a
reply, then we know that the _first_ transmission has completed. Using
zero-copy in that situation is therefore safe.
If a time out occurs, we then send the retransmission using sendmsg()
(i.e. no zero-copy), We then know that the socket contains a full copy of
the data, and so it will retransmit a faithful reproduction even if the
RPC call completes, and the application reuses the O_DIRECT buffer in
the meantime.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f1ff0c27fd9987c59d707cd1a6b6c1fc3ae0a250 upstream.
The NFS layer needs to know when a key has expired.
This change also returns -EKEYEXPIRED to the application, and the informative
"Key has expired" error message is displayed. The user then knows that
credential renewal is required.
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit eb96d5c97b0825d542e9c4ba5e0a22b519355166 upstream.
Currently, when an RPCSEC_GSS context has expired or is non-existent
and the users (Kerberos) credentials have also expired or are non-existent,
the client receives the -EKEYEXPIRED error and tries to refresh the context
forever. If an application is performing I/O, or other work against the share,
the application hangs, and the user is not prompted to refresh/establish their
credentials. This can result in a denial of service for other users.
Users are expected to manage their Kerberos credential lifetimes to mitigate
this issue.
Move the -EKEYEXPIRED handling into the RPC layer. Try tk_cred_retry number
of times to refresh the gss_context, and then return -EACCES to the application.
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Adjust context
- Drop change to nfs4_handle_reclaim_lease_error()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
packet
commit 3a7b21eaf4fb3c971bdb47a98f570550ddfe4471 upstream.
Some Cisco phones create huge messages that are spread over multiple packets.
After calculating the offset of the SIP body, it is validated to be within
the packet and the packet is dropped otherwise. This breaks operation of
these phones. Since connection tracking is supposed to be passive, just let
those packets pass unmodified and untracked.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 6f092343855a71e03b8d209815d8c45bf3a27fcd ]
We don't validate iph->ihl which may lead a dead loop if we meet a IPIP
skb whose iph->ihl is zero. Fix this by failing immediately when iph->ihl
is evil (less than 5).
This issue were introduced by commit ec5efe7946280d1e84603389a1030ccec0a767ae
(rps: support IPIP encapsulation).
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 0c5b93290b2f3c7a376567c03ae8d385b0e99851 upstream.
When clients are idle for too long, hostapd sends nullfunc frames for
probing. When those are acked by the client, the idle time needs to be
updated.
To make this work (and to avoid unnecessary probing), update sta->last_rx
whenever an ACK was received for a tx packet. Only do this if the flag
IEEE80211_HW_REPORTS_TX_ACK_STATUS is set.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit a754055a1296fcbe6f32de3a5eaca6efb2fd1865 upstream.
__ieee80211_scan_completed is called from a worker. This
means that the following flow is possible.
* driver calls ieee80211_scan_completed
* mac80211 cancels the scan (that is already complete)
* __ieee80211_scan_completed runs
When scan_work will finally run, it will see that the scan
hasn't been aborted and might even trigger another scan on
another band. This leads to a situation where cfg80211's
scan is not done and no further scan can be issued.
Fix this by setting a new flag when a HW scan is being
cancelled so that no other scan will be triggered.
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit f5563318ff1bde15b10e736e97ffce13be08bc1a upstream.
When parsing an invalid radiotap header, the parser can overrun
the buffer that is passed in because it doesn't correctly check
1) the minimum radiotap header size
2) the space for extended bitmaps
The first issue doesn't affect any in-kernel user as they all
check the minimum size before calling the radiotap function.
The second issue could potentially affect the kernel if an skb
is passed in that consists only of the radiotap header with a
lot of extended bitmaps that extend past the SKB. In that case
a read-only buffer overrun by at most 4 bytes is possible.
Fix this by adding the appropriate checks to the parser.
Reported-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ This is a simplified -stable version of a set of upstream commits. ]
This is a replacement patch only for stable which does fix the problems
handled by the following two commits in -net:
"ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9)
"ip6_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (c547dbf55d5f8cf615ccc0e7265e98db27d3fb8b)
Three frames are written on a corked udp socket for which the output
netdevice has UFO enabled. If the first and third frame are smaller than
the mtu and the second one is bigger, we enqueue the second frame with
skb_append_datato_frags without initializing the gso fields. This leads
to the third frame appended regulary and thus constructing an invalid skb.
This fixes the problem by always using skb_append_datato_frags as soon
as the first frag got enqueued to the skb without marking the packet
as SKB_GSO_UDP.
The problem with only two frames for ipv6 was fixed by "ipv6: udp
packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO"
(2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47).
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 90c6bd34f884cd9cee21f1d152baf6c18bcac949 ]
In the case of credentials passing in unix stream sockets (dgram
sockets seem not affected), we get a rather sparse race after
commit 16e5726 ("af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default").
We have a stream server on receiver side that requests credential
passing from senders (e.g. nc -U). Since we need to set SO_PASSCRED
on each spawned/accepted socket on server side to 1 first (as it's
not inherited), it can happen that in the time between accept() and
setsockopt() we get interrupted, the sender is being scheduled and
continues with passing data to our receiver. At that time SO_PASSCRED
is neither set on sender nor receiver side, hence in cmsg's
SCM_CREDENTIALS we get eventually pid:0, uid:65534, gid:65534
(== overflow{u,g}id) instead of what we actually would like to see.
On the sender side, here nc -U, the tests in maybe_add_creds()
invoked through unix_stream_sendmsg() would fail, as at that exact
time, as mentioned, the sender has neither SO_PASSCRED on his side
nor sees it on the server side, and we have a valid 'other' socket
in place. Thus, sender believes it would just look like a normal
connection, not needing/requesting SO_PASSCRED at that time.
As reverting 16e5726 would not be an option due to the significant
performance regression reported when having creds always passed,
one way/trade-off to prevent that would be to set SO_PASSCRED on
the listener socket and allow inheriting these flags to the spawned
socket on server side in accept(). It seems also logical to do so
if we'd tell the listener socket to pass those flags onwards, and
would fix the race.
Before, strace:
recvmsg(4, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{"blub\n", 4096}],
msg_controllen=32, {cmsg_len=28, cmsg_level=SOL_SOCKET,
cmsg_type=SCM_CREDENTIALS{pid=0, uid=65534, gid=65534}},
msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
After, strace:
recvmsg(4, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{"blub\n", 4096}],
msg_controllen=32, {cmsg_len=28, cmsg_level=SOL_SOCKET,
cmsg_type=SCM_CREDENTIALS{pid=11580, uid=1000, gid=1000}},
msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit d2dbbba77e95dff4b4f901fee236fef6d9552072 ]
IP/IPv6 fragmentation knows how to compute only TCP/UDP checksum.
This causes problems if SCTP packets has to be fragmented and
ipsummed has been set to PARTIAL due to checksum offload support.
This condition can happen when retransmitting after MTU discover,
or when INIT or other control chunks are larger then MTU.
Check for the rare fragmentation condition in SCTP and use software
checksum calculation in this case.
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 27127a82561a2a3ed955ce207048e1b066a80a2a ]
igb/ixgbe have hardware sctp checksum support, when this feature is enabled
and also IPsec is armed to protect sctp traffic, ugly things happened as
xfrm_output checks CHECKSUM_PARTIAL to do checksum operation(sum every thing
up and pack the 16bits result in the checksum field). The result is fail
establishment of sctp communication.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit 6865d1e834be84ddd5808d93d5035b492346c64a ]
When filling the netlink message we miss to wipe the pad field,
therefore leak one byte of heap memory to userland. Fix this by
setting pad to 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 455cc32bf128e114455d11ad919321ab89a2c312 ]
François Cachereul made a very nice bug report and suspected
the bh_lock_sock() / bh_unlok_sock() pair used in l2tp_xmit_skb() from
process context was not good.
This problem was added by commit 6af88da14ee284aaad6e4326da09a89191ab6165
("l2tp: Fix locking in l2tp_core.c").
l2tp_eth_dev_xmit() runs from BH context, so we must disable BH
from other l2tp_xmit_skb() users.
[ 452.060011] BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 23s! [accel-pppd:6662]
[ 452.061757] Modules linked in: l2tp_ppp l2tp_netlink l2tp_core pppoe pppox
ppp_generic slhc ipv6 ext3 mbcache jbd virtio_balloon xfs exportfs dm_mod
virtio_blk ata_generic virtio_net floppy ata_piix libata virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]
[ 452.064012] CPU 1
[ 452.080015] BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 23s! [accel-pppd:6643]
[ 452.080015] CPU 2
[ 452.080015]
[ 452.080015] Pid: 6643, comm: accel-pppd Not tainted 3.2.46.mini #1 Bochs Bochs
[ 452.080015] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81059f6c>] [<ffffffff81059f6c>] do_raw_spin_lock+0x17/0x1f
[ 452.080015] RSP: 0018:ffff88007125fc18 EFLAGS: 00000293
[ 452.080015] RAX: 000000000000aba9 RBX: ffffffff811d0703 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 452.080015] RDX: 00000000000000ab RSI: ffff8800711f6896 RDI: ffff8800745c8110
[ 452.080015] RBP: ffff88007125fc18 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 452.080015] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000280 R12: 0000000000000286
[ 452.080015] R13: 0000000000000020 R14: 0000000000000240 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 452.080015] FS: 00007fdc0cc24700(0000) GS:ffff8800b6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 452.080015] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 452.080015] CR2: 00007fdb054899b8 CR3: 0000000074404000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
[ 452.080015] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 452.080015] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 452.080015] Process accel-pppd (pid: 6643, threadinfo ffff88007125e000, task ffff8800b27e6dd0)
[ 452.080015] Stack:
[ 452.080015] ffff88007125fc28 ffffffff81256559 ffff88007125fc98 ffffffffa01b2bd1
[ 452.080015] ffff88007125fc58 000000000000000c 00000000029490d0 0000009c71dbe25e
[ 452.080015] 000000000000005c 000000080000000e 0000000000000000 ffff880071170600
[ 452.080015] Call Trace:
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff81256559>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffffa01b2bd1>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x189/0x4ac [l2tp_core]
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffffa01c2d36>] pppol2tp_sendmsg+0x15e/0x19c [l2tp_ppp]
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff811c7872>] __sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x22/0x24
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff811c83bd>] sock_sendmsg+0xa1/0xb6
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff81254e88>] ? __schedule+0x5c1/0x616
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff8103c7c6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0xb7/0x10c
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff810bbd21>] ? fget_light+0x75/0x89
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff811c8444>] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x20/0x56
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff811c9b34>] sys_sendto+0x10c/0x13b
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff8125cac2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 452.080015] Code: 81 48 89 e5 72 0c 31 c0 48 81 ff 45 66 25 81 0f 92 c0 5d c3 55 b8 00 01 00 00 48 89 e5 f0 66 0f c1 07 0f b6 d4 38 d0 74 06 f3 90 <8a> 07 eb f6 5d c3 90 90 55 48 89 e5 9c 58 0f 1f 44 00 00 5d c3
[ 452.080015] Call Trace:
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff81256559>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffffa01b2bd1>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x189/0x4ac [l2tp_core]
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffffa01c2d36>] pppol2tp_sendmsg+0x15e/0x19c [l2tp_ppp]
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff811c7872>] __sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x22/0x24
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff811c83bd>] sock_sendmsg+0xa1/0xb6
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff81254e88>] ? __schedule+0x5c1/0x616
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff8103c7c6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0xb7/0x10c
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff810bbd21>] ? fget_light+0x75/0x89
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff811c8444>] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x20/0x56
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff811c9b34>] sys_sendto+0x10c/0x13b
[ 452.080015] [<ffffffff8125cac2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 452.064012]
[ 452.064012] Pid: 6662, comm: accel-pppd Not tainted 3.2.46.mini #1 Bochs Bochs
[ 452.064012] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81059f6e>] [<ffffffff81059f6e>] do_raw_spin_lock+0x19/0x1f
[ 452.064012] RSP: 0018:ffff8800b6e83ba0 EFLAGS: 00000297
[ 452.064012] RAX: 000000000000aaa9 RBX: ffff8800b6e83b40 RCX: 0000000000000002
[ 452.064012] RDX: 00000000000000aa RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffff8800745c8110
[ 452.064012] RBP: ffff8800b6e83ba0 R08: 000000000000c802 R09: 000000000000001c
[ 452.064012] R10: ffff880071096c4e R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff8800b6e83b18
[ 452.064012] R13: ffffffff8125d51e R14: ffff8800b6e83ba0 R15: ffff880072a589c0
[ 452.064012] FS: 00007fdc0b81e700(0000) GS:ffff8800b6e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 452.064012] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 452.064012] CR2: 0000000000625208 CR3: 0000000074404000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
[ 452.064012] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 452.064012] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 452.064012] Process accel-pppd (pid: 6662, threadinfo ffff88007129a000, task ffff8800744f7410)
[ 452.064012] Stack:
[ 452.064012] ffff8800b6e83bb0 ffffffff81256559 ffff8800b6e83bc0 ffffffff8121c64a
[ 452.064012] ffff8800b6e83bf0 ffffffff8121ec7a ffff880072a589c0 ffff880071096c62
[ 452.064012] 0000000000000011 ffffffff81430024 ffff8800b6e83c80 ffffffff8121f276
[ 452.064012] Call Trace:
[ 452.064012] <IRQ>
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81256559>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121c64a>] spin_lock+0x9/0xb
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121ec7a>] udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x186/0x269
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121f276>] __udp4_lib_rcv+0x297/0x4ae
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121c178>] ? raw_rcv+0xe9/0xf0
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121f4a7>] udp_rcv+0x1a/0x1c
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811fe385>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x12b/0x1a5
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811fe54e>] ip_local_deliver+0x53/0x84
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811fe1d0>] ip_rcv_finish+0x2bc/0x2f3
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811fe78f>] ip_rcv+0x210/0x269
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8101911e>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0xb
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811d88cd>] __netif_receive_skb+0x3a5/0x3f7
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811d8eba>] netif_receive_skb+0x57/0x5e
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811cf30f>] ? __netdev_alloc_skb+0x1f/0x3b
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa0049126>] virtnet_poll+0x4ba/0x5a4 [virtio_net]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811d9417>] net_rx_action+0x73/0x184
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa01b2cc2>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x27a/0x4ac [l2tp_core]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff810343b9>] __do_softirq+0xc3/0x1a8
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81013b56>] ? ack_APIC_irq+0x10/0x12
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81256559>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8125e0ac>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x26
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81003587>] do_softirq+0x45/0x82
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81034667>] irq_exit+0x42/0x9c
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8125e146>] do_IRQ+0x8e/0xa5
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8125676e>] common_interrupt+0x6e/0x6e
[ 452.064012] <EOI>
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff810b82a1>] ? kfree+0x8a/0xa3
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa01b2cc2>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x27a/0x4ac [l2tp_core]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa01b2c25>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x1dd/0x4ac [l2tp_core]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa01c2d36>] pppol2tp_sendmsg+0x15e/0x19c [l2tp_ppp]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811c7872>] __sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x22/0x24
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811c83bd>] sock_sendmsg+0xa1/0xb6
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81254e88>] ? __schedule+0x5c1/0x616
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8103c7c6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0xb7/0x10c
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff810bbd21>] ? fget_light+0x75/0x89
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811c8444>] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x20/0x56
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811c9b34>] sys_sendto+0x10c/0x13b
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8125cac2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 452.064012] Code: 89 e5 72 0c 31 c0 48 81 ff 45 66 25 81 0f 92 c0 5d c3 55 b8 00 01 00 00 48 89 e5 f0 66 0f c1 07 0f b6 d4 38 d0 74 06 f3 90 8a 07 <eb> f6 5d c3 90 90 55 48 89 e5 9c 58 0f 1f 44 00 00 5d c3 55 48
[ 452.064012] Call Trace:
[ 452.064012] <IRQ> [<ffffffff81256559>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121c64a>] spin_lock+0x9/0xb
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121ec7a>] udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x186/0x269
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121f276>] __udp4_lib_rcv+0x297/0x4ae
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121c178>] ? raw_rcv+0xe9/0xf0
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8121f4a7>] udp_rcv+0x1a/0x1c
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811fe385>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x12b/0x1a5
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811fe54e>] ip_local_deliver+0x53/0x84
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811fe1d0>] ip_rcv_finish+0x2bc/0x2f3
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811fe78f>] ip_rcv+0x210/0x269
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8101911e>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0xb
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811d88cd>] __netif_receive_skb+0x3a5/0x3f7
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811d8eba>] netif_receive_skb+0x57/0x5e
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811cf30f>] ? __netdev_alloc_skb+0x1f/0x3b
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa0049126>] virtnet_poll+0x4ba/0x5a4 [virtio_net]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811d9417>] net_rx_action+0x73/0x184
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa01b2cc2>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x27a/0x4ac [l2tp_core]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff810343b9>] __do_softirq+0xc3/0x1a8
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81013b56>] ? ack_APIC_irq+0x10/0x12
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81256559>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8125e0ac>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x26
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81003587>] do_softirq+0x45/0x82
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81034667>] irq_exit+0x42/0x9c
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8125e146>] do_IRQ+0x8e/0xa5
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8125676e>] common_interrupt+0x6e/0x6e
[ 452.064012] <EOI> [<ffffffff810b82a1>] ? kfree+0x8a/0xa3
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa01b2cc2>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x27a/0x4ac [l2tp_core]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa01b2c25>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x1dd/0x4ac [l2tp_core]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffffa01c2d36>] pppol2tp_sendmsg+0x15e/0x19c [l2tp_ppp]
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811c7872>] __sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x22/0x24
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811c83bd>] sock_sendmsg+0xa1/0xb6
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff81254e88>] ? __schedule+0x5c1/0x616
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8103c7c6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0xb7/0x10c
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff810bbd21>] ? fget_light+0x75/0x89
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811c8444>] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x20/0x56
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff811c9b34>] sys_sendto+0x10c/0x13b
[ 452.064012] [<ffffffff8125cac2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-by: François Cachereul <f.cachereul@alphalink.fr>
Tested-by: François Cachereul <f.cachereul@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c33a39c575068c2ea9bffb22fd6de2df19c74b89 ]
This patch fixes the calculation of the nlmsg size, by adding the missing
nla_total_size().
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4b6c7879d84ad06a2ac5b964808ed599187a188d ]
Commit be4f154d5ef0ca147ab6bcd38857a774133f5450
bridge: Clamp forward_delay when enabling STP
had a typo when attempting to clamp maximum forward delay.
It is possible to set bridge_forward_delay to be higher then
permitted maximum when STP is off. When turning STP on, the
higher then allowed delay has to be clamed down to max value.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CC: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Reviewed-by: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This patch is based on 3.2.y branch, the one used by reporter. Please let me
know if it should be different. Thanks.
The patch which introduced the regression was applied on stables:
3.0.64 3.4.31 3.7.8 3.2.39
The patch which introduced the regression was for stable trees only.
---8<---
Commit 0d6a77079c475033cb622c07c5a880b392ef664e "ipv6: do not create
neighbor entries for local delivery" introduced a regression on
which routes to local delivery would not work anymore. Like this:
$ ip -6 route add local 2001::/64 dev lo
$ ping6 -c1 2001::9
PING 2001::9(2001::9) 56 data bytes
ping: sendmsg: Invalid argument
As this is a local delivery, that commit would not allow the creation of a
neighbor entry and thus the packet cannot be sent.
But as TPROXY scenario actually needs to avoid the neighbor entry creation only
for input flow, this patch now limits previous patch to input flow, keeping
output as before that patch.
Reported-by: Debabrata Banerjee <dbavatar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
CC: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0a7e22609067ff524fc7bbd45c6951dd08561667 ]
When sending out multicast messages, the source address in inet->mc_addr is
ignored and rewritten by an autoselected one. This is caused by a typo in
commit 813b3b5db831 ("ipv4: Use caller's on-stack flowi as-is in output
route lookups").
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1661bf364ae9c506bc8795fef70d1532931be1e8 ]
We need to cap ->msg_namelen or it leads to a buffer overflow when we
to the memcpy() in __audit_sockaddr(). It requires CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to
exploit this bug.
The call tree is:
___sys_recvmsg()
move_addr_to_user()
audit_sockaddr()
__audit_sockaddr()
Reported-by: Jüri Aedla <juri.aedla@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 80ad1d61e72d626e30ebe8529a0455e660ca4693 ]
commit 3ab5aee7fe84 ("net: Convert TCP & DCCP hash tables to use RCU /
hlist_nulls") incorrectly used sock_put() on TIMEWAIT sockets.
We should instead use inet_twsk_put()
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5e8a402f831dbe7ee831340a91439e46f0d38acd ]
Yuchung found following problem :
There are bugs in the SACK processing code, merging part in
tcp_shift_skb_data(), that incorrectly resets or ignores the sacked
skbs FIN flag. When a receiver first SACK the FIN sequence, and later
throw away ofo queue (e.g., sack-reneging), the sender will stop
retransmitting the FIN flag, and hangs forever.
Following packetdrill test can be used to reproduce the bug.
$ cat sack-merge-bug.pkt
`sysctl -q net.ipv4.tcp_fack=0`
// Establish a connection and send 10 MSS.
0.000 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3
+.000 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0
+.000 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0
+.000 listen(3, 1) = 0
+.050 < S 0:0(0) win 32792 <mss 1000,sackOK,nop,nop,nop,wscale 7>
+.000 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 6>
+.001 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 1024
+.000 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4
+.100 write(4, ..., 12000) = 12000
+.000 shutdown(4, SHUT_WR) = 0
+.000 > . 1:10001(10000) ack 1
+.050 < . 1:1(0) ack 2001 win 257
+.000 > FP. 10001:12001(2000) ack 1
+.050 < . 1:1(0) ack 2001 win 257 <sack 10001:11001,nop,nop>
+.050 < . 1:1(0) ack 2001 win 257 <sack 10001:12002,nop,nop>
// SACK reneg
+.050 < . 1:1(0) ack 12001 win 257
+0 %{ print "unacked: ",tcpi_unacked }%
+5 %{ print "" }%
First, a typo inverted left/right of one OR operation, then
code forgot to advance end_seq if the merged skb carried FIN.
Bug was added in 2.6.29 by commit 832d11c5cd076ab
("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Acked-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c52e2421f7368fd36cbe330d2cf41b10452e39a9 ]
TCP stack should make sure it owns skbs before mangling them.
We had various crashes using bnx2x, and it turned out gso_size
was cleared right before bnx2x driver was populating TC descriptor
of the _previous_ packet send. TCP stack can sometime retransmit
packets that are still in Qdisc.
Of course we could make bnx2x driver more robust (using
ACCESS_ONCE(shinfo->gso_size) for example), but the bug is TCP stack.
We have identified two points where skb_unclone() was needed.
This patch adds a WARN_ON_ONCE() to warn us if we missed another
fix of this kind.
Kudos to Neal for finding the root cause of this bug. Its visible
using small MSS.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 89cbb4da0abee2f39d75f67f9fd57f7410c8b65c upstream.
This patch fixes the connection encryption key size information when
the host is playing the peripheral role. We should set conn->enc_key_
size in hci_le_ltk_request_evt, otherwise it is left uninitialized.
Signed-off-by: Andre Guedes <andre.guedes@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f8776218e8546397be64ad2bc0ebf4748522d6e3 upstream.
While playing the peripheral role, the host gets a LE Long Term Key
Request Event from the controller when a connection is established
with a bonded device. The host then informs the LTK which should be
used for the connection. Once the link is encrypted, the host gets
an Encryption Change Event.
Therefore we should set conn->pending_sec_level instead of conn->
sec_level in hci_le_ltk_request_evt. This way, conn->sec_level is
properly updated in hci_encrypt_change_evt.
Moreover, since we have a LTK associated to the device, we have at
least BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM security level.
Signed-off-by: Andre Guedes <andre.guedes@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9260d3e1013701aa814d10c8fc6a9f92bd17d643 ]
It is possible for the timer handlers to run after the call to
ipv6_mc_down so use in6_dev_put instead of __in6_dev_put in the
handler function in order to do proper cleanup when the refcnt
reaches 0. Otherwise, the refcnt can reach zero without the
inet6_dev being destroyed and we end up leaking a reference to
the net_device and see messages like the following,
unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 1
Tested on linux-3.4.43.
Signed-off-by: Salam Noureddine <noureddine@aristanetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e2401654dd0f5f3fb7a8d80dad9554d73d7ca394 ]
It is possible for the timer handlers to run after the call to
ip_mc_down so use in_dev_put instead of __in_dev_put in the handler
function in order to do proper cleanup when the refcnt reaches 0.
Otherwise, the refcnt can reach zero without the in_device being
destroyed and we end up leaking a reference to the net_device and
see messages like the following,
unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 1
Tested on linux-3.4.43.
Signed-off-by: Salam Noureddine <noureddine@aristanetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47 ]
In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the already queued up gso-skb via
plain ip6_append_data. This causes random memory corruptions.
In ip6_ufo_append_data we also have to be careful to not queue up the
same skb multiple times. So setup the gso frame only when no first skb
is available.
This also fixes a shortcoming where we add the current packet's length to
cork->length but return early because of a packet > mtu with dontfrag set
(instead of sutracting it again).
Found with trinity.
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 703133de331a7a7df47f31fb9de51dc6f68a9de8 ]
If local fragmentation is allowed, then ip_select_ident() and
ip_select_ident_more() need to generate unique IDs to ensure
correct defragmentation on the peer.
For example, if IPsec (tunnel mode) has to encrypt large skbs
that have local_df bit set, then all IP fragments that belonged
to different ESP datagrams would have used the same identificator.
If one of these IP fragments would get lost or reordered, then
peer could possibly stitch together wrong IP fragments that did
not belong to the same datagram. This would lead to a packet loss
or data corruption.
Signed-off-by: Ansis Atteka <aatteka@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 749154aa56b57652a282cbde57a57abc278d1205 ]
skb->data already points to IP header, but for the sake of
consistency we can also use ip_hdr() to retrieve it.
Signed-off-by: Ansis Atteka <aatteka@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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