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commit 51e97a12bef19b7e43199fc153cf9bd5f2140362 upstream
The sctp_asoc_get_hmac() function iterates through a peer's hmac_ids
array and attempts to ensure that only a supported hmac entry is
returned. The current code fails to do this properly - if the last id
in the array is out of range (greater than SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX), the
id integer remains set after exiting the loop, and the address of an
out-of-bounds entry will be returned and subsequently used in the parent
function, causing potentially ugly memory corruption. This patch resets
the id integer to 0 on encountering an invalid id so that NULL will be
returned after finishing the loop if no valid ids are found.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit a5990ea1254cd186b38744507aeec3136a0c1c95 upstream
Don't forget to release the module refcnt if seq_open() returns failure.
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 6dfbd87a20a737641ef228230c77f4262434fa24 upstream.
Add necessary alias to autoload ip6ip6 tunnel module.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b upstream.
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
[PG: in 2.6.34, the bare MODULE_ALIAS for ipip/tunl0 and ip_gre/gre0
didn't exist, but this adds the limited scope MODULE_ALIAS_NETDEV ones]
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 96642d42f076101ba98866363d908cab706d156c upstream.
In x25_link_free(), we destroy 'nb' before dereferencing
'nb->dev'. Don't do this, because 'nb' might be freed
by then.
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit ed2849d3ecfa339435818eeff28f6c3424300cec upstream.
When an xprt is created, it has a refcount of 1, and XPT_BUSY is set.
The refcount is *not* owned by the thread that created the xprt
(as is clear from the fact that creators never put the reference).
Rather, it is owned by the absence of XPT_DEAD. Once XPT_DEAD is set,
(And XPT_BUSY is clear) that initial reference is dropped and the xprt
can be freed.
So when a creator clears XPT_BUSY it is dropping its only reference and
so must not touch the xprt again.
However svc_recv, after calling ->xpo_accept (and so getting an XPT_BUSY
reference on a new xprt), calls svc_xprt_recieved. This clears
XPT_BUSY and then svc_xprt_enqueue - this last without owning a reference.
This is dangerous and has been seen to leave svc_xprt_enqueue working
with an xprt containing garbage.
So we need to hold an extra counted reference over that call to
svc_xprt_received.
For safety, any time we clear XPT_BUSY and then use the xprt again, we
first get a reference, and the put it again afterwards.
Note that svc_close_all does not need this extra protection as there are
no threads running, and the final free can only be called asynchronously
from such a thread.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 171995e5d82dcc92bea37a7d2a2ecc21068a0f19 upstream
x25 does not decrement the network device reference counts on module unload.
Thus unregistering any pre-existing interface after unloading the x25 module
hangs and results in
unregister_netdevice: waiting for tap0 to become free. Usage count = 1
This patch decrements the reference counts of all interfaces in x25_link_free,
the way it is already done in x25_link_device_down for NETDEV_DOWN events.
Signed-off-by: Apollon Oikonomopoulos <apollon@noc.grnet.gr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 4e085e76cbe558b79b54cbab772f61185879bc64 upstream
Unconditional use of skb->dev won't work here,
try to fetch the econet device via skb_dst()->dev
instead.
Suggested by Eric Dumazet.
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 0c62fc6dd02c8d793c75ae76a9b6881fc36388ad upstream
We need to drop the mutex and do a dev_put, so set an error code and break like
the other paths, instead of returning directly.
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 46bcf14f44d8f31ecfdc8b6708ec15a3b33316d9 upstream
Pavel Emelyanov tried to fix a race between sk_filter_(de|at)tach and
sk_clone() in commit 47e958eac280c263397
Problem is we can have several clones sharing a common sk_filter, and
these clones might want to sk_filter_attach() their own filters at the
same time, and can overwrite old_filter->rcu, corrupting RCU queues.
We can not use filter->rcu without being sure no other thread could do
the same thing.
Switch code to a more conventional ref-counting technique : Do the
atomic decrement immediately and queue one rcu call back when last
reference is released.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 67286640f638f5ad41a946b9a3dc75327950248f upstream
packet_getname_spkt() doesn't initialize all members of sa_data field of
sockaddr struct if strlen(dev->name) < 13. This structure is then copied
to userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory.
We have to fully fill sa_data with strncpy() instead of strlcpy().
The same with packet_getname(): it doesn't initialize sll_pkttype field of
sockaddr_ll. Set it to zero.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 25888e30319f8896fc656fc68643e6a078263060 upstream
Its easy to eat all kernel memory and trigger NMI watchdog, using an
exploit program that queues unix sockets on top of others.
lkml ref : http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/11/25/8
This mechanism is used in applications, one choice we have is to have a
recursion limit.
Other limits might be needed as well (if we queue other types of files),
since the passfd mechanism is currently limited by socket receive queue
sizes only.
Add a recursion_level to unix socket, allowing up to 4 levels.
Each time we send an unix socket through sendfd mechanism, we copy its
recursion level (plus one) to receiver. This recursion level is cleared
when socket receive queue is emptied.
[PG: slight modifications required due to absense of 7361c36c5 in 34]
Reported-by: Марк Коренберг <socketpair@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 9915672d41273f5b77f1b3c29b391ffb7732b84b upstream
Vegard Nossum found a unix socket OOM was possible, posting an exploit
program.
My analysis is we can eat all LOWMEM memory before unix_gc() being
called from unix_release_sock(). Moreover, the thread blocked in
unix_gc() can consume huge amount of time to perform cleanup because of
huge working set.
One way to handle this is to have a sensible limit on unix_tot_inflight,
tested from wait_for_unix_gc() and to force a call to unix_gc() if this
limit is hit.
This solves the OOM and also reduce overall latencies, and should not
slowdown normal workloads.
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit ad9f4f50fe9288bbe65b7dfd76d8820afac6a24c upstream
sysctl_tcp_tso_win_divisor might be set to zero while one cpu runs in
tcp_tso_should_defer(). Make sure we dont allow a divide by zero by
reading sysctl_tcp_tso_win_divisor exactly once.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit b1afde60f2b9ee8444fba4e012dc99a3b28d224d upstream
The bug has to do with boundary checks on the initial receive window.
If the initial receive window falls between init_cwnd and the
receive window specified by the user, the initial window is incorrectly
brought down to init_cwnd. The correct behavior is to allow it to
remain unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit c39508d6f118308355468314ff414644115a07f3 upstream
Use TCP_MIN_MSS instead of constant 64.
Reported-by: Min Zhang <mzhang@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 7a1abd08d52fdeddb3e9a5a33f2f15cc6a5674d2 upstream
As noted by Steve Chen, since commit
f5fff5dc8a7a3f395b0525c02ba92c95d42b7390 ("tcp: advertise MSS
requested by user") we can end up with a situation where
tcp_select_initial_window() does a divide by a zero (or
even negative) mss value.
The problem is that sometimes we effectively subtract
TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED and/or TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED from the mss.
Fix this by increasing the minimum from 8 to 64.
Reported-by: Steve Chen <schen@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 8f49c2703b33519aaaccc63f571b465b9d2b3a2d upstream
Alexey Kuznetsov noticed a regression introduced by
commit f1ecd5d9e7366609d640ff4040304ea197fbc618
("Revert Backoff [v3]: Revert RTO on ICMP destination unreachable")
The RTO and timer modification code added to tcp_v4_err()
doesn't check sock_owned_by_user(), which if true means we
don't have exclusive access to the socket and therefore cannot
modify it's critical state.
Just skip this new code block if sock_owned_by_user() is true
and eliminate the now superfluous sock_owned_by_user() code
block contained within.
Reported-by: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Damian Lukowski <damian@tvk.rwth-aachen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 57fe93b374a6b8711995c2d466c502af9f3a08bb upstream
There is a possibility malicious users can get limited information about
uninitialized stack mem array. Even if sk_run_filter() result is bound
to packet length (0 .. 65535), we could imagine this can be used by
hostile user.
Initializing mem[] array, like Dan Rosenberg suggested in his patch is
expensive since most filters dont even use this array.
Its hard to make the filter validation in sk_chk_filter(), because of
the jumps. This might be done later.
In this patch, I use a bitmap (a single long var) so that only filters
using mem[] loads/stores pay the price of added security checks.
For other filters, additional cost is a single instruction.
[ Since we access fentry->k a lot now, cache it in a local variable
and mark filter entry pointer as const. -DaveM ]
Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit a27e13d370415add3487949c60810e36069a23a6 upstream
Don't declare variable sized array of iovecs on the stack since this
could cause stack overflow if msg->msgiovlen is large. Instead, coalesce
the user-supplied data into a new buffer and use a single iovec for it.
Signed-off-by: Phil Blundell <philb@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 1c40be12f7d8ca1d387510d39787b12e512a7ce8 upstream.
We leak at least 32bits of kernel memory to user land in tc dump,
because we dont init all fields (capab ?) of the dumped structure.
Use C99 initializers so that holes and non explicit fields are zeroed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 504f85c9d05f7c605306e808f0d835fe11bfd18d upstream.
act_nat: use stack variable
structure tc_nat isn't too big for stack, so we can put it in stack.
Signed-off-by: Changli Gao <xiaosuo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 8acfe468b0384e834a303f08ebc4953d72fb690a upstream.
This helps protect us from overflow issues down in the
individual protocol sendmsg/recvmsg handlers. Once
we hit INT_MAX we truncate out the rest of the iovec
by setting the iov_len members to zero.
This works because:
1) For SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET sockets, partial
writes are allowed and the application will just continue
with another write to send the rest of the data.
2) For datagram oriented sockets, where there must be a
one-to-one correspondance between write() calls and
packets on the wire, INT_MAX is going to be far larger
than the packet size limit the protocol is going to
check for and signal with -EMSGSIZE.
Based upon a patch by Linus Torvalds.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 253eacc070b114c2ec1f81b067d2fed7305467b0 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 218854af84038d828a32f061858b1902ed2beec6 upstream.
In rds_cmsg_rdma_args(), the user-provided args->nr_local value is
restricted to less than UINT_MAX. This seems to need a tighter upper
bound, since the calculation of total iov_size can overflow, resulting
in a small sock_kmalloc() allocation. This would probably just result
in walking off the heap and crashing when calling rds_rdma_pages() with
a high count value. If it somehow doesn't crash here, then memory
corruption could occur soon after.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 16c41745c7b92a243d0874f534c1655196c64b74 upstream.
Add missing check for capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) in SIOCSIFADDR operation.
Signed-off-by: Phil Blundell <philb@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit fa0e846494792e722d817b9d3d625a4ef4896c96 upstream.
Later parts of econet_sendmsg() rely on saddr != NULL, so return early
with EINVAL if NULL was passed otherwise an oops may occur.
Signed-off-by: Phil Blundell <philb@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 5ef41308f94dcbb3b7afc56cdef1c2ba53fa5d2f upstream.
Now with improved comma support.
On parsing malformed X.25 facilities, decrementing the remaining length
may cause it to underflow. Since the length is an unsigned integer,
this will result in the loop continuing until the kernel crashes.
This patch adds checks to ensure decrementing the remaining length does
not cause it to wrap around.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 0597d1b99fcfc2c0eada09a698f85ed413d4ba84 upstream.
On 64-bit platforms the ASCII representation of a pointer may be up to 17
bytes long. This patch increases the length of the buffer accordingly.
http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=128872251418192&w=2
Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit a6331d6f9a4298173b413cf99a40cc86a9d92c37 upstream.
Signed-of-by: Andrew Hendry <andrew.hendry@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 8d987e5c75107ca7515fa19e857cfa24aab6ec8f upstream.
Robin Holt tried to boot a 16TB machine and found some limits were
reached : sysctl_tcp_mem[2], sysctl_udp_mem[2]
We can switch infrastructure to use long "instead" of "int", now
atomic_long_t primitives are available for free.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com>
Reviewed-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 0f04cfd098fb81fded74e78ea1a1b86cc6c6c31e upstream.
While reviewing commit 1c40be12f7d8ca1d387510d39787b12e512a7ce8, I
audited other users of tc_action_ops->dump for information leaks.
That commit covered almost all of them but act_police still had a leak.
opt.limit and opt.capab aren't zeroed out before the structure is
passed out.
This patch uses the C99 initializers to zero everything unused out.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 3c6f27bf33052ea6ba9d82369fb460726fb779c0 upstream.
A single uninitialized padding byte is leaked to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 6b1686a71e3158d3c5f125260effce171cc7852b upstream.
commit ea781f197d6a8 (use SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU and get rid of call_rcu())
did a mistake in __vmalloc() call in nf_ct_alloc_hashtable().
I forgot to add __GFP_HIGHMEM, so pages were taken from LOWMEM only.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 66c68bcc489fadd4f5e8839e966e3a366e50d1d5 upstream.
NETIF_F_HW_CSUM indicates the ability to update an TCP/IP-style 16-bit
checksum with the checksum of an arbitrary part of the packet data,
whereas the FCoE CRC is something entirely different.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit ae6df5f96a51818d6376da5307d773baeece4014 upstream.
Calling ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL with a large rule_cnt will allocate kernel
heap without clearing it. For the one driver (niu) that implements it,
it will leave the unused portion of heap unchanged and copy the full
contents back to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 37f9fc452d138dfc4da2ee1ce5ae85094efc3606 upstream.
While parsing the GetValuebyClass command frame, we could potentially write
passed the skb->data pointer.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit efc463eb508798da4243625b08c7396462cabf9f upstream.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 719f835853a92f6090258114a72ffe41f09155cd upstream
commit 30fff923 introduced in linux-2.6.33 (udp: bind() optimisation)
added a secondary hash on UDP, hashed on (local addr, local port).
Problem is that following sequence :
fd = socket(...)
connect(fd, &remote, ...)
not only selects remote end point (address and port), but also sets
local address, while UDP stack stored in secondary hash table the socket
while its local address was INADDR_ANY (or ipv6 equivalent)
Sequence is :
- autobind() : choose a random local port, insert socket in hash tables
[while local address is INADDR_ANY]
- connect() : set remote address and port, change local address to IP
given by a route lookup.
When an incoming UDP frame comes, if more than 10 sockets are found in
primary hash table, we switch to secondary table, and fail to find
socket because its local address changed.
One solution to this problem is to rehash datagram socket if needed.
We add a new rehash(struct socket *) method in "struct proto", and
implement this method for UDP v4 & v6, using a common helper.
This rehashing only takes care of secondary hash table, since primary
hash (based on local port only) is not changed.
Reported-by: Krzysztof Piotr Oledzki <ole@ans.pl>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Krzysztof Piotr Oledzki <ole@ans.pl>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit ae2688d59b5f861dc70a091d003773975d2ae7fb upstream.
Blackhole routes are used when xfrm_lookup() returns -EREMOTE (error
triggered by IKE for example), hence this kind of route is always
temporary and so we should check if a better route exists for next
packets.
Bug has been introduced by commit d11a4dc18bf41719c9f0d7ed494d295dd2973b92.
Signed-off-by: Jianzhao Wang <jianzhao.wang@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 9828e6e6e3f19efcb476c567b9999891d051f52f upstream.
Just use explicit casts, since we really can't change the
types of structures exported to userspace which have been
around for 15 years or so.
Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit a4d258036ed9b2a1811c3670c6099203a0f284a0 upstream.
If a RST comes in immediately after checking sk->sk_err, tcp_poll will
return POLLIN but not POLLOUT. Fix this by checking sk->sk_err at the end
of tcp_poll. Additionally, ensure the correct order of operations on SMP
machines with memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Tom Marshall <tdm.code@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit b00916b189d13a615ff05c9242201135992fcda3 upstream.
Several other ethtool functions leave heap uncleared (potentially) by
drivers. Some interfaces appear safe (eeprom, etc), in that the sizes
are well controlled. In some situations (e.g. unchecked error conditions),
the heap will remain unchanged in areas before copying back to userspace.
Note that these are less of an issue since these all require CAP_NET_ADMIN.
[PG: 34 doesn't have ethtool_get_rxnfc(), drop that chunk]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 3d13008e7345fa7a79d8f6438150dc15d6ba6e9d upstream.
Special care should be taken when slow path is hit in ip_fragment() :
When walking through frags, we transfert truesize ownership from skb to
frags. Then if we hit a slow_path condition, we must undo this or risk
uncharging frags->truesize twice, and in the end, having negative socket
sk_wmem_alloc counter, or even freeing socket sooner than expected.
Many thanks to Nick Bowler, who provided a very clean bug report and
test program.
Thanks to Jarek for reviewing my first patch and providing a V2
While Nick bisection pointed to commit 2b85a34e911 (net: No more
expensive sock_hold()/sock_put() on each tx), underlying bug is older
(2.6.12-rc5)
A side effect is to extend work done in commit b2722b1c3a893e
(ip_fragment: also adjust skb->truesize for packets not owned by a
socket) to ipv6 as well.
Reported-and-bisected-by: Nick Bowler <nbowler@elliptictech.com>
Tested-by: Nick Bowler <nbowler@elliptictech.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
CC: Jarek Poplawski <jarkao2@gmail.com>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit ae878ae280bea286ff2b1e1cb6e609dd8cb4501d upstream.
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit a91e7d471e2e384035b9746ea707ccdcd353f5dd upstream.
Retrieve the header after doing pskb_may_pull since, pskb_may_pull
could change the buffer structure.
This is based on the comment given by Eric Dumazet on Phonet
Pipe controller patch for a similar problem.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Sanghvi <kumar.sanghvi@stericsson.com>
Acked-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@stericsson.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Rémi Denis-Courmont <remi.denis-courmont@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 482964e56e1320cb7952faa1932d8ecf59c4bf75 upstream.
This patch fixes the condition (3rd arg) passed to sk_wait_event() in
sk_stream_wait_memory(). The incorrect check in sk_stream_wait_memory()
causes the following soft lockup in tcp_sendmsg() when the global tcp
memory pool has exhausted.
>>> snip <<<
localhost kernel: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 11s! [sshd:6429]
localhost kernel: CPU 3:
localhost kernel: RIP: 0010:[sk_stream_wait_memory+0xcd/0x200] [sk_stream_wait_memory+0xcd/0x200] sk_stream_wait_memory+0xcd/0x200
localhost kernel:
localhost kernel: Call Trace:
localhost kernel: [sk_stream_wait_memory+0x1b1/0x200] sk_stream_wait_memory+0x1b1/0x200
localhost kernel: [<ffffffff802557c0>] autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40
localhost kernel: [ipv6:tcp_sendmsg+0x6e6/0xe90] tcp_sendmsg+0x6e6/0xce0
localhost kernel: [sock_aio_write+0x126/0x140] sock_aio_write+0x126/0x140
localhost kernel: [xfs:do_sync_write+0xf1/0x130] do_sync_write+0xf1/0x130
localhost kernel: [<ffffffff802557c0>] autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40
localhost kernel: [hrtimer_start+0xe3/0x170] hrtimer_start+0xe3/0x170
localhost kernel: [vfs_write+0x185/0x190] vfs_write+0x185/0x190
localhost kernel: [sys_write+0x50/0x90] sys_write+0x50/0x90
localhost kernel: [system_call+0x7e/0x83] system_call+0x7e/0x83
>>> snip <<<
What is happening is, that the sk_wait_event() condition passed from
sk_stream_wait_memory() evaluates to true for the case of tcp global memory
exhaustion. This is because both sk_stream_memory_free() and vm_wait are true
which causes sk_wait_event() to *not* call schedule_timeout().
Hence sk_stream_wait_memory() returns immediately to the caller w/o sleeping.
This causes the caller to again try allocation, which again fails and again
calls sk_stream_wait_memory(), and so on.
[ Bug introduced by commit c1cbe4b7ad0bc4b1d98ea708a3fecb7362aa4088
("[NET]: Avoid atomic xchg() for non-error case") -DaveM ]
Signed-off-by: Nagendra Singh Tomar <tomer_iisc@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 01db403cf99f739f86903314a489fb420e0e254f upstream.
Fixes kernel bugzilla #16603
tcp_sendmsg() truncates iov_len to an 'int' which a 4GB write to write
zero bytes, for example.
There is also the problem higher up of how verify_iovec() works. It
wants to prevent the total length from looking like an error return
value.
However it does this using 'int', but syscalls return 'long' (and
thus signed 64-bit on 64-bit machines). So it could trigger
false-positives on 64-bit as written. So fix it to use 'long'.
Reported-by: Olaf Bonorden <bono@onlinehome.de>
Reported-by: Daniel Büse <dbuese@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 94e2238969e89f5112297ad2a00103089dde7e8f upstream.
otherwise ECT(1) bit will get interpreted as RTO_ONLINK
and routing will fail with XfrmOutBundleGenError.
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weber <uweber@astaro.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 799c10559d60f159ab2232203f222f18fa3c4a5f upstream.
Don't try to "optimize" rds_page_copy_user() by using kmap_atomic() and
the unsafe atomic user mode accessor functions. It's actually slower
than the straightforward code on any reasonable modern CPU.
Back when the code was written (although probably not by the time it was
actually merged, though), 32-bit x86 may have been the dominant
architecture. And there kmap_atomic() can be a lot faster than kmap()
(unless you have very good locality, in which case the virtual address
caching by kmap() can overcome all the downsides).
But these days, x86-64 may not be more populous, but it's getting there
(and if you care about performance, it's definitely already there -
you'd have upgraded your CPU's already in the last few years). And on
x86-64, the non-kmap_atomic() version is faster, simply because the code
is simpler and doesn't have the "re-try page fault" case.
People with old hardware are not likely to care about RDS anyway, and
the optimization for the 32-bit case is simply buggy, since it doesn't
verify the user addresses properly.
Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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