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2011-04-14net: fix rds_iovec page count overflowLinus Torvalds
commit 1b1f693d7ad6d193862dcb1118540a030c5e761f upstream. As reported by Thomas Pollet, the rdma page counting can overflow. We get the rdma sizes in 64-bit unsigned entities, but then limit it to UINT_MAX bytes and shift them down to pages (so with a possible "+1" for an unaligned address). So each individual page count fits comfortably in an 'unsigned int' (not even close to overflowing into signed), but as they are added up, they might end up resulting in a signed return value. Which would be wrong. Catch the case of tot_pages turning negative, and return the appropriate error code. Reported-by: Thomas Pollet <thomas.pollet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andy Grover <andy.grover@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14CAN: Use inode instead of kernel address for /proc fileDan Rosenberg
commit 9f260e0efa4766e56d0ac14f1aeea6ee5eb8fe83 upstream. Since the socket address is just being used as a unique identifier, its inode number is an alternative that does not leak potentially sensitive information. CC-ing stable because MITRE has assigned CVE-2010-4565 to the issue. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14irda: prevent integer underflow in IRLMP_ENUMDEVICESDan Rosenberg
commit fdac1e0697356ac212259f2147aa60c72e334861 upstream. If the user-provided len is less than the expected offset, the IRLMP_ENUMDEVICES getsockopt will do a copy_to_user() with a very large size value. While this isn't be a security issue on x86 because it will get caught by the access_ok() check, it may leak large amounts of kernel heap on other architectures. In any event, this patch fixes it. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14econet: Fix crash in aun_incoming().David S. Miller
commit 4e085e76cbe558b79b54cbab772f61185879bc64 upstream. Unconditional use of skb->dev won't work here, try to fetch the econet device via skb_dst()->dev instead. Suggested by Eric Dumazet. Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com> Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> [jmm: Slightly adapted for 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14inet_diag: Make sure we actually run the same bytecode we audited.Nelson Elhage
commit 22e76c849d505d87c5ecf3d3e6742a65f0ff4860 upstream. We were using nlmsg_find_attr() to look up the bytecode by attribute when auditing, but then just using the first attribute when actually running bytecode. So, if we received a message with two attribute elements, where only the second had type INET_DIAG_REQ_BYTECODE, we would validate and run different bytecode strings. Fix this by consistently using nlmsg_find_attr everywhere. Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [jmm: Slightly adapted to apply against 2.6.32] Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14net: tipc: fix information leak to userlandKulikov Vasiliy
commit 88f8a5e3e7defccd3925cabb1ee4d3994e5cdb52 upstream. Structure sockaddr_tipc is copied to userland with padding bytes after "id" field in union field "name" unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory. We have to initialize them to zero. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14net: packet: fix information leak to userlandVasiliy Kulikov
commit 67286640f638f5ad41a946b9a3dc75327950248f upstream. packet_getname_spkt() doesn't initialize all members of sa_data field of sockaddr struct if strlen(dev->name) < 13. This structure is then copied to userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory. We have to fully fill sa_data with strncpy() instead of strlcpy(). The same with packet_getname(): it doesn't initialize sll_pkttype field of sockaddr_ll. Set it to zero. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> [jmm: Backported to 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14net: ax25: fix information leak to userlandVasiliy Kulikov
commit fe10ae53384e48c51996941b7720ee16995cbcb7 upstream. Sometimes ax25_getname() doesn't initialize all members of fsa_digipeater field of fsa struct, also the struct has padding bytes between sax25_call and sax25_ndigis fields. This structure is then copied to userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14sctp: fix to calc the INIT/INIT-ACK chunk length correctly is setWei Yongjun
commit a8170c35e738d62e9919ce5b109cf4ed66e95bde upstream. When calculating the INIT/INIT-ACK chunk length, we should not only account the length of parameters, but also the parameters zero padding length, such as AUTH HMACS parameter and CHUNKS parameter. Without the parameters zero padding length we may get following oops. skb_over_panic: text:ce2068d2 len:130 put:6 head:cac3fe00 data:cac3fe00 tail:0xcac3fe82 end:0xcac3fe80 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:127! invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] SMP last sysfs file: /sys/module/aes_generic/initstate Modules linked in: authenc ...... Pid: 4102, comm: sctp_darn Tainted: G D 2.6.34-rc2 #6 EIP: 0060:[<c0607630>] EFLAGS: 00010282 CPU: 0 EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x37/0x3e EAX: 00000078 EBX: c07c024b ECX: c07c02b9 EDX: cb607b78 ESI: 00000000 EDI: cac3fe7a EBP: 00000002 ESP: cb607b74 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 Process sctp_darn (pid: 4102, ti=cb607000 task=cabdc990 task.ti=cb607000) Stack: c07c02b9 ce2068d2 00000082 00000006 cac3fe00 cac3fe00 cac3fe82 cac3fe80 <0> c07c024b cac3fe7c cac3fe7a c0608dec ca986e80 ce2068d2 00000006 0000007a <0> cb8120ca ca986e80 cb812000 00000003 cb8120c4 ce208a25 cb8120ca cadd9400 Call Trace: [<ce2068d2>] ? sctp_addto_chunk+0x45/0x85 [sctp] [<c0608dec>] ? skb_put+0x2e/0x32 [<ce2068d2>] ? sctp_addto_chunk+0x45/0x85 [sctp] [<ce208a25>] ? sctp_make_init+0x279/0x28c [sctp] [<c0686a92>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x2a/0x30 [<ce1fdc0b>] ? sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc+0x2b/0x7b [sctp] [<ce202823>] ? sctp_do_sm+0xa0/0x14a [sctp] [<ce2133b9>] ? sctp_pname+0x0/0x14 [sctp] [<ce211d72>] ? sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0x2b/0x31 [sctp] [<ce20f3cf>] ? sctp_sendmsg+0x7a0/0x9eb [sctp] [<c064eb1e>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x3b/0x43 [<c04244b7>] ? task_tick_fair+0x2d/0xd9 [<c06031e1>] ? sock_sendmsg+0xa7/0xc1 [<c0416afe>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6b/0x75 [<c0425123>] ? dequeue_task_fair+0x34/0x19b [<c0446abb>] ? sched_clock_local+0x17/0x11e [<c052ea87>] ? _copy_from_user+0x2b/0x10c [<c060ab3a>] ? verify_iovec+0x3c/0x6a [<c06035ca>] ? sys_sendmsg+0x186/0x1e2 [<c042176b>] ? __wake_up_common+0x34/0x5b [<c04240c2>] ? __wake_up+0x2c/0x3b [<c057e35c>] ? tty_wakeup+0x43/0x47 [<c04430f2>] ? remove_wait_queue+0x16/0x24 [<c0580c94>] ? n_tty_read+0x5b8/0x65e [<c042be02>] ? default_wake_function+0x0/0x8 [<c0604e0e>] ? sys_socketcall+0x17f/0x1cd [<c040264c>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x22 Code: 0f 45 de 53 ff b0 98 00 00 00 ff b0 94 ...... EIP: [<c0607630>] skb_over_panic+0x37/0x3e SS:ESP 0068:cb607b74 To reproduce: # modprobe sctp # echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/sctp/addip_enable # echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable # sctp_test -H 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e -P 800 -l # sctp_darn -H 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e -P 900 -h 192.168.0.21 -p 800 -I -s -t sctp_darn ready to send... 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e:900-192.168.0.21:800 Interactive mode> bindx-add=192.168.0.21 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e:900-192.168.0.21:800 Interactive mode> bindx-add=192.168.1.21 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e:900-192.168.0.21:800 Interactive mode> snd=10 ------------------------------------------------------------------ eth0 has addresses: 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e and 192.168.0.21 eth1 has addresses: 192.168.1.21 ------------------------------------------------------------------ Reported-by: George Cheimonidis <gchimon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14gro: reset skb_iif on reuseAndy Gospodarek
commit 6d152e23ad1a7a5b40fef1f42e017d66e6115159 upstream. Like Herbert's change from a few days ago: 66c46d741e2e60f0e8b625b80edb0ab820c46d7a gro: Reset dev pointer on reuse this may not be necessary at this point, but we should still clean up the skb->skb_iif. If not we may end up with an invalid valid for skb->skb_iif when the skb is reused and the check is done in __netif_receive_skb. Signed-off-by: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Brandon Philips <bphilips@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14gro: Reset dev pointer on reuseHerbert Xu
commit 66c46d741e2e60f0e8b625b80edb0ab820c46d7a upstream. On older kernels the VLAN code may zero skb->dev before dropping it and causing it to be reused by GRO. Unfortunately we didn't reset skb->dev in that case which causes the next GRO user to get a bogus skb->dev pointer. This particular problem no longer happens with the current upstream kernel due to changes in VLAN processing. However, for correctness we should still reset the skb->dev pointer in the GRO reuse function in case a future user does the same thing. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Brandon Philips <bphilips@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14econet: 4 byte infoleak to the networkVasiliy Kulikov
commit 67c5c6cb8129c595f21e88254a3fc6b3b841ae8e upstream. struct aunhdr has 4 padding bytes between 'pad' and 'handle' fields on x86_64. These bytes are not initialized in the variable 'ah' before sending 'ah' to the network. This leads to 4 bytes kernel stack infoleak. This bug was introduced before the git epoch. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Acked-by: Phil Blundell <philb@gnu.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspaceVasiliy Kulikov
commit 6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54 upstream. Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe process. The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14netfilter: ipt_CLUSTERIP: fix buffer overflowVasiliy Kulikov
commit 961ed183a9fd080cf306c659b8736007e44065a5 upstream. 'buffer' string is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether it is zero terminated. This may lead to overflow inside of simple_strtoul(). Changli Gao suggested to copy not more than user supplied 'size' bytes. It was introduced before the git epoch. Files "ipt_CLUSTERIP/*" are root writable only by default, however, on some setups permissions might be relaxed to e.g. network admin user. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Acked-by: Changli Gao <xiaosuo@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14netfilter: arp_tables: fix infoleak to userspaceVasiliy Kulikov
commit 42eab94fff18cb1091d3501cd284d6bd6cc9c143 upstream. Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe process. The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second is introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1); the third is introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14netfilter: ip_tables: fix infoleak to userspaceVasiliy Kulikov
commit 78b79876761b86653df89c48a7010b5cbd41a84a upstream. Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe process. The first and the third bugs were introduced before the git epoch; the second was introduced in 2722971c (v2.6.17-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14Bluetooth: bnep: fix buffer overflowVasiliy Kulikov
commit 43629f8f5ea32a998d06d1bb41eefa0e821ff573 upstream. Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "device" field is NULL terminated. This potentially leads to BUG() inside of alloc_netdev_mqs() and/or information leak by creating a device with a name made of contents of kernel stack. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14bridge: netfilter: fix information leakVasiliy Kulikov
commit d846f71195d57b0bbb143382647c2c6638b04c5a upstream. Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name" field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and, consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace processes. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14Bluetooth: sco: fix information leak to userspaceVasiliy Kulikov
commit c4c896e1471aec3b004a693c689f60be3b17ac86 upstream. struct sco_conninfo has one padding byte in the end. Local variable cinfo of type sco_conninfo is copied to userspace with this uninizialized one byte, leading to old stack contents leak. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14ROSE: prevent heap corruption with bad facilitiesDan Rosenberg
commit be20250c13f88375345ad99950190685eda51eb8 upstream. When parsing the FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS facilities field, it's possible for a remote host to provide more digipeaters than expected, resulting in heap corruption. Check against ROSE_MAX_DIGIS to prevent overflows, and abort facilities parsing on failure. Additionally, when parsing the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP facilities fields, a remote host can provide a length of less than 10, resulting in an underflow in a memcpy size, causing a kernel panic due to massive heap corruption. A length of greater than 20 results in a stack overflow of the callsign array. Abort facilities parsing on these invalid length values. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14irda: prevent heap corruption on invalid nicknameDan Rosenberg
commit d50e7e3604778bfc2dc40f440e0742dbae399d54 upstream. Invalid nicknames containing only spaces will result in an underflow in a memcpy size calculation, subsequently destroying the heap and panicking. v2 also catches the case where the provided nickname is longer than the buffer size, which can result in controllable heap corruption. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14irda: validate peer name and attribute lengthsDan Rosenberg
commit d370af0ef7951188daeb15bae75db7ba57c67846 upstream. Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer than the destination array sizes. Validate lengths to prevent stack buffer overflows. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-04-14mac80211: initialize sta->last_rx in sta_info_allocFelix Fietkau
commit 8bc8aecdc5e26cfda12dbd6867af4aa67836da6a upstream. This field is used to determine the inactivity time. When in AP mode, hostapd uses it for kicking out inactive clients after a while. Without this patch, hostapd immediately deauthenticates a new client if it checks the inactivity time before the client sends its first data frame. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-03-27SUNRPC: Never reuse the socket port after an xs_close()Trond Myklebust
commit 246408dcd5dfeef2df437ccb0ef4d6ee87805f58 upstream. If we call xs_close(), we're in one of two situations: - Autoclose, which means we don't expect to resend a request - bind+connect failed, which probably means the port is in use Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-03-23SUNRPC: Ensure we always run the tk_callback before tk_actionTrond Myklebust
commit e020c6800c9621a77223bf2c1ff68180e41e8ebf upstream. This fixes a race in which the task->tk_callback() puts the rpc_task to sleep, setting a new callback. Under certain circumstances, the current code may end up executing the task->tk_action before it gets round to the callback. Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-03-14ip6ip6: autoload ip6 tunnelstephen hemminger
commit 6dfbd87a20a737641ef228230c77f4262434fa24 upstream ip6ip6: autoload ip6 tunnel Add necessary alias to autoload ip6ip6 tunnel module. Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-03-14net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modulesVasiliy Kulikov
commit 8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b upstream. Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't allow anybody load any module not related to networking. This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019. Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0". Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit. root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) -- root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status CapInh: 0000000000000000 CapPrm: fffffff800001000 CapEff: fffffff800001000 CapBnd: fffffff800001000 root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs FATAL: Error inserting xfs (/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0 sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4 NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1 root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit sit 10457 0 tunnel4 2957 1 sit For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed: root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status CapInh: 0000000000000000 CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff CapEff: ffffffffffffffff CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs xfs 745319 0 Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203 Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-03-14netfilter: nf_log: avoid oops in (un)bind with invalid nfproto valuesJan Engelhardt
commit 9ef0298a8e5730d9a46d640014c727f3b4152870 upstream. Like many other places, we have to check that the array index is within allowed limits, or otherwise, a kernel oops and other nastiness can ensue when we access memory beyond the end of the array. [ 5954.115381] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000004000000000 [ 5954.120014] IP: __find_logger+0x6f/0xa0 [ 5954.123979] nf_log_bind_pf+0x2b/0x70 [ 5954.123979] nfulnl_recv_config+0xc0/0x4a0 [nfnetlink_log] [ 5954.123979] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x12c/0x1b0 [nfnetlink] ... The problem goes back to v2.6.30-rc1~1372~1342~31 where nf_log_bind was decoupled from nf_log_register. Reported-by: Miguel Di Ciurcio Filho <miguel.filho@gmail.com>, via irc.freenode.net/#netfilter Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@medozas.de> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-03-07arp_notify: unconditionally send gratuitous ARP for NETDEV_NOTIFY_PEERS.Ian Campbell
commit d11327ad6695db8117c78d70611e71102ceec2ac upstream. NETDEV_NOTIFY_PEER is an explicit request by the driver to send a link notification while NETDEV_UP/NETDEV_CHANGEADDR generate link notifications as a sort of side effect. In the later cases the sysctl option is present because link notification events can have undesired effects e.g. if the link is flapping. I don't think this applies in the case of an explicit request from a driver. This patch makes NETDEV_NOTIFY_PEER unconditional, if preferred we could add a new sysctl for this case which defaults to on. This change causes Xen post-migration ARP notifications (which cause switches to relearn their MAC tables etc) to be sent by default. Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [reported to solve hyperv live migration problem - gkh] Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: Mike Surcouf <mike@surcouf.co.uk> Cc: Hank Janssen <hjanssen@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-03-07dccp: fix oops on Reset after closeGerrit Renker
commit 720dc34bbbe9493c7bd48b2243058b4e447a929d upstream. This fixes a bug in the order of dccp_rcv_state_process() that still permitted reception even after closing the socket. A Reset after close thus causes a NULL pointer dereference by not preventing operations on an already torn-down socket. dccp_v4_do_rcv() | | state other than OPEN v dccp_rcv_state_process() | | DCCP_PKT_RESET v dccp_rcv_reset() | v dccp_time_wait() WARNING: at net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:141 __inet_twsk_hashdance+0x48/0x128() Modules linked in: arc4 ecb carl9170 rt2870sta(C) mac80211 r8712u(C) crc_ccitt ah [<c0038850>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xec) from [<c0055364>] (warn_slowpath_common) [<c0055364>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x4c/0x64) from [<c0055398>] (warn_slowpath_n) [<c0055398>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24) from [<c02b72d0>] (__inet_twsk_hashd) [<c02b72d0>] (__inet_twsk_hashdance+0x48/0x128) from [<c031caa0>] (dccp_time_wai) [<c031caa0>] (dccp_time_wait+0x40/0xc8) from [<c031c15c>] (dccp_rcv_state_proces) [<c031c15c>] (dccp_rcv_state_process+0x120/0x538) from [<c032609c>] (dccp_v4_do_) [<c032609c>] (dccp_v4_do_rcv+0x11c/0x14c) from [<c0286594>] (release_sock+0xac/0) [<c0286594>] (release_sock+0xac/0x110) from [<c031fd34>] (dccp_close+0x28c/0x380) [<c031fd34>] (dccp_close+0x28c/0x380) from [<c02d9a78>] (inet_release+0x64/0x70) The fix is by testing the socket state first. Receiving a packet in Closed state now also produces the required "No connection" Reset reply of RFC 4340, 8.3.1. Reported-and-tested-by: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-03-07sctp: Fix oops when sending queued ASCONF chunksVlad Yasevich
commit c0786693404cffd80ca3cb6e75ee7b35186b2825 upstream. When we finish processing ASCONF_ACK chunk, we try to send the next queued ASCONF. This action runs the sctp state machine recursively and it's not prepared to do so. kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:790! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP last sysfs file: /sys/module/ipv6/initstate Modules linked in: sha256_generic sctp libcrc32c ipv6 dm_multipath uinput 8139too i2c_piix4 8139cp mii i2c_core pcspkr virtio_net joydev floppy virtio_blk virtio_pci [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan] Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.34-rc4 #15 /Bochs EIP: 0060:[<c044a2ef>] EFLAGS: 00010286 CPU: 0 EIP is at add_timer+0xd/0x1b EAX: cecbab14 EBX: 000000f0 ECX: c0957b1c EDX: 03595cf4 ESI: cecba800 EDI: cf276f00 EBP: c0957aa0 ESP: c0957aa0 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 Process swapper (pid: 0, ti=c0956000 task=c0988ba0 task.ti=c0956000) Stack: c0957ae0 d1851214 c0ab62e4 c0ab5f26 0500ffff 00000004 00000005 00000004 <0> 00000000 d18694fd 00000004 1666b892 cecba800 cecba800 c0957b14 00000004 <0> c0957b94 d1851b11 ceda8b00 cecba800 cf276f00 00000001 c0957b14 000000d0 Call Trace: [<d1851214>] ? sctp_side_effects+0x607/0xdfc [sctp] [<d1851b11>] ? sctp_do_sm+0x108/0x159 [sctp] [<d1863386>] ? sctp_pname+0x0/0x1d [sctp] [<d1861a56>] ? sctp_primitive_ASCONF+0x36/0x3b [sctp] [<d185657c>] ? sctp_process_asconf_ack+0x2a4/0x2d3 [sctp] [<d184e35c>] ? sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack+0x1dd/0x2b4 [sctp] [<d1851ac1>] ? sctp_do_sm+0xb8/0x159 [sctp] [<d1863334>] ? sctp_cname+0x0/0x52 [sctp] [<d1854377>] ? sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xac/0xe1 [sctp] [<d1858f0f>] ? sctp_inq_push+0x2d/0x30 [sctp] [<d186329d>] ? sctp_rcv+0x797/0x82e [sctp] Tested-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Yuansong Qiao <ysqiao@research.ait.ie> Signed-off-by: Shuaijun Zhang <szhang@research.ait.ie> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: maximilian attems <max@stro.at> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-03-02x25: Do not reference freed memory.David S. Miller
commit 96642d42f076101ba98866363d908cab706d156c upstream. In x25_link_free(), we destroy 'nb' before dereferencing 'nb->dev'. Don't do this, because 'nb' might be freed by then. Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-03-02tcp: Make TCP_MAXSEG minimum more correct.David S. Miller
commit c39508d6f118308355468314ff414644115a07f3 upstream. Use TCP_MIN_MSS instead of constant 64. Reported-by: Min Zhang <mzhang@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-03-02tcp: Increase TCP_MAXSEG socket option minimum.David S. Miller
commit 7a1abd08d52fdeddb3e9a5a33f2f15cc6a5674d2 upstream. As noted by Steve Chen, since commit f5fff5dc8a7a3f395b0525c02ba92c95d42b7390 ("tcp: advertise MSS requested by user") we can end up with a situation where tcp_select_initial_window() does a divide by a zero (or even negative) mss value. The problem is that sometimes we effectively subtract TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED and/or TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED from the mss. Fix this by increasing the minimum from 8 to 64. Reported-by: Steve Chen <schen@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-03-02sunrpc/cache: fix module refcnt leak in a failure pathLi Zefan
commit a5990ea1254cd186b38744507aeec3136a0c1c95 upstream. Don't forget to release the module refcnt if seq_open() returns failure. Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Cc: maximilian attems <max@stro.at> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-03-02x25: decrement netdev reference counts on unloadApollon Oikonomopoulos
commit 171995e5d82dcc92bea37a7d2a2ecc21068a0f19 upstream. x25 does not decrement the network device reference counts on module unload. Thus unregistering any pre-existing interface after unloading the x25 module hangs and results in unregister_netdevice: waiting for tap0 to become free. Usage count = 1 This patch decrements the reference counts of all interfaces in x25_link_free, the way it is already done in x25_link_device_down for NETDEV_DOWN events. Signed-off-by: Apollon Oikonomopoulos <apollon@noc.grnet.gr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-03-02filter: make sure filters dont read uninitialized memoryDavid S. Miller
commit 57fe93b374a6b8711995c2d466c502af9f3a08bb upstream. There is a possibility malicious users can get limited information about uninitialized stack mem array. Even if sk_run_filter() result is bound to packet length (0 .. 65535), we could imagine this can be used by hostile user. Initializing mem[] array, like Dan Rosenberg suggested in his patch is expensive since most filters dont even use this array. Its hard to make the filter validation in sk_chk_filter(), because of the jumps. This might be done later. In this patch, I use a bitmap (a single long var) so that only filters using mem[] loads/stores pay the price of added security checks. For other filters, additional cost is a single instruction. [ Since we access fentry->k a lot now, cache it in a local variable and mark filter entry pointer as const. -DaveM ] Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [Backported by dann frazier <dannf@debian.org>] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-03-02sctp: Fix out-of-bounds reading in sctp_asoc_get_hmac()Dan Rosenberg
commit 51e97a12bef19b7e43199fc153cf9bd5f2140362 upstream. The sctp_asoc_get_hmac() function iterates through a peer's hmac_ids array and attempts to ensure that only a supported hmac entry is returned. The current code fails to do this properly - if the last id in the array is out of range (greater than SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX), the id integer remains set after exiting the loop, and the address of an out-of-bounds entry will be returned and subsequently used in the parent function, causing potentially ugly memory corruption. This patch resets the id integer to 0 on encountering an invalid id so that NULL will be returned after finishing the loop if no valid ids are found. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-02-17sched: Fix softirq time accountingVenkatesh Pallipadi
Commit: 75e1056f5c57050415b64cb761a3acc35d91f013 upstream Peter Zijlstra found a bug in the way softirq time is accounted in VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING on this thread: http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail//linux/kernel/1009.2/01366.html The problem is, softirq processing uses local_bh_disable internally. There is no way, later in the flow, to differentiate between whether softirq is being processed or is it just that bh has been disabled. So, a hardirq when bh is disabled results in time being wrongly accounted as softirq. Looking at the code a bit more, the problem exists in !VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING as well. As account_system_time() in normal tick based accouting also uses softirq_count, which will be set even when not in softirq with bh disabled. Peter also suggested solution of using 2*SOFTIRQ_OFFSET as irq count for local_bh_{disable,enable} and using just SOFTIRQ_OFFSET while softirq processing. The patch below does that and adds API in_serving_softirq() which returns whether we are currently processing softirq or not. Also changes one of the usages of softirq_count in net/sched/cls_cgroup.c to in_serving_softirq. Looks like many usages of in_softirq really want in_serving_softirq. Those changes can be made individually on a case by case basis. Signed-off-by: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venki@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> LKML-Reference: <1286237003-12406-2-git-send-email-venki@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-01-07sctp: Fix a race between ICMP protocol unreachable and connect()Vlad Yasevich
commit 50b5d6ad63821cea324a5a7a19854d4de1a0a819 upstream. ICMP protocol unreachable handling completely disregarded the fact that the user may have locked the socket. It proceeded to destroy the association, even though the user may have held the lock and had a ref on the association. This resulted in the following: Attempt to release alive inet socket f6afcc00 ========================= [ BUG: held lock freed! ] ------------------------- somenu/2672 is freeing memory f6afcc00-f6afcfff, with a lock still held there! (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.+.}, at: [<c122098a>] sctp_connect+0x13/0x4c 1 lock held by somenu/2672: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.+.}, at: [<c122098a>] sctp_connect+0x13/0x4c stack backtrace: Pid: 2672, comm: somenu Not tainted 2.6.32-telco #55 Call Trace: [<c1232266>] ? printk+0xf/0x11 [<c1038553>] debug_check_no_locks_freed+0xce/0xff [<c10620b4>] kmem_cache_free+0x21/0x66 [<c1185f25>] __sk_free+0x9d/0xab [<c1185f9c>] sk_free+0x1c/0x1e [<c1216e38>] sctp_association_put+0x32/0x89 [<c1220865>] __sctp_connect+0x36d/0x3f4 [<c122098a>] ? sctp_connect+0x13/0x4c [<c102d073>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x33 [<c12209a8>] sctp_connect+0x31/0x4c [<c11d1e80>] inet_dgram_connect+0x4b/0x55 [<c11834fa>] sys_connect+0x54/0x71 [<c103a3a2>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0x88/0x239 [<c1054026>] ? might_fault+0x42/0x7c [<c1054026>] ? might_fault+0x42/0x7c [<c11847ab>] sys_socketcall+0x6d/0x178 [<c10da994>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0xc/0x10 [<c1002959>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb This was because the sctp_wait_for_connect() would aqcure the socket lock and then proceed to release the last reference count on the association, thus cause the fully destruction path to finish freeing the socket. The simplest solution is to start a very short timer in case the socket is owned by user. When the timer expires, we can do some verification and be able to do the release properly. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-01-07net: release dst entry while cache-hot for GSO case tooKrishna Kumar
commit 068a2de57ddf4f472e32e7af868613c574ad1d88 upstream. Non-GSO code drops dst entry for performance reasons, but the same is missing for GSO code. Drop dst while cache-hot for GSO case too. Signed-off-by: Krishna Kumar <krkumar2@in.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2011-01-07sunrpc: prevent use-after-free on clearing XPT_BUSYNeilBrown
commit ed2849d3ecfa339435818eeff28f6c3424300cec upstream. When an xprt is created, it has a refcount of 1, and XPT_BUSY is set. The refcount is *not* owned by the thread that created the xprt (as is clear from the fact that creators never put the reference). Rather, it is owned by the absence of XPT_DEAD. Once XPT_DEAD is set, (And XPT_BUSY is clear) that initial reference is dropped and the xprt can be freed. So when a creator clears XPT_BUSY it is dropping its only reference and so must not touch the xprt again. However svc_recv, after calling ->xpo_accept (and so getting an XPT_BUSY reference on a new xprt), calls svc_xprt_recieved. This clears XPT_BUSY and then svc_xprt_enqueue - this last without owning a reference. This is dangerous and has been seen to leave svc_xprt_enqueue working with an xprt containing garbage. So we need to hold an extra counted reference over that call to svc_xprt_received. For safety, any time we clear XPT_BUSY and then use the xprt again, we first get a reference, and the put it again afterwards. Note that svc_close_all does not need this extra protection as there are no threads running, and the final free can only be called asynchronously from such a thread. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2010-12-09net sched: fix some kernel memory leaksEric Dumazet
commit 1c40be12f7d8ca1d387510d39787b12e512a7ce8 upstream. We leak at least 32bits of kernel memory to user land in tc dump, because we dont init all fields (capab ?) of the dumped structure. Use C99 initializers so that holes and non explicit fields are zeroed. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: dann frazier <dannf@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2010-12-09act_nat: use stack variableChangli Gao
commit 504f85c9d05f7c605306e808f0d835fe11bfd18d upstream. act_nat: use stack variable structure tc_nat isn't too big for stack, so we can put it in stack. Signed-off-by: Changli Gao <xiaosuo@gmail.com> Cc: dann frazier <dannf@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2010-12-09net: Limit socket I/O iovec total length to INT_MAX.David S. Miller
commit 8acfe468b0384e834a303f08ebc4953d72fb690a upstream. This helps protect us from overflow issues down in the individual protocol sendmsg/recvmsg handlers. Once we hit INT_MAX we truncate out the rest of the iovec by setting the iov_len members to zero. This works because: 1) For SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET sockets, partial writes are allowed and the application will just continue with another write to send the rest of the data. 2) For datagram oriented sockets, where there must be a one-to-one correspondance between write() calls and packets on the wire, INT_MAX is going to be far larger than the packet size limit the protocol is going to check for and signal with -EMSGSIZE. Based upon a patch by Linus Torvalds. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2010-12-09net: Truncate recvfrom and sendto length to INT_MAX.Linus Torvalds
commit 253eacc070b114c2ec1f81b067d2fed7305467b0 upstream. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2010-12-09rds: Integer overflow in RDS cmsg handlingDan Rosenberg
commit 218854af84038d828a32f061858b1902ed2beec6 upstream. In rds_cmsg_rdma_args(), the user-provided args->nr_local value is restricted to less than UINT_MAX. This seems to need a tighter upper bound, since the calculation of total iov_size can overflow, resulting in a small sock_kmalloc() allocation. This would probably just result in walking off the heap and crashing when calling rds_rdma_pages() with a high count value. If it somehow doesn't crash here, then memory corruption could occur soon after. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2010-12-09econet: fix CVE-2010-3850Phil Blundell
commit 16c41745c7b92a243d0874f534c1655196c64b74 upstream. Add missing check for capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) in SIOCSIFADDR operation. Signed-off-by: Phil Blundell <philb@gnu.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2010-12-09econet: disallow NULL remote addr for sendmsg(), fixes CVE-2010-3849Phil Blundell
commit fa0e846494792e722d817b9d3d625a4ef4896c96 upstream. Later parts of econet_sendmsg() rely on saddr != NULL, so return early with EINVAL if NULL was passed otherwise an oops may occur. Signed-off-by: Phil Blundell <philb@gnu.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2010-12-09x25: Prevent crashing when parsing bad X.25 facilitiesDan Rosenberg
commit 5ef41308f94dcbb3b7afc56cdef1c2ba53fa5d2f upstream. Now with improved comma support. On parsing malformed X.25 facilities, decrementing the remaining length may cause it to underflow. Since the length is an unsigned integer, this will result in the loop continuing until the kernel crashes. This patch adds checks to ensure decrementing the remaining length does not cause it to wrap around. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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