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commit ad61df918c44316940404891d5082c63e79c256a upstream.
Commit 9ef1d4c7c7aca1cd436612b6ca785b726ffb8ed8 ("[NETLINK]: Missing
initializations in dumped data") introduced a typo in
initialization. This patch fixes this.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit ffcfb8db540ff879c2a85bf7e404954281443414 upstream
appletalk: Fix skb leak when ipddp interface is not loaded
[ backport to 2.6.27 : Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com ]
And also do a better job of returning proper NET_{RX,XMIT}_ values.
Based on a patch and suggestions by Mark Smith.
This fixes CVE-2009-2903
Reported-by: Mark Smith <lk-netdev@lk-netdev.nosense.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 77238f2b942b38ab4e7f3aced44084493e4a8675 upstream.
I found a deadlock bug in UNIX domain socket, which makes able to DoS
attack against the local machine by non-root users.
How to reproduce:
1. Make a listening AF_UNIX/SOCK_STREAM socket with an abstruct
namespace(*), and shutdown(2) it.
2. Repeat connect(2)ing to the listening socket from the other sockets
until the connection backlog is full-filled.
3. connect(2) takes the CPU forever. If every core is taken, the
system hangs.
PoC code: (Run as many times as cores on SMP machines.)
int main(void)
{
int ret;
int csd;
int lsd;
struct sockaddr_un sun;
/* make an abstruct name address (*) */
memset(&sun, 0, sizeof(sun));
sun.sun_family = PF_UNIX;
sprintf(&sun.sun_path[1], "%d", getpid());
/* create the listening socket and shutdown */
lsd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
bind(lsd, (struct sockaddr *)&sun, sizeof(sun));
listen(lsd, 1);
shutdown(lsd, SHUT_RDWR);
/* connect loop */
alarm(15); /* forcely exit the loop after 15 sec */
for (;;) {
csd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
ret = connect(csd, (struct sockaddr *)&sun, sizeof(sun));
if (-1 == ret) {
perror("connect()");
break;
}
puts("Connection OK");
}
return 0;
}
(*) Make sun_path[0] = 0 to use the abstruct namespace.
If a file-based socket is used, the system doesn't deadlock because
of context switches in the file system layer.
Why this happens:
Error checks between unix_socket_connect() and unix_wait_for_peer() are
inconsistent. The former calls the latter to wait until the backlog is
processed. Despite the latter returns without doing anything when the
socket is shutdown, the former doesn't check the shutdown state and
just retries calling the latter forever.
Patch:
The patch below adds shutdown check into unix_socket_connect(), so
connect(2) to the shutdown socket will return -ECONREFUSED.
Signed-off-by: Tomoki Sekiyama <tomoki.sekiyama.qu@hitachi.com>
Signed-off-by: Masanori Yoshida <masanori.yoshida.tv@hitachi.com>
Cc: Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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netfilter: bridge: refcount fix
Upstream commit f3abc9b9:
commit f216f082b2b37c4943f1e7c393e2786648d48f6f
([NETFILTER]: bridge netfilter: deal with martians correctly)
added a refcount leak on in_dev.
Instead of using in_dev_get(), we can use __in_dev_get_rcu(),
as netfilter hooks are running under rcu_read_lock(), as pointed
by Patrick.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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fixed upstream in commit b7058842c940ad2c08dd829b21e5c92ebe3b8758 in a different way
The length of the to-copy data structure is currently stored in
a signed integer. However many comparisons are done with sizeof(..)
which is unsigned. It's more suitable for this variable to be unsigned
to make these comparisons more naturally right.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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fixed upstream in commit b7058842c940ad2c08dd829b21e5c92ebe3b8758 in a different way
The ax25 code tried to use
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
as a security check against optlen being negative (or zero) in the
set socket option.
Unfortunately, "sizeof(int)" is an unsigned property, with the
result that the whole comparison is done in unsigned, letting
negative values slip through.
This patch changes this to
if (optlen < (int)sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
so that the comparison is done as signed, and negative values
get properly caught.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 144586301f6af5ae5943a002f030d8c626fa4fdd ]
memcpy() should take into account size of pointers,
not only number of pointers to copy.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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This fixes a problem that was reported as Red Hat Bugzilla entry number
485339, in which rpciod starts looping on the TCP connection code,
rendering the NFS client unusable for 1/2 minute or so.
It is basically a backport of commit
f75e6745aa3084124ae1434fd7629853bdaf6798 (SUNRPC: Fix the problem of
EADDRNOTAVAIL syslog floods on reconnect)
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 17ac2e9c58b69a1e25460a568eae1b0dc0188c25 upstream.
rose_getname() can leak kernel memory to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit f6b97b29513950bfbf621a83d85b6f86b39ec8db upstream.
nr_getname() can leak kernel memory to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 28e9fc592cb8c7a43e4d3147b38be6032a0e81bc upstream.
sllc_arphrd member of sockaddr_llc might not be changed. Zero sllc
before copying to the above layer's structure.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 09384dfc76e526c3993c09c42e016372dc9dd22c upstream.
irda_getname() can leak kernel memory to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 80922bbb12a105f858a8f0abb879cb4302d0ecaa upstream.
econet_getname() can leak kernel memory to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit e84b90ae5eb3c112d1f208964df1d8156a538289 upstream.
raw_getname() can leak 10 bytes of kernel memory to user
(two bytes hole between can_family and can_ifindex,
8 bytes at the end of sockaddr_can structure)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <oliver@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 3d392475c873c10c10d6d96b94d092a34ebd4791 upstream.
atalk_getname() can leak 8 bytes of kernel memory to user
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 2574cc9f4ffc6c681c9177111357efe5b76f0e36 upstream.
This patch fixes the bug that was reported in
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14053
If we're in the case where we need to force a reencode and then resend of
the RPC request, due to xprt_transmit failing with a networking error, then
we _must_ retransmit the entire request.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit e694958388c50148389b0e9b9e9e8945cf0f1b98 upstream.
kernel_sendpage() does the proper default case handling for when the
socket doesn't have a native sendpage implementation.
Now, arguably this might be something that we could instead solve by
just specifying that all protocols should do it themselves at the
protocol level, but we really only care about the common protocols.
Does anybody really care about sendpage on something like Appletalk? Not
likely.
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Julien TINNES <julien@cr0.org>
Acked-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@sdf.lonestar.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 14ebaf81e13ce66bff275380b246796fd16cbfa1 ]
If socket destuction gets delayed to a timer, we try to
lock_sock() from that timer which won't work.
Use bh_lock_sock() in that case.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 245acb87729bc76ba65c7476665c01837e0cdccb ]
Our CAST algorithm is called cast5, not cast128. Clearly nobody
has ever used it :)
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 40d2549db5f515e415894def98b49db7d4c56714 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 670f94573104b4a25525d3fcdcd6496c678df172 upstream.
...so that we can distinguish between when we need to shutdown and when we
don't. Also remove the call to xs_tcp_shutdown() from xs_tcp_connect(),
since xprt_connect() makes the same test.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 15f081ca8ddfe150fb639c591b18944a539da0fc upstream.
If the socket is unconnected, and xprt_transmit() returns ENOTCONN, we
currently give up the lock on the transport channel. Doing so means that
the lock automatically gets assigned to the next task in the xprt->sending
queue, and so that task needs to be woken up to do the actual connect.
The following patch aims to avoid that unnecessary task switch.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit f5fff5dc8a7a3f395b0525c02ba92c95d42b7390 upstream.
I'm trying to use the TCP_MAXSEG option to setsockopt() to set the MSS
for both sides of a bidirectional connection.
man tcp says: "If this option is set before connection establishment, it
also changes the MSS value announced to the other end in the initial
packet."
However, the kernel only uses the MTU/route cache to set the advertised
MSS. That means if I set the MSS to, say, 500 before calling connect(),
I will send at most 500-byte packets, but I will still receive 1500-byte
packets in reply.
This is a bug, either in the kernel or the documentation.
This patch (applies to latest net-2.6) reduces the advertised value to
that requested by the user as long as setsockopt() is called before
connect() or accept(). This seems like the behavior that one would
expect as well as that which is documented.
I've tried to make sure that things that depend on the advertised MSS
are set correctly.
Signed-off-by: Tom Quetchenbach <virtualphtn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit a8659597bf744b0f8d2560e2a734b5c941569e0e upstream
pid doesn't count with some band having more bitrates than the one
associated the first time.
Fix that by counting the maximal available bitrate count and allocate
big enough space.
Secondly, fix touching uninitialized memory which causes panics.
Index sucked from this random memory points to the hell.
The fix is to sort the rates on each band change.
Also remove a comment which is wrong now.
This version also contains half of
mac80211: avoid NULL ptr deref when finding max_rates in PID and minstrel
patch by John W. Linville, which is namely:
- if (sband->n_bitrates > max_rates)
+ if (sband && sband->n_bitrates > max_rates)
to fix oopses on one band devices.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Cc: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 86bcebafc5e7f5163ccf828792fe694b112ed6fa ]
A long-standing feature in tcp_init_metrics() is such that
any of its goto reset prevents call to tcp_init_cwnd().
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 995b337952cdf7e05d288eede580257b632a8343 ]
When called with a consumed value that is less than skb_headlen(skb)
bytes into a page frag, skb_seq_read() incorrectly returns an
offset/length relative to skb->data. Ensure that data which should come
from a page frag does.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Chenault <thomas_chenault@dell.com>
Tested-by: Shyam Iyer <shyam_iyer@dell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 5b5f792a6a9a2f9ae812d151ed621f72e99b1725 ]
typo -- pkt_dev->nflows is for stats only, the number of concurrent
flows is stored in cflows.
Reported-By: Vladimir Ivashchenko <hazard@francoudi.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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upstream commit: 1f9352ae2253a97b07b34dcf16ffa3b4ca12c558
Commit e1b4b9f ([NETFILTER]: {ip,ip6,arp}_tables: fix exponential worst-case
search for loops) introduced a regression in the loop detection algorithm,
causing sporadic incorrectly detected loops.
When a chain has already been visited during the check, it is treated as
having a standard target containing a RETURN verdict directly at the
beginning in order to not check it again. The real target of the first
rule is then incorrectly treated as STANDARD target and checked not to
contain invalid verdicts.
Fix by making sure the rule does actually contain a standard target.
Based on patch by Francis Dupont <Francis_Dupont@isc.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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upstream commit: cc29c70dd581f85ee7a3e7980fb031f90b90a2ab
Patch "af_rose/x25: Sanity check the maximum user frame size"
(commit 83e0bbcbe2145f160fbaa109b0439dae7f4a38a9) from Alan Cox got
locking wrong. If we bail out due to user frame size being too large,
we must unlock the socket beforehand.
Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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upstream commit: 83e0bbcbe2145f160fbaa109b0439dae7f4a38a9
CVE-2009-0795.
Otherwise we can wrap the sizes and end up sending garbage.
Closes #10423
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit cb0dc77de0d23615a845e45844a2e22fc224d7fe ]
broken by commit 5e739d1752aca4e8f3e794d431503bfca3162df4; AFAICS should
be -stable fodder as well...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Aced-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 534f81a5068799799e264fd162e9488a129f98d4 ]
This patch fixes an unaligned memory access in tcp_sack while reading
sequence numbers from TCP selective acknowledgement options. Prior to
applying this patch, upstream linux-2.6.27.20 was occasionally
generating messages like this on my sparc64 system:
[54678.532071] Kernel unaligned access at TPC[6b17d4] tcp_packet+0xcd4/0xd00
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 71f6f6dfdf7c7a67462386d9ea05c1095a89c555 ]
Commit 778d80be52699596bf70e0eb0761cf5e1e46088d
(ipv6: Add disable_ipv6 sysctl to disable IPv6 operaion on specific interface)
seems to have introduced a leak of sk_buff's for ipv6 traffic,
at least in some configurations where idev is NULL, or when ipv6
is disabled via sysctl.
The problem is that if the first condition of the if-statement
returns non-NULL, it returns an skb with only one reference,
and when the other conditions apply, execution jumps to the "out"
label, which does not call kfree_skb for it.
To plug this leak, change to use the "drop" label instead.
(this relies on it being ok to call kfree_skb on NULL)
This also allows us to avoid calling rcu_read_unlock here,
and removes the only user of the "out" label.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 3f53a38131a4e7a053c0aa060aba0411242fb6b9 ]
We already have a valid net in that place, but this is not just a
cleanup - the tw pointer can be NULL there sometimes, thus causing
an oops in NET_NS=y case.
The same place in ipv4 code already works correctly using existing
net, rather than tw's one.
The bug exists since 2.6.27.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit cda6d377ec6b2ee2e58d563d0bd7eb313e0165df ]
This fixes an crash when empty bond device is added to a bridge.
If an interface with invalid ethernet address (all zero) is added
to a bridge, then bridge code detects it when setting up the forward
databas entry. But the error unwind is broken, the bridge port object
can get freed twice: once when ref count went to zeo, and once by kfree.
Since object is never really accessible, just free it.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 92a0acce186cde8ead56c6915d9479773673ea1a ]
A long time ago we had bugs, primarily in TCP, where we would modify
skb->truesize (for TSO queue collapsing) in ways which would corrupt
the socket memory accounting.
skb_truesize_check() was added in order to try and catch this error
more systematically.
However this debugging check has morphed into a Frankenstein of sorts
and these days it does nothing other than catch false-positives.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 50fee1dec5d71b8a14c1b82f2f42e16adc227f8b ]
The fix for CVE-2009-0676 (upstream commit df0bca04) is incomplete. Note
that the same problem of leaking kernel memory will reappear if someone
on some architecture uses struct timeval with some internal padding (for
example tv_sec 64-bit and tv_usec 32-bit) --- then, you are going to
leak the padded bytes to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg>
Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 631339f1e544a4d39a63cfe6708c5bddcd5a2c48 ]
As GRE tries to call the update_pmtu function on skb->dst and
bridge supplies an skb->dst that has a NULL ops field, all is
not well.
This patch fixes this by giving the bridge device an ops field
with an update_pmtu function. For the moment I've left all
other fields blank but we can fill them in later should the
need arise.
Based on report and patch by Philip Craig.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 8b9d3728977760f6bd1317c4420890f73695354e ]
The trick in socket splicing where we try to convert the skb->data
into a page based reference using virt_to_page() does not work so
well.
The idea is to pass the virt_to_page() reference via the pipe
buffer, and refcount the buffer using a SKB reference.
But if we are splicing from a socket to a socket (via sendpage)
this doesn't work.
The from side processing will grab the page (and SKB) references.
The sendpage() calls will grab page references only, return, and
then the from side processing completes and drops the SKB ref.
The page based reference to skb->data is not enough to keep the
kmalloc() buffer backing it from being reused. Yet, that is
all that the socket send side has at this point.
This leads to data corruption if the skb->data buffer is reused
by SLAB before the send side socket actually gets the TX packet
out to the device.
The fix employed here is to simply allocate a page and copy the
skb->data bytes into that page.
This will hurt performance, but there is no clear way to fix this
properly without a copy at the present time, and it is important
to get rid of the data corruption.
With fixes from Herbert Xu.
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Foreseen-by: Changli Gao <xiaosuo@gmail.com>
Diagnosed-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Reported-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Fixed-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarek Poplawski <jarkao2@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 013cd397532e5803a1625954a884d021653da720 upstream.
net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c
The trailing zero was written to state[4], it's out of bounds.
Signed-off-by: Jianjun Kong <jianjun@zeuux.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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This patch is basically a backport of
commit ee8a1a0a1a5817accd03ced7e7ffde3a4430f485 upstream
which was made after the big HID overhaul in 2.6.28.
Kernel 2.6.27 fails to handle quirks for the aluminum Apple Wireless
Keyboard because it is handled as USB device and not as Bluetooth
device. This patch expands 'hidp_blacklist' to make the kernel handle
the keyboard in the same way as the Apple wireless Mighty Mouse (also a
Bluetooth device).
Signed-off-by: Torsten Rausche <torsten@rausche.net>
Cc: Jan Scholz <Scholz@fias.uni-frankfurt.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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netfilter: xt_sctp: sctp chunk mapping doesn't work
Upstream commit: d4e2675a
When user tries to map all chunks given in argument, kernel
works on a copy of the chunkmap, but at the end it doesn't
check the copy, but the orginal one.
Signed-off-by: Qu Haoran <haoran.qu@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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netfilter: fix tuple inversion for Node information request
Upstream commit: a51f42f3c
The patch fixes a typo in the inverse mapping of Node Information
request. Following draft-ietf-ipngwg-icmp-name-lookups-09, "Querier"
sends a type 139 (ICMPV6_NI_QUERY) packet to "Responder" which answer
with a type 140 (ICMPV6_NI_REPLY) packet.
Signed-off-by: Eric Leblond <eric@inl.fr>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 9fa5fdf291c9b58b1cb8b4bb2a0ee57efa21d635 ]
tcp_splice_data_recv has two lengths to consider: the len parameter it
gets from tcp_read_sock, which specifies the amount of data in the skb,
and rd_desc->count, which is the amount of data the splice caller still
wants. Currently it passes just the latter to skb_splice_bits, which then
splices min(rd_desc->count, skb->len - offset) bytes.
Most of the time this is fine, except when the skb contains urgent data.
In that case len goes only up to the urgent byte and is less than
skb->len - offset. By ignoring len tcp_splice_data_recv may a) splice
data tcp_read_sock told it not to, b) return to tcp_read_sock a value > len.
Now, tcp_read_sock doesn't handle used > len and leaves the socket in a
bad state (both sk_receive_queue and copied_seq are bad at that point)
resulting in duplicated data and corruption.
Fix by passing min(rd_desc->count, len) to skb_splice_bits.
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Michailidis <dm@chelsio.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 33966dd0e2f68f26943cd9ee93ec6abbc6547a8e ]
As spotted by Willy Tarreau, current splice() from tcp socket to pipe is not
optimal. It processes at most one segment per call.
This results in low performance and very high overhead due to syscall rate
when splicing from interfaces which do not support LRO.
Willy provided a patch inside tcp_splice_read(), but a better fix
is to let tcp_read_sock() process as many segments as possible, so
that tcp_rcv_space_adjust() and tcp_cleanup_rbuf() are called less
often.
With this change, splice() behaves like tcp_recvmsg(), being able
to consume many skbs in one system call. With typical 1460 bytes
of payload per frame, that means splice(SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK) can return
16*1460 = 23360 bytes.
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 905db44087855e3c1709f538ecdc22fd149cadd8 ]
As the mmap handler gets called under mmap_sem, and we may grab
mmap_sem elsewhere under the socket lock to access user data, we
should avoid grabbing the socket lock in the mmap handler.
Since the only thing we care about in the mmap handler is for
pg_vec* to be invariant, i.e., to exclude packet_set_ring, we
can achieve this by simply using a new mutex.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Martin MOKREJŠ <mmokrejs@ribosome.natur.cuni.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 71b3346d182355f19509fadb8fe45114a35cc499 ]
It oopsd for me in skb_seq_read. addr2line said it was
linux-2.6/net/core/skbuff.c:2228, which is this line:
while (st->frag_idx < skb_shinfo(st->cur_skb)->nr_frags) {
I added some printks in there and it looks like we hit this:
} else if (st->root_skb == st->cur_skb &&
skb_shinfo(st->root_skb)->frag_list) {
st->cur_skb = skb_shinfo(st->root_skb)->frag_list;
st->frag_idx = 0;
goto next_skb;
}
Actually I did some testing and added a few printks and found that the
st->cur_skb->data was 0 and hence the ptr used by iscsi_tcp was null.
This caused the kernel panic.
if (abs_offset < block_limit) {
- *data = st->cur_skb->data + abs_offset;
+ *data = st->cur_skb->data + (abs_offset - st->stepped_offset);
I enabled the debug_tcp and with a few printks found that the code did
not go to the next_skb label and could find that the sequence being
followed was this -
It hit this if condition -
if (st->cur_skb->next) {
st->cur_skb = st->cur_skb->next;
st->frag_idx = 0;
goto next_skb;
And so, now the st pointer is shifted to the next skb whereas actually
it should have hit the second else if first since the data is in the
frag_list.
else if (st->root_skb == st->cur_skb &&
skb_shinfo(st->root_skb)->frag_list) {
st->cur_skb = skb_shinfo(st->root_skb)->frag_list;
goto next_skb;
}
Reversing the two conditions the attached patch fixes the issue for me
on top of Herbert's patches.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Iyer <shyam_iyer@dell.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 95e3b24cfb4ec0479d2c42f7a1780d68063a542a ]
The frag_list handling was broken in skb_seq_read:
1) We didn't add the stepped offset when looking at the head
are of fragments other than the first.
2) We didn't take the stepped offset away when setting the data
pointer in the head area.
3) The frag index wasn't reset.
This patch fixes both issues.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit e408b8dcb5ce42243a902205005208e590f28454 ]
Commit 93821778def10ec1e69aa3ac10adee975dad4ff3 (udp: Fix rcv socket
locking) accidentally removed sk_drops increments for UDP IPV4
sockets.
This field can be used to detect incorrect sizing of socket receive
buffers.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 7b5e56f9d635643ad54f2f42e69ad16b80a2cff1 ]
The UDP header pointer assignment must happen after calling
pskb_may_pull(). As pskb_may_pull() can potentially alter the SKB
buffer.
This was exposted by running multicast traffic through the NIU driver,
as it won't prepull the protocol headers into the linear area on
receive.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@comx.dk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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