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2013-08-04tracing: Fix irqs-off tag display in syscall tracingzhangwei(Jovi)
commit 11034ae9c20f4057a6127fc965906417978e69b2 upstream Initialization of variable irq_flags and pc was missed when backport 11034ae9c to linux-3.0.y and linux-3.4.y, my fault. Signed-off-by: zhangwei(Jovi) <jovi.zhangwei@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28hrtimers: Move SMP function call to thread contextThomas Gleixner
commit 5ec2481b7b47a4005bb446d176e5d0257400c77d upstream. smp_call_function_* must not be called from softirq context. But clock_was_set() which calls on_each_cpu() is called from softirq context to implement a delayed clock_was_set() for the timer interrupt handler. Though that almost never gets invoked. A recent change in the resume code uses the softirq based delayed clock_was_set to support Xens resume mechanism. linux-next contains a new warning which warns if smp_call_function_* is called from softirq context which gets triggered by that Xen change. Fix this by moving the delayed clock_was_set() call to a work context. Reported-and-tested-by: Artem Savkov <artem.savkov@gmail.com> Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>, Cc: Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xen.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28tracing: Fix irqs-off tag display in syscall tracingzhangwei(Jovi)
commit 11034ae9c20f4057a6127fc965906417978e69b2 upstream. All syscall tracing irqs-off tags are wrong, the syscall enter entry doesn't disable irqs. [root@jovi tracing]#echo "syscalls:sys_enter_open" > set_event [root@jovi tracing]# cat trace # tracer: nop # # entries-in-buffer/entries-written: 13/13 #P:2 # # _-----=> irqs-off # / _----=> need-resched # | / _---=> hardirq/softirq # || / _--=> preempt-depth # ||| / delay # TASK-PID CPU# |||| TIMESTAMP FUNCTION # | | | |||| | | irqbalance-513 [000] d... 56115.496766: sys_open(filename: 804e1a6, flags: 0, mode: 1b6) irqbalance-513 [000] d... 56115.497008: sys_open(filename: 804e1bb, flags: 0, mode: 1b6) sendmail-771 [000] d... 56115.827982: sys_open(filename: b770e6d1, flags: 0, mode: 1b6) The reason is syscall tracing doesn't record irq_flags into buffer. The proper display is: [root@jovi tracing]#echo "syscalls:sys_enter_open" > set_event [root@jovi tracing]# cat trace # tracer: nop # # entries-in-buffer/entries-written: 14/14 #P:2 # # _-----=> irqs-off # / _----=> need-resched # | / _---=> hardirq/softirq # || / _--=> preempt-depth # ||| / delay # TASK-PID CPU# |||| TIMESTAMP FUNCTION # | | | |||| | | irqbalance-514 [001] .... 46.213921: sys_open(filename: 804e1a6, flags: 0, mode: 1b6) irqbalance-514 [001] .... 46.214160: sys_open(filename: 804e1bb, flags: 0, mode: 1b6) <...>-920 [001] .... 47.307260: sys_open(filename: 4e82a0c5, flags: 80000, mode: 0) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365564393-10972-3-git-send-email-jovi.zhangwei@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.35 Signed-off-by: zhangwei(Jovi) <jovi.zhangwei@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28perf: Fix perf_lock_task_context() vs RCUPeter Zijlstra
commit 058ebd0eba3aff16b144eabf4510ed9510e1416e upstream. Jiri managed to trigger this warning: [] ====================================================== [] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [] 3.10.0+ #228 Tainted: G W [] ------------------------------------------------------- [] p/6613 is trying to acquire lock: [] (rcu_node_0){..-...}, at: [<ffffffff810ca797>] rcu_read_unlock_special+0xa7/0x250 [] [] but task is already holding lock: [] (&ctx->lock){-.-...}, at: [<ffffffff810f2879>] perf_lock_task_context+0xd9/0x2c0 [] [] which lock already depends on the new lock. [] [] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [] [] -> #4 (&ctx->lock){-.-...}: [] -> #3 (&rq->lock){-.-.-.}: [] -> #2 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.-.}: [] -> #1 (&rnp->nocb_gp_wq[1]){......}: [] -> #0 (rcu_node_0){..-...}: Paul was quick to explain that due to preemptible RCU we cannot call rcu_read_unlock() while holding scheduler (or nested) locks when part of the read side critical section was preemptible. Therefore solve it by making the entire RCU read side non-preemptible. Also pull out the retry from under the non-preempt to play nice with RT. Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Helped-out-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28perf: Remove WARN_ON_ONCE() check in __perf_event_enable() for valid scenarioJiri Olsa
commit 06f417968beac6e6b614e17b37d347aa6a6b1d30 upstream. The '!ctx->is_active' check has a valid scenario, so there's no need for the warning. The reason is that there's a time window between the 'ctx->is_active' check in the perf_event_enable() function and the __perf_event_enable() function having: - IRQs on - ctx->lock unlocked where the task could be killed and 'ctx' deactivated by perf_event_exit_task(), ending up with the warning below. So remove the WARN_ON_ONCE() check and add comments to explain it all. This addresses the following warning reported by Vince Weaver: [ 324.983534] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 324.984420] WARNING: at kernel/events/core.c:1953 __perf_event_enable+0x187/0x190() [ 324.984420] Modules linked in: [ 324.984420] CPU: 19 PID: 2715 Comm: nmi_bug_snb Not tainted 3.10.0+ #246 [ 324.984420] Hardware name: Supermicro X8DTN/X8DTN, BIOS 4.6.3 01/08/2010 [ 324.984420] 0000000000000009 ffff88043fce3ec8 ffffffff8160ea0b ffff88043fce3f00 [ 324.984420] ffffffff81080ff0 ffff8802314fdc00 ffff880231a8f800 ffff88043fcf7860 [ 324.984420] 0000000000000286 ffff880231a8f800 ffff88043fce3f10 ffffffff8108103a [ 324.984420] Call Trace: [ 324.984420] <IRQ> [<ffffffff8160ea0b>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff81080ff0>] warn_slowpath_common+0x70/0xa0 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff8108103a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff81134437>] __perf_event_enable+0x187/0x190 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff81130030>] remote_function+0x40/0x50 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff810e51de>] generic_smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0xbe/0x130 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff81066a47>] smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x27/0x40 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff8161fd2f>] call_function_single_interrupt+0x6f/0x80 [ 324.984420] <EOI> [<ffffffff816161a1>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x41/0x70 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff8113799d>] perf_event_exit_task+0x14d/0x210 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff810acd04>] ? switch_task_namespaces+0x24/0x60 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff81086946>] do_exit+0x2b6/0xa40 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff8161615c>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x30 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff81087279>] do_group_exit+0x49/0xc0 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff81096854>] get_signal_to_deliver+0x254/0x620 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff81043057>] do_signal+0x57/0x5a0 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff8161a164>] ? __do_page_fault+0x2a4/0x4e0 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff8161665c>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff816166cd>] ? retint_signal+0x11/0x84 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff81043605>] do_notify_resume+0x65/0x80 [ 324.984420] [<ffffffff81616702>] retint_signal+0x46/0x84 [ 324.984420] ---[ end trace 442ec2f04db3771a ]--- Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Corey Ashford <cjashfor@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1373384651-6109-2-git-send-email-jolsa@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28perf: Clone child context from parent context pmuJiri Olsa
commit 734df5ab549ca44f40de0f07af1c8803856dfb18 upstream. Currently when the child context for inherited events is created, it's based on the pmu object of the first event of the parent context. This is wrong for the following scenario: - HW context having HW and SW event - HW event got removed (closed) - SW event stays in HW context as the only event and its pmu is used to clone the child context The issue starts when the cpu context object is touched based on the pmu context object (__get_cpu_context). In this case the HW context will work with SW cpu context ending up with following WARN below. Fixing this by using parent context pmu object to clone from child context. Addresses the following warning reported by Vince Weaver: [ 2716.472065] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 2716.476035] WARNING: at kernel/events/core.c:2122 task_ctx_sched_out+0x3c/0x) [ 2716.476035] Modules linked in: nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry nfs_acl nfs locn [ 2716.476035] CPU: 0 PID: 3164 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.10.0-rc4 #2 [ 2716.476035] Hardware name: AOpen DE7000/nMCP7ALPx-DE R1.06 Oct.19.2012, BI2 [ 2716.476035] 0000000000000000 ffffffff8102e215 0000000000000000 ffff88011fc18 [ 2716.476035] ffff8801175557f0 0000000000000000 ffff880119fda88c ffffffff810ad [ 2716.476035] ffff880119fda880 ffffffff810af02a 0000000000000009 ffff880117550 [ 2716.476035] Call Trace: [ 2716.476035] [<ffffffff8102e215>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x5b/0x70 [ 2716.476035] [<ffffffff810ab2bd>] ? task_ctx_sched_out+0x3c/0x5f [ 2716.476035] [<ffffffff810af02a>] ? perf_event_exit_task+0xbf/0x194 [ 2716.476035] [<ffffffff81032a37>] ? do_exit+0x3e7/0x90c [ 2716.476035] [<ffffffff810cd5ab>] ? __do_fault+0x359/0x394 [ 2716.476035] [<ffffffff81032fe6>] ? do_group_exit+0x66/0x98 [ 2716.476035] [<ffffffff8103dbcd>] ? get_signal_to_deliver+0x479/0x4ad [ 2716.476035] [<ffffffff810ac05c>] ? __perf_event_task_sched_out+0x230/0x2d1 [ 2716.476035] [<ffffffff8100205d>] ? do_signal+0x3c/0x432 [ 2716.476035] [<ffffffff810abbf9>] ? ctx_sched_in+0x43/0x141 [ 2716.476035] [<ffffffff810ac2ca>] ? perf_event_context_sched_in+0x7a/0x90 [ 2716.476035] [<ffffffff810ac311>] ? __perf_event_task_sched_in+0x31/0x118 [ 2716.476035] [<ffffffff81050dd9>] ? mmdrop+0xd/0x1c [ 2716.476035] [<ffffffff81051a39>] ? finish_task_switch+0x7d/0xa6 [ 2716.476035] [<ffffffff81002473>] ? do_notify_resume+0x20/0x5d [ 2716.476035] [<ffffffff813654f5>] ? retint_signal+0x3d/0x78 [ 2716.476035] ---[ end trace 827178d8a5966c3d ]--- Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Corey Ashford <cjashfor@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1373384651-6109-1-git-send-email-jolsa@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28tracing: Use current_uid() for critical time tracingSteven Rostedt (Red Hat)
commit f17a5194859a82afe4164e938b92035b86c55794 upstream. The irqsoff tracer records the max time that interrupts are disabled. There are hooks in the assembly code that calls back into the tracer when interrupts are disabled or enabled. When they are enabled, the tracer checks if the amount of time they were disabled is larger than the previous recorded max interrupts off time. If it is, it creates a snapshot of the currently running trace to store where the last largest interrupts off time was held and how it happened. During testing, this RCU lockdep dump appeared: [ 1257.829021] =============================== [ 1257.829021] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] [ 1257.829021] 3.10.0-rc1-test+ #171 Tainted: G W [ 1257.829021] ------------------------------- [ 1257.829021] /home/rostedt/work/git/linux-trace.git/include/linux/rcupdate.h:780 rcu_read_lock() used illegally while idle! [ 1257.829021] [ 1257.829021] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1257.829021] [ 1257.829021] [ 1257.829021] RCU used illegally from idle CPU! [ 1257.829021] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 [ 1257.829021] RCU used illegally from extended quiescent state! [ 1257.829021] 2 locks held by trace-cmd/4831: [ 1257.829021] #0: (max_trace_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff810e2b77>] stop_critical_timing+0x1a3/0x209 [ 1257.829021] #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff810dae5a>] __update_max_tr+0x88/0x1ee [ 1257.829021] [ 1257.829021] stack backtrace: [ 1257.829021] CPU: 3 PID: 4831 Comm: trace-cmd Tainted: G W 3.10.0-rc1-test+ #171 [ 1257.829021] Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./To be filled by O.E.M., BIOS SDBLI944.86P 05/08/2007 [ 1257.829021] 0000000000000001 ffff880065f49da8 ffffffff8153dd2b ffff880065f49dd8 [ 1257.829021] ffffffff81092a00 ffff88006bd78680 ffff88007add7500 0000000000000003 [ 1257.829021] ffff88006bd78680 ffff880065f49e18 ffffffff810daebf ffffffff810dae5a [ 1257.829021] Call Trace: [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff8153dd2b>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff81092a00>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x109/0x112 [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff810daebf>] __update_max_tr+0xed/0x1ee [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff810dae5a>] ? __update_max_tr+0x88/0x1ee [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff811002b9>] ? user_enter+0xfd/0x107 [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff810dbf85>] update_max_tr_single+0x11d/0x12d [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff811002b9>] ? user_enter+0xfd/0x107 [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff810e2b15>] stop_critical_timing+0x141/0x209 [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff8109569a>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff811002b9>] ? user_enter+0xfd/0x107 [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff810e3057>] time_hardirqs_on+0x2a/0x2f [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff811002b9>] ? user_enter+0xfd/0x107 [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff8109550c>] trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x197 [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff8109569a>] trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff811002b9>] user_enter+0xfd/0x107 [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff810029b4>] do_notify_resume+0x92/0x97 [ 1257.829021] [<ffffffff8154bdca>] int_signal+0x12/0x17 What happened was entering into the user code, the interrupts were enabled and a max interrupts off was recorded. The trace buffer was saved along with various information about the task: comm, pid, uid, priority, etc. The uid is recorded with task_uid(tsk). But this is a macro that uses rcu_read_lock() to retrieve the data, and this happened to happen where RCU is blind (user_enter). As only the preempt and irqs off tracers can have this happen, and they both only have the tsk == current, if tsk == current, use current_uid() instead of task_uid(), as current_uid() does not use RCU as only current can change its uid. This fixes the RCU suspicious splat. Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-28tick: Prevent uncontrolled switch to oneshot modeThomas Gleixner
commit 1f73a9806bdd07a5106409bbcab3884078bd34fe upstream. When the system switches from periodic to oneshot mode, the broadcast logic causes a possibility that a CPU which has not yet switched to oneshot mode puts its own clock event device into oneshot mode without updating the state and the timer handler. CPU0 CPU1 per cpu tickdev is in periodic mode and switched to broadcast Switch to oneshot mode tick_broadcast_switch_to_oneshot() cpumask_copy(tick_oneshot_broacast_mask, tick_broadcast_mask); broadcast device mode = oneshot Timer interrupt irq_enter() tick_check_oneshot_broadcast() dev->set_mode(ONESHOT); tick_handle_periodic() if (dev->mode == ONESHOT) dev->next_event += period; FAIL. We fail, because dev->next_event contains KTIME_MAX, if the device was in periodic mode before the uncontrolled switch to oneshot happened. We must copy the broadcast bits over to the oneshot mask, because otherwise a CPU which relies on the broadcast would not been woken up anymore after the broadcast device switched to oneshot mode. So we need to verify in tick_check_oneshot_broadcast() whether the CPU has already switched to oneshot mode. If not, leave the device untouched and let the CPU switch controlled into oneshot mode. This is a long standing bug, which was never noticed, because the main user of the broadcast x86 cannot run into that scenario, AFAICT. The nonarchitected timer mess of ARM creates a gazillion of differently broken abominations which trigger the shortcomings of that broadcast code, which better had never been necessary in the first place. Reported-and-tested-by: Stehle Vincent-B46079 <B46079@freescale.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>, Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.02.1307012153060.4013@ionos.tec.linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-21timer: Fix jiffies wrap behavior of round_jiffies_common()Bart Van Assche
commit 9e04d3804d3ac97d8c03a41d78d0f0674b5d01e1 upstream. Direct compare of jiffies related values does not work in the wrap around case. Replace it with time_is_after_jiffies(). Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/519BC066.5080600@acm.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-21genirq: Fix can_request_irq() for IRQs without an actionBen Hutchings
commit 2779db8d37d4b542d9ca2575f5f178dbeaca6c86 upstream. Commit 02725e7471b8 ('genirq: Use irq_get/put functions'), inadvertently changed can_request_irq() to return 0 for IRQs that have no action. This causes pcibios_lookup_irq() to select only IRQs that already have an action with IRQF_SHARED set, or to fail if there are none. Change can_request_irq() to return 1 for IRQs that have no action (if the first two conditions are met). Reported-by: Bjarni Ingi Gislason <bjarniig@rhi.hi.is> Tested-by: Bjarni Ingi Gislason <bjarniig@rhi.hi.is> (against 3.2) Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: 709647@bugs.debian.org Link: http://bugs.debian.org/709647 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1372383630.23847.40.camel@deadeye.wl.decadent.org.uk Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-03hw_breakpoint: Use cpu_possible_mask in {reserve,release}_bp_slot()Oleg Nesterov
commit c790b0ad23f427c7522ffed264706238c57c007e upstream. fetch_bp_busy_slots() and toggle_bp_slot() use for_each_online_cpu(), this is obviously wrong wrt cpu_up() or cpu_down(), we can over/under account the per-cpu numbers. For example: # echo 0 >> /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online # perf record -e mem:0x10 -p 1 & # echo 1 >> /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online # perf record -e mem:0x10,mem:0x10,mem:0x10,mem:0x10 -C1 -a & # taskset -p 0x2 1 triggers the same WARN_ONCE("Can't find any breakpoint slot") in arch_install_hw_breakpoint(). Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130620155009.GA6327@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-13ftrace: Move ftrace_filter_lseek out of CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE sectionSteven Rostedt
commit 7f49ef69db6bbf756c0abca7e9b65b32e999eec8 upstream. As ftrace_filter_lseek is now used with ftrace_pid_fops, it needs to be moved out of the #ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE section as the ftrace_pid_fops is defined when DYNAMIC_FTRACE is not. Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> [ lizf: adjust context ] Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-13tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferencesNamhyung Kim
commit 6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d upstream. Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic. It can be easily reproduced with following command: $ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing $ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a") and then the fopen() internally calls lseek(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> [ lizf: adjust context ] Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-19usermodehelper: check subprocess_info->path != NULLOleg Nesterov
commit 264b83c07a84223f0efd0d1db9ccc66d6f88288f upstream. argv_split(empty_or_all_spaces) happily succeeds, it simply returns argc == 0 and argv[0] == NULL. Change call_usermodehelper_exec() to check sub_info->path != NULL to avoid the crash. This is the minimal fix, todo: - perhaps we should change argv_split() to return NULL or change the callers. - kill or justify ->path[0] check - narrow the scope of helper_lock() Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-By: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-19tick: Cleanup NOHZ per cpu data on cpu downThomas Gleixner
commit 4b0c0f294f60abcdd20994a8341a95c8ac5eeb96 upstream. Prarit reported a crash on CPU offline/online. The reason is that on CPU down the NOHZ related per cpu data of the dead cpu is not cleaned up. If at cpu online an interrupt happens before the per cpu tick device is registered the irq_enter() check potentially sees stale data and dereferences a NULL pointer. Cleanup the data after the cpu is dead. Reported-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <bitbucket@online.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1305031451561.2886@ionos Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-19timer: Don't reinitialize the cpu base lock during CPU_UP_PREPARETirupathi Reddy
commit 42a5cf46cd56f46267d2a9fcf2655f4078cd3042 upstream. An inactive timer's base can refer to a offline cpu's base. In the current code, cpu_base's lock is blindly reinitialized each time a CPU is brought up. If a CPU is brought online during the period that another thread is trying to modify an inactive timer on that CPU with holding its timer base lock, then the lock will be reinitialized under its feet. This leads to following SPIN_BUG(). <0> BUG: spinlock already unlocked on CPU#3, kworker/u:3/1466 <0> lock: 0xe3ebe000, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: kworker/u:3/1466, .owner_cpu: 1 <4> [<c0013dc4>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0x11c) from [<c026e794>] (do_raw_spin_unlock+0x40/0xcc) <4> [<c026e794>] (do_raw_spin_unlock+0x40/0xcc) from [<c076c160>] (_raw_spin_unlock+0x8/0x30) <4> [<c076c160>] (_raw_spin_unlock+0x8/0x30) from [<c009b858>] (mod_timer+0x294/0x310) <4> [<c009b858>] (mod_timer+0x294/0x310) from [<c00a5e04>] (queue_delayed_work_on+0x104/0x120) <4> [<c00a5e04>] (queue_delayed_work_on+0x104/0x120) from [<c04eae00>] (sdhci_msm_bus_voting+0x88/0x9c) <4> [<c04eae00>] (sdhci_msm_bus_voting+0x88/0x9c) from [<c04d8780>] (sdhci_disable+0x40/0x48) <4> [<c04d8780>] (sdhci_disable+0x40/0x48) from [<c04bf300>] (mmc_release_host+0x4c/0xb0) <4> [<c04bf300>] (mmc_release_host+0x4c/0xb0) from [<c04c7aac>] (mmc_sd_detect+0x90/0xfc) <4> [<c04c7aac>] (mmc_sd_detect+0x90/0xfc) from [<c04c2504>] (mmc_rescan+0x7c/0x2c4) <4> [<c04c2504>] (mmc_rescan+0x7c/0x2c4) from [<c00a6a7c>] (process_one_work+0x27c/0x484) <4> [<c00a6a7c>] (process_one_work+0x27c/0x484) from [<c00a6e94>] (worker_thread+0x210/0x3b0) <4> [<c00a6e94>] (worker_thread+0x210/0x3b0) from [<c00aad9c>] (kthread+0x80/0x8c) <4> [<c00aad9c>] (kthread+0x80/0x8c) from [<c000ea80>] (kernel_thread_exit+0x0/0x8) As an example, this particular crash occurred when CPU #3 is executing mod_timer() on an inactive timer whose base is refered to offlined CPU #2. The code locked the timer_base corresponding to CPU #2. Before it could proceed, CPU #2 came online and reinitialized the spinlock corresponding to its base. Thus now CPU #3 held a lock which was reinitialized. When CPU #3 finally ended up unlocking the old cpu_base corresponding to CPU #2, we hit the above SPIN_BUG(). CPU #0 CPU #3 CPU #2 ------ ------- ------- ..... ...... <Offline> mod_timer() lock_timer_base spin_lock_irqsave(&base->lock) cpu_up(2) ..... ...... init_timers_cpu() .... ..... spin_lock_init(&base->lock) ..... spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base->lock) ...... <spin_bug> Allocation of per_cpu timer vector bases is done only once under "tvec_base_done[]" check. In the current code, spinlock_initialization of base->lock isn't under this check. When a CPU is up each time the base lock is reinitialized. Move base spinlock initialization under the check. Signed-off-by: Tirupathi Reddy <tirupath@codeaurora.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1368520142-4136-1-git-send-email-tirupath@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-11kernel/audit_tree.c: tree will leak memory when failure occurs in ↵Chen Gang
audit_trim_trees() commit 12b2f117f3bf738c1a00a6f64393f1953a740bd4 upstream. audit_trim_trees() calls get_tree(). If a failure occurs we must call put_tree(). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: run put_tree() before mutex_lock() for small scalability improvement] Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jonghwan Choi <jhbird.choi@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-11tracing: Fix ftrace_dump()Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)
commit 7fe70b579c9e3daba71635e31b6189394e7b79d3 upstream. ftrace_dump() had a lot of issues. What ftrace_dump() does, is when ftrace_dump_on_oops is set (via a kernel parameter or sysctl), it will dump out the ftrace buffers to the console when either a oops, panic, or a sysrq-z occurs. This was written a long time ago when ftrace was fragile to recursion. But it wasn't written well even for that. There's a possible deadlock that can occur if a ftrace_dump() is happening and an NMI triggers another dump. This is because it grabs a lock before checking if the dump ran. It also totally disables ftrace, and tracing for no good reasons. As the ring_buffer now checks if it is read via a oops or NMI, where there's a chance that the buffer gets corrupted, it will disable itself. No need to have ftrace_dump() do the same. ftrace_dump() is now cleaned up where it uses an atomic counter to make sure only one dump happens at a time. A simple atomic_inc_return() is enough that is needed for both other CPUs and NMIs. No need for a spinlock, as if one CPU is running the dump, no other CPU needs to do it too. The tracing_on variable is turned off and not turned on. The original code did this, but it wasn't pretty. By just disabling this variable we get the result of not seeing traces that happen between crashes. For sysrq-z, it doesn't get turned on, but the user can always write a '1' to the tracing_on file. If they are using sysrq-z, then they should know about tracing_on. The new code is much easier to read and less error prone. No more deadlock possibility when an NMI triggers here. Reported-by: zhangwei(Jovi) <jovi.zhangwei@huawei.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-07clockevents: Set dummy handler on CPU_DEAD shutdownThomas Gleixner
commit 6f7a05d7018de222e40ca003721037a530979974 upstream. Vitaliy reported that a per cpu HPET timer interrupt crashes the system during hibernation. What happens is that the per cpu HPET timer gets shut down when the nonboot cpus are stopped. When the nonboot cpus are onlined again the HPET code sets up the MSI interrupt which fires before the clock event device is registered. The event handler is still set to hrtimer_interrupt, which then crashes the machine due to highres mode not being active. See http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=700333 There is no real good way to avoid that in the HPET code. The HPET code alrady has a mechanism to detect spurious interrupts when event handler == NULL for a similar reason. We can handle that in the clockevent/tick layer and replace the previous functional handler with a dummy handler like we do in tick_setup_new_device(). The original clockevents code did this in clockevents_exchange_device(), but that got removed by commit 7c1e76897 (clockevents: prevent clockevent event_handler ending up handler_noop) which forgot to fix it up in tick_shutdown(). Same issue with the broadcast device. Reported-by: Vitaliy Fillipov <vitalif@yourcmc.ru> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: 700333@bugs.debian.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-07cgroup: fix an off-by-one bug which may trigger BUG_ON()Li Zefan
commit 3ac1707a13a3da9cfc8f242a15b2fae6df2c5f88 upstream. The 3rd parameter of flex_array_prealloc() is the number of elements, not the index of the last element. The effect of the bug is, when opening cgroup.procs, a flex array will be allocated and all elements of the array is allocated with GFP_KERNEL flag, but the last one is GFP_ATOMIC, and if we fail to allocate memory for it, it'll trigger a BUG_ON(). Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-07hrtimer: Add expiry time overflow check in hrtimer_interruptPrarit Bhargava
commit 8f294b5a139ee4b75e890ad5b443c93d1e558a8b upstream. The settimeofday01 test in the LTP testsuite effectively does gettimeofday(current time); settimeofday(Jan 1, 1970 + 100 seconds); settimeofday(current time); This test causes a stack trace to be displayed on the console during the setting of timeofday to Jan 1, 1970 + 100 seconds: [ 131.066751] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 131.096448] WARNING: at kernel/time/clockevents.c:209 clockevents_program_event+0x135/0x140() [ 131.104935] Hardware name: Dinar [ 131.108150] Modules linked in: sg nfsv3 nfs_acl nfsv4 auth_rpcgss nfs dns_resolver fscache lockd sunrpc nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ipt_MASQUERADE ip6table_mangle ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat iptable_mangle ipt_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter ip_tables kvm_amd kvm sp5100_tco bnx2 i2c_piix4 crc32c_intel k10temp fam15h_power ghash_clmulni_intel amd64_edac_mod pcspkr serio_raw edac_mce_amd edac_core microcode xfs libcrc32c sr_mod sd_mod cdrom ata_generic crc_t10dif pata_acpi radeon i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ttm drm ahci pata_atiixp libahci libata usb_storage i2c_core dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [ 131.176784] Pid: 0, comm: swapper/28 Not tainted 3.8.0+ #6 [ 131.182248] Call Trace: [ 131.184684] <IRQ> [<ffffffff810612af>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7f/0xc0 [ 131.191312] [<ffffffff8106130a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20 [ 131.197131] [<ffffffff810b9fd5>] clockevents_program_event+0x135/0x140 [ 131.203721] [<ffffffff810bb584>] tick_program_event+0x24/0x30 [ 131.209534] [<ffffffff81089ab1>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x131/0x230 [ 131.215437] [<ffffffff814b9600>] ? cpufreq_p4_target+0x130/0x130 [ 131.221509] [<ffffffff81619119>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x69/0x99 [ 131.227839] [<ffffffff8161805d>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 [ 131.233816] <EOI> [<ffffffff81099745>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc5/0x120 [ 131.240267] [<ffffffff814b9ff0>] ? cpuidle_wrap_enter+0x50/0xa0 [ 131.246252] [<ffffffff814b9fe9>] ? cpuidle_wrap_enter+0x49/0xa0 [ 131.252238] [<ffffffff814ba050>] cpuidle_enter_tk+0x10/0x20 [ 131.257877] [<ffffffff814b9c89>] cpuidle_idle_call+0xa9/0x260 [ 131.263692] [<ffffffff8101c42f>] cpu_idle+0xaf/0x120 [ 131.268727] [<ffffffff815f8971>] start_secondary+0x255/0x257 [ 131.274449] ---[ end trace 1151a50552231615 ]--- When we change the system time to a low value like this, the value of timekeeper->offs_real will be a negative value. It seems that the WARN occurs because an hrtimer has been started in the time between the releasing of the timekeeper lock and the IPI call (via a call to on_each_cpu) in clock_was_set() in the do_settimeofday() code. The end result is that a REALTIME_CLOCK timer has been added with softexpires = expires = KTIME_MAX. The hrtimer_interrupt() fires/is called and the loop at kernel/hrtimer.c:1289 is executed. In this loop the code subtracts the clock base's offset (which was set to timekeeper->offs_real in do_settimeofday()) from the current hrtimer_cpu_base->expiry value (which was KTIME_MAX): KTIME_MAX - (a negative value) = overflow A simple check for an overflow can resolve this problem. Using KTIME_MAX instead of the overflow value will result in the hrtimer function being run, and the reprogramming of the timer after that. Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> [jstultz: Tweaked commit subject] Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-07hrtimer: Fix ktime_add_ns() overflow on 32bit architecturesDavid Engraf
commit 51fd36f3fad8447c487137ae26b9d0b3ce77bb25 upstream. One can trigger an overflow when using ktime_add_ns() on a 32bit architecture not supporting CONFIG_KTIME_SCALAR. When passing a very high value for u64 nsec, e.g. 7881299347898368000 the do_div() function converts this value to seconds (7881299347) which is still to high to pass to the ktime_set() function as long. The result in is a negative value. The problem on my system occurs in the tick-sched.c, tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick() when time_delta is set to timekeeping_max_deferment(). The check for time_delta < KTIME_MAX is valid, thus ktime_add_ns() is called with a too large value resulting in a negative expire value. This leads to an endless loop in the ticker code: time_delta: 7881299347898368000 expires = ktime_add_ns(last_update, time_delta) expires: negative value This fix caps the value to KTIME_MAX. This error doesn't occurs on 64bit or architectures supporting CONFIG_KTIME_SCALAR (e.g. ARM, x86-32). Signed-off-by: David Engraf <david.engraf@sysgo.com> [jstultz: Minor tweaks to commit message & header] Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-07tracing: Reset ftrace_graph_filter_enabled if count is zeroNamhyung Kim
commit 9f50afccfdc15d95d7331acddcb0f7703df089ae upstream. The ftrace_graph_count can be decreased with a "!" pattern, so that the enabled flag should be updated too. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663698-2413-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-07tracing: Check return value of tracing_init_dentry()Namhyung Kim
commit ed6f1c996bfe4b6e520cf7a74b51cd6988d84420 upstream. Check return value and bail out if it's NULL. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365553093-10180-2-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-07tracing: Fix off-by-one on allocating stat->pagesNamhyung Kim
commit 39e30cd1537937d3c00ef87e865324e981434e5b upstream. The first page was allocated separately, so no need to start from 0. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1364820385-32027-2-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-07tracing: Remove most or all of stack tracer stack size from stack_max_sizeSteven Rostedt (Red Hat)
commit 4df297129f622bdc18935c856f42b9ddd18f9f28 upstream. Currently, the depth reported in the stack tracer stack_trace file does not match the stack_max_size file. This is because the stack_max_size includes the overhead of stack tracer itself while the depth does not. The first time a max is triggered, a calculation is not performed that figures out the overhead of the stack tracer and subtracts it from the stack_max_size variable. The overhead is stored and is subtracted from the reported stack size for comparing for a new max. Now the stack_max_size corresponds to the reported depth: # cat stack_max_size 4640 # cat stack_trace Depth Size Location (48 entries) ----- ---- -------- 0) 4640 32 _raw_spin_lock+0x18/0x24 1) 4608 112 ____cache_alloc+0xb7/0x22d 2) 4496 80 kmem_cache_alloc+0x63/0x12f 3) 4416 16 mempool_alloc_slab+0x15/0x17 [...] While testing against and older gcc on x86 that uses mcount instead of fentry, I found that pasing in ip + MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE let the stack trace show one more function deep which was missing before. Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-07tracing: Fix stack tracer with fentry useSteven Rostedt (Red Hat)
commit d4ecbfc49b4b1d4b597fb5ba9e4fa25d62f105c5 upstream. When gcc 4.6 on x86 is used, the function tracer will use the new option -mfentry which does a call to "fentry" at every function instead of "mcount". The significance of this is that fentry is called as the first operation of the function instead of the mcount usage of being called after the stack. This causes the stack tracer to show some bogus results for the size of the last function traced, as well as showing "ftrace_call" instead of the function. This is due to the stack frame not being set up by the function that is about to be traced. # cat stack_trace Depth Size Location (48 entries) ----- ---- -------- 0) 4824 216 ftrace_call+0x5/0x2f 1) 4608 112 ____cache_alloc+0xb7/0x22d 2) 4496 80 kmem_cache_alloc+0x63/0x12f The 216 size for ftrace_call includes both the ftrace_call stack (which includes the saving of registers it does), as well as the stack size of the parent. To fix this, if CC_USING_FENTRY is defined, then the stack_tracer will reserve the first item in stack_dump_trace[] array when calling save_stack_trace(), and it will fill it in with the parent ip. Then the code will look for the parent pointer on the stack and give the real size of the parent's stack pointer: # cat stack_trace Depth Size Location (14 entries) ----- ---- -------- 0) 2640 48 update_group_power+0x26/0x187 1) 2592 224 update_sd_lb_stats+0x2a5/0x4ac 2) 2368 160 find_busiest_group+0x31/0x1f1 3) 2208 256 load_balance+0xd9/0x662 I'm Cc'ing stable, although it's not urgent, as it only shows bogus size for item #0, the rest of the trace is legit. It should still be corrected in previous stable releases. Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-05-07tracing: Use stack of calling function for stack tracerSteven Rostedt (Red Hat)
commit 87889501d0adfae10e3b0f0e6f2d7536eed9ae84 upstream. Use the stack of stack_trace_call() instead of check_stack() as the test pointer for max stack size. It makes it a bit cleaner and a little more accurate. Adding stable, as a later fix depends on this patch. Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-04-25perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()Tommi Rantala
commit 8176cced706b5e5d15887584150764894e94e02f upstream. Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in sw_perf_event_destroy(). Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU implementations"). Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: davej@redhat.com Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-04-25sched: Convert BUG_ON()s in try_to_wake_up_local() to WARN_ON_ONCE()sTejun Heo
commit 383efcd00053ec40023010ce5034bd702e7ab373 upstream. try_to_wake_up_local() should only be invoked to wake up another task in the same runqueue and BUG_ON()s are used to enforce the rule. Missing try_to_wake_up_local() can stall workqueue execution but such stalls are likely to be finite either by another work item being queued or the one blocked getting unblocked. There's no reason to trigger BUG while holding rq lock crashing the whole system. Convert BUG_ON()s in try_to_wake_up_local() to WARN_ON_ONCE()s. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130318192234.GD3042@htj.dyndns.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-04-25kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscallsEmese Revfy
commit b9e146d8eb3b9ecae5086d373b50fa0c1f3e7f0f upstream. This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls for compat processes. This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field when handling signals delivered from tkill. The place of the infoleak: int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from) { ... put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr); ... } Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-04-25hrtimer: Don't reinitialize a cpu_base lock on CPU_UPMichael Bohan
commit 84cc8fd2fe65866e49d70b38b3fdf7219dd92fe0 upstream. The current code makes the assumption that a cpu_base lock won't be held if the CPU corresponding to that cpu_base is offline, which isn't always true. If a hrtimer is not queued, then it will not be migrated by migrate_hrtimers() when a CPU is offlined. Therefore, the hrtimer's cpu_base may still point to a CPU which has subsequently gone offline if the timer wasn't enqueued at the time the CPU went down. Normally this wouldn't be a problem, but a cpu_base's lock is blindly reinitialized each time a CPU is brought up. If a CPU is brought online during the period that another thread is performing a hrtimer operation on a stale hrtimer, then the lock will be reinitialized under its feet, and a SPIN_BUG() like the following will be observed: <0>[ 28.082085] BUG: spinlock already unlocked on CPU#0, swapper/0/0 <0>[ 28.087078] lock: 0xc4780b40, value 0x0 .magic: dead4ead, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: -1 <4>[ 42.451150] [<c0014398>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0x120) from [<c0269220>] (do_raw_spin_unlock+0x44/0xdc) <4>[ 42.460430] [<c0269220>] (do_raw_spin_unlock+0x44/0xdc) from [<c071b5bc>] (_raw_spin_unlock+0x8/0x30) <4>[ 42.469632] [<c071b5bc>] (_raw_spin_unlock+0x8/0x30) from [<c00a9ce0>] (__hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x1e4/0x4f8) <4>[ 42.479521] [<c00a9ce0>] (__hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x1e4/0x4f8) from [<c00aa014>] (hrtimer_start+0x20/0x28) <4>[ 42.489247] [<c00aa014>] (hrtimer_start+0x20/0x28) from [<c00e6190>] (rcu_idle_enter_common+0x1ac/0x320) <4>[ 42.498709] [<c00e6190>] (rcu_idle_enter_common+0x1ac/0x320) from [<c00e6440>] (rcu_idle_enter+0xa0/0xb8) <4>[ 42.508259] [<c00e6440>] (rcu_idle_enter+0xa0/0xb8) from [<c000f268>] (cpu_idle+0x24/0xf0) <4>[ 42.516503] [<c000f268>] (cpu_idle+0x24/0xf0) from [<c06ed3c0>] (rest_init+0x88/0xa0) <4>[ 42.524319] [<c06ed3c0>] (rest_init+0x88/0xa0) from [<c0c00978>] (start_kernel+0x3d0/0x434) As an example, this particular crash occurred when hrtimer_start() was executed on CPU #0. The code locked the hrtimer's current cpu_base corresponding to CPU #1. CPU #0 then tried to switch the hrtimer's cpu_base to an optimal CPU which was online. In this case, it selected the cpu_base corresponding to CPU #3. Before it could proceed, CPU #1 came online and reinitialized the spinlock corresponding to its cpu_base. Thus now CPU #0 held a lock which was reinitialized. When CPU #0 finally ended up unlocking the old cpu_base corresponding to CPU #1 so that it could switch to CPU #3, we hit this SPIN_BUG() above while in switch_hrtimer_base(). CPU #0 CPU #1 ---- ---- ... <offline> hrtimer_start() lock_hrtimer_base(base #1) ... init_hrtimers_cpu() switch_hrtimer_base() ... ... raw_spin_lock_init(&cpu_base->lock) raw_spin_unlock(&cpu_base->lock) ... <spin_bug> Solve this by statically initializing the lock. Signed-off-by: Michael Bohan <mbohan@codeaurora.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1363745965-23475-1-git-send-email-mbohan@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-04-16sched_clock: Prevent 64bit inatomicity on 32bit systemsThomas Gleixner
commit a1cbcaa9ea87b87a96b9fc465951dcf36e459ca2 upstream. The sched_clock_remote() implementation has the following inatomicity problem on 32bit systems when accessing the remote scd->clock, which is a 64bit value. CPU0 CPU1 sched_clock_local() sched_clock_remote(CPU0) ... remote_clock = scd[CPU0]->clock read_low32bit(scd[CPU0]->clock) cmpxchg64(scd->clock,...) read_high32bit(scd[CPU0]->clock) While the update of scd->clock is using an atomic64 mechanism, the readout on the remote cpu is not, which can cause completely bogus readouts. It is a quite rare problem, because it requires the update to hit the narrow race window between the low/high readout and the update must go across the 32bit boundary. The resulting misbehaviour is, that CPU1 will see the sched_clock on CPU1 ~4 seconds ahead of it's own and update CPU1s sched_clock value to this bogus timestamp. This stays that way due to the clamping implementation for about 4 seconds until the synchronization with CLOCK_MONOTONIC undoes the problem. The issue is hard to observe, because it might only result in a less accurate SCHED_OTHER timeslicing behaviour. To create observable damage on realtime scheduling classes, it is necessary that the bogus update of CPU1 sched_clock happens in the context of an realtime thread, which then gets charged 4 seconds of RT runtime, which results in the RT throttler mechanism to trigger and prevent scheduling of RT tasks for a little less than 4 seconds. So this is quite unlikely as well. The issue was quite hard to decode as the reproduction time is between 2 days and 3 weeks and intrusive tracing makes it less likely, but the following trace recorded with trace_clock=global, which uses sched_clock_local(), gave the final hint: <idle>-0 0d..30 400269.477150: hrtimer_cancel: hrtimer=0xf7061e80 <idle>-0 0d..30 400269.477151: hrtimer_start: hrtimer=0xf7061e80 ... irq/20-S-587 1d..32 400273.772118: sched_wakeup: comm= ... target_cpu=0 <idle>-0 0dN.30 400273.772118: hrtimer_cancel: hrtimer=0xf7061e80 What happens is that CPU0 goes idle and invokes sched_clock_idle_sleep_event() which invokes sched_clock_local() and CPU1 runs a remote wakeup for CPU0 at the same time, which invokes sched_remote_clock(). The time jump gets propagated to CPU0 via sched_remote_clock() and stays stale on both cores for ~4 seconds. There are only two other possibilities, which could cause a stale sched clock: 1) ktime_get() which reads out CLOCK_MONOTONIC returns a sporadic wrong value. 2) sched_clock() which reads the TSC returns a sporadic wrong value. #1 can be excluded because sched_clock would continue to increase for one jiffy and then go stale. #2 can be excluded because it would not make the clock jump forward. It would just result in a stale sched_clock for one jiffy. After quite some brain twisting and finding the same pattern on other traces, sched_clock_remote() remained the only place which could cause such a problem and as explained above it's indeed racy on 32bit systems. So while on 64bit systems the readout is atomic, we need to verify the remote readout on 32bit machines. We need to protect the local->clock readout in sched_clock_remote() on 32bit as well because an NMI could hit between the low and the high readout, call sched_clock_local() and modify local->clock. Thanks to Siegfried Wulsch for bearing with my debug requests and going through the tedious tasks of running a bunch of reproducer systems to generate the debug information which let me decode the issue. Reported-by: Siegfried Wulsch <Siegfried.Wulsch@rovema.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1304051544160.21884@ionos Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-04-16PM / reboot: call syscore_shutdown() after disable_nonboot_cpus()Huacai Chen
commit 6f389a8f1dd22a24f3d9afc2812b30d639e94625 upstream. As commit 40dc166c (PM / Core: Introduce struct syscore_ops for core subsystems PM) say, syscore_ops operations should be carried with one CPU on-line and interrupts disabled. However, after commit f96972f2d (kernel/sys.c: call disable_nonboot_cpus() in kernel_restart()), syscore_shutdown() is called before disable_nonboot_cpus(), so break the rules. We have a MIPS machine with a 8259A PIC, and there is an external timer (HPET) linked at 8259A. Since 8259A has been shutdown too early (by syscore_shutdown()), disable_nonboot_cpus() runs without timer interrupt, so it hangs and reboot fails. This patch call syscore_shutdown() a little later (after disable_nonboot_cpus()) to avoid reboot failure, this is the same way as poweroff does. For consistency, add disable_nonboot_cpus() to kernel_halt(). Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-04-16tracing: Fix double free when function profile init failedNamhyung Kim
commit 83e03b3fe4daffdebbb42151d5410d730ae50bd1 upstream. On the failure path, stat->start and stat->pages will refer same page. So it'll attempt to free the same page again and get kernel panic. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1364820385-32027-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-04-12ftrace: Consistently restore trace function on sysctl enablingJan Kiszka
commit 5000c418840b309251c5887f0b56503aae30f84c upstream. If we reenable ftrace via syctl, we currently set ftrace_trace_function based on the previous simplistic algorithm. This is inconsistent with what update_ftrace_function does. So better call that helper instead. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5151D26F.1070702@siemens.com Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-04-05tracing: Prevent buffer overwrite disabled for latency tracersSteven Rostedt (Red Hat)
commit 613f04a0f51e6e68ac6fe571ab79da3c0a5eb4da upstream. The latency tracers require the buffers to be in overwrite mode, otherwise they get screwed up. Force the buffers to stay in overwrite mode when latency tracers are enabled. Added a flag_changed() method to the tracer structure to allow the tracers to see what flags are being changed, and also be able to prevent the change from happing. [Backported for 3.4-stable. Re-added current_trace NULL checks; removed allocated_snapshot field; adapted to tracing_trace_options_write without trace_set_options.] Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Lingzhu Xiang <lxiang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-04-05tracing: Protect tracer flags with trace_types_lockSteven Rostedt (Red Hat)
commit 69d34da2984c95b33ea21518227e1f9470f11d95 upstream. Seems that the tracer flags have never been protected from synchronous writes. Luckily, admins don't usually modify the tracing flags via two different tasks. But if scripts were to be used to modify them, then they could get corrupted. Move the trace_types_lock that protects against tracers changing to also protect the flags being set. [Backported for 3.4, 3.0-stable. Moved return to after unlock.] Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Lingzhu Xiang <lxiang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-04-05kernel/signal.c: use __ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER instead of SA_RESTORERAndrew Morton
commit 522cff142d7d2f9230839c9e1f21a4d8bcc22a4a upstream. __ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER is the preferred conditional for use in 3.9 and later kernels, per Kees. Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-03-28clockevents: Don't allow dummy broadcast timersMark Rutland
commit a7dc19b8652c862d5b7c4d2339bd3c428bd29c4a upstream. Currently tick_check_broadcast_device doesn't reject clock_event_devices with CLOCK_EVT_FEAT_DUMMY, and may select them in preference to real hardware if they have a higher rating value. In this situation, the dummy timer is responsible for broadcasting to itself, and the core clockevents code may attempt to call non-existent callbacks for programming the dummy, eventually leading to a panic. This patch makes tick_check_broadcast_device always reject dummy timers, preventing this problem. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Jon Medhurst (Tixy) <tixy@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-03-28tracing: Fix free of probe entry by calling call_rcu_sched()Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)
commit 740466bc89ad8bd5afcc8de220f715f62b21e365 upstream. Because function tracing is very invasive, and can even trace calls to rcu_read_lock(), RCU access in function tracing is done with preempt_disable_notrace(). This requires a synchronize_sched() for updates and not a synchronize_rcu(). Function probes (traceon, traceoff, etc) must be freed after a synchronize_sched() after its entry has been removed from the hash. But call_rcu() is used. Fix this by using call_rcu_sched(). Also fix the usage to use hlist_del_rcu() instead of hlist_del(). Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-03-28tracing: Fix race in snapshot swappingSteven Rostedt (Red Hat)
commit 2721e72dd10f71a3ba90f59781becf02638aa0d9 upstream. Although the swap is wrapped with a spin_lock, the assignment of the temp buffer used to swap is not within that lock. It needs to be moved into that lock, otherwise two swaps happening on two different CPUs, can end up using the wrong temp buffer to assign in the swap. Luckily, all current callers of the swap function appear to have their own locks. But in case something is added that allows two different callers to call the swap, then there's a chance that this race can trigger and corrupt the buffers. New code is coming soon that will allow for this race to trigger. I've Cc'd stable, so this bug will not show up if someone backports one of the changes that can trigger this bug. Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-03-20signal: always clear sa_restorer on execveKees Cook
commit 2ca39528c01a933f6689cd6505ce65bd6d68a530 upstream. When the new signal handlers are set up, the location of sa_restorer is not cleared, leaking a parent process's address space location to children. This allows for a potential bypass of the parent's ASLR by examining the sa_restorer value returned when calling sigaction(). Based on what should be considered "secret" about addresses, it only matters across the exec not the fork (since the VMAs haven't changed until the exec). But since exec sets SIG_DFL and keeps sa_restorer, this is where it should be fixed. Given the few uses of sa_restorer, a "set" function was not written since this would be the only use. Instead, we use __ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER, as already done in other places. Example of the leak before applying this patch: $ cat /proc/$$/maps ... 7fb9f3083000-7fb9f3238000 r-xp 00000000 fd:01 404469 .../libc-2.15.so ... $ ./leak ... 7f278bc74000-7f278be29000 r-xp 00000000 fd:01 404469 .../libc-2.15.so ... 1 0 (nil) 0x7fb9f30b94a0 2 4000000 (nil) 0x7f278bcaa4a0 3 4000000 (nil) 0x7f278bcaa4a0 4 0 (nil) 0x7fb9f30b94a0 ... [akpm@linux-foundation.org: use SA_RESTORER for backportability] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-03-14ftrace: Update the kconfig for DYNAMIC_FTRACESteven Rostedt
commit db05021d49a994ee40a9735d9c3cb0060c9babb8 upstream. The prompt to enable DYNAMIC_FTRACE (the ability to nop and enable function tracing at run time) had a confusing statement: "enable/disable ftrace tracepoints dynamically" This was written before tracepoints were added to the kernel, but now that tracepoints have been added, this is very confusing and has confused people enough to give wrong information during presentations. Not only that, I looked at the help text, and it still references that dreaded daemon that use to wake up once a second to update the nop locations and brick NICs, that hasn't been around for over five years. Time to bring the text up to the current decade. Reported-by: Ezequiel Garcia <elezegarcia@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-03-04cgroup: fix exit() vs rmdir() raceLi Zefan
commit 71b5707e119653039e6e95213f00479668c79b75 upstream. In cgroup_exit() put_css_set_taskexit() is called without any lock, which might lead to accessing a freed cgroup: thread1 thread2 --------------------------------------------- exit() cgroup_exit() put_css_set_taskexit() atomic_dec(cgrp->count); rmdir(); /* not safe !! */ check_for_release(cgrp); rcu_read_lock() can be used to make sure the cgroup is alive. Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-03-04cpuset: fix cpuset_print_task_mems_allowed() vs rename() raceLi Zefan
commit 63f43f55c9bbc14f76b582644019b8a07dc8219a upstream. rename() will change dentry->d_name. The result of this race can be worse than seeing partially rewritten name, but we might access a stale pointer because rename() will re-allocate memory to hold a longer name. It's safe in the protection of dentry->d_lock. v2: check NULL dentry before acquiring dentry lock. Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-03-04wake_up_process() should be never used to wakeup a TASK_STOPPED/TRACED taskOleg Nesterov
Upstream commit 9067ac85d533651b98c2ff903182a20cbb361fcb. wake_up_process() should never wakeup a TASK_STOPPED/TRACED task. Change it to use TASK_NORMAL and add the WARN_ON(). TASK_ALL has no other users, probably can be killed. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-03-04ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILLOleg Nesterov
Upstream commit 9899d11f654474d2d54ea52ceaa2a1f4db3abd68. putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee does SAVE_REST again. set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the logic. As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace() call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths. Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before access_process_vm(). While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state(). Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com> Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-03-04ptrace: introduce signal_wake_up_state() and ptrace_signal_wake_up()Oleg Nesterov
Upstream commit 910ffdb18a6408e14febbb6e4b6840fd2c928c82. Cleanup and preparation for the next change. signal_wake_up(resume => true) is overused. None of ptrace/jctl callers actually want to wakeup a TASK_WAKEKILL task, but they can't specify the necessary mask. Turn signal_wake_up() into signal_wake_up_state(state), reintroduce signal_wake_up() as a trivial helper, and add ptrace_signal_wake_up() which adds __TASK_TRACED. This way ptrace_signal_wake_up() can work "inside" ptrace_request() even if the tracee doesn't have the TASK_WAKEKILL bit set. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-03-04sysctl: fix null checking in bin_dn_node_address()Xi Wang
commit df1778be1a33edffa51d094eeda87c858ded6560 upstream. The null check of `strchr() + 1' is broken, which is always non-null, leading to OOB read. Instead, check the result of strchr(). Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>