| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
commit 8c2eb4805d422bdbf60ba00ff233c794d23c3c00 upstream.
Ensure additions on touch_ts do not overflow. This can occur
when the top 32 bits of the TSC reach 0xffffffff causing
additions to touch_ts to overflow and this in turn generates
spurious softlockup warnings.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
LKML-Reference: <1268994482.1798.6.camel@lenovo>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 0b1adaa031a55e44f5dd942f234bf09d28e8a0d6 upstream.
Lars-Peter pointed out that the oneshot threaded interrupt handler
code has the following race:
CPU0 CPU1
hande_level_irq(irq X)
mask_ack_irq(irq X)
handle_IRQ_event(irq X)
wake_up(thread_handler)
thread handler(irq X) runs
finalize_oneshot(irq X)
does not unmask due to
!(desc->status & IRQ_MASKED)
return from irq
does not unmask due to
(desc->status & IRQ_ONESHOT)
This leaves the interrupt line masked forever.
The reason for this is the inconsistent handling of the IRQ_MASKED
flag. Instead of setting it in the mask function the oneshot support
sets the flag after waking up the irq thread.
The solution for this is to set/clear the IRQ_MASKED status whenever
we mask/unmask an interrupt line. That's the easy part, but that
cleanup opens another race:
CPU0 CPU1
hande_level_irq(irq)
mask_ack_irq(irq)
handle_IRQ_event(irq)
wake_up(thread_handler)
thread handler(irq) runs
finalize_oneshot_irq(irq)
unmask(irq)
irq triggers again
handle_level_irq(irq)
mask_ack_irq(irq)
return from irq due to IRQ_INPROGRESS
return from irq
does not unmask due to
(desc->status & IRQ_ONESHOT)
This requires that we synchronize finalize_oneshot_irq() with the
primary handler. If IRQ_INPROGESS is set we wait until the primary
handler on the other CPU has returned before unmasking the interrupt
line again.
We probably have never seen that problem because it does not happen on
UP and on SMP the irqbalancer protects us by pinning the primary
handler and the thread to the same CPU.
Reported-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 5ab116c9349ef52d6fbd2e2917a53f13194b048e upstream.
cpuset_mem_spread_node() returns an offline node, and causes an oops.
This patch fixes it by initializing task->mems_allowed to
node_states[N_HIGH_MEMORY], and updating task->mems_allowed when doing
memory hotplug.
Signed-off-by: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Reported-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Tested-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 220b140b52ab6cc133f674a7ffec8fa792054f25 upstream.
Anton Blanchard found that he could reliably make the kernel hit a
BUG_ON in the slab allocator by taking a cpu offline and then online
while a system-wide perf record session was running.
The reason is that when the cpu comes up, we completely reinitialize
the ctx field of the struct perf_cpu_context for the cpu. If there is
a system-wide perf record session running, then there will be a struct
perf_event that has a reference to the context, so its refcount will
be 2. (The perf_event has been removed from the context's group_entry
and event_entry lists by perf_event_exit_cpu(), but that doesn't
remove the perf_event's reference to the context and doesn't decrement
the context's refcount.)
When the cpu comes up, perf_event_init_cpu() gets called, and it calls
__perf_event_init_context() on the cpu's context. That resets the
refcount to 1. Then when the perf record session finishes and the
perf_event is closed, the refcount gets decremented to 0 and the
context gets kfreed after an RCU grace period. Since the context
wasn't kmalloced -- it's part of a per-cpu variable -- bad things
happen.
In fact we don't need to completely reinitialize the context when the
cpu comes up. It's sufficient to initialize the context once at boot,
but we need to do it for all possible cpus.
This moves the context initialization to happen at boot time. With
this, we don't trash the refcount and the context never gets kfreed,
and we don't hit the BUG_ON.
Reported-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Tested-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
This makes it easier to extend perf_sample_data and fixes a bug on arm
and sparc, which failed to set ->raw to NULL, which can cause crashes
when combined with PERF_SAMPLE_RAW.
It also optimizes PowerPC and tracepoint, because the struct
initialization is forced to zero out the whole structure.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Jean Pihet <jpihet@mvista.com>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jamie Iles <jamie.iles@picochip.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
LKML-Reference: <20100304140100.315416040@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit dd5feea14a7de4edbd9f36db1a2db785de91b88d upstream
On platforms like dual socket quad-core platform, the scheduler load
balancer is not detecting the load imbalances in certain scenarios. This
is leading to scenarios like where one socket is completely busy (with
all the 4 cores running with 4 tasks) and leaving another socket
completely idle. This causes performance issues as those 4 tasks share
the memory controller, last-level cache bandwidth etc. Also we won't be
taking advantage of turbo-mode as much as we would like, etc.
Some of the comparisons in the scheduler load balancing code are
comparing the "weighted cpu load that is scaled wrt sched_group's
cpu_power" with the "weighted average load per task that is not scaled
wrt sched_group's cpu_power". While this has probably been broken for a
longer time (for multi socket numa nodes etc), the problem got aggrevated
via this recent change:
|
| commit f93e65c186ab3c05ce2068733ca10e34fd00125e
| Author: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
| Date: Tue Sep 1 10:34:32 2009 +0200
|
| sched: Restore __cpu_power to a straight sum of power
|
Also with this change, the sched group cpu power alone no longer reflects
the group capacity that is needed to implement MC, MT performance
(default) and power-savings (user-selectable) policies.
We need to use the computed group capacity (sgs.group_capacity, that is
computed using the SD_PREFER_SIBLING logic in update_sd_lb_stats()) to
find out if the group with the max load is above its capacity and how
much load to move etc.
Reported-by: Ma Ling <ling.ma@intel.com>
Initial-Analysis-by: Zhang, Yanmin <yanmin_zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
[ -v2: build fix ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
LKML-Reference: <1266970432.11588.22.camel@sbs-t61.sc.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
|
commit b6345879ccbd9b92864fbd7eb8ac48acdb4d6b15 upstream.
A bug was found with Li Zefan's ftrace_stress_test that caused applications
to segfault during the test.
Placing a tracing_off() in the segfault code, and examining several
traces, I found that the following was always the case. The lock tracer
was enabled (lockdep being required) and userstack was enabled. Testing
this out, I just enabled the two, but that was not good enough. I needed
to run something else that could trigger it. Running a load like hackbench
did not work, but executing a new program would. The following would
trigger the segfault within seconds:
# echo 1 > /debug/tracing/options/userstacktrace
# echo 1 > /debug/tracing/events/lock/enable
# while :; do ls > /dev/null ; done
Enabling the function graph tracer and looking at what was happening
I finally noticed that all cashes happened just after an NMI.
1) | copy_user_handle_tail() {
1) | bad_area_nosemaphore() {
1) | __bad_area_nosemaphore() {
1) | no_context() {
1) | fixup_exception() {
1) 0.319 us | search_exception_tables();
1) 0.873 us | }
[...]
1) 0.314 us | __rcu_read_unlock();
1) 0.325 us | native_apic_mem_write();
1) 0.943 us | }
1) 0.304 us | rcu_nmi_exit();
[...]
1) 0.479 us | find_vma();
1) | bad_area() {
1) | __bad_area() {
After capturing several traces of failures, all of them happened
after an NMI. Curious about this, I added a trace_printk() to the NMI
handler to read the regs->ip to see where the NMI happened. In which I
found out it was here:
ffffffff8135b660 <page_fault>:
ffffffff8135b660: 48 83 ec 78 sub $0x78,%rsp
ffffffff8135b664: e8 97 01 00 00 callq ffffffff8135b800 <error_entry>
What was happening is that the NMI would happen at the place that a page
fault occurred. It would call rcu_read_lock() which was traced by
the lock events, and the user_stack_trace would run. This would trigger
a page fault inside the NMI. I do not see where the CR2 register is
saved or restored in NMI handling. This means that it would corrupt
the page fault handling that the NMI interrupted.
The reason the while loop of ls helped trigger the bug, was that
each execution of ls would cause lots of pages to be faulted in, and
increase the chances of the race happening.
The simple solution is to not allow user stack traces in NMI context.
After this patch, I ran the above "ls" test for a couple of hours
without any issues. Without this patch, the bug would trigger in less
than a minute.
Reported-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit a2f8071428ed9a0f06865f417c962421c9a6b488 upstream.
When the trace iterator is read, tracing_start() and tracing_stop()
is called to stop tracing while the iterator is processing the trace
output.
These functions disable both the standard buffer and the max latency
buffer. But if the wakeup tracer is running, it can switch these
buffers between the two disables:
buffer = global_trace.buffer;
if (buffer)
ring_buffer_record_disable(buffer);
<<<--------- swap happens here
buffer = max_tr.buffer;
if (buffer)
ring_buffer_record_disable(buffer);
What happens is that we disabled the same buffer twice. On tracing_start()
we can enable the same buffer twice. All ring_buffer_record_disable()
must be matched with a ring_buffer_record_enable() or the buffer
can be disable permanently, or enable prematurely, and cause a bug
where a reset happens while a trace is commiting.
This patch protects these two by taking the ftrace_max_lock to prevent
a switch from occurring.
Found with Li Zefan's ftrace_stress_test.
Reported-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 283740c619d211e34572cc93c8cdba92ccbdb9cc upstream.
In the ftrace code that resets the ring buffer it references the
buffer with a local variable, but then uses the tr->buffer as the
parameter to reset. If the wakeup tracer is running, which can
switch the tr->buffer with the max saved buffer, this can break
the requirement of disabling the buffer before the reset.
buffer = tr->buffer;
ring_buffer_record_disable(buffer);
synchronize_sched();
__tracing_reset(tr->buffer, cpu);
If the tr->buffer is swapped, then the reset is not happening to the
buffer that was disabled. This will cause the ring buffer to fail.
Found with Li Zefan's ftrace_stress_test.
Reported-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit ac91d85456372a90af5b85eb6620fd2efb1e431b upstream.
This warning in s_next() can be triggered by lseek():
[<c018b3f7>] ? s_next+0x77/0x80
[<c013e3c1>] warn_slowpath_common+0x81/0xa0
[<c018b3f7>] ? s_next+0x77/0x80
[<c013e3fa>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
[<c018b3f7>] s_next+0x77/0x80
[<c01efa77>] traverse+0x117/0x200
[<c01eff13>] seq_lseek+0xa3/0x120
[<c01efe70>] ? seq_lseek+0x0/0x120
[<c01d7081>] vfs_llseek+0x41/0x50
[<c01d8116>] sys_llseek+0x66/0xa0
[<c0102bd0>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x26
The iterator "leftover" variable is zeroed in the opening of the trace
file. But lseek can call s_start() which will call s_next() without
reseting the "leftover" variable back to zero, which might trigger
the WARN_ON_ONCE(iter->leftover) that is in s_next().
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
LKML-Reference: <4B8CE06A.9090207@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit ea14eb714041d40fcc5180b5a586034503650149 upstream.
If the graph tracer is active, and a task is forked but the allocating of
the processes graph stack fails, it can cause crash later on.
This is due to the temporary stack being NULL, but the curr_ret_stack
variable is copied from the parent. If it is not -1, then in
ftrace_graph_probe_sched_switch() the following:
for (index = next->curr_ret_stack; index >= 0; index--)
next->ret_stack[index].calltime += timestamp;
Will cause a kernel OOPS.
Found with Li Zefan's ftrace_stress_test.
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 1e259e0a9982078896f3404240096cbea01daca4 upstream.
We support event unthrottling in breakpoint events. It means
that if we have more than sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate/HZ,
perf will throttle, ignoring subsequent events until the next
tick.
So if ptrace exceeds this max rate, it will omit events, which
breaks the ptrace determinism that is supposed to report every
triggered breakpoints. This is likely to happen if we set
sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate to 1.
This patch removes support for unthrottling in breakpoint
events to break throttling and restore ptrace determinism.
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: K.Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 52fbe9cde7fdb5c6fac196d7ebd2d92d05ef3cd4 upstream.
The ring buffer resizing and resetting relies on a schedule RCU
action. The buffers are disabled, a synchronize_sched() is called
and then the resize or reset takes place.
But this only works if the disabling of the buffers are within the
preempt disabled section, otherwise a window exists that the buffers
can be written to while a reset or resize takes place.
Reported-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
LKML-Reference: <4B949E43.2010906@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit ad6759fbf35d104dbf573cd6f4c6784ad6823f7e upstream.
Aaro Koskinen reported an issue in kernel.org bugzilla #15366, where
on non-GENERIC_TIME systems, accessing
/sys/devices/system/clocksource/clocksource0/current_clocksource
results in an oops.
It seems the timekeeper/clocksource rework missed initializing the
curr_clocksource value in the !GENERIC_TIME case.
Thanks to Aaro for reporting and diagnosing the issue as well as
testing the fix!
Reported-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
LKML-Reference: <1267475683.4216.61.camel@localhost.localdomain>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 83ab0aa0d5623d823444db82c3b3c34d7ec364ae upstream.
setscheduler() saves task->sched_class outside of the rq->lock held
region for a check after the setscheduler changes have become
effective. That might result in checking a stale value.
rtmutex_setprio() has the same problem, though it is protected by
p->pi_lock against setscheduler(), but for correctness sake (and to
avoid bad examples) it needs to be fixed as well.
Retrieve task->sched_class inside of the rq->lock held region.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 9000f05c6d1607f79c0deacf42b09693be673f4c upstream.
Fix a SMT scheduler performance regression that is leading to a scenario
where SMT threads in one core are completely idle while both the SMT threads
in another core (on the same socket) are busy.
This is caused by this commit (with the problematic code highlighted)
commit bdb94aa5dbd8b55e75f5a50b61312fe589e2c2d1
Author: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Date: Tue Sep 1 10:34:38 2009 +0200
sched: Try to deal with low capacity
@@ -4203,15 +4223,18 @@ find_busiest_queue()
...
for_each_cpu(i, sched_group_cpus(group)) {
+ unsigned long power = power_of(i);
...
- wl = weighted_cpuload(i);
+ wl = weighted_cpuload(i) * SCHED_LOAD_SCALE;
+ wl /= power;
- if (rq->nr_running == 1 && wl > imbalance)
+ if (capacity && rq->nr_running == 1 && wl > imbalance)
continue;
On a SMT system, power of the HT logical cpu will be 589 and
the scheduler load imbalance (for scenarios like the one mentioned above)
can be approximately 1024 (SCHED_LOAD_SCALE). The above change of scaling
the weighted load with the power will result in "wl > imbalance" and
ultimately resulting in find_busiest_queue() return NULL, causing
load_balance() to think that the load is well balanced. But infact
one of the tasks can be moved to the idle core for optimal performance.
We don't need to use the weighted load (wl) scaled by the cpu power to
compare with imabalance. In that condition, we already know there is only a
single task "rq->nr_running == 1" and the comparison between imbalance,
wl is to make sure that we select the correct priority thread which matches
imbalance. So we really need to compare the imabalnce with the original
weighted load of the cpu and not the scaled load.
But in other conditions where we want the most hammered(busiest) cpu, we can
use scaled load to ensure that we consider the cpu power in addition to the
actual load on that cpu, so that we can move the load away from the
guy that is getting most hammered with respect to the actual capacity,
as compared with the rest of the cpu's in that busiest group.
Fix it.
Reported-by: Ma Ling <ling.ma@intel.com>
Initial-Analysis-by: Zhang, Yanmin <yanmin_zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
LKML-Reference: <1266023662.2808.118.camel@sbs-t61.sc.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit ced5b697a76d325e7a7ac7d382dbbb632c765093 upstream.
Keep chip_data in create_irq_nr and destroy_irq.
When two drivers are setting up MSI-X at the same time via
pci_enable_msix() there is a race. See this dmesg excerpt:
[ 85.170610] ixgbe 0000:02:00.1: irq 97 for MSI/MSI-X
[ 85.170611] alloc irq_desc for 99 on node -1
[ 85.170613] igb 0000:08:00.1: irq 98 for MSI/MSI-X
[ 85.170614] alloc kstat_irqs on node -1
[ 85.170616] alloc irq_2_iommu on node -1
[ 85.170617] alloc irq_desc for 100 on node -1
[ 85.170619] alloc kstat_irqs on node -1
[ 85.170621] alloc irq_2_iommu on node -1
[ 85.170625] ixgbe 0000:02:00.1: irq 99 for MSI/MSI-X
[ 85.170626] alloc irq_desc for 101 on node -1
[ 85.170628] igb 0000:08:00.1: irq 100 for MSI/MSI-X
[ 85.170630] alloc kstat_irqs on node -1
[ 85.170631] alloc irq_2_iommu on node -1
[ 85.170635] alloc irq_desc for 102 on node -1
[ 85.170636] alloc kstat_irqs on node -1
[ 85.170639] alloc irq_2_iommu on node -1
[ 85.170646] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference
at 0000000000000088
As you can see igb and ixgbe are both alternating on create_irq_nr()
via pci_enable_msix() in their probe function.
ixgbe: While looping through irq_desc_ptrs[] via create_irq_nr() ixgbe
choses irq_desc_ptrs[102] and exits the loop, drops vector_lock and
calls dynamic_irq_init. Then it sets irq_desc_ptrs[102]->chip_data =
NULL via dynamic_irq_init().
igb: Grabs the vector_lock now and starts looping over irq_desc_ptrs[]
via create_irq_nr(). It gets to irq_desc_ptrs[102] and does this:
cfg_new = irq_desc_ptrs[102]->chip_data;
if (cfg_new->vector != 0)
continue;
This hits the NULL deref.
Another possible race exists via pci_disable_msix() in a driver or in
the number of error paths that call free_msi_irqs():
destroy_irq()
dynamic_irq_cleanup() which sets desc->chip_data = NULL
...race window...
desc->chip_data = cfg;
Remove the save and restore code for cfg in create_irq_nr() and
destroy_irq() and take the desc->lock when checking the irq_cfg.
Reported-and-analyzed-by: Brandon Philips <bphilips@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
LKML-Reference: <1265793639-15071-3-git-send-email-yinghai@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Brandon Phililps <bphilips@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 86c38a31aa7f2dd6e74a262710bf8ebf7455acc5 upstream.
GCC 4.5 introduces behavior that forces the alignment of structures to
use the largest possible value. The default value is 32 bytes, so if
some structures are defined with a 4-byte alignment and others aren't
declared with an alignment constraint at all - it will align at 32-bytes.
For things like the ftrace events, this results in a non-standard array.
When initializing the ftrace subsystem, we traverse the _ftrace_events
section and call the initialization callback for each event. When the
structures are misaligned, we could be treating another part of the
structure (or the zeroed out space between them) as a function pointer.
This patch forces the alignment for all the ftrace_event_call structures
to 4 bytes.
Without this patch, the kernel fails to boot very early when built with
gcc 4.5.
It's trivial to check the alignment of the members of the array, so it
might be worthwhile to add something to the build system to do that
automatically. Unfortunately, that only covers this case. I've asked one
of the gcc developers about adding a warning when this condition is seen.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
LKML-Reference: <4B85770B.6010901@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit abd50713944c8ea9e0af5b7bffa0aacae21cc91a upstream.
There was a bug in the old period code that caused intel_pmu_enable_all()
or native_write_msr_safe() to show up quite high in the profiles.
In staring at that code it made my head hurt, so I rewrote it in a
hopefully simpler fashion. Its now fully symetric between tick and
overflow driven adjustments and uses less data to boot.
The only complication is that it basically wants to do a u128 division.
The code approximates that in a rather simple truncate until it fits
fashion, taking care to balance the terms while truncating.
This version does not generate that sampling artefact.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit 24691ea964cc0123e386b661e03a86a481c6ee79 upstream.
A recent commit introduced a preemption warning for
perf_clock(), use raw_smp_processor_id() to avoid this, it
really doesn't matter which cpu we use here.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
LKML-Reference: <1267198583.22519.684.camel@laptop>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
commit a9c9b4429df437982d2fbfab1f4b46b01329e9ed upstream.
The hibernate memory preallocation code allocates memory to push some
user space data out of physical RAM, so that the hibernation image is
not too large. It allocates more memory than necessary for creating
the image, so it has to release some pages to make room for
allocations made while suspending devices and disabling nonboot CPUs,
or the system will hang due to the lack of free pages to allocate
from. Unfortunately, the function used for freeing these pages,
free_unnecessary_pages(), contains a bug that prevents it from doing
the job on all systems without highmem.
Fix this problem, which is a regression from the 2.6.30 kernel, by
using the right condition for the termination of the loop in
free_unnecessary_pages().
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Reported-and-tested-by: Alan Jenkins <sourcejedi.lkml@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
find_task_by_vpid() is not safe without rcu_read_lock(). 2.6.33-rc7 got
RCU protection for sys_setpriority() but missed it for sys_getpriority().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'perf-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
perf probe: Init struct probe_point and set counter correctly
hw-breakpoint: Keep track of dr7 local enable bits
hw-breakpoints: Accept breakpoints on NULL address
perf_events: Fix FORK events
|
|
This patch fixes following sparse warnings:
include/linux/kfifo.h:127:25: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
kernel/kfifo.c:83:21: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
Signed-off-by: Anton Vorontsov <avorontsov@ru.mvista.com>
Acked-by: Stefani Seibold <stefani@seibold.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
After kfifo rework it's no longer possible to reliably know if kfifo is
usable, since after kfifo_free(), kfifo_initialized() would still return
true. The correct behaviour is needed for at least FHCI USB driver.
This patch fixes the issue by resetting the kfifo to zero values (the
same approach is used in kfifo_alloc() if allocation failed).
Signed-off-by: Anton Vorontsov <avorontsov@ru.mvista.com>
Acked-by: Stefani Seibold <stefani@seibold.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'timers-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
hrtimer, softirq: Fix hrtimer->softirq trampoline
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'tracing-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
tracing/kprobes: Fix probe parsing
tracing: Fix circular dead lock in stack trace
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'perf-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
perf top: Fix help text alignment
perf: Fix hypervisor sample reporting
perf: Make bp_len type to u64 generic across the arch
|
|
Commit 22e19085 ("Honour event state for aux stream data")
introduced a bug where we would drop FORK events.
The thing is that we deliver FORK events to the child process'
event, which at that time will be PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE
because the child won't be scheduled in (we're in the middle of
fork).
Solve this twice, change the event state filter to exclude only
disabled (STATE_OFF) or worse, and deliver FORK events to the
current (parent).
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
LKML-Reference: <1266142324.5273.411.camel@laptop>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
|
Trying to add a probe like:
echo p:myprobe 0x10000 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
will fail since the wrong pointer is passed to strict_strtoul
when trying to convert the address to an unsigned long.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
LKML-Reference: <20100210162346.GA6933@osiris.boeblingen.de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
|
Export getboottime and monotonic_to_bootbased in order to let them
could be used by following patch.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'core-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
futex: Handle futex value corruption gracefully
futex: Handle user space corruption gracefully
futex_lock_pi() key refcnt fix
softlockup: Add sched_clock_tick() to avoid kernel warning on kgdb resume
|
|
Change 'bp_len' type to __u64 to make it work across archs as
the s390 architecture watch point length can be upto 2^64.
reference:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/1/25/212
This is an ABI change that is not backward compatible with
the previous hardware breakpoint info layout integrated in this
development cycle, a rebuilt of perf tools is necessary for
versions based on 2.6.33-rc1 - 2.6.33-rc6 to work with a
kernel based on this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com>
Cc: "K. Prasad" <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Maneesh Soni <maneesh@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
LKML-Reference: <20100130045518.GA20776@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
|
|
hrtimers callbacks are always done from hardirq context, either the
jiffy tick interrupt or the hrtimer device interrupt.
[ there is currently one exception that can still call a hrtimer
callback from softirq, but even in that case this will still
work correctly. ]
Reported-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Yury Polyanskiy <ypolyans@princeton.edu>
Tested-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
LKML-Reference: <1265120401.24455.306.camel@laptop>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
|
|
The WARN_ON in lookup_pi_state which complains about a mismatch
between pi_state->owner->pid and the pid which we retrieved from the
user space futex is completely bogus.
The code just emits the warning and then continues despite the fact
that it detected an inconsistent state of the futex. A conveniant way
for user space to spam the syslog.
Replace the WARN_ON by a consistency check. If the values do not match
return -EINVAL and let user space deal with the mess it created.
This also fixes the missing task_pid_vnr() when we compare the
pi_state->owner pid with the futex value.
Reported-by: Jermome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
|
|
If the owner of a PI futex dies we fix up the pi_state and set
pi_state->owner to NULL. When a malicious or just sloppy programmed
user space application sets the futex value to 0 e.g. by calling
pthread_mutex_init(), then the futex can be acquired again. A new
waiter manages to enqueue itself on the pi_state w/o damage, but on
unlock the kernel dereferences pi_state->owner and oopses.
Prevent this by checking pi_state->owner in the unlock path. If
pi_state->owner is not current we know that user space manipulated the
futex value. Ignore the mess and return -EINVAL.
This catches the above case and also the case where a task hijacks the
futex by setting the tid value and then tries to unlock it.
Reported-by: Jermome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
|
|
This fixes a futex key reference count bug in futex_lock_pi(),
where a key's reference count is incremented twice but decremented
only once, causing the backing object to not be released.
If the futex is created in a temporary file in an ext3 file system,
this bug causes the file's inode to become an "undead" orphan,
which causes an oops from a BUG_ON() in ext3_put_super() when the
file system is unmounted. glibc's test suite is known to trigger this,
see <http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14256>.
The bug is a regression from 2.6.28-git3, namely Peter Zijlstra's
38d47c1b7075bd7ec3881141bb3629da58f88dab "[PATCH] futex: rely on
get_user_pages() for shared futexes". That commit made get_futex_key()
also increment the reference count of the futex key, and updated its
callers to decrement the key's reference count before returning.
Unfortunately the normal exit path in futex_lock_pi() wasn't corrected:
the reference count is incremented by get_futex_key() and queue_lock(),
but the normal exit path only decrements once, via unqueue_me_pi().
The fix is to put_futex_key() after unqueue_me_pi(), since 2.6.31
this is easily done by 'goto out_put_key' rather than 'goto out'.
Signed-off-by: Mikael Pettersson <mikpe@it.uu.se>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
kernel/cred.c: use kmem_cache_free
|
|
In cgroup_create(), if alloc_css_id() returns failure, the errno is not
propagated to userspace, so mkdir will fail silently.
To trigger this bug, we mount blkio (or memory subsystem), and create more
then 65534 cgroups. (The number of cgroups is limited to 65535 if a
subsystem has use_id == 1)
# mount -t cgroup -o blkio xxx /mnt
# for ((i = 0; i < 65534; i++)); do mkdir /mnt/$i; done
# mkdir /mnt/65534
(should return ENOSPC)
#
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Fix kfifo kernel-doc warnings:
Warning(kernel/kfifo.c:361): No description found for parameter 'total'
Warning(kernel/kfifo.c:402): bad line: @ @lenout: pointer to output variable with copied data
Warning(kernel/kfifo.c:412): No description found for parameter 'lenout'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: Stefani Seibold <stefani@seibold.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Free memory allocated using kmem_cache_zalloc using kmem_cache_free rather
than kfree.
The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)
// <smpl>
@@
expression x,E,c;
@@
x = \(kmem_cache_alloc\|kmem_cache_zalloc\|kmem_cache_alloc_node\)(c,...)
... when != x = E
when != &x
?-kfree(x)
+kmem_cache_free(c,x)
// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
When we cat <debugfs>/tracing/stack_trace, we may cause circular lock:
sys_read()
t_start()
arch_spin_lock(&max_stack_lock);
t_show()
seq_printf(), vsnprintf() .... /* they are all trace-able,
when they are traced, max_stack_lock may be required again. */
The following script can trigger this circular dead lock very easy:
#!/bin/bash
echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/stack_tracer_enabled
mount -t debugfs xxx /mnt > /dev/null 2>&1
(
# make check_stack() zealous to require max_stack_lock
for ((; ;))
{
echo 1 > /mnt/tracing/stack_max_size
}
) &
for ((; ;))
{
cat /mnt/tracing/stack_trace > /dev/null
}
To fix this bug, we increase the percpu trace_active before
require the lock.
Reported-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
LKML-Reference: <4B67D4F9.9080905@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'core-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
lockdep: Fix check_usage_backwards() error message
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'perf-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
perf, hw_breakpoint, kgdb: Do not take mutex for kernel debugger
x86, hw_breakpoints, kgdb: Fix kgdb to use hw_breakpoint API
hw_breakpoints: Release the bp slot if arch_validate_hwbkpt_settings() fails.
perf: Ignore perf.data.old
perf report: Fix segmentation fault when running with '-g none'
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'sched-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
sched: Correct printk whitespace in warning from cpu down task check
sched: Fix incorrect sanity check
sched: Fix fork vs hotplug vs cpuset namespaces
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'timers-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
clocksource: Prevent potential kgdb dead lock
|
|
When CONFIG_HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK is set, sched_clock() gets
the time from hardware such as the TSC on x86. In this
configuration kgdb will report a softlock warning message on
resuming or detaching from a debug session.
Sequence of events in the problem case:
1) "cpu sched clock" and "hardware time" are at 100 sec prior
to a call to kgdb_handle_exception()
2) Debugger waits in kgdb_handle_exception() for 80 sec and on
exit the following is called ... touch_softlockup_watchdog() -->
__raw_get_cpu_var(touch_timestamp) = 0;
3) "cpu sched clock" = 100s (it was not updated, because the
interrupt was disabled in kgdb) but the "hardware time" = 180 sec
4) The first timer interrupt after resuming from
kgdb_handle_exception updates the watchdog from the "cpu sched clock"
update_process_times() { ... run_local_timers() -->
softlockup_tick() --> check (touch_timestamp == 0) (it is "YES"
here, we have set "touch_timestamp = 0" at kgdb) -->
__touch_softlockup_watchdog() ***(A)--> reset "touch_timestamp"
to "get_timestamp()" (Here, the "touch_timestamp" will still be
set to 100s.) ...
scheduler_tick() ***(B)--> sched_clock_tick() (update "cpu sched
clock" to "hardware time" = 180s) ... }
5) The Second timer interrupt handler appears to have a large
jump and trips the softlockup warning.
update_process_times() { ... run_local_timers() -->
softlockup_tick() --> "cpu sched clock" - "touch_timestamp" =
180s-100s > 60s --> printk "soft lockup error messages" ... }
note: ***(A) reset "touch_timestamp" to
"get_timestamp(this_cpu)"
Why is "touch_timestamp" 100 sec, instead of 180 sec?
When CONFIG_HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK is set, the call trace of
get_timestamp() is:
get_timestamp(this_cpu)
-->cpu_clock(this_cpu)
-->sched_clock_cpu(this_cpu)
-->__update_sched_clock(sched_clock_data, now)
The __update_sched_clock() function uses the GTOD tick value to
create a window to normalize the "now" values. So if "now"
value is too big for sched_clock_data, it will be ignored.
The fix is to invoke sched_clock_tick() to update "cpu sched
clock" in order to recover from this state. This is done by
introducing the function touch_softlockup_watchdog_sync(). This
allows kgdb to request that the sched clock is updated when the
watchdog thread runs the first time after a resume from kgdb.
[yong.zhang0@gmail.com: Use per cpu instead of an array]
Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Dongdong Deng <Dongdong.Deng@windriver.com>
Cc: kgdb-bugreport@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
LKML-Reference: <1264631124-4837-2-git-send-email-jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
|
This patch fixes the regression in functionality where the
kernel debugger and the perf API do not nicely share hw
breakpoint reservations.
The kernel debugger cannot use any mutex_lock() calls because it
can start the kernel running from an invalid context.
A mutex free version of the reservation API needed to get
created for the kernel debugger to safely update hw breakpoint
reservations.
The possibility for a breakpoint reservation to be concurrently
processed at the time that kgdb interrupts the system is
improbable. Should this corner case occur the end user is
warned, and the kernel debugger will prohibit updating the
hardware breakpoint reservations.
Any time the kernel debugger reserves a hardware breakpoint it
will be a system wide reservation.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: kgdb-bugreport@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: K.Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
LKML-Reference: <1264719883-7285-3-git-send-email-jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
|
In the 2.6.33 kernel, the hw_breakpoint API is now used for the
performance event counters. The hw_breakpoint_handler() now
consumes the hw breakpoints that were previously set by kgdb
arch specific code. In order for kgdb to work in conjunction
with this core API change, kgdb must use some of the low level
functions of the hw_breakpoint API to install, uninstall, and
deal with hw breakpoint reservations.
The kgdb core required a change to call kgdb_disable_hw_debug
anytime a slave cpu enters kgdb_wait() in order to keep all the
hw breakpoints in sync as well as to prevent hitting a hw
breakpoint while kgdb is active.
During the architecture specific initialization of kgdb, it will
pre-allocate 4 disabled (struct perf event **) structures. Kgdb
will use these to manage the capabilities for the 4 hw
breakpoint registers, per cpu. Right now the hw_breakpoint API
does not have a way to ask how many breakpoints are available,
on each CPU so it is possible that the install of a breakpoint
might fail when kgdb restores the system to the run state. The
intent of this patch is to first get the basic functionality of
hw breakpoints working and leave it to the person debugging the
kernel to understand what hw breakpoints are in use and what
restrictions have been imposed as a result. Breakpoint
constraints will be dealt with in a future patch.
While atomic, the x86 specific kgdb code will call
arch_uninstall_hw_breakpoint() and arch_install_hw_breakpoint()
to manage the cpu specific hw breakpoints.
The net result of these changes allow kgdb to use the same pool
of hw_breakpoints that are used by the perf event API, but
neither knows about future reservations for the available hw
breakpoint slots.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: kgdb-bugreport@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: K.Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
LKML-Reference: <1264719883-7285-2-git-send-email-jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
|
On a given architecture, when hardware breakpoint registration fails
due to un-supported access type (read/write/execute), we lose the bp
slot since register_perf_hw_breakpoint() does not release the bp slot
on failure.
Hence, any subsequent hardware breakpoint registration starts failing
with 'no space left on device' error.
This patch introduces error handling in register_perf_hw_breakpoint()
function and releases bp slot on error.
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com>
Cc: K. Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Maneesh Soni <maneesh@in.ibm.com>
LKML-Reference: <20100121125516.GA32521@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
|
