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commit 2bc3c1179c781b359d4f2f3439cb3df72afc17fc upstream.
When read_buf is called to move over to the next page in the pagelist
of an NFSv4 request, it sets argp->end to essentially a random
number, certainly not an address within the page which argp->p now
points to. So subsequent calls to READ_BUF will think there is much
more than a page of spare space (the cast to u32 ensures an unsigned
comparison) so we can expect to fall off the end of the second
page.
We never encountered thsi in testing because typically the only
operations which use more than two pages are write-like operations,
which have their own decoding logic. Something like a getattr after a
write may cross a page boundary, but it would be very unusual for it to
cross another boundary after that.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit fb2162df74bb19552db3d988fd11c787cf5fad56 upstream.
Commit 48b32a3553a54740d236b79a90f20147a25875e3 ("reiserfs: use generic
xattr handlers") introduced a problem that causes corruption when extended
attributes are replaced with a smaller value.
The issue is that the reiserfs_setattr to shrink the xattr file was moved
from before the write to after the write.
The root issue has always been in the reiserfs xattr code, but was papered
over by the fact that in the shrink case, the file would just be expanded
again while the xattr was written.
The end result is that the last 8 bytes of xattr data are lost.
This patch fixes it to use new_size.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14826
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Reported-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Tested-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Cc: Edward Shishkin <edward.shishkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Jethro Beekman <kernel@jbeekman.nl>
Cc: Greg Surbey <gregsurbey@hotmail.com>
Cc: Marco Gatti <marco.gatti@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit cac36f707119b792b2396aed371d6b5cdc194890 upstream.
Commit 677c9b2e393a0cd203bd54e9c18b012b2c73305a ("reiserfs: remove
privroot hiding in lookup") removed the magic from the lookup code to hide
the .reiserfs_priv directory since it was getting loaded at mount-time
instead. The intent was that the entry would be hidden from the user via
a poisoned d_compare, but this was faulty.
This introduced a security issue where unprivileged users could access and
modify extended attributes or ACLs belonging to other users, including
root.
This patch resolves the issue by properly hiding .reiserfs_priv. This was
the intent of the xattr poisoning code, but it appears to have never
worked as expected. This is fixed by using d_revalidate instead of
d_compare.
This patch makes -oexpose_privroot a no-op. I'm fine leaving it this way.
The effort involved in working out the corner cases wrt permissions and
caching outweigh the benefit of the feature.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Acked-by: Edward Shishkin <edward.shishkin@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Matt McCutchen <matt@mattmccutchen.net>
Tested-by: Matt McCutchen <matt@mattmccutchen.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit a1de02dccf906faba2ee2d99cac56799bda3b96a upstream.
The "offset" member in ext4_io_end holds bytes, not blocks, so
ext4_lblk_t is wrong - and too small (u32).
This caused the async i/o writes to sparse files beyond 4GB to fail
when they wrapped around to 0.
Also fix up the type of arguments to ext4_convert_unwritten_extents(),
it gets ssize_t from ext4_end_aio_dio_nolock() and
ext4_ext_direct_IO().
Reported-by: Giel de Nijs <giel@vectorwise.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: maximilian attems <max@stro.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c8afb44682fcef6273e8b8eb19fab13ddd05b386 upstream.
Creating many small files in rapid succession on a small
filesystem can lead to spurious ENOSPC; on a 104MB filesystem:
for i in `seq 1 22500`; do
echo -n > $SCRATCH_MNT/$i
echo XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX > $SCRATCH_MNT/$i
done
leads to ENOSPC even though after a sync, 40% of the fs is free
again.
This is because we reserve worst-case metadata for delalloc writes,
and when data is allocated that worst-case reservation is not
usually needed.
When freespace is low, kicking off an async writeback will start
converting that worst-case space usage into something more realistic,
almost always freeing up space to continue.
This resolves the testcase for me, and survives all 4 generic
ENOSPC tests in xfstests.
We'll still need a hard synchronous sync to squeeze out the last bit,
but this fixes things up to a large degree.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: maximilian attems <max@stro.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 17bd55d037a02b04d9119511cfd1a4b985d20f63 upstream.
ext4, at least, would like to start pushing on writeback if it starts
to get close to ENOSPC when reserving worst-case blocks for delalloc
writes. Writing out delalloc data will convert those worst-case
predictions into usually smaller actual usage, freeing up space
before we hit ENOSPC based on this speculation.
Thanks to Jens for the suggestion for the helper function,
& the naming help.
I've made the helper return status on whether writeback was
started even though I don't plan to use it in the ext4 patch;
it seems like it would be potentially useful to test this
in some cases.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: maximilian attems <max@stro.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit cfce08c6bdfb20ade979284e55001ca1f100ed51 upstream.
If the lower file system driver has extended attributes disabled,
ecryptfs' own access functions return -ENOSYS instead of -EOPNOTSUPP.
This breaks execution of programs in the ecryptfs mount, since the
kernel expects the latter error when checking for security
capabilities in xattrs.
Signed-off-by: Christian Pulvermacher <pulvermacher@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 3a60a1686f0d51c99bd0df8ac93050fb6dfce647 upstream.
Create a getattr handler for eCryptfs symlinks that is capable of
reading the lower target and decrypting its path. Prior to this patch,
a stat's st_size field would represent the strlen of the encrypted path,
while readlink() would return the strlen of the decrypted path. This
could lead to confusion in some userspace applications, since the two
values should be equal.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/524919
Reported-by: Loïc Minier <loic.minier@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 133b8f9d632cc23715c6d72d1c5ac449e054a12a upstream.
Since tmpfs has no persistent storage, it pins all its dentries in memory
so they have d_count=1 when other file systems would have d_count=0.
->lookup is only used to create new dentries. If the caller doesn't
instantiate it, it's freed immediately at dput(). ->readdir reads
directly from the dcache and depends on the dentries being hashed.
When an ecryptfs mount is mounted, it associates the lower file and dentry
with the ecryptfs files as they're accessed. When it's umounted and
destroys all the in-memory ecryptfs inodes, it fput's the lower_files and
d_drop's the lower_dentries. Commit 4981e081 added this and a d_delete in
2008 and several months later commit caeeeecf removed the d_delete. I
believe the d_drop() needs to be removed as well.
The d_drop effectively hides any file that has been accessed via ecryptfs
from the underlying tmpfs since it depends on it being hashed for it to
be accessible. I've removed the d_drop on my development node and see no
ill effects with basic testing on both tmpfs and persistent storage.
As a side effect, after ecryptfs d_drops the dentries on tmpfs, tmpfs
BUGs on umount. This is due to the dentries being unhashed.
tmpfs->kill_sb is kill_litter_super which calls d_genocide to drop
the reference pinning the dentry. It skips unhashed and negative dentries,
but shrink_dcache_for_umount_subtree doesn't. Since those dentries
still have an elevated d_count, we get a BUG().
This patch removes the d_drop call and fixes both issues.
This issue was reported at:
https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=567887
Reported-by: Árpád Bíró <biroa@demasz.hu>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit f78233dd44a110c574fe760ad6f9c1e8741a0d00 upstream.
While investigating a bug, I came across a possible bug in v9fs. The
problem is similar to the one reported for NFS by ASANO Masahiro in
http://lkml.org/lkml/2005/12/21/334.
v9fs_file_lock() will skip locks on file which has mode set to 02666.
This is a problem in cases where the mode of the file is changed after
a process has obtained a lock on the file. Such a lock will be skipped
during unlock and the machine will end up with a BUG in
locks_remove_flock().
v9fs_file_lock() should skip the check for mandatory locks when
unlocking a file.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Cc: maximilian attems <max@stro.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 78c37eb0d5e6a9727b12ea0f1821795ffaa66cfe upstream.
In ocfs2_validate_gd_parent, we check bg_chain against the
cl_next_free_rec of the dinode. Actually in resize, we have
the chance of bg_chain == cl_next_free_rec. So add some
additional condition check for it.
I also rename paramter "clean_error" to "resize", since the
old one is not clearly enough to indicate that we should only
meet with this case in resize.
btw, the correpsonding bug is
http://oss.oracle.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=1230.
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <tao.ma@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Cc: maximilian attems <max@stro.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit fcefd25ac89239cb57fa198f125a79ff85468c75 upstream.
ocfs2_set_acl() and ocfs2_init_acl() were setting i_mode on the in-memory
inode, but never setting it on the disk copy. Thus, acls were some times not
getting propagated between nodes. This patch fixes the issue by adding a
helper function ocfs2_acl_set_mode() which does this the right way.
ocfs2_set_acl() and ocfs2_init_acl() are then updated to call
ocfs2_acl_set_mode().
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Cc: maximilian attems <max@stro.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 08261673cb6dc638c39f44d69b76fffb57b92a8b upstream.
dq_flags are modified non-atomically in do_set_dqblk via __set_bit calls and
atomically for example in mark_dquot_dirty or clear_dquot_dirty. Hence a
change done by an atomic operation can be overwritten by a change done by a
non-atomic one. Fix the problem by using atomic bitops even in do_set_dqblk.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Perepechko <andrew.perepechko@sun.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 462d60577a997aa87c935ae4521bd303733a9f2b upstream.
RFC says we need to follow the chain of mounts if there's more
than one stacked on that point.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 0df5dd4aae211edeeeb84f7f84f6d093406d7c22 upstream.
Arnaud Giersch reports that NFSv4 locking is broken when we hold a
delegation since commit 8e469ebd6dc32cbaf620e134d79f740bf0ebab79 (NFSv4:
Don't allow posix locking against servers that don't support it).
According to Arnaud, the lock succeeds the first time he opens the file
(since we cannot do a delegated open) but then fails after we start using
delegated opens.
The following patch fixes it by ensuring that locking behaviour is
governed by a per-filesystem capability flag that is initially set, but
gets cleared if the server ever returns an OPEN without the
NFS4_OPEN_RESULT_LOCKTYPE_POSIX flag being set.
Reported-by: Arnaud Giersch <arnaud.giersch@iut-bm.univ-fcomte.fr>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 80e60639f1b7c121a7fea53920c5a4b94009361a upstream.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit a24e2d7d8f512340991ef0a59cb5d08d491b8e98 upstream.
By doing this we always overwrite nbytes value that is being passed on to
CIFSSMBWrite() and need not rely on the callers to initialize. CIFSSMBWrite2 is
doing this already.
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 6513a81e9325d712f1bfb9a1d7b750134e49ff18 upstream.
While chasing a bug report involving a OS/2 server, I noticed the server sets
pSMBr->CountHigh to a incorrect value even in case of normal writes. This
results in 'nbytes' being computed wrongly and triggers a kernel BUG at
mm/filemap.c.
void iov_iter_advance(struct iov_iter *i, size_t bytes)
{
BUG_ON(i->count < bytes); <--- BUG here
Why the server is setting 'CountHigh' is not clear but only does so after
writing 64k bytes. Though this looks like the server bug, the client side
crash may not be acceptable.
The workaround is to mask off high 16 bits if the number of bytes written as
returned by the server is greater than the bytes requested by the client as
suggested by Jeff Layton.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit d965736b8cb42ae51ba9c3f13488035a98d025c6 upstream.
ext3_xattr_set_handle() was zeroing out an inode outside
of journaling constraints; this is one of the accesses that
was causing the crc errors in journal replay as seen in
kernel.org bugzilla #14354.
Although ext3 doesn't have the crc issue, modifications
out of journal control are a Bad Thing.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: maximilian attems <max@stro.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit b918397542388de75bd86c32fbfa820e5d629fa9 upstream.
commit a71ce8c6c9bf269b192f352ea555217815cf027e updated ext3_statfs()
to update the on-disk superblock counters, but modified this buffer
directly without any journaling of the change. This is one of the
accesses that was causing the crc errors in journal replay as seen in
kernel.org bugzilla #14354.
The modifications were originally to keep the sb "more" in sync,
so that a readonly fsck of the device didn't flag this as an
error (as often), but apparently e2fsprogs deals with this differently
now, anyway.
Based on Ted's patch for ext4, which was in turn based on my
work on that bug and another preliminary patch...
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: maximilian attems <max@stro.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 55ab3a1ff843e3f0e24d2da44e71bffa5d853010 upstream.
Commit 148f948ba877f4d3cdef036b1ff6d9f68986706a (vfs: Introduce new
helpers for syncing after writing to O_SYNC file or IS_SYNC inode) broke
the raw driver.
We now call through generic_file_aio_write -> generic_write_sync ->
vfs_fsync_range. vfs_fsync_range has:
if (!fop || !fop->fsync) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
But drivers/char/raw.c doesn't set an fsync method.
We have two options: fix it or remove the raw driver completely. I'm
happy to do either, the fact this has been broken for so long suggests it
is rarely used.
The patch below adds an fsync method to the raw driver. My knowledge of
the block layer is pretty sketchy so this could do with a once over.
If we instead decide to remove the raw driver, this patch might still be
useful as a backport to 2.6.33 and 2.6.32.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit f1f724e4b523d444c5a598d74505aefa3d6844d2 upstream
The radix-tree code requires it's users to serialize tag updates
against other updates to the tree. While XFS protects tag updates
against each other it does not serialize them against updates of the
tree contents, which can lead to tag corruption. Fix the inode
cache to always take pag_ici_lock in exclusive mode when updating
radix tree tags.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reported-by: Patrick Schreurs <patrick@news-service.com>
Tested-by: Patrick Schreurs <patrick@news-service.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 77d7a0c2eeb285c9069e15396703d0cb9690ac50 upstream
The introduction of barriers to loop devices has created a new IO
order completion dependency that XFS does not handle. The loop
device implements barriers using fsync and so turns a log IO in the
XFS filesystem on the loop device into a data IO in the backing
filesystem. That is, the completion of log IOs in the loop
filesystem are now dependent on completion of data IO in the backing
filesystem.
This can cause deadlocks when a flush daemon issues a log force with
an inode locked because the IO completion of IO on the inode is
blocked by the inode lock. This in turn prevents further data IO
completion from occuring on all XFS filesystems on that CPU (due to
the shared nature of the completion queues). This then prevents the
log IO from completing because the log is waiting for data IO
completion as well.
The fix for this new completion order dependency issue is to make
the IO completion inode locking non-blocking. If the inode lock
can't be grabbed, simply requeue the IO completion back to the work
queue so that it can be processed later. This prevents the
completion queue from being blocked and allows data IO completion on
other inodes to proceed, hence avoiding completion order dependent
deadlocks.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit e8b217e7530c6a073ac69f1c85b922d93fdf5647 upstream
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2010 10:16:26 +1100
We always need to flush the disk write cache and can't skip it just because
the no inode attributes have changed.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit cbe132a8bdcff0f9afd9060948fb50597c7400b8 upstream
If we hold onto reserved blocks when doing a remount,ro we end
up writing the blocks used count to disk that includes the reserved
blocks. Reserved blocks are not actually used, so this results in
the values in the superblock being incorrect.
Hence if we run xfs_check or xfs_repair -n while the filesystem is
mounted remount,ro we end up with an inconsistent filesystem being
reported. Also, running xfs_copy on the remount,ro filesystem will
result in an inconsistent image being generated.
To fix this, unreserve the blocks when doing the remount,ro, and
reserved them again on remount,rw. This way a remount,ro filesystem
will appear consistent on disk to all utilities.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 9b00f30762fe9f914eb6e03057a616ed63a4e8ca upstream
A "df" run on an NFS client of an exported XFS file system reports
the wrong information for "available" blocks. When a block quota is
enforced, the amount reported as free is limited by the quota, but
the amount reported available is not (and should be).
Reported-by: Guk-Bong, Kwon <gbkwon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit e09f98606dcc156de1146c209d45a0d6d5f51c3f upstream
When swapping extents, we can corrupt inodes by swapping data forks
that are in incompatible formats. This is caused by the two indoes
having different fork offsets due to the presence of an attribute
fork on an attr2 filesystem. xfs_fsr tries to be smart about
setting the fork offset, but the trick it plays only works on attr1
(old fixed format attribute fork) filesystems.
Changing the way xfs_fsr sets up the attribute fork will prevent
this situation from ever occurring, so in the kernel code we can get
by with a preventative fix - check that the data fork in the
defragmented inode is in a format valid for the inode it is being
swapped into. This will lead to files that will silently and
potentially repeatedly fail defragmentation, so issue a warning to
the log when this particular failure occurs to let us know that
xfs_fsr needs updating/fixing.
To help identify how to improve xfs_fsr to avoid this issue, add
trace points for the inodes being swapped so that we can determine
why the swap was rejected and to confirm that the code is making the
right decisions and modifications when swapping forks.
A further complication is even when the swap is allowed to proceed
when the fork offset is different between the two inodes then value
for the maximum number of extents the data fork can hold can be
wrong. Make sure these are also set correctly after the swap occurs.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 4b6a46882cca8349e8942e2650c33b11bc571c92 upstream
When reclaiming stale inodes, we need to guarantee that inodes are
unpinned before returning with a "clean" status. If we don't we can
reclaim inodes that are pinned, leading to use after free in the
transaction subsystem as transactions complete.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 57817c68229984818fea9e614d6f95249c3fb098 upstream
We cannot do direct inode reclaim without taking the flush lock to
ensure that we do not reclaim an inode under IO. We check the inode
is clean before doing direct reclaim, but this is not good enough
because the inode flush code marks the inode clean once it has
copied the in-core dirty state to the backing buffer.
It is the flush lock that determines whether the inode is still
under IO, even though it is marked clean, and the inode is still
required at IO completion so we can't reclaim it even though it is
clean in core. Hence the requirement that we need to take the flush
lock even on clean inodes because this guarantees that the inode
writeback IO has completed and it is safe to reclaim the inode.
With delayed write inode flushing, we could end up waiting a long
time on the flush lock even for a clean inode. The background
reclaim already handles this efficiently, so avoid all the problems
by killing the direct reclaim path altogether.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 018027be90a6946e8cf3f9b17b5582384f7ed117 upstream
The reclaim code will handle flushing of dirty inodes before reclaim
occurs, so avoid them when determining whether an inode is a
candidate for flushing to disk when walking the radix trees. This
is based on a test patch from Christoph Hellwig.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c8e20be020f234c8d492927a424a7d8bbefd5b5d upstream
Make the inode tree reclaim walk exclusive to avoid races with
concurrent sync walkers and lookups. This is a version of a patch
posted by Christoph Hellwig that avoids all the code duplication.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit fd45e4784164d1017521086524e3442318c67370 upstream
When we search for and find a busy extent during allocation we
force the log out to ensure the extent free transaction is on
disk before the allocation transaction. The current implementation
has a subtle bug in it--it does not handle multiple overlapping
ranges.
That is, if we free lots of little extents into a single
contiguous extent, then allocate the contiguous extent, the busy
search code stops searching at the first extent it finds that
overlaps the allocated range. It then uses the commit LSN of the
transaction to force the log out to.
Unfortunately, the other busy ranges might have more recent
commit LSNs than the first busy extent that is found, and this
results in xfs_alloc_search_busy() returning before all the
extent free transactions are on disk for the range being
allocated. This can lead to potential metadata corruption or
stale data exposure after a crash because log replay won't replay
all the extent free transactions that cover the allocation range.
Modified-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
(Dropped the "found" argument from the xfs_alloc_busysearch trace
event.)
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 44e08c45cc14e6190a424be8d450070c8e508fad upstream
Because inodes remain in cache much longer than inode buffers do
under memory pressure, we can get the situation where we have
stale, dirty inodes being reclaimed but the backing storage has
been freed. Hence we should never, ever flush XFS_ISTALE inodes
to disk as there is no guarantee that the backing buffer is in
cache and still marked stale when the flush occurs.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit d6d59bada372bcf8bd36c3bbc71c485c29dd2a4b upstream
We currently have some rather odd code in xfs_setattr for
updating the a/c/mtime timestamps:
- first we do a non-transaction update if all three are updated
together
- second we implicitly update the ctime for various changes
instead of relying on the ATTR_CTIME flag
- third we set the timestamps to the current time instead of the
arguments in the iattr structure in many cases.
This patch makes sure we update it in a consistent way:
- always transactional
- ctime is only updated if ATTR_CTIME is set or we do a size
update, which is a special case
- always to the times passed in from the caller instead of the
current time
The only non-size caller of xfs_setattr that doesn't come from
the VFS is updated to set ATTR_CTIME and pass in a valid ctime
value.
Reported-by: Eric Blake <ebb9@byu.net>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit b44b1126279b60597f96bbe77507b1650f88a969 upstream
Add an assert for inodes not added to the inode cache in xfs_ireclaim,
to make sure we're not going to introduce something like the
famous nfsd inode cache bug again.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 44a743f68705c681439f264deb05f8f38e9048d3 upstream
Noticed that through glibc fallocate would return 28 rather than -1
and errno = 28 for ENOSPC. The xfs routines uses XFS_ERROR format
positive return error codes while the syscalls use negative return
codes. Fixup the two cases in xfs_vn_fallocate syscall to convert to
negative.
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@sandeen.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit fc5bc4c85c45f0bf854404e5736aa8b65720a18d upstream
Summary of problem:
If a journal record wraps at the physical end of the journal, it has to be
read in two parts in xlog_do_recovery_pass(): a read at the physical end and a
read at the physical beginning. If xlog_bread() has to re-align the first
read, the second read request does not take that re-alignment into account.
If the first read was re-aligned, the second read over-writes the end of the
data from the first read, effectively corrupting it. This can happen either
when reading the record header or reading the record data.
The first sanity check in xlog_recover_process_data() is to check for a valid
clientid, so that is the error reported.
Summary of fix:
If there was a first read at the physical end, XFS_BUF_PTR() returns where the
data was requested to begin. Conversely, because it is the result of
xlog_align(), offset indicates where the requested data for the first read
actually begins - whether or not xlog_bread() has re-aligned it.
Using offset as the base for the calculation of where to place the second read
data ensures that it will be correctly placed immediately following the data
from the first read instead of sometimes over-writing the end of it.
The attached patch has resolved the reported problem of occasional inability
to recover the journal (reporting "bad clientid").
Signed-off-by: Andy Poling <andy@realbig.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 80641dc66a2d6dfb22af4413227a92b8ab84c7bb upstream
When completing I/O requests we must not allow the memory allocator to
recurse into the filesystem, as we might deadlock on waiting for the
I/O completion otherwise. The only thing currently allocating normal
GFP_KERNEL memory is the allocation of the transaction structure for
the unwritten extent conversion. Add a memflags argument to
_xfs_trans_alloc to allow controlling the allocator behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reported-by: Thomas Neumann <tneumann@users.sourceforge.net>
Tested-by: Thomas Neumann <tneumann@users.sourceforge.net>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c56c9631cbe88f08854a56ff9776c1f310916830 upstream
When xfs_free_eofblocks is called from ->release the VM might already
hold the mmap_sem, but in the write path we take the iolock before
taking the mmap_sem in the generic write code.
Switch xfs_free_eofblocks to only trylock the iolock if called from
->release and skip trimming the prellocated blocks in that case.
We'll still free them later on the final iput.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 848ce8f731aed0a2d4ab5884a4f6664af73d2dd0 upstream
Currently the reclaim code for the case where we don't reclaim the
final reclaim is overly complicated. We know that the inode is clean
but instead of just directly reclaiming the clean inode we go through
the whole process of marking the inode reclaimable just to directly
reclaim it from the calling context. Besides being overly complicated
this introduces a race where iget could recycle an inode between
marked reclaimable and actually being reclaimed leading to panics.
This patch gets rid of the existing reclaim path, and replaces it with
a simple call to xfs_ireclaim if the inode was clean. While we're at
it we also use the slightly more lax xfs_inode_clean check we'd use
later to determine if we need to flush the inode here.
Finally get rid of xfs_reclaim function and place the remaining small
bits of reclaim code directly into xfs_fs_destroy_inode.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reported-by: Patrick Schreurs <patrick@news-service.com>
Reported-by: Tommy van Leeuwen <tommy@news-service.com>
Tested-by: Patrick Schreurs <patrick@news-service.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit b95c35e76b29ba812e5dabdd91592e25ec640e93 upstream.
proc_oom_score(task) has a reference to task_struct, but that is all.
If this task was already released before we take tasklist_lock
- we can't use task->group_leader, it points to nowhere
- it is not safe to call badness() even if this task is
->group_leader, has_intersects_mems_allowed() assumes
it is safe to iterate over ->thread_group list.
- even worse, badness() can hit ->signal == NULL
Add the pid_alive() check to ensure __unhash_process() was not called.
Also, use "task" instead of task->group_leader. badness() should return
the same result for any sub-thread. Currently this is not true, but
this should be changed anyway.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 30d1872d9eb3663b4cf7bdebcbf5cd465674cced upstream.
When using the string representation of a random counter as part of the base
name, ensure that it is no longer than 4 bytes.
Since we are repeatedly decrementing the counter in a loop until we have found a
unique base name, the counter may wrap around zero; therefore, it is not enough
to mask its higher bits before entering the loop, this must be done inside the
loop.
[hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp: use snprintf()]
Signed-off-by: Nikolaus Schulz <microschulz@web.de>
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 720e7749279bde0d08684b1bb4e7a2eedeec6394 upstream.
gfs2_lock() will skip locks on file which have mode set to 02666. This is a problem in cases where the mode of the file is changed after a process has obtained a lock on the file. Such a lock will be skipped and will result in a BUG in locks_remove_flock().
gfs2_lock() should skip the check for mandatory locks when unlocking a file.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 0a5a9c725512461d19397490f3adf29931dca1f2 upstream.
If a delayed-allocation write happens before quota is enabled, the
kernel spits out a warning:
WARNING: at fs/quota/dquot.c:988 dquot_claim_space+0x77/0x112()
because the fact that user has some delayed allocation is not recorded
in quota structure.
Make dquot_initialize() update amount of reserved space for user if it sees
inode has some space reserved. Also make sure that reserved quota space does
not go negative and we warn about the filesystem bug just once.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c469070aea5a0ada45a836937c776fd3083dae2b upstream.
Since we implemented generic reserved space management interface,
then it is possible to account reserved space even when quota
is not active (similar to i_blocks/i_bytes).
Without this patch following testcase result in massive comlain from
WARN_ON in dquot_claim_space()
TEST_CASE:
mount /dev/sdb /mnt -oquota
dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/test bs=1M count=1
quotaon /mnt
# fs_reserved_spave == 1Mb
# quota_reserved_space == 0, because quota was disabled
dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/test seek=1 bs=1M count=1
# fs_reserved_spave == 2Mb
# quota_reserved_space == 1Mb
sync # ->dquot_claim_space() -> WARN_ON
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 8e0cc811e0f8029a7225372fb0951fab102c012f upstream.
Smaller size than a minimum blocksize can't be used, after all it's
handled like 0 size.
For extended partition itself, this makes sure to use bigger size than one
logical sector size at least.
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: Daniel Taylor <Daniel.Taylor@wdc.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 3fbf586cf7f245392142e5407c2a56f1cff979b6 upstream.
In order to use disks larger than 2TiB on Windows XP, it is necessary to
use 4096-byte logical sectors in an MBR.
Although the kernel storage and functions called from msdos.c used
"sector_t" internally, msdos.c still used u32 variables, which results in
the ability to handle XP-compatible large disks.
This patch changes the internal variables to "sector_t".
Daniel said: "In the near future, WD will be releasing products that need
this patch".
[hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp: tweaks and fix]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Taylor <daniel.taylor@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit d812e575822a2b7ab1a7cadae2571505ec6ec2bd upstream.
We should not attempt to free the page if __GFP_FS is not set. Otherwise we
can deadlock as per
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15578
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit bb6fbc4548b9ae7ebbd06ef72f00229df259d217 upstream.
J.R. Okajima reports the following deadlock:
INFO: task kswapd0:305 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
kswapd0 D 0000000000000001 0 305 2 0x00000000
ffff88001f21d4f0 0000000000000046 ffff88001fdea680 ffff88001f21c000
ffff88001f21dfd8 ffff88001f21c000 ffff88001f21dfd8 ffff88001f21dfd8
ffff88001fdea040 0000000000014c00 0000000000000001 ffff88001fdea040
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8146155d>] io_schedule+0x4d/0x70
[<ffffffff810d2be5>] sync_page+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81461b12>] __wait_on_bit_lock+0x52/0xb0
[<ffffffff810d2b80>] ? sync_page+0x0/0xa0
[<ffffffff810d2b64>] __lock_page+0x64/0x70
[<ffffffff81070ce0>] ? wake_bit_function+0x0/0x40
[<ffffffff810df1d4>] truncate_inode_pages_range+0x344/0x4a0
[<ffffffff810df340>] truncate_inode_pages+0x10/0x20
[<ffffffff8112cbfe>] generic_delete_inode+0x15e/0x190
[<ffffffff8112cc8d>] generic_drop_inode+0x5d/0x80
[<ffffffff8112bb88>] iput+0x78/0x80
[<ffffffff811bc908>] nfs_dentry_iput+0x38/0x50
[<ffffffff811285f4>] dentry_iput+0x84/0x110
[<ffffffff811286ae>] d_kill+0x2e/0x60
[<ffffffff8112912a>] dput+0x7a/0x170
[<ffffffff8111e925>] path_put+0x15/0x40
[<ffffffff811c3a44>] __put_nfs_open_context+0xa4/0xb0
[<ffffffff811cb5d0>] ? nfs_free_request+0x0/0x50
[<ffffffff811c3b0b>] put_nfs_open_context+0xb/0x10
[<ffffffff811cb5f9>] nfs_free_request+0x29/0x50
[<ffffffff81234b7e>] kref_put+0x8e/0xe0
[<ffffffff811cb594>] nfs_release_request+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff811cf769>] nfs_find_and_lock_request+0x89/0xa0
[<ffffffff811d1180>] nfs_wb_page+0x80/0x110
[<ffffffff811c0770>] nfs_release_page+0x70/0x90
[<ffffffff810d18ee>] try_to_release_page+0x5e/0x80
[<ffffffff810e1178>] shrink_page_list+0x638/0x860
[<ffffffff810e19de>] shrink_zone+0x63e/0xc40
We can fix this by making the call to put_nfs_open_context() happen when we
actually remove the write request from the inode (which is done by the
nfsiod thread in this case).
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit b4d2314bb88b07e5a04e6c75b442a1dfcd60e340 upstream.
If the NFS_INO_REVAL_FORCED flag is set, that means that we don't yet have
an up to date attribute cache. Even if we hold a delegation, we must
put a GETATTR on the wire.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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