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commit 1cd9f0976aa4606db8d6e3dc3edd0aca8019372a upstream.
This doesn't make much sense, and it exposes a bug in the kernel where
attempts to create a new file in an append-only directory using
O_CREAT will fail (but still leave a zero-length file). This was
discovered when xfstests #79 was generalized so it could run on all
file systems.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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Does not corrispond with a direct commit in Linus's tree as it was fixed
differently in the 3.0 release.
We will meet with a BUG_ON() if following script is run.
mkfs.ext4 -b 4096 /dev/sdb1 1000000
mount -t ext4 /dev/sdb1 /mnt/sdb1
fallocate -l 100M /mnt/sdb1/test
sync
for((i=0;i<170;i++))
do
dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/sdb1/test conv=notrunc bs=256k count=1
seek=`expr $i \* 2`
done
umount /mnt/sdb1
mount -t ext4 /dev/sdb1 /mnt/sdb1
dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/sdb1/test conv=notrunc bs=256k count=1 seek=341
umount /mnt/sdb1
mount /dev/sdb1 /mnt/sdb1
dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/sdb1/test conv=notrunc bs=256k count=1 seek=340
sync
The reason is that it forgot to mark dirty when splitting two extents in
ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized(). Althrough ex has been updated in
memory, it is not dirtied both in ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_ext_insert_extent(). The disk layout is corrupted. Then it will
meet with a BUG_ON() when writting at the start of that extent again.
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Xiaoyun Mao <xiaoyun.maoxy@aliyun-inc.com>
Cc: Yingbin Wang <yingbin.wangyb@aliyun-inc.com>
Cc: Jia Wan <jia.wanj@aliyun-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f upstream.
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit a9712bc12c40c172e393f85a9b2ba8db4bf59509 upstream.
All of those are rw-r--r-- and all are broken for suid - if you open
a file before the target does suid-root exec, you'll be still able
to access it. For personality it's not a big deal, but for syscall
and stack it's a real problem.
Fix: check that task is tracable for you at the time of read().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 4fd2c20d964a8fb9861045f1022475c9d200d684 upstream.
"m" is never NULL here. We need a different test for the end of list
condition.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Leonardo Chiquitto <leonardo.lists@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c30e92df30d7d5fe65262fbce5d1b7de675fe34e upstream.
We don't use WANT bits yet--and sending them can probably trigger a
BUG() further down.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 832023bffb4b493f230be901f681020caf3ed1f8 upstream.
Fan Yong <yong.fan@whamcloud.com> noticed setting
FMODE_32bithash wouldn't work with nfsd v4, as
nfsd4_readdir() checks for 32 bit cookies. However, according to RFC 3530
cookies have a 64 bit type and cookies are also defined as u64 in
'struct nfsd4_readdir'. So remove the test for >32-bit values.
Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert <bernd.schubert@itwm.fraunhofer.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit d8805e633e054c816c47cb6e727c81f156d9253d upstream.
epoll can acquire recursively acquire ep->mtx on multiple "struct
eventpoll"s at once in the case where one epoll fd is monitoring another
epoll fd. This is perfectly OK, since we're careful about the lock
ordering, but it causes spurious lockdep warnings. Annotate the recursion
using mutex_lock_nested, and add a comment explaining the nesting rules
for good measure.
Recent versions of systemd are triggering this, and it can also be
demonstrated with the following trivial test program:
--------------------8<--------------------
int main(void) {
int e1, e2;
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create1(0);
e2 = epoll_create1(0);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
--------------------8<--------------------
Reported-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Tested-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@nelhage.com>
Acked-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 2cb4b05e7647891b46b91c07c9a60304803d1688 upstream.
direct_splice_actor() shouldn't use sd->pos, as sd->pos is for file reading,
file->f_pos should be used instead.
Signed-off-by: Changli Gao <xiaosuo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jaxboe@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 9438fabb73eb48055b58b89fc51e0bc4db22fabd upstream.
The name_len variable in CIFSFindNext is a signed int that gets set to
the resume_name_len in the cifs_search_info. The resume_name_len however
is unsigned and for some infolevels is populated directly from a 32 bit
value sent by the server.
If the server sends a very large value for this, then that value could
look negative when converted to a signed int. That would make that
value pass the PATH_MAX check later in CIFSFindNext. The name_len would
then be used as a length value for a memcpy. It would then be treated
as unsigned again, and the memcpy scribbles over a ton of memory.
Fix this by making the name_len an unsigned value in CIFSFindNext.
Reported-by: Darren Lavender <dcl@hppine99.gbr.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c2183d1e9b3f313dd8ba2b1b0197c8d9fb86a7ae upstream.
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 338d0f0a6fbc82407864606f5b64b75aeb3c70f2 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 3eb8e74ec72736b9b9d728bad30484ec89c91dde upstream.
The kernel automatically evaluates partition tables of storage devices.
The code for evaluating GUID partitions (in fs/partitions/efi.c) contains
a bug that causes a kernel oops on certain corrupted GUID partition
tables.
This bug has security impacts, because it allows, for example, to
prepare a storage device that crashes a kernel subsystem upon connecting
the device (e.g., a "USB Stick of (Partial) Death").
crc = efi_crc32((const unsigned char *) (*gpt), le32_to_cpu((*gpt)->header_size));
computes a CRC32 checksum over gpt covering (*gpt)->header_size bytes.
There is no validation of (*gpt)->header_size before the efi_crc32 call.
A corrupted partition table may have large values for (*gpt)->header_size.
In this case, the CRC32 computation access memory beyond the memory
allocated for gpt, which may cause a kernel heap overflow.
Validate value of GUID partition table header size.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix layout and indenting]
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Cc: Matt Domsch <Matt_Domsch@dell.com>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 1d1221f375c94ef961ba8574ac4f85c8870ddd51 upstream.
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 24e6cf92fde1f140d8eb0bf7cd24c2c78149b6b2 upstream.
It's possible for a cifsSesInfo struct to have a NULL password, so we
need to check for that prior to running strncmp on it.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit fc87a40677bbe0937e2ff0642c7e83c9a4813f3d upstream.
cifs_find_smb_ses assumes that the vol->password field is a valid
pointer, but that's only the case if a password was passed in via
the options string. It's possible that one won't be if there is
no mount helper on the box.
Reported-by: diabel <gacek-2004@wp.pl>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 4ff67b720c02c36e54d55b88c2931879b7db1cd2 upstream.
This patch replaces the earlier patch by the same name. The only
difference is that MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE has been increased to attempt to
match the limits that windows enforces.
Do a better job of matching sessions by authtype. Matching by username
for a Kerberos session is incorrect, and anonymous sessions need special
handling.
Also, in the case where we do match by username, we also need to match
by password. That ensures that someone else doesn't "borrow" an existing
session without needing to know the password.
Finally, passwords can be longer than 16 bytes. Bump MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE
to 512 to match the size that the userspace mount helper allows.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
[dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32]
Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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This reverts commit 5b2745db12a3f97a9ec9efd4ffa077da707d3e4c (commit
02e352287a40bd456eb78df705bf888bc3161d3f upstream)
This should have only been commited on .38 and newer, not older kernels
like this one, sorry.
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: David Zeuthen <zeuthen@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin Pitt <martin.pitt@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Jens Axboe <jaxboe@fusionio.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit ad95c5e9bc8b5885f94dce720137cac8fa8da4c9 upstream.
Block allocation is called from two places: ext3_get_blocks_handle() and
ext3_xattr_block_set(). These two callers are not necessarily synchronized
because xattr code holds only xattr_sem and i_mutex, and
ext3_get_blocks_handle() may hold only truncate_mutex when called from
writepage() path. Block reservation code does not expect two concurrent
allocations to happen to the same inode and thus assertions can be triggered
or reservation structure corruption can occur.
Fix the problem by taking truncate_mutex in xattr code to serialize
allocations.
CC: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
Reported-by: Fyodor Ustinov <ufm@ufm.su>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit e5012d1f3861d18c7f3814e757c1c3ab3741dbcd upstream.
Attribute IDs assigned in RFC 5661 now require three bitmaps.
Fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead when getting ACLs.
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 2aa15890f3c191326678f1bd68af61ec6b8753ec upstream.
Michael Leun reported that running parallel opens on a fuse filesystem
can trigger a "kernel BUG at mm/truncate.c:475"
Gurudas Pai reported the same bug on NFS.
The reason is, unmap_mapping_range() is not prepared for more than
one concurrent invocation per inode. For example:
thread1: going through a big range, stops in the middle of a vma and
stores the restart address in vm_truncate_count.
thread2: comes in with a small (e.g. single page) unmap request on
the same vma, somewhere before restart_address, finds that the
vma was already unmapped up to the restart address and happily
returns without doing anything.
Another scenario would be two big unmap requests, both having to
restart the unmapping and each one setting vm_truncate_count to its
own value. This could go on forever without any of them being able to
finish.
Truncate and hole punching already serialize with i_mutex. Other
callers of unmap_mapping_range() do not, and it's difficult to get
i_mutex protection for all callers. In particular ->d_revalidate(),
which calls invalidate_inode_pages2_range() in fuse, may be called
with or without i_mutex.
This patch adds a new mutex to 'struct address_space' to prevent
running multiple concurrent unmap_mapping_range() on the same mapping.
[ We'll hopefully get rid of all this with the upcoming mm
preemptibility series by Peter Zijlstra, the "mm: Remove i_mmap_mutex
lockbreak" patch in particular. But that is for 2.6.39 ]
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Michael Leun <lkml20101129@newton.leun.net>
Reported-by: Gurudas Pai <gurudas.pai@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Gurudas Pai <gurudas.pai@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit dac853ae89043f1b7752875300faf614de43c74b upstream.
Unconditionally changing the address limit to USER_DS and not restoring
it to its old value in the error path is wrong because it prevents us
using kernel memory on repeated calls to this function. This, in fact,
breaks the fallback of hard coded paths to the init program from being
ever successful if the first candidate fails to load.
With this patch applied switching to USER_DS is delayed until the point
of no return is reached which makes it possible to have a multi-arch
rootfs with one arch specific init binary for each of the (hard coded)
probed paths.
Since the address limit is already set to USER_DS when start_thread()
will be invoked, this redundancy can be safely removed.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 081003fff467ea0e727f66d5d435b4f473a789b3 upstream.
When marking an inode reclaimable, a per-AG counter is increased, the
inode is tagged reclaimable in its per-AG tree, and, when this is the
first reclaimable inode in the AG, the AG entry in the per-mount tree
is also tagged.
When an inode is finally reclaimed, however, it is only deleted from
the per-AG tree. Neither the counter is decreased, nor is the parent
tree's AG entry untagged properly.
Since the tags in the per-mount tree are not cleared, the inode
shrinker iterates over all AGs that have had reclaimable inodes at one
point in time.
The counters on the other hand signal an increasing amount of slab
objects to reclaim. Since "70e60ce xfs: convert inode shrinker to
per-filesystem context" this is not a real issue anymore because the
shrinker bails out after one iteration.
But the problem was observable on a machine running v2.6.34, where the
reclaimable work increased and each process going into direct reclaim
eventually got stuck on the xfs inode shrinking path, trying to scan
several million objects.
Fix this by properly unwinding the reclaimable-state tracking of an
inode when it is reclaimed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Backported-by: Stefan Priebe <s.priebe@profihost.ag>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit fe47ae7f53e179d2ef6771024feb000cbb86640f upstream.
The lockdep warning below detects a possible A->B/B->A locking
dependency of mm->mmap_sem and dcookie_mutex. The order in
sync_buffer() is mm->mmap_sem/dcookie_mutex, while in
sys_lookup_dcookie() it is vice versa.
Fixing it in sys_lookup_dcookie() by unlocking dcookie_mutex before
copy_to_user().
oprofiled/4432 is trying to acquire lock:
(&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff810b444b>] might_fault+0x53/0xa3
but task is already holding lock:
(dcookie_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81124d28>] sys_lookup_dcookie+0x45/0x149
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (dcookie_mutex){+.+.+.}:
[<ffffffff8106557f>] lock_acquire+0xf8/0x11e
[<ffffffff814634f0>] mutex_lock_nested+0x63/0x309
[<ffffffff81124e5c>] get_dcookie+0x30/0x144
[<ffffffffa0000fba>] sync_buffer+0x196/0x3ec [oprofile]
[<ffffffffa0001226>] task_exit_notify+0x16/0x1a [oprofile]
[<ffffffff81467b96>] notifier_call_chain+0x37/0x63
[<ffffffff8105803d>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x67
[<ffffffff81058068>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x14/0x16
[<ffffffff8105a718>] profile_task_exit+0x1a/0x1c
[<ffffffff81039e8f>] do_exit+0x2a/0x6fc
[<ffffffff8103a5e4>] do_group_exit+0x83/0xae
[<ffffffff8103a626>] sys_exit_group+0x17/0x1b
[<ffffffff8146ad4b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
-> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}:
[<ffffffff81064dfb>] __lock_acquire+0x1085/0x1711
[<ffffffff8106557f>] lock_acquire+0xf8/0x11e
[<ffffffff810b4478>] might_fault+0x80/0xa3
[<ffffffff81124de7>] sys_lookup_dcookie+0x104/0x149
[<ffffffff8146ad4b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
other info that might help us debug this:
1 lock held by oprofiled/4432:
#0: (dcookie_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81124d28>] sys_lookup_dcookie+0x45/0x149
stack backtrace:
Pid: 4432, comm: oprofiled Not tainted 2.6.39-00008-ge5a450d #9
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81063193>] print_circular_bug+0xae/0xbc
[<ffffffff81064dfb>] __lock_acquire+0x1085/0x1711
[<ffffffff8102ef13>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x42
[<ffffffff810b444b>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xa3
[<ffffffff8106557f>] lock_acquire+0xf8/0x11e
[<ffffffff810b444b>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xa3
[<ffffffff810d7d54>] ? path_put+0x22/0x27
[<ffffffff810b4478>] might_fault+0x80/0xa3
[<ffffffff810b444b>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xa3
[<ffffffff81124de7>] sys_lookup_dcookie+0x104/0x149
[<ffffffff8146ad4b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
References: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13809
Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 1adffbae22332bb558c2a29de19d9aca391869f6 upstream.
We are clearly missing '~' in fat_ioctl_set_attributes().
Reported-by: Dmitry Dmitriev <dimondmm@yandex.ru>
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 812eb258311f89bcd664a34a620f249d54a2cd83 upstream.
UBIFS leaks memory on error path in 'ubifs_jnl_update()' in case of write
failure because it forgets to free the 'struct ubifs_dent_node *dent' object.
Although the object is small, the alignment can make it large - e.g., 2KiB
if the min. I/O unit is 2KiB.
Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <Artem.Bityutskiy@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit cf610bf4199770420629d3bc273494bd27ad6c1d upstream.
Sometimes VM asks the shrinker to return amount of objects it can shrink,
and we return the ubifs_clean_zn_cnt in that case. However, it is possible
that this counter is negative for a short period of time, due to the way
UBIFS TNC code updates it. And I can observe the following warnings sometimes:
shrink_slab: ubifs_shrinker+0x0/0x2b7 [ubifs] negative objects to delete nr=-8541616642706119788
This patch makes sure UBIFS never returns negative count of objects.
Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <Artem.Bityutskiy@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit eaeee242c531cd4b0a4a46e8b5dd7ef504380c42 upstream.
When re-mounting from R/O mode to R/W mode and the LEB count in the superblock
is not up-to date, because for the underlying UBI volume became larger, we
re-write the superblock. We allocate RAM for these purposes, but never free it.
So this is a memory leak, although very rare one.
Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <Artem.Bityutskiy@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 8d08dab786ad5cc2aca2bf870de370144b78c85a upstream.
The buffers allocated while encrypting and decrypting long filenames can
sometimes straddle two pages. In this situation, virt_to_scatterlist()
will return -ENOMEM, causing the operation to fail and the user will get
scary error messages in their logs:
kernel: ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet: Internal error whilst attempting
to convert filename memory to scatterlist; expected rc = 1; got rc =
[-12]. block_aligned_filename_size = [272]
kernel: ecryptfs_encrypt_filename: Error attempting to generate tag 70
packet; rc = [-12]
kernel: ecryptfs_encrypt_and_encode_filename: Error attempting to
encrypt filename; rc = [-12]
kernel: ecryptfs_lookup: Error attempting to encrypt and encode
filename; rc = [-12]
The solution is to allow up to 2 scatterlist entries to be used.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit cae13fe4cc3f24820ffb990c09110626837e85d4 upstream.
As Ben Hutchings discovered [1], the patch for CVE-2011-1017 (buffer
overflow in ldm_frag_add) is not sufficient. The original patch in
commit c340b1d64000 ("fs/partitions/ldm.c: fix oops caused by corrupted
partition table") does not consider that, for subsequent fragments,
previously allocated memory is used.
[1] http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/5/6/407
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 26626f1172fb4f3f323239a6a5cf4e082643fa46 upstream.
Add missing page_cache_release in the error path of ext4_mb_load_buddy
Signed-off-by: Yang Ruirui <ruirui.r.yang@tieto.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit d9b01934d56a96d9f4ae2d6204d4ea78a36f5f36 upstream.
If an application program does not make any changes to the indirect
blocks or extent tree, i_datasync_tid will not get updated. If there
are enough commits (i.e., 2**31) such that tid_geq()'s calculations
wrap, and there isn't a currently active transaction at the time of
the fdatasync() call, this can end up triggering a BUG_ON in
fs/jbd/commit.c:
J_ASSERT(journal->j_running_transaction != NULL);
It's pretty rare that this can happen, since it requires the use of
fdatasync() plus *very* frequent and excessive use of fsync(). But
with the right workload, it can.
We fix this by replacing the use of tid_geq() with an equality test,
since there's only one valid transaction id that is valid for us to
start: namely, the currently running transaction (if it exists).
Reported-by: Martin_Zielinski@McAfee.com
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 2842bb20eed2e25cde5114298edc62c8883a1d9a upstream.
In do_get_write_access() we wait on BH_Unshadow bit for buffer to get
from shadow state. The waking code in journal_commit_transaction() has
a bug because it does not issue a memory barrier after the buffer is moved
from the shadow state and before wake_up_bit() is called. Thus a waitqueue
check can happen before the buffer is actually moved from the shadow state
and waiting process may never be woken. Fix the problem by issuing proper
barrier.
Reported-by: Tao Ma <boyu.mt@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 86c4f6d85595cd7da635dc6985d27bfa43b1ae10 upstream.
When make_indexed_dir() fails (e.g. because of ENOSPC) after it has allocated
block for index tree root, we did not properly mark all changed buffers dirty.
This lead to only some of these buffers being written out and thus effectively
corrupting the directory.
Fix the issue by marking all changed data dirty even in the error failure case.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 02e352287a40bd456eb78df705bf888bc3161d3f upstream.
__blkdev_get() doesn't rescan partitions if disk->fops->open() fails,
which leads to ghost partition devices lingering after medimum removal
is known to both the kernel and userland. The behavior also creates a
subtle inconsistency where O_NONBLOCK open, which doesn't fail even if
there's no medium, clears the ghots partitions, which is exploited to
work around the problem from userland.
Fix it by updating __blkdev_get() to issue partition rescan after
-ENOMEDIA too.
This was reported in the following bz.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13029
Stable: 2.6.38
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: David Zeuthen <zeuthen@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Martin Pitt <martin.pitt@ubuntu.com>
Reported-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Tested-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jaxboe@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 221d1d797202984cb874e3ed9f1388593d34ee22 upstream.
The is_path_accessible check uses a QPathInfo call, which isn't
supported by ancient win9x era servers. Fall back to an older
SMBQueryInfo call if it fails with the magic error codes.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Sandro Bonazzola <sandro.bonazzola@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 4906e50b37e6f6c264e7ee4237343eb2b7f8d16d upstream.
While password processing we can get out of options array bound if
the next character after array is delimiter. The patch adds a check
if we reach the end.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit fa039d5f6b126fbd65eefa05db2f67e44df8f121 upstream.
Otherwise corrupted EFI partition tables can cause total confusion.
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit fcda7f4578bbf9717444ca6da8a421d21489d078 upstream.
It's possible that when we go to decode the string area in the
SESSION_SETUP response, that bytes_remaining will be 0. Decrementing it at
that point will mean that it can go "negative" and wrap. Check for a
bytes_remaining value of 0, and don't try to decode the string area if
that's the case.
Reported-and-Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 6f88a4403def422bd8e276ddf6863d6ac71435d2 upstream.
Filesystem rebalancing (BTRFS_IOC_BALANCE) affects the entire
filesystem and may run uninterruptibly for a long time. This does not
seem to be something that an unprivileged user should be able to do.
Reported-by: Aron Xu <happyaron.xu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit a7851ce73b9fdef53f251420e6883cf4f3766534 upstream.
cifs_root_iget allocates full_path through
cifs_build_path_to_root, but fails to kfree it upon
cifs_get_inode_info* failure.
Make all failure exit paths traverse clean up
handling at the end of the function.
Signed-off-by: Oskar Schirmer <oskar@scara.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 34d211a2d5df4984a35b18d8ccacbe1d10abb067 upstream.
It turns out that while a maximum of 8 partitions may be what people
"should" have had, you can actually fit up to 18 entries(*) in a sector.
And some people clearly were taking advantage of that, like Michael
Cree, who had ten partitions on one of his OSF disks.
(*) The OSF partition data starts at byte offset 64 in the first sector,
and the array of 16-byte partition entries start at offset 148 in
the on-disk partition structure.
Reported-by: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org (v2.6.38)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 1eafbfeb7bdf59cfe173304c76188f3fd5f1fd05 upstream.
The kernel automatically evaluates partition tables of storage devices.
The code for evaluating OSF partitions contains a bug that leaks data
from kernel heap memory to userspace for certain corrupted OSF
partitions.
In more detail:
for (i = 0 ; i < le16_to_cpu(label->d_npartitions); i++, partition++) {
iterates from 0 to d_npartitions - 1, where d_npartitions is read from
the partition table without validation and partition is a pointer to an
array of at most 8 d_partitions.
Add the proper and obvious validation.
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
[ Changed the patch trivially to not repeat the whole le16_to_cpu()
thing, and to use an explicit constant for the magic value '8' ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 43b7c3f051dea504afccc39bcb56d8e26c2e0b77 upstream.
this commit fix compilation warning as following:
linux-2.6/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c:3265: warning: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast
Signed-off-by: Jovi Zhang <bookjovi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit e9e3d724e2145f5039b423c290ce2b2c3d8f94bc upstream.
The "bad_page()" page allocator sanity check was reported recently (call
chain as follows):
bad_page+0x69/0x91
free_hot_cold_page+0x81/0x144
skb_release_data+0x5f/0x98
__kfree_skb+0x11/0x1a
tcp_ack+0x6a3/0x1868
tcp_rcv_established+0x7a6/0x8b9
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2a/0x2fa
tcp_v4_rcv+0x9a2/0x9f6
do_timer+0x2df/0x52c
ip_local_deliver+0x19d/0x263
ip_rcv+0x539/0x57c
netif_receive_skb+0x470/0x49f
:virtio_net:virtnet_poll+0x46b/0x5c5
net_rx_action+0xac/0x1b3
__do_softirq+0x89/0x133
call_softirq+0x1c/0x28
do_softirq+0x2c/0x7d
do_IRQ+0xec/0xf5
default_idle+0x0/0x50
ret_from_intr+0x0/0xa
default_idle+0x29/0x50
cpu_idle+0x95/0xb8
start_kernel+0x220/0x225
_sinittext+0x22f/0x236
It occurs because an skb with a fraglist was freed from the tcp
retransmit queue when it was acked, but a page on that fraglist had
PG_Slab set (indicating it was allocated from the Slab allocator (which
means the free path above can't safely free it via put_page.
We tracked this back to an nfsv4 setacl operation, in which the nfs code
attempted to fill convert the passed in buffer to an array of pages in
__nfs4_proc_set_acl, which gets used by the skb->frags list in
xs_sendpages. __nfs4_proc_set_acl just converts each page in the buffer
to a page struct via virt_to_page, but the vfs allocates the buffer via
kmalloc, meaning the PG_slab bit is set. We can't create a buffer with
kmalloc and free it later in the tcp ack path with put_page, so we need
to either:
1) ensure that when we create the list of pages, no page struct has
PG_Slab set
or
2) not use a page list to send this data
Given that these buffers can be multiple pages and arbitrarily sized, I
think (1) is the right way to go. I've written the below patch to
allocate a page from the buddy allocator directly and copy the data over
to it. This ensures that we have a put_page free-able page for every
entry that winds up on an skb frag list, so it can be safely freed when
the frame is acked. We do a put page on each entry after the
rpc_call_sync call so as to drop our own reference count to the page,
leaving only the ref count taken by tcp_sendpages. This way the data
will be properly freed when the ack comes in
Successfully tested by myself to solve the above oops.
Note, as this is the result of a setacl operation that exceeded a page
of data, I think this amounts to a local DOS triggerable by an
uprivlidged user, so I'm CCing security on this as well.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CC: security@kernel.org
CC: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 8b4216018bdbfbb1b76150d202b15ee68c38e991 upstream.
HighMem pages on i686 do not get mapped to the buffer_heads and this was
causing a NULL pointer dereference when we were trying to memset page buffers
to zero.
We now use zero_user() that kmaps the page and directly manipulates page data.
This patch also fixes a boundary condition that was incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Abhi Das <adas@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
[Adjusted to apply to 2.6.32 by dann frazier <dannf@debian.org>]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 7e619bc3e6252dc746f64ac3b486e784822e9533 upstream.
This is the upstream fix for this bug. This patch differs
from the RHEL5 fix (Red Hat bz #555754) which simply writes to the 8-byte
value field of the quota. In upstream quota code, we're
required to write the entire quota (88 bytes) which can be split
across a page boundary. We check for such quotas, and read/write
the two parts from/to the corresponding pages holding these parts.
With this patch, I don't see the bug anymore using the reproducer
in Red Hat bz 555754. I successfully ran a couple of simple tests/mounts/
umounts and it doesn't seem like this patch breaks anything else.
Signed-off-by: Abhi Das <adas@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
[Backported to 2.6.32 by dann frazier <dannf@debian.org>]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 1e72c0f7c40e665d2ed40014750fdd2fa9968bcf upstream.
Both of these functions contained confusing and in one case
duplicate code. This patch adds a new check in do_glock()
so that we report -ENOENT if we are asked to sync a quota
entry which doesn't exist. Due to the previous patch this is
now reported correctly to userspace.
Also there are a few new comments, and I hope that the code
is easier to understand now.
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c340b1d640001c8c9ecff74f68fd90422ae2448a upstream.
The kernel automatically evaluates partition tables of storage devices.
The code for evaluating LDM partitions (in fs/partitions/ldm.c) contains
a bug that causes a kernel oops on certain corrupted LDM partitions.
A kernel subsystem seems to crash, because, after the oops, the kernel no
longer recognizes newly connected storage devices.
The patch validates the value of vblk_size.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg>
Cc: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Cc: Richard Russon <rich@flatcap.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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directories
commit 1574dff8996ab1ed92c09012f8038b5566fce313 upstream.
An open on a NFS4 share using the O_CREAT flag on an existing file for
which we have permissions to open but contained in a directory with no
write permissions will fail with EACCES.
A tcpdump shows that the client had set the open mode to UNCHECKED which
indicates that the file should be created if it doesn't exist and
encountering an existing flag is not an error. Since in this case the
file exists and can be opened by the user, the NFS server is wrong in
attempting to check create permissions on the parent directory.
The patch adds a conditional statement to check for create permissions
only if the file doesn't exist.
Signed-off-by: Sachin S. Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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