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commit 2743f865543c0c4a5e12fc13edb2bf89a6e9687c upstream.
If we don't check the current backing device status, balance_dirty_pages can
fall into infinite pausing routine.
This can be occurred when a lot of directories make a small number of dirty
dentry pages including files.
Reported-by: Brian Chadwick <brianchad@westnet.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6fb03f3a40805a412c9b285010ffdc2e7563f81b upstream.
If so many dirty dentry blocks are cached, not reached to the flush condition,
we should fall into livelock in balance_dirty_pages.
So, let's consider the mem size for the condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4e26445faad366d67d7723622bf6a60a6f0f5993 upstream.
kernfs_pin_sb() tries to get a refcnt of the superblock.
This will be used by cgroupfs.
v2:
- make kernfs_pin_sb() return the superblock.
- drop kernfs_drop_sb().
tj: Updated the comment a bit.
[ This is a prerequisite for a bugfix. ]
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7d568a8383bbb9c1f5167781075906acb2bb1550 upstream.
Currently, there's no way to find out which super_blocks are
associated with a given kernfs_root. Let's implement it - the planned
inotify extension to kernfs_notify() needs it.
Make kernfs_super_info point back to the super_block and chain it at
kernfs_root->supers.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
[lizf: Backported to 3.15: Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3f1f9b851311a76226140b55b1ea22111234a7c2 upstream.
This fixes the following lockdep complaint:
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
3.16.0-rc2-mm1+ #7 Tainted: G O
-------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u24:0/4356 is trying to acquire lock:
(&(&sbi->s_es_lru_lock)->rlock){+.+.-.}, at: [<ffffffff81285fff>] __ext4_es_shrink+0x4f/0x2e0
but task is already holding lock:
(&ei->i_es_lock){++++-.}, at: [<ffffffff81286961>] ext4_es_insert_extent+0x71/0x180
which lock already depends on the new lock.
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&ei->i_es_lock);
lock(&(&sbi->s_es_lru_lock)->rlock);
lock(&ei->i_es_lock);
lock(&(&sbi->s_es_lru_lock)->rlock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
6 locks held by kworker/u24:0/4356:
#0: ("writeback"){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81071d00>] process_one_work+0x180/0x560
#1: ((&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81071d00>] process_one_work+0x180/0x560
#2: (&type->s_umount_key#22){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff811a9c74>] grab_super_passive+0x44/0x90
#3: (jbd2_handle){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff812979f9>] start_this_handle+0x189/0x5f0
#4: (&ei->i_data_sem){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff81247062>] ext4_map_blocks+0x132/0x550
#5: (&ei->i_es_lock){++++-.}, at: [<ffffffff81286961>] ext4_es_insert_extent+0x71/0x180
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 4356 Comm: kworker/u24:0 Tainted: G O 3.16.0-rc2-mm1+ #7
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: writeback bdi_writeback_workfn (flush-253:0)
ffffffff8213dce0 ffff880014b07538 ffffffff815df0bb 0000000000000007
ffffffff8213e040 ffff880014b07588 ffffffff815db3dd ffff880014b07568
ffff880014b07610 ffff88003b868930 ffff88003b868908 ffff88003b868930
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff815df0bb>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x68
[<ffffffff815db3dd>] print_circular_bug+0x1fb/0x20c
[<ffffffff810a7a3e>] __lock_acquire+0x163e/0x1d00
[<ffffffff815e89dc>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe
[<ffffffff815ddc7b>] ? __slab_alloc+0x4a8/0x4ce
[<ffffffff81285fff>] ? __ext4_es_shrink+0x4f/0x2e0
[<ffffffff810a8707>] lock_acquire+0x87/0x120
[<ffffffff81285fff>] ? __ext4_es_shrink+0x4f/0x2e0
[<ffffffff8128592d>] ? ext4_es_free_extent+0x5d/0x70
[<ffffffff815e6f09>] _raw_spin_lock+0x39/0x50
[<ffffffff81285fff>] ? __ext4_es_shrink+0x4f/0x2e0
[<ffffffff8119760b>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x18b/0x1a0
[<ffffffff81285fff>] __ext4_es_shrink+0x4f/0x2e0
[<ffffffff812869b8>] ext4_es_insert_extent+0xc8/0x180
[<ffffffff812470f4>] ext4_map_blocks+0x1c4/0x550
[<ffffffff8124c4c4>] ext4_writepages+0x6d4/0xd00
...
Reported-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Zheng Liu <gnehzuil.liu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f9ae9cf5d72b3926ca48ea60e15bdbb840f42372 upstream.
Commit 007649375f6af2 ("ext4: initialize multi-block allocator before
checking block descriptors") causes the block group descriptor's count
of the number of free blocks to become inconsistent with the number of
free blocks in the allocation bitmap. This is a harmless form of fs
corruption, but it causes the kernel to potentially remount the file
system read-only, or to panic, depending on the file systems's error
behavior.
Thanks to Eric Whitney for his tireless work to reproduce and to find
the guilty commit.
Fixes: 007649375f6af2 ("ext4: initialize multi-block allocator before checking block descriptors"
Reported-by: David Jander <david@protonic.nl>
Reported-by: Matteo Croce <technoboy85@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Eric Whitney <enwlinux@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Whitney <enwlinux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5dd214248f94d430d70e9230bda72f2654ac88a8 upstream.
The mount manpage says of the max_batch_time option,
This optimization can be turned off entirely
by setting max_batch_time to 0.
But the code doesn't do that. So fix the code to do
that.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 94d4c066a4ff170a2671b1a9b153febbf36796f6 upstream.
We are spending a lot of time explaining to users what this error
means. Let's try to improve the message to avoid this problem.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ae0f78de2c43b6fadd007c231a352b13b5be8ed2 upstream.
Make it clear that values printed are times, and that it is error
since last fsck. Also add note about fsck version required.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 61c219f5814277ecb71d64cb30297028d6665979 upstream.
The first time that we allocate from an uninitialized inode allocation
bitmap, if the block allocation bitmap is also uninitalized, we need
to get write access to the block group descriptor before we start
modifying the block group descriptor flags and updating the free block
count, etc. Otherwise, there is the potential of a bad journal
checksum (if journal checksums are enabled), and of the file system
becoming inconsistent if we crash at exactly the wrong time.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 472b909ff6f4884d235ef7b9d3847fad5efafbff upstream.
This is a regression from my patch a26e8c9f75b0bfd8cccc9e8f110737b136eb5994, we
need to only unlock the block if we were the one who locked it. Otherwise this
will trip BUG_ON()'s in locking.c Thanks,
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 76f47128f9b33af1e96819746550d789054c9664 upstream.
An NFS operation that creates a new symlink includes the symlink data,
which is xdr-encoded as a length followed by the data plus 0 to 3 bytes
of zero-padding as required to reach a 4-byte boundary.
The vfs, on the other hand, wants null-terminated data.
The simple way to handle this would be by copying the data into a newly
allocated buffer with space for the final null.
The current nfsd_symlink code tries to be more clever by skipping that
step in the (likely) case where the byte following the string is already
0.
But that assumes that the byte following the string is ours to look at.
In fact, it might be the first byte of a page that we can't read, or of
some object that another task might modify.
Worse, the NFSv4 code tries to fix the problem by actually writing to
that byte.
In the NFSv2/v3 cases this actually appears to be safe:
- nfs3svc_decode_symlinkargs explicitly null-terminates the data
(after first checking its length and copying it to a new
page).
- NFSv2 limits symlinks to 1k. The buffer holding the rpc
request is always at least a page, and the link data (and
previous fields) have maximum lengths that prevent the request
from reaching the end of a page.
In the NFSv4 case the CREATE op is potentially just one part of a long
compound so can end up on the end of a page if you're unlucky.
The minimal fix here is to copy and null-terminate in the NFSv4 case.
The nfsd_symlink() interface here seems too fragile, though. It should
really either do the copy itself every time or just require a
null-terminated string.
Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a93cd4cf86466caa49cfe64607bea7f0bde3f916 upstream.
Hole punching code for files with indirect blocks wrongly computed
number of blocks which need to be cleared when traversing the indirect
block tree. That could result in punching more blocks than actually
requested and thus effectively cause a data loss. For example:
fallocate -n -p 10240000 4096
will punch the range 10240000 - 12632064 instead of the range 1024000 -
10244096. Fix the calculation.
Fixes: 8bad6fc813a3a5300f51369c39d315679fd88c72
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c5c7b8ddfbf8cb3b2291e515a34ab1b8982f5a2d upstream.
Error recovery in ext4_alloc_branch() calls ext4_forget() even for
buffer corresponding to indirect block it did not allocate. This leads
to brelse() being called twice for that buffer (once from ext4_forget()
and once from cleanup in ext4_ind_map_blocks()) leading to buffer use
count misaccounting. Eventually (but often much later because there
are other users of the buffer) we will see messages like:
VFS: brelse: Trying to free free buffer
Another manifestation of this problem is an error:
JBD2 unexpected failure: jbd2_journal_revoke: !buffer_revoked(bh);
inconsistent data on disk
The fix is easy - don't forget buffer we did not allocate. Also add an
explanatory comment because the indexing at ext4_alloc_branch() is
somewhat subtle.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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option
commit ce36d9ab3bab06b7b5522f5c8b68fac231b76ffb upstream.
When we SMB3 mounted with mapchars (to allow reserved characters : \ / > < * ?
via the Unicode Windows to POSIX remap range) empty paths
(eg when we open "" to query the root of the SMB3 directory on mount) were not
null terminated so we sent garbarge as a path name on empty paths which caused
SMB2/SMB2.1/SMB3 mounts to fail when mapchars was specified. mapchars is
particularly important since Unix Extensions for SMB3 are not supported (yet)
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a1d0b84c308d7fdfb67eb76498116a6c2fdda507 upstream.
commit d81b8a40e2ece0a9ab57b1fe1798e291e75bf8fc
("CIFS: Cleanup cifs open codepath")
changed disposition to FILE_OPEN.
Signed-off-by: Björn Baumbach <bb@sernet.de>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Cc: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 22e7478ddbcb670e33fab72d0bbe7c394c3a2c84 upstream.
Prior to commit 0e4f6a791b1e (Fix reiserfs_file_release()), reiserfs
truncates serialized on i_mutex. They mostly still do, with the exception
of reiserfs_file_release. That blocks out other writers via the tailpack
mutex and the inode openers counter adjusted in reiserfs_file_open.
However, NFS will call reiserfs_setattr without having called ->open, so
we end up with a race when nfs is calling ->setattr while another
process is releasing the file. Ultimately, it triggers the
BUG_ON(inode->i_size != new_file_size) check in maybe_indirect_to_direct.
The solution is to pull the lock into reiserfs_setattr to encompass the
truncate_setsize call as well.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 556b8883cfac3d3203557e161ea8005f8b5479b2 upstream.
Commit daba542 ("xfs: skip verification on initial "guess"
superblock read") dropped the use of a verifier for the initial
superblock read so we can probe the sector size of the filesystem
stored in the superblock. It, however, now fails to validate that
what was read initially is actually an XFS superblock and hence will
fail the sector size check and return ENOSYS.
This causes probe-based mounts to fail because it expects XFS to
return EINVAL when it doesn't recognise the superblock format.
Reported-by: Plamen Petrov <plamen.sisi@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Plamen Petrov <plamen.sisi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 18dd78c427513fb0f89365138be66e6ee8700d1b upstream.
NFS_INO_INVALID_DATA cannot be ignored, even if we have a delegation.
We're still having some problems with data corruption when multiple
clients are appending to a file and those clients are being granted
write delegations on open.
To reproduce:
Client A:
vi /mnt/`hostname -s`
while :; do echo "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" >>/mnt/file; sleep $(( $RANDOM % 5 )); done
Client B:
vi /mnt/`hostname -s`
while :; do echo "YYYYYYYYYYYYYYY" >>/mnt/file; sleep $(( $RANDOM % 5 )); done
What's happening is that in nfs_update_inode() we're recognizing that
the file size has changed and we're setting NFS_INO_INVALID_DATA
accordingly, but then we ignore the cache_validity flags in
nfs_write_pageuptodate() because we have a delegation. As a result,
in nfs_updatepage() we're extending the write to cover the full page
even though we've not read in the data to begin with.
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a914722f333b3359d2f4f12919380a334176bb89 upstream.
Otherwise the kernel oopses when remounting with IPv6 server because
net is dereferenced in dev_get_by_name.
Use net ns of current thread so that dev_get_by_name does not operate on
foreign ns. Changing the address is prohibited anyway so this should not
affect anything.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit abbec2da13f0e4c5d9b78b7e2c025a3e617228ba upstream.
The addition of lockdep code to write_seqcount_begin/end has lead to
a bunch of false positive claims of ABBA deadlocks with the so_lock
spinlock. Audits show that this simply cannot happen because the
read side code does not spin while holding so_lock.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 43b6535e717d2f656f71d9bd16022136b781c934 upstream.
Fix a bug, whereby nfs_update_inode() was declaring the inode to be
up to date despite not having checked all the attributes.
The bug occurs because the temporary variable in which we cache
the validity information is 'sanitised' before reapplying to
nfsi->cache_validity.
Reported-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 12337901d654415d9f764b5f5ba50052e9700f37 upstream.
Note nobody's ever noticed because the typical client probably never
requests FILES_AVAIL without also requesting something else on the list.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 48385408b45523d9a432c66292d47ef43efcbb94 upstream.
27b11428b7de ("nfsd4: remove lockowner when removing lock stateid")
introduced a memory leak.
Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6df200f5d5191bdde4d2e408215383890f956781 upstream.
Return the NULL pointer when the allocation fails.
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 72abc8f4b4e8574318189886de627a2bfe6cd0da upstream.
I hit the same assert failed as Dolev Raviv reported in Kernel v3.10
shows like this:
[ 9641.164028] UBIFS assert failed in shrink_tnc at 131 (pid 13297)
[ 9641.234078] CPU: 1 PID: 13297 Comm: mmap.test Tainted: G O 3.10.40 #1
[ 9641.234116] [<c0011a6c>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0x12c) from [<c000d0b0>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[ 9641.234137] [<c000d0b0>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) from [<c0311134>] (dump_stack+0x20/0x28)
[ 9641.234188] [<c0311134>] (dump_stack+0x20/0x28) from [<bf22425c>] (shrink_tnc_trees+0x25c/0x350 [ubifs])
[ 9641.234265] [<bf22425c>] (shrink_tnc_trees+0x25c/0x350 [ubifs]) from [<bf2245ac>] (ubifs_shrinker+0x25c/0x310 [ubifs])
[ 9641.234307] [<bf2245ac>] (ubifs_shrinker+0x25c/0x310 [ubifs]) from [<c00cdad8>] (shrink_slab+0x1d4/0x2f8)
[ 9641.234327] [<c00cdad8>] (shrink_slab+0x1d4/0x2f8) from [<c00d03d0>] (do_try_to_free_pages+0x300/0x544)
[ 9641.234344] [<c00d03d0>] (do_try_to_free_pages+0x300/0x544) from [<c00d0a44>] (try_to_free_pages+0x2d0/0x398)
[ 9641.234363] [<c00d0a44>] (try_to_free_pages+0x2d0/0x398) from [<c00c6a60>] (__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x494/0x7e8)
[ 9641.234382] [<c00c6a60>] (__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x494/0x7e8) from [<c00f62d8>] (new_slab+0x78/0x238)
[ 9641.234400] [<c00f62d8>] (new_slab+0x78/0x238) from [<c031081c>] (__slab_alloc.constprop.42+0x1a4/0x50c)
[ 9641.234419] [<c031081c>] (__slab_alloc.constprop.42+0x1a4/0x50c) from [<c00f80e8>] (kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x54/0x188)
[ 9641.234459] [<c00f80e8>] (kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x54/0x188) from [<bf227908>] (do_readpage+0x168/0x468 [ubifs])
[ 9641.234553] [<bf227908>] (do_readpage+0x168/0x468 [ubifs]) from [<bf2296a0>] (ubifs_readpage+0x424/0x464 [ubifs])
[ 9641.234606] [<bf2296a0>] (ubifs_readpage+0x424/0x464 [ubifs]) from [<c00c17c0>] (filemap_fault+0x304/0x418)
[ 9641.234638] [<c00c17c0>] (filemap_fault+0x304/0x418) from [<c00de694>] (__do_fault+0xd4/0x530)
[ 9641.234665] [<c00de694>] (__do_fault+0xd4/0x530) from [<c00e10c0>] (handle_pte_fault+0x480/0xf54)
[ 9641.234690] [<c00e10c0>] (handle_pte_fault+0x480/0xf54) from [<c00e2bf8>] (handle_mm_fault+0x140/0x184)
[ 9641.234716] [<c00e2bf8>] (handle_mm_fault+0x140/0x184) from [<c0316688>] (do_page_fault+0x150/0x3ac)
[ 9641.234737] [<c0316688>] (do_page_fault+0x150/0x3ac) from [<c000842c>] (do_DataAbort+0x3c/0xa0)
[ 9641.234759] [<c000842c>] (do_DataAbort+0x3c/0xa0) from [<c0314e38>] (__dabt_usr+0x38/0x40)
After analyzing the code, I found a condition that may cause this failed
in correct operations. Thus, I think this assertion is wrong and should be
removed.
Suppose there are two clean znodes and one dirty znode in TNC. So the
per-filesystem atomic_t @clean_zn_cnt is (2). If commit start, dirty_znode
is set to COW_ZNODE in get_znodes_to_commit() in case of potentially ops
on this znode. We clear COW bit and DIRTY bit in write_index() without
@tnc_mutex locked. We don't increase @clean_zn_cnt in this place. As the
comments in write_index() shows, if another process hold @tnc_mutex and
dirty this znode after we clean it, @clean_zn_cnt would be decreased to (1).
We will increase @clean_zn_cnt to (2) with @tnc_mutex locked in
free_obsolete_znodes() to keep it right.
If shrink_tnc() performs between decrease and increase, it will release
other 2 clean znodes it holds and found @clean_zn_cnt is less than zero
(1 - 2 = -1), then hit the assertion. Because free_obsolete_znodes() will
soon correct @clean_zn_cnt and no harm to fs in this case, I think this
assertion could be removed.
2 clean zondes and 1 dirty znode, @clean_zn_cnt == 2
Thread A (commit) Thread B (write or others) Thread C (shrinker)
->write_index
->clear_bit(DIRTY_NODE)
->clear_bit(COW_ZNODE)
@clean_zn_cnt == 2
->mutex_locked(&tnc_mutex)
->dirty_cow_znode
->!ubifs_zn_cow(znode)
->!test_and_set_bit(DIRTY_NODE)
->atomic_dec(&clean_zn_cnt)
->mutex_unlocked(&tnc_mutex)
@clean_zn_cnt == 1
->mutex_locked(&tnc_mutex)
->shrink_tnc
->destroy_tnc_subtree
->atomic_sub(&clean_zn_cnt, 2)
->ubifs_assert <- hit
->mutex_unlocked(&tnc_mutex)
@clean_zn_cnt == -1
->mutex_lock(&tnc_mutex)
->free_obsolete_znodes
->atomic_inc(&clean_zn_cnt)
->mutux_unlock(&tnc_mutex)
@clean_zn_cnt == 0 (correct after shrink)
Signed-off-by: hujianyang <hujianyang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 691a7c6f28ac90cccd0dbcf81348ea90b211bdd0 upstream.
There is a race condition in UBIFS:
Thread A (mmap) Thread B (fsync)
->__do_fault ->write_cache_pages
-> ubifs_vm_page_mkwrite
-> budget_space
-> lock_page
-> release/convert_page_budget
-> SetPagePrivate
-> TestSetPageDirty
-> unlock_page
-> lock_page
-> TestClearPageDirty
-> ubifs_writepage
-> do_writepage
-> release_budget
-> ClearPagePrivate
-> unlock_page
-> !(ret & VM_FAULT_LOCKED)
-> lock_page
-> set_page_dirty
-> ubifs_set_page_dirty
-> TestSetPageDirty (set page dirty without budgeting)
-> unlock_page
This leads to situation where we have a diry page but no budget allocated for
this page, so further write-back may fail with -ENOSPC.
In this fix we return from page_mkwrite without performing unlock_page. We
return VM_FAULT_LOCKED instead. After doing this, the race above will not
happen.
Signed-off-by: hujianyang <hujianyang@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Laurence Withers <lwithers@guralp.com>
Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ebe06187bf2aec10d537ce4595e416035367d703 upstream.
This fixes use-after-free of epi->fllink.next inside list loop macro.
This loop actually releases elements in the body. The list is
rcu-protected but here we cannot hold rcu_read_lock because we need to
lock mutex inside.
The obvious solution is to use list_for_each_entry_safe(). RCU-ness
isn't essential because nobody can change this list under us, it's final
fput for this file.
The bug was introduced by ae10b2b4eb01 ("epoll: optimize EPOLL_CTL_DEL
using rcu")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3e2426bd0eb980648449e7a2f5a23e3cd3c7725c upstream.
If this condition in end_extent_writepage() is false:
if (tree->ops && tree->ops->writepage_end_io_hook)
we will then test an uninitialized "ret" at:
ret = ret < 0 ? ret : -EIO;
The test for ret is for the case where ->writepage_end_io_hook
failed, and we'd choose that ret as the error; but if
there is no ->writepage_end_io_hook, nothing sets ret.
Initializing ret to 0 should be sufficient; if
writepage_end_io_hook wasn't set, (!uptodate) means
non-zero err was passed in, so we choose -EIO in that case.
Signed-of-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6eda71d0c030af0fc2f68aaa676e6d445600855b upstream.
The skinny extents are intepreted incorrectly in scrub_print_warning(),
and end up hitting the BUG() in btrfs_extent_inline_ref_size.
Reported-by: Konstantinos Skarlatos <k.skarlatos@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cd857dd6bc2ae9ecea14e75a34e8a8fdc158e307 upstream.
We want to make sure the point is still within the extent item, not to verify
the memory it's pointing to.
Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8a56457f5f8fa7c2698ffae8545214c5b96a2cb5 upstream.
The backref code was looking at nodes as well as leaves when we tried to
populate extent item entries. This is not good, and although we go away with it
for the most part because we'd skip where disk_bytenr != random_memory,
sometimes random_memory would match and suddenly boom. This fixes that problem.
Thanks,
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8321cf2596d283821acc466377c2b85bcd3422b7 upstream.
There is otherwise a risk of a possible null pointer dereference.
Was largely found by using a static code analysis program called cppcheck.
Signed-off-by: Rickard Strandqvist <rickard_strandqvist@spectrumdigital.se>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c1895442be01c58449e3bf9272f22062a670e08f upstream.
We are currently allocating space_info objects in an array when we
allocate space_info. When a user does something like:
# btrfs balance start -mconvert=raid1 -dconvert=raid1 /mnt
# btrfs balance start -mconvert=single -dconvert=single /mnt -f
# btrfs balance start -mconvert=raid1 -dconvert=raid1 /
We can end up with memory corruption since the kobject hasn't
been reinitialized properly and the name pointer was left set.
The rationale behind allocating them statically was to avoid
creating a separate kobject container that just contained the
raid type. It used the index in the array to determine the index.
Ultimately, though, this wastes more memory than it saves in all
but the most complex scenarios and introduces kobject lifetime
questions.
This patch allocates the kobjects dynamically instead. Note that
we also remove the kobject_get/put of the parent kobject since
kobject_add and kobject_del do that internally.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Reported-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7e3ae33efad1490d01040f552ef50e58ed6376ca upstream.
We were limiting the sum of the xattr name and value lengths to PATH_MAX,
which is not correct, specially on filesystems created with btrfs-progs
v3.12 or higher, where the default leaf size is max(16384, PAGE_SIZE), or
systems with page sizes larger than 4096 bytes.
Xattrs have their own specific maximum name and value lengths, which depend
on the leaf size, therefore use these limits to be able to send xattrs with
sizes larger than PATH_MAX.
A test case for xfstests follows.
Signed-off-by: Filipe David Borba Manana <fdmanana@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1af56070e3ef9477dbc7eba3b9ad7446979c7974 upstream.
If we are doing an incremental send and the base snapshot has a
directory with name X that doesn't exist anymore in the second
snapshot and a new subvolume/snapshot exists in the second snapshot
that has the same name as the directory (name X), the incremental
send would fail with -ENOENT error. This is because it attempts
to lookup for an inode with a number matching the objectid of a
root, which doesn't exist.
Steps to reproduce:
mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdd
mount /dev/sdd /mnt
mkdir /mnt/testdir
btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt /mnt/mysnap1
rmdir /mnt/testdir
btrfs subvolume create /mnt/testdir
btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt /mnt/mysnap2
btrfs send -p /mnt/mysnap1 /mnt/mysnap2 -f /tmp/send.data
A test case for xfstests follows.
Reported-by: Robert White <rwhite@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe David Borba Manana <fdmanana@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 298658414a2f0bea1f05a81876a45c1cd96aa2e0 upstream.
Seeding device support allows us to create a new filesystem
based on existed filesystem.
However newly created filesystem's @total_devices should include seed
devices. This patch fix the following problem:
# mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
# btrfstune -S 1 /dev/sdb
# mount /dev/sdb /mnt
# btrfs device add -f /dev/sdc /mnt --->fs_devices->total_devices = 1
# umount /mnt
# mount /dev/sdc /mnt --->fs_devices->total_devices = 2
This is because we record right @total_devices in superblock, but
@fs_devices->total_devices is reset to be 0 in btrfs_prepare_sprout().
Fix this problem by not resetting @fs_devices->total_devices.
Signed-off-by: Wang Shilong <wangsl.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5dca6eea91653e9949ce6eb9e9acab6277e2f2c4 upstream.
According to commit 865ffef3797da2cac85b3354b5b6050dc9660978
(fs: fix fsync() error reporting),
it's not stable to just check error pages because pages can be
truncated or invalidated, we should also mark mapping with error
flag so that a later fsync can catch the error.
Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 29cc83f69c8338ff8fd1383c9be263d4bdf52d73 upstream.
Same as normal devices, seed devices should be initialized with
fs_info->dev_root as well, otherwise we'll get a NULL pointer crash.
Cc: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com>
Reported-by: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com>
Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit de348ee022175401e77d7662b7ca6e231a94e3fd upstream.
In close_ctree(), after we have stopped all workers,there maybe still
some read requests(for example readahead) to submit and this *maybe* trigger
an oops that user reported before:
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:619!
By hacking codes, i can reproduce this problem with one cpu available.
We fix this potential problem by invalidating all btree inode pages before
stopping all workers.
Thanks to Miao for pointing out this problem.
Signed-off-by: Wang Shilong <wangsl.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c992ec94f24c3e7135d6c23860615f269f0b1d87 upstream.
If we have directories with a pending move/rename operation, we must take into
account any orphan directories that got created before executing the pending
move/rename. Those orphan directories are directories with an inode number higher
then the current send progress and that don't exist in the parent snapshot, they
are created before current progress reaches their inode number, with a generated
name of the form oN-M-I and at the root of the filesystem tree, and later when
progress matches their inode number, moved/renamed to their final location.
Reproducer:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdd
$ mount /dev/sdd /mnt
$ mkdir -p /mnt/a/b/c/d
$ mkdir /mnt/a/b/e
$ mv /mnt/a/b/c /mnt/a/b/e/CC
$ mkdir /mnt/a/b/e/CC/d/f
$ mkdir /mnt/a/g
$ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt /mnt/snap1
$ btrfs send /mnt/snap1 -f /tmp/base.send
$ mkdir /mnt/a/g/h
$ mv /mnt/a/b/e /mnt/a/g/h/EE
$ mv /mnt/a/g/h/EE/CC/d /mnt/a/g/h/EE/DD
$ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt /mnt/snap2
$ btrfs send -p /mnt/snap1 /mnt/snap2 -f /tmp/incremental.send
The second receive command failed with the following error:
ERROR: rename a/b/e/CC/d -> o264-7-0/EE/DD failed. No such file or directory
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Signed-off-by: Filipe David Borba Manana <fdmanana@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 32d6b47fe6fc1714d5f1bba1b9f38e0ab0ad58a8 upstream.
If we fail to load a free space cache, we can rebuild it from the extent tree,
so it is not a serious error, we should not output a error message that
would make the users uncomfortable. This patch uses warning message instead
of it.
Signed-off-by: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5a1972bd9fd4b2fb1bac8b7a0b636d633d8717e3 upstream.
Btrfs will send uevent to udev inform the device change,
but ctime/mtime for the block device inode is not udpated, which cause
libblkid used by btrfs-progs unable to detect device change and use old
cache, causing 'btrfs dev scan; btrfs dev rmove; btrfs dev scan' give an
error message.
Reported-by: Tsutomu Itoh <t-itoh@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a1a50f60a6bf4f861eb94793420274bc1ccd409a upstream.
In a previous change, commit 12870f1c9b2de7d475d22e73fd7db1b418599725,
I accidentally moved the roundup of inode->i_size to outside of the
critical section delimited by the inode mutex, which is not atomic and
not correct since the size can be changed by other task before we acquire
the mutex. Therefore fix it.
Signed-off-by: Filipe David Borba Manana <fdmanana@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7d78874273463a784759916fc3e0b4e2eb141c70 upstream.
We need to NULL the cached_state after freeing it, otherwise
we might free it again if find_delalloc_range doesn't find anything.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fc19c5e73645f95d3eca12b4e91e7b56faf1e4a4 upstream.
While running a stress test with multiple threads writing to the same btrfs
file system, I ended up with a situation where a leaf was corrupted in that
it had 2 file extent item keys that had the same exact key. I was able to
detect this quickly thanks to the following patch which triggers an assertion
as soon as a leaf is marked dirty if there are duplicated keys or out of order
keys:
Btrfs: check if items are ordered when a leaf is marked dirty
(https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/3955431/)
Basically while running the test, I got the following in dmesg:
[28877.415877] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 10706 at fs/btrfs/file.c:553 btrfs_drop_extent_cache+0x435/0x440 [btrfs]()
(...)
[28877.415917] Call Trace:
[28877.415922] [<ffffffff816f1189>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x68
[28877.415926] [<ffffffff8104a32c>] warn_slowpath_common+0x8c/0xc0
[28877.415929] [<ffffffff8104a37a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
[28877.415944] [<ffffffffa03775a5>] btrfs_drop_extent_cache+0x435/0x440 [btrfs]
[28877.415949] [<ffffffff8118e7be>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xfe/0x1c0
[28877.415962] [<ffffffffa03777d9>] fill_holes+0x229/0x3e0 [btrfs]
[28877.415972] [<ffffffffa0345865>] ? block_rsv_add_bytes+0x55/0x80 [btrfs]
[28877.415984] [<ffffffffa03792cb>] btrfs_fallocate+0xb6b/0xc20 [btrfs]
(...)
[29854.132560] BTRFS critical (device sdc): corrupt leaf, bad key order: block=955232256,root=1, slot=24
[29854.132565] BTRFS info (device sdc): leaf 955232256 total ptrs 40 free space 778
(...)
[29854.132637] item 23 key (3486 108 667648) itemoff 2694 itemsize 53
[29854.132638] extent data disk bytenr 14574411776 nr 286720
[29854.132639] extent data offset 0 nr 286720 ram 286720
[29854.132640] item 24 key (3486 108 954368) itemoff 2641 itemsize 53
[29854.132641] extent data disk bytenr 0 nr 0
[29854.132643] extent data offset 0 nr 0 ram 0
[29854.132644] item 25 key (3486 108 954368) itemoff 2588 itemsize 53
[29854.132645] extent data disk bytenr 8699670528 nr 77824
[29854.132646] extent data offset 0 nr 77824 ram 77824
[29854.132647] item 26 key (3486 108 1146880) itemoff 2535 itemsize 53
[29854.132648] extent data disk bytenr 8699670528 nr 77824
[29854.132649] extent data offset 0 nr 77824 ram 77824
(...)
[29854.132707] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3901!
(...)
[29854.132771] Call Trace:
[29854.132779] [<ffffffffa0342b5c>] setup_items_for_insert+0x2dc/0x400 [btrfs]
[29854.132791] [<ffffffffa0378537>] __btrfs_drop_extents+0xba7/0xdd0 [btrfs]
[29854.132794] [<ffffffff8109c0d6>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x1d0
[29854.132797] [<ffffffff8109c29d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[29854.132800] [<ffffffff8118e7be>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xfe/0x1c0
[29854.132810] [<ffffffffa036783b>] insert_reserved_file_extent.constprop.66+0xab/0x310 [btrfs]
[29854.132820] [<ffffffffa036a6c6>] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x116/0x340 [btrfs]
[29854.132830] [<ffffffffa0374d53>] btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x23/0x30 [btrfs]
(...)
So this is caused by getting an -ENOSPC error while punching a file hole, more
specifically, we get -ENOSPC error from __btrfs_drop_extents in the while loop
of file.c:btrfs_punch_hole() when it's unable to modify the btree to delete one
or more file extent items due to lack of enough free space. When this happens,
in btrfs_punch_hole(), we attempt to reclaim free space by switching our transaction
block reservation object to root->fs_info->trans_block_rsv, end our transaction and
start a new transaction basically - and, we keep increasing our current offset
(cur_offset) as long as it's smaller than the end of the target range (lockend) -
this makes use leave the loop with cur_offset == drop_end which in turn makes us
call fill_holes() for inserting a file extent item that represents a 0 bytes range
hole (and this insertion succeeds, as in the meanwhile more space became available).
This 0 bytes file hole extent item is a problem because any subsequent caller of
__btrfs_drop_extents (regular file writes, or fallocate calls for e.g.), with a
start file offset that is equal to the offset of the hole, will not remove this
extent item due to the following conditional in the while loop of
__btrfs_drop_extents:
if (extent_end <= search_start) {
path->slots[0]++;
goto next_slot;
}
This later makes the call to setup_items_for_insert() (at the very end of
__btrfs_drop_extents), insert a new file extent item with the same offset as
the 0 bytes file hole extent item that follows it. Needless is to say that this
causes chaos, either when reading the leaf from disk (btree_readpage_end_io_hook),
where we perform leaf sanity checks or in subsequent operations that manipulate
file extent items, as in the fallocate call as shown by the dmesg trace above.
Without my other patch to perform the leaf sanity checks once a leaf is marked
as dirty (if the integrity checker is enabled), it would have been much harder
to debug this issue.
This change might fix a few similar issues reported by users in the mailing
list regarding assertion failures in btrfs_set_item_key_safe calls performed
by __btrfs_drop_extents, such as the following report:
http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.comp.file-systems.btrfs/32938
Asking fill_holes() to create a 0 bytes wide file hole item also produced the
first warning in the trace above, as we passed a range to btrfs_drop_extent_cache
that has an end smaller (by -1) than its start.
On 3.14 kernels this issue manifests itself through leaf corruption, as we get
duplicated file extent item keys in a leaf when calling setup_items_for_insert(),
but on older kernels, setup_items_for_insert() isn't called by __btrfs_drop_extents(),
instead we have callers of __btrfs_drop_extents(), namely the functions
inode.c:insert_inline_extent() and inode.c:insert_reserved_file_extent(), calling
btrfs_insert_empty_item() to insert the new file extent item, which would fail with
error -EEXIST, instead of inserting a duplicated key - which is still a serious
issue as it would make all similar file extent item replace operations keep
failing if they target the same file range.
Signed-off-by: Filipe David Borba Manana <fdmanana@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 663a962151593c69374776e8651238d0da072459 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit edfbbf388f293d70bf4b7c0bc38774d05e6f711a upstream.
A kernel memory disclosure was introduced in aio_read_events_ring() in v3.10
by commit a31ad380bed817aa25f8830ad23e1a0480fef797. The changes made to
aio_read_events_ring() failed to correctly limit the index into
ctx->ring_pages[], allowing an attacked to cause the subsequent kmap() of
an arbitrary page with a copy_to_user() to copy the contents into userspace.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2014-0206. Thanks to Mateusz and
Petr for disclosing this issue.
This patch applies to v3.12+. A separate backport is needed for 3.10/3.11.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f8567a3845ac05bb28f3c1b478ef752762bd39ef upstream.
The aio cleanups and optimizations by kmo that were merged into the 3.10
tree added a regression for userspace event reaping. Specifically, the
reference counts are not decremented if the event is reaped in userspace,
leading to the application being unable to submit further aio requests.
This patch applies to 3.12+. A separate backport is required for 3.10/3.11.
This issue was uncovered as part of CVE-2014-0206.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2aea39eca6b68d6ae7eb545332df0695f56a3d3f upstream.
If f2fs_write_data_page is called through the reclaim path, we should submit
the bio right away.
This patch resolves the following issue that Marc Dietrich reported.
"It took me a while to bisect a problem which causes my ARM (tegra2) netbook to
frequently stall for 5-10 seconds when I enable EXA acceleration (opentegra
experimental ddx)."
And this patch fixes that.
Reported-by: Marc Dietrich <marvin24@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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