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commit 480efaee085235bb848f1063f959bf144103c342 upstream.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 4c69d5855a16f7378648c5733632628fa10431db upstream.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 9f415eb25574db4b73a9a712a4438e41dc284922 upstream.
The Linux client is using CLAIM_FH to implement regular opens, not just
recovery cases, so it depends on the server to check permissions
correctly.
Therefore the owner override, which may make sense in the delegation
recovery case, isn't right in the CLAIM_FH case.
Symptoms: on a client with 49f9a0fafd844c32f2abada047c0b9a5ba0d6255
"NFSv4.1: Enable open-by-filehandle", Bryan noticed this:
touch test.txt
chmod 000 test.txt
echo test > test.txt
succeeding.
Reported-by: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit b022032e195ffca83d7002d6b84297d796ed443b upstream.
we should return error status directly when nfs4_preprocess_stateid_op
return error.
Signed-off-by: fanchaoting <fanchaoting@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 7007c90fb9fef593b4aeaeee57e6a6754276c97c upstream.
With NFSv4, if we create a file then open it we explicit avoid checking
the permissions on the file during the open because the fact that we
created it ensures we should be allow to open it (the create and the
open should appear to be a single operation).
However if the reply to an EXCLUSIVE create gets lots and the client
resends the create, the current code will perform the permission check -
because it doesn't realise that it did the open already..
This patch should fix this.
Note that I haven't actually seen this cause a problem. I was just
looking at the code trying to figure out a different EXCLUSIVE open
related issue, and this looked wrong.
(Fix confirmed with pynfs 4.0 test OPEN4--bfields)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
[bfields: use OWNER_OVERRIDE and update for 4.1]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Adjust context
- Use current_fh as file handle in do_open_lookup()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 9dc4e6c4d1182d34604ea40fef641775f5b15456 upstream.
Allow a v3 unchecked open of a non-regular file succeed as if it were a
lookup; typically a client in such a case will want to fall back on a
local open, so succeeding and giving it the filehandle is more useful
than failing with nfserr_exist, which makes it appear that nothing at
all exists by that name.
Similarly for v4, on an open-create, return the same errors we would on
an attempt to open a non-regular file, instead of returning
nfserr_exist.
This fixes a problem found doing a v4 open of a symlink with
O_RDONLY|O_CREAT, which resulted in the current client returning EEXIST.
Thanks also to Trond for analysis.
Reported-by: Orion Poplawski <orion@cora.nwra.com>
Tested-by: Orion Poplawski <orion@cora.nwra.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: use &resfh, not resfh]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 96f6f98501196d46ce52c2697dd758d9300c63f5 upstream.
..._want_write() returns -EROFS on failure, _not_ an NFS error value.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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According to rfc5661 18.50, implement DESTROY_CLIENTID operation.
Signed-off-by: Mi Jinlong <mijinlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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If we create the object and then return failure to the client, we're
left with an unexpected file in the filesystem.
I'm trying to eliminate such cases but not 100% sure I have so an
assertion might be helpful for now.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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If process_open1() creates a new open owner, but the open later fails,
the current code will leave the open owner around. It won't be on the
close_lru list, and the client isn't expected to send a CLOSE, so it
will hang around as long as the client does.
Similarly, if process_open1() removes an existing open owner from the
close lru, anticipating that an open owner that previously had no
associated stateid's now will, but the open subsequently fails, then
we'll again be left with the same leak.
Fix both problems.
Reported-by: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Mask out the WANT bits right at the start instead of on each use.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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I'm not sure why I used a new field for this originally.
Also, the differences between some of these flags are a little subtle;
add some comments to explain.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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I want at least one more bit here. So, let's haul out the caps lock key
and add a flags field.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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For checking the size of reply before calling a operation,
we need try to get maxsize of the operation's reply.
v3: using new method as Bruce said,
"we could handle operations in two different ways:
- For operations that actually change something (write, rename,
open, close, ...), do it the way we're doing it now: be
very careful to estimate the size of the response before even
processing the operation.
- For operations that don't change anything (read, getattr, ...)
just go ahead and do the operation. If you realize after the
fact that the response is too large, then return the error at
that point.
So we'd add another flag to op_flags: say, OP_MODIFIES_SOMETHING. And for
operations with OP_MODIFIES_SOMETHING set, we'd do the first thing. For
operations without it set, we'd do the second."
Signed-off-by: Mi Jinlong <mijinlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
[bfields@redhat.com: crash, don't attempt to handle, undefined op_rsize_bop]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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The stateowner has some fields that only make sense for openowners, and
some that only make sense for lockowners, and I find it a lot clearer if
those are separated out.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Maybe we'll bring it back some day, but we don't have much real use for
it now.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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There are currently a couple races in the seqid replay code: a
retransmission could come while we're still encoding the original reply,
or a new seqid-mutating call could come as we're encoding a replay.
So, extend the state lock over the encoding (both encoding of a replayed
reply and caching of the original encoded reply).
I really hate doing this, and previously added the stateowner
reference-counting code to avoid it (which was insufficient)--but I
don't see a less complicated alternative at the moment.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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The server is returning nfserr_resource for both permanent errors and
for errors (like allocation failures) that might be resolved by retrying
later. Save nfserr_resource for the former and use delay/jukebox for
the latter.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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A client that wants to execute a file must be able to read it. Read
opens over nfs are therefore implicitly allowed for executable files
even when those files are not readable.
NFSv2/v3 get this right by using a passed-in NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE on
read requests, but NFSv4 has gotten this wrong ever since
dc730e173785e29b297aa605786c94adaffe2544 "nfsd4: fix owner-override on
open", when we realized that the file owner shouldn't override
permissions on non-reclaim NFSv4 opens.
So we can't use NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE to tell nfsd_permission to allow
reads of executable files.
So, do the same thing we do whenever we encounter another weird NFS
permission nit: define yet another NFSD_MAY_* flag.
The industry's future standardization on 128-bit processors will be
motivated primarily by the need for integers with enough bits for all
the NFSD_MAY_* flags.
Reported-by: Leonardo Borda <leonardoborda@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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The nfsd4 code has a bunch of special exceptions for error returns which
map nfserr_symlink to other errors.
In fact, the spec makes it clear that nfserr_symlink is to be preferred
over less specific errors where possible.
The patch that introduced it back in 2.6.4 is "kNFSd: correct symlink
related error returns.", which claims that these special exceptions are
represent an NFSv4 break from v2/v3 tradition--when in fact the symlink
error was introduced with v4.
I suspect what happened was pynfs tests were written that were overly
faithful to the (known-incomplete) rfc3530 error return lists, and then
code was fixed up mindlessly to make the tests pass.
Delete these unnecessary exceptions.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Without this, an attempt to open a device special file without first
stat'ing it will fail.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Fan Yong <yong.fan@whamcloud.com> noticed setting
FMODE_32bithash wouldn't work with nfsd v4, as
nfsd4_readdir() checks for 32 bit cookies. However, according to RFC 3530
cookies have a 64 bit type and cookies are also defined as u64 in
'struct nfsd4_readdir'. So remove the test for >32-bit values.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert <bernd.schubert@itwm.fraunhofer.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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It's sort of ridiculous that we've never had a working reply cache for
NFSv4.
On the other hand, we may still not: our current reply cache is likely
not very good, especially in the TCP case (which is the only case that
matters for v4). What we really need here is some serious testing.
Anyway, here's a start.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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This simplifies cleanup a bit.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Before nfs41 client's RECLAIM_COMPLETE done, nfs server should deny any
new locks or opens.
rfc5661:
" Whenever a client establishes a new client ID and before it does
the first non-reclaim operation that obtains a lock, it MUST send a
RECLAIM_COMPLETE with rca_one_fs set to FALSE, even if there are no
locks to reclaim. If non-reclaim locking operations are done before
the RECLAIM_COMPLETE, an NFS4ERR_GRACE error will be returned. "
Signed-off-by: Mi Jinlong <mijinlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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This operation is used by the client to check the validity of a list of
stateids.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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This operation is used by the client to tell the server to free a
stateid.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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DESTROY_CLIENTID MAY be preceded with a SEQUENCE operation as long as
the client ID derived from the session ID of SEQUENCE is not the same
as the client ID to be destroyed. If the client IDs are the same,
then the server MUST return NFS4ERR_CLIENTID_BUSY.
(that's not implemented yet)
If DESTROY_CLIENTID is not prefixed by SEQUENCE, it MUST be the only
operation in the COMPOUND request (otherwise, the server MUST return
NFS4ERR_NOT_ONLY_OP).
This fixes the error return; before, we returned
NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION; after this patch, we return NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP.
Signed-off-by: Benny Halevy <benny@tonian.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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The NFS server uses nfsd_create_v3 to handle EXCLUSIVE4_1 opens, but
that function is not prepared to handle them.
Rename nfsd_create_v3() to do_nfsd_create(), and add handling of
EXCLUSIVE4_1.
Signed-off-by: Mi Jinlong <mijinlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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When PUTFH is followed by an operation that uses the filehandle, and
when the current client is using a security flavor that is inconsistent
with the given filehandle, we have a choice: we can return WRONGSEC
either when the current filehandle is set using the PUTFH, or when the
filehandle is first used by the following operation.
Follow the recommendations of RFC 5661 in making this choice.
(Our current behavior prevented the client from doing security
negotiation by returning WRONGSEC on PUTFH+SECINFO_NO_NAME.)
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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The secinfo caller actually won't want this.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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The members of nfsd4_op_flags, (ALLOWED_WITHOUT_FH | ALLOWED_ON_ABSENT_FS)
equals to ALLOWED_AS_FIRST_OP, maybe that's not what we want.
OP_PUTROOTFH with op_flags = ALLOWED_WITHOUT_FH | ALLOWED_ON_ABSENT_FS,
can't appears as the first operation with out SEQUENCE ops.
This patch modify the wrong value of ALLOWED_WITHOUT_FH etc which
was introduced by f9bb94c4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Benny Halevy <bhalevy@panasas.com>
Signed-off-by: Mi Jinlong <mijinlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Basic xdr and processing for BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION. This adds a
connection to the list of connections associated with a session.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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We no longer need a few of these special cases.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Implementation of this operation is mandatory for NFSv4.1.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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We'll reuse this code in secinfo_no_name.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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See the referenced spec language; an attempt by a 4.1 client to use the
current filehandle after a secinfo call should result in a NOFILEHANDLE
error.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Now that a slight delay in getting a reply to an upcall doesn't
require deferring of requests, request deferral for all NFSv4
requests - the concept doesn't really fit with the v4 model.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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This is a mandatory operation. Also, here (not in open) is where we
should be committing the reboot recovery information.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
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Conflicts:
fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c
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In the replay case, the
renew_client(session->se_client);
happens after we've droppped the sessionid_lock, and without holding a
reference on the session; so there's nothing preventing the session
being freed before we get here.
Thanks to Benny Halevy for catching a bug in an earlier version of this
patch.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Acked-by: Benny Halevy <bhalevy@panasas.com>
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Enforce the rules about compound op ordering.
Motivated by implementing RECLAIM_COMPLETE, for which the client is
implicit in the current session, so it is important to ensure a
succesful SEQUENCE proceeds the RECLAIM_COMPLETE.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
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implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
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The new .h files have paths at the top that are now out of date. While
we're here, just remove all of those from fs/nfsd; they never served any
purpose.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
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Lots of include/linux/nfsd/* headers are only used by
nfsd module. Move them to the source directory
Signed-off-by: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
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Now that the headers are fixed and carry their own wait, all fs/nfsd/
source files can include a minimal set of headers. and still compile just
fine.
This patch should improve the compilation speed of the nfsd module.
Signed-off-by: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
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NFSv4 opens may function as locks denying other NFSv4 users the rights
to open a file.
We're requiring a user to have write permissions before they can deny
write. We're *not* requiring a user to have write permissions to deny
read, which is if anything a more drastic denial.
What was intended was to require write permissions for DENY_READ.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
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None of this stuff is used outside nfsd, so move it out of the common
linux include directory.
Actually, probably none of the stuff in include/linux/nfsd/nfsd.h really
belongs there, so later we may remove that file entirely.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
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