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2005-07-06[CRYPTO] Add faster DES code from Dag Arne OsvikDag Arne Osvik
I've made a new implementation of DES to replace the old one in the kernel. It provides faster encryption on all tested processors apart from the original Pentium, and key setup is many times faster. Speed relative to old kernel implementation Processor des_setkey des_encrypt des3_ede_setkey des3_ede_encrypt Pentium 120Mhz 6.8 0.82 7.2 0.86 Pentium III 1.266Ghz 5.6 1.19 5.8 1.34 Pentium M 1.3Ghz 5.7 1.15 6.0 1.31 Pentium 4 2.266Ghz 5.8 1.24 6.0 1.40 Pentium 4E 3Ghz 5.4 1.27 5.5 1.48 StrongARM 1110 206Mhz 4.3 1.03 4.4 1.14 Athlon XP 2Ghz 7.8 1.44 8.1 1.61 Athlon 64 2Ghz 7.8 1.34 8.3 1.49 Signed-off-by: Dag Arne Osvik <da@osvik.no> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-07-06[CRYPTO] Remove unused iv field from context structureHerbert Xu
The iv field in des_ctx/des3_ede_ctx/serpent_ctx has never been used. This was noticed by Dag Arne Osvik. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-07-06[CRYPTO] Add x86_64 asm AESAndreas Steinmetz
Implementation: =============== The encrypt/decrypt code is based on an x86 implementation I did a while ago which I never published. This unpublished implementation does include an assembler based key schedule and precomputed tables. For simplicity and best acceptance, however, I took Gladman's in-kernel code for table generation and key schedule for the kernel port of my assembler code and modified this code to produce the key schedule as required by my assembler implementation. File locations and Kconfig are kept similar to the i586 AES assembler implementation. It may seem a little bit strange to use 32 bit I/O and registers in the assembler implementation but this gives the best code size. My implementation takes one instruction more per round compared to Gladman's x86 assembler but it doesn't require any stack for local variables or saved registers and it is less serialized than Gladman's code. Note that all comparisons to Gladman's code were done after my code was implemented. I did only use FIPS PUB 197 for the implementation so my implementation is independent work. If anybody has a better assembler solution for x86_64 I'll be pleased to have my code replaced with the better solution. Testing: ======== The implementation passes the in-kernel crypto testing module and I'm running it without any problems on my laptop where it is mainly used for dm-crypt. Microbenchmark: =============== The microbenchmark was done in userspace with similar compile flags as used during kernel compile. Encrypt/decrypt is about 35% faster than the generic C implementation. As the generic C as well as my assembler implementation are both table I don't really expect that there is much room for further improvements though I'll be glad to be corrected here. The key schedule is about 5% slower than the generic C implementation. This is due to the fact that some more work has to be done in the key schedule routine to fit the schedule to the assembler implementation. Code Size: ========== Encrypt and decrypt are together about 2.1 Kbytes smaller than the generic C implementation which is important with regard to L1 cache usage. The key schedule routine is about 100 bytes larger than the generic C implementation. Data Size: ========== There's no difference in data size requirements between the assembler implementation and the generic C implementation. License: ======== Gladmans's code is dual BSD/GPL whereas my assembler code is GPLv2 only (I'm not going to change the license for my code). So I had to change the module license for the x86_64 aes module from 'Dual BSD/GPL' to 'GPL' to reflect the most restrictive license within the module. Signed-off-by: Andreas Steinmetz <ast@domdv.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-07-06[CRYPTO] Add null short circuit to crypto_free_tfmJesper Juhl
As far as I'm aware there's a general concensus that functions that are responsible for freeing resources should be able to cope with being passed a NULL pointer. This makes sense as it removes the need for all callers to check for NULL, thus elliminating the bugs that happen when some forget (safer to just check centrally in the freeing function) and it also makes for smaller code all over due to the lack of all those NULL checks. This patch makes it safe to pass the crypto_free_tfm() function a NULL pointer. Once this patch is applied we can start removing the NULL checks from the callers. Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <juhl-lkml@dif.dk> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-07-06[CRYPTO] Handle unaligned iv from encrypt_iv/decrypt_ivHerbert Xu
Even though cit_iv is now always aligned, the user can still supply an unaligned iv through crypto_cipher_encrypt_iv/crypto_cipher_decrypt_iv. This patch will check the alignment of the user-supplied iv and copy it if necessary. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-07-06[CRYPTO] Ensure cit_iv is aligned correctlyHerbert Xu
This patch ensures that cit_iv is aligned according to cra_alignmask by allocating it as part of the tfm structure. As a side effect the crypto layer will also guarantee that the tfm ctx area has enough space to be aligned by cra_alignmask. This allows us to remove the extra space reservation from the Padlock driver. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-07-06[CRYPTO] Make crypto_alg_lookup staticAdrian Bunk
This patch makes a needlessly global function static. Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-07-06[CRYPTO] Add alignmask for low-level cipher implementationsHerbert Xu
The VIA Padlock device requires the input and output buffers to be aligned on 16-byte boundaries. This patch adds the alignmask attribute for low-level cipher implementations to indicate their alignment requirements. The mid-level crypt() function will copy the input/output buffers if they are not aligned correctly before they are passed to the low-level implementation. Strictly speaking, some of the software implementations require the buffers to be aligned on 4-byte boundaries as they do 32-bit loads. However, it is not clear whether it is better to copy the buffers or pay the penalty for unaligned loads/stores. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-07-06[CRYPTO] Add support for low-level multi-block operationsHerbert Xu
This patch adds hooks for cipher algorithms to implement multi-block ECB/CBC operations directly. This is expected to provide significant performance boots to the VIA Padlock. It could also be used for improving software implementations such as AES where operating on multiple blocks at a time may enable certain optimisations. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-07-06[CRYPTO] Add plumbing for multi-block operationsHerbert Xu
The VIA Padlock device is able to perform much better when multiple blocks are fed to it at once. As this device offers an exceptional throughput rate it is worthwhile to optimise the infrastructure specifically for it. We shift the existing page-sized fast path down to the CBC/ECB functions. We can then replace the CBC/ECB functions with functions provided by the underlying algorithm that performs the multi-block operations. As a side-effect this improves the performance of large cipher operations for all existing algorithm implementations. I've measured the gain to be around 5% for 3DES and 15% for AES. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-07-06[CRYPTO] Don't check for NULL before kfree()Jesper Juhl
Checking a pointer for NULL before calling kfree() on it is redundant. This patch removes such checks from crypto/ Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <juhl-lkml@dif.dk> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-22[CRYPTO]: Use CPU cycle counters in tcryptHerbert Xu
After using this facility for a while to test my changes to the cipher crypt() layer, I realised that I should've listend to Dave and made this thing use CPU cycle counters :) As it is it's too jittery for me to feel safe about relying on the results. So here is a patch to make it use CPU cycles by default but fall back to jiffies if the user specifies a non-zero sec value. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-22[CRYPTO]: Use template keys for speed tests if possibleHerbert Xu
The existing keys used in the speed tests do not pass the 3DES quality check. This patch makes it use the template keys instead. Other algorithms can supply template keys through the same interface if needed. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-22[CRYPTO]: Add cipher speed testsHarald Welte
From: Reyk Floeter <reyk@vantronix.net> I recently had the requirement to do some benchmarking on cryptoapi, and I found reyk's very useful performance test patch [1]. However, I could not find any discussion on why that extension (or something providing a similar feature but different implementation) was not merged into mainline. If there was such a discussion, can someone please point me to the archive[s]? I've now merged the old patch into 2.6.12-rc1, the result can be found attached to this email. [1] http://lists.logix.cz/pipermail/padlock/2004/000010.html Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-22[CRYPTO]: Kill unnecessary strncpy from tcryptHerbert Xu
It seems that bad code tends to get copied (see test_cipher_speed). So let's kill this idiom before it spreads any further. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-22[CRYPTO]: White space and coding style clean up in tcryptHerbert Xu
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-05-23[CRYPTO]: Only reschedule if !in_atomic()Herbert Xu
The netlink gfp_any() problem made me double-check the uses of in_softirq() in crypto/*. It seems to me that we should be checking in_atomic() instead of in_softirq() in crypto_yield. Otherwise people calling the crypto ops with spin locks held or preemption disabled will get burnt, right? Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-05-17[PATCH] crypto: fix null encryption/compressionPatrick McHardy
null_encrypt() needs to copy the data in case src and dst are disjunct, null_compress() needs to copy the data in any case as far as I can tell. I joined compress/decompress and encrypt/decrypt to avoid duplicating code. Without this patch ESP null_enc packets look like this: IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 23130, offset 0, flags [DF], length: 128) 10.0.0.1 > 10.0.0.2: ESP(spi=0x0f9ca149,seq=0x4) 0x0000: 4500 0080 5a5a 4000 4032 cbef 0a00 0001 E...ZZ@.@2...... 0x0010: 0a00 0002 0f9c a149 0000 0004 0000 0000 .......I........ 0x0020: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 0x0030: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 0x0040: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 0x0050: 0000 .. IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 256, offset 0, flags [DF], length: 128) 10.0.0.2 > 10.0.0.1: ESP(spi=0x0e4f7b51,seq=0x2) 0x0000: 4500 0080 0100 4000 4032 254a 0a00 0002 E.....@.@2%J.... 0x0010: 0a00 0001 0e4f 7b51 0000 0002 a8a8 a8a8 .....O{Q........ 0x0020: a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 ................ 0x0030: a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 ................ 0x0040: a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 a8a8 ................ 0x0050: a8a8 .. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-05-01[PATCH] uml: support AES i586 crypto driverPaolo 'Blaisorblade' Giarrusso
We want to make possible, for the user, to enable the i586 AES implementation. This requires a restructure. - Add a CONFIG_UML_X86 to notify that we are building a UML for i386. - Rename CONFIG_64_BIT to CONFIG_64BIT as is used for all other archs - Tell crypto/Kconfig that UML_X86 is as good as X86 - Tell it that it must exclude not X86_64 but 64BIT, which will give the same results. - Tell kbuild to descend down into arch/i386/crypto/ to build what's needed. Signed-off-by: Paolo 'Blaisorblade' Giarrusso <blaisorblade@yahoo.it> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-04-16[PATCH] crypto: call zlib end functions on deflate exit pathArtem B. Bityuckiy
In the deflate_[compress|uncompress|pcompress] functions we call the zlib_[in|de]flateReset function at the beginning. This is OK. But when we unload the deflate module we don't call zlib_[in|de]flateEnd to free all the zlib internal data. It looks like a bug for me. Please, consider the attached patch. Signed-off-by: Artem B. Bityuckiy <dedekind@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-04-16Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!