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commit 5b41395fcc0265fc9f193aef9df39ce49d64677c upstream.
When writing a contiguous set of blocks, two indirect blocks could be
needed depending on how the blocks are aligned, so we need to increase
the number of credits needed by one.
[ Also fixed a another bug which could further underestimate the
number of journal credits needed by 1; the code was using integer
division instead of DIV_ROUND_UP() -- tytso]
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <xiaoqiangnk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 67286640f638f5ad41a946b9a3dc75327950248f upstream.
packet_getname_spkt() doesn't initialize all members of sa_data field of
sockaddr struct if strlen(dev->name) < 13. This structure is then copied
to userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory.
We have to fully fill sa_data with strncpy() instead of strlcpy().
The same with packet_getname(): it doesn't initialize sll_pkttype field of
sockaddr_ll. Set it to zero.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org>
[jmm: Backported to 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit fe10ae53384e48c51996941b7720ee16995cbcb7 upstream.
Sometimes ax25_getname() doesn't initialize all members of fsa_digipeater
field of fsa struct, also the struct has padding bytes between
sax25_call and sax25_ndigis fields. This structure is then copied to
userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit a8170c35e738d62e9919ce5b109cf4ed66e95bde upstream.
When calculating the INIT/INIT-ACK chunk length, we should not
only account the length of parameters, but also the parameters
zero padding length, such as AUTH HMACS parameter and CHUNKS
parameter. Without the parameters zero padding length we may get
following oops.
skb_over_panic: text:ce2068d2 len:130 put:6 head:cac3fe00 data:cac3fe00 tail:0xcac3fe82 end:0xcac3fe80 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:127!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/module/aes_generic/initstate
Modules linked in: authenc ......
Pid: 4102, comm: sctp_darn Tainted: G D 2.6.34-rc2 #6
EIP: 0060:[<c0607630>] EFLAGS: 00010282 CPU: 0
EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x37/0x3e
EAX: 00000078 EBX: c07c024b ECX: c07c02b9 EDX: cb607b78
ESI: 00000000 EDI: cac3fe7a EBP: 00000002 ESP: cb607b74
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
Process sctp_darn (pid: 4102, ti=cb607000 task=cabdc990 task.ti=cb607000)
Stack:
c07c02b9 ce2068d2 00000082 00000006 cac3fe00 cac3fe00 cac3fe82 cac3fe80
<0> c07c024b cac3fe7c cac3fe7a c0608dec ca986e80 ce2068d2 00000006 0000007a
<0> cb8120ca ca986e80 cb812000 00000003 cb8120c4 ce208a25 cb8120ca cadd9400
Call Trace:
[<ce2068d2>] ? sctp_addto_chunk+0x45/0x85 [sctp]
[<c0608dec>] ? skb_put+0x2e/0x32
[<ce2068d2>] ? sctp_addto_chunk+0x45/0x85 [sctp]
[<ce208a25>] ? sctp_make_init+0x279/0x28c [sctp]
[<c0686a92>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x2a/0x30
[<ce1fdc0b>] ? sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc+0x2b/0x7b [sctp]
[<ce202823>] ? sctp_do_sm+0xa0/0x14a [sctp]
[<ce2133b9>] ? sctp_pname+0x0/0x14 [sctp]
[<ce211d72>] ? sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0x2b/0x31 [sctp]
[<ce20f3cf>] ? sctp_sendmsg+0x7a0/0x9eb [sctp]
[<c064eb1e>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x3b/0x43
[<c04244b7>] ? task_tick_fair+0x2d/0xd9
[<c06031e1>] ? sock_sendmsg+0xa7/0xc1
[<c0416afe>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6b/0x75
[<c0425123>] ? dequeue_task_fair+0x34/0x19b
[<c0446abb>] ? sched_clock_local+0x17/0x11e
[<c052ea87>] ? _copy_from_user+0x2b/0x10c
[<c060ab3a>] ? verify_iovec+0x3c/0x6a
[<c06035ca>] ? sys_sendmsg+0x186/0x1e2
[<c042176b>] ? __wake_up_common+0x34/0x5b
[<c04240c2>] ? __wake_up+0x2c/0x3b
[<c057e35c>] ? tty_wakeup+0x43/0x47
[<c04430f2>] ? remove_wait_queue+0x16/0x24
[<c0580c94>] ? n_tty_read+0x5b8/0x65e
[<c042be02>] ? default_wake_function+0x0/0x8
[<c0604e0e>] ? sys_socketcall+0x17f/0x1cd
[<c040264c>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x22
Code: 0f 45 de 53 ff b0 98 00 00 00 ff b0 94 ......
EIP: [<c0607630>] skb_over_panic+0x37/0x3e SS:ESP 0068:cb607b74
To reproduce:
# modprobe sctp
# echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/sctp/addip_enable
# echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable
# sctp_test -H 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e -P 800 -l
# sctp_darn -H 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e -P 900 -h 192.168.0.21 -p 800 -I -s -t
sctp_darn ready to send...
3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e:900-192.168.0.21:800 Interactive mode> bindx-add=192.168.0.21
3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e:900-192.168.0.21:800 Interactive mode> bindx-add=192.168.1.21
3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e:900-192.168.0.21:800 Interactive mode> snd=10
------------------------------------------------------------------
eth0 has addresses: 3ffe:501:ffff:100:20c:29ff:fe4d:f37e and 192.168.0.21
eth1 has addresses: 192.168.1.21
------------------------------------------------------------------
Reported-by: George Cheimonidis <gchimon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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powerpc: Fix default_machine_crash_shutdown #ifdef botch
Commit: c2be05481f6125254c45b78f334d4dd09c701c82 upstream
crash_kexec_wait_realmode() is defined only if CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64
and CONFIG_SMP, but is called if CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 even if !CONFIG_SMP.
Fix the conditional compilation around the invocation.
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamalesh Babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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powerpc/kexec: Add ifdef CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 to PPC64 code
This patch introduces PPC64 specific #ifdef bits from the upstream
commit: b3df895aebe091b1657a42a8c859bd49fc96646b.
Reported-and-tested-by: dann frazier <dannf@dannf.org>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Gala <galak@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamalesh Babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit fb82c0ff27b2c40c6f7a3d1a94cafb154591fa80 upstream.
The gdbserial protocol handler should return an empty packet instead
of an error string when ever it responds to a command it does not
implement.
The problem cases come from a debugger client sending
qTBuffer, qTStatus, qSearch, qSupported.
The incorrect response from the gdbstub leads the debugger clients to
not function correctly. Recent versions of gdb will not detach correctly as a result of this behavior.
Backport-request-by: Frank Pan <frankpzh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Dongdong Deng <dongdong.deng@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit b3390ceab95601afc12213c3ec5551d3bc7b638f upstream.
get_user() may fail, if so return -EFAULT.
Signed-off-by: Kulikov Vasiliy <segooon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit b769f49463711205d57286e64cf535ed4daf59e9 upstream.
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 67c5c6cb8129c595f21e88254a3fc6b3b841ae8e upstream.
struct aunhdr has 4 padding bytes between 'pad' and 'handle' fields on
x86_64. These bytes are not initialized in the variable 'ah' before
sending 'ah' to the network. This leads to 4 bytes kernel stack
infoleak.
This bug was introduced before the git epoch.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Acked-by: Phil Blundell <philb@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 49d50fb1c28738ef6bad0c2b87d5355a1653fed5 upstream.
Don't allow everybogy to write to NVRAM.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Andy Sharp <andy.sharp@onstor.com>
Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54 upstream.
Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was
introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 961ed183a9fd080cf306c659b8736007e44065a5 upstream.
'buffer' string is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether it is
zero terminated. This may lead to overflow inside of simple_strtoul().
Changli Gao suggested to copy not more than user supplied 'size' bytes.
It was introduced before the git epoch. Files "ipt_CLUSTERIP/*" are
root writable only by default, however, on some setups permissions might be
relaxed to e.g. network admin user.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Acked-by: Changli Gao <xiaosuo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 42eab94fff18cb1091d3501cd284d6bd6cc9c143 upstream.
Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second is
introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1); the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 78b79876761b86653df89c48a7010b5cbd41a84a upstream.
Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first and the third bugs were introduced before the git epoch; the
second was introduced in 2722971c (v2.6.17-rc1). To trigger the bug
one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 1309d7afbed112f0e8e90be9af975550caa0076b upstream.
This patch fixes information leakage to the userspace by initializing
the data buffer to zero.
Reported-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Selhorst <m.selhorst@sirrix.com>
[ Also removed the silly "* sizeof(u8)". If that isn't 1, we have way
deeper problems than a simple multiplication can fix. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 272b62c1f0f6f742046e45b50b6fec98860208a0 upstream.
When a hole spans across page boundaries, the next write forces
a read of the block. This could end up reading existing garbage
data from the disk in ocfs2_map_page_blocks. This leads to
non-zero holes. In order to avoid this, mark the writes as new
when the holes span across page boundaries.
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: jlbec <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 63a8588debd4dc72becb9e27add9343c76301c7d upstream.
Just adding the vendor details makes it work fine.
Signed-off-by: Marc-Antoine Perennou <Marc-Antoine@Perennou.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 43629f8f5ea32a998d06d1bb41eefa0e821ff573 upstream.
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "device"
field is NULL terminated. This potentially leads to BUG() inside of
alloc_netdev_mqs() and/or information leak by creating a device with a name
made of contents of kernel stack.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit d846f71195d57b0bbb143382647c2c6638b04c5a upstream.
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c4c896e1471aec3b004a693c689f60be3b17ac86 upstream.
struct sco_conninfo has one padding byte in the end. Local variable
cinfo of type sco_conninfo is copied to userspace with this uninizialized
one byte, leading to old stack contents leak.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 982134ba62618c2d69fbbbd166d0a11ee3b7e3d8 upstream.
The normal mmap paths all avoid creating a mapping where the pgoff
inside the mapping could wrap around due to overflow. However, an
expanding mremap() can take such a non-wrapping mapping and make it
bigger and cause a wrapping condition.
Noticed by Robert Swiecki when running a system call fuzzer, where it
caused a BUG_ON() due to terminally confusing the vma_prio_tree code. A
vma dumping patch by Hugh then pinpointed the crazy wrapped case.
Reported-and-tested-by: Robert Swiecki <robert@swiecki.net>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
[wt: 2.6.27 has this code in do_mremap()]
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commit b03f24567ce7caf2420b8be4c6eb74c191d59a91 upstream.
There's no reason to write quota info in dquot_commit(). The writing is a
relict from the old days when we didn't have dquot_acquire() and
dquot_release() and thus dquot_commit() could have created / removed quota
structures from the file. These days dquot_commit() only updates usage counters
/ limits in quota structure and thus there's no need to write quota info.
This also fixes an issue with journaling filesystem which didn't reserve
enough space in the transaction for write of quota info (it could have been
dirty at the time of dquot_commit() because of a race with other operation
changing it).
Reported-and-tested-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 54acbaaa523ca0bd284a18f67ad213c379679e86 upstream.
Thanks to coverity which spotted that UBIFS will oops if 'kmalloc()'
in 'read_pnode()' fails and we dereference a NULL 'pnode' pointer
when we 'goto out'.
Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <Artem.Bityutskiy@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 8b229c76765816796eec7ccd428f03bd8de8b525 upstream.
This fix makes the 'dbg_check_old_index()' function return
immediately if debugging is disabled, instead of executing
incorrect 'goto out' which causes UBIFS to:
1. Allocate memory
2. Read the flash
On every commit. OK, we do not commit that often, but it is
still silly to do unneeded I/O anyway.
Credits to coverity for spotting this silly issue.
Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <Artem.Bityutskiy@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit be20250c13f88375345ad99950190685eda51eb8 upstream.
When parsing the FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS facilities field, it's possible for
a remote host to provide more digipeaters than expected, resulting in
heap corruption. Check against ROSE_MAX_DIGIS to prevent overflows, and
abort facilities parsing on failure.
Additionally, when parsing the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and
FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP facilities fields, a remote host can provide a length
of less than 10, resulting in an underflow in a memcpy size, causing a
kernel panic due to massive heap corruption. A length of greater than
20 results in a stack overflow of the callsign array. Abort facilities
parsing on these invalid length values.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 6ebb8a4a43e34f999ab36f27f972f3cd751cda4f upstream.
To make the EV1938 chip work, add a magic bit and an extra delay.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Tested-by: Tino Schmidt <mailtinoshomepage@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 0ca03cd7d0fa3bfbd56958136a10f19733c4ce12 upstream.
This stops code that handles widgets generically from attempting to access
registers for these widgets.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Liam Girdwood <lrg@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit d50e7e3604778bfc2dc40f440e0742dbae399d54 upstream.
Invalid nicknames containing only spaces will result in an underflow in
a memcpy size calculation, subsequently destroying the heap and
panicking.
v2 also catches the case where the provided nickname is longer than the
buffer size, which can result in controllable heap corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit d370af0ef7951188daeb15bae75db7ba57c67846 upstream.
Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes. Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c4d0c3b097f7584772316ee4d64a09fe0e4ddfca upstream.
The FSGEOMETRY_V1 ioctl (and its compat equivalent) calls out to
xfs_fs_geometry() with a version number of 3. This code path does not
fill in the logsunit member of the passed xfs_fsop_geom_t, leading to
the leaking of four bytes of uninitialized stack data to potentially
unprivileged callers.
v2 switches to memset() to avoid future issues if structure members
change, on suggestion of Dave Chinner.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Reviewed-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 243b422af9ea9af4ead07a8ad54c90d4f9b6081a upstream.
Commit da48524eb206 ("Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo
from spoofing the signal code") made the check on si_code too strict.
There are several legitimate places where glibc wants to queue a
negative si_code different from SI_QUEUE:
- This was first noticed with glibc's aio implementation, which wants
to queue a signal with si_code SI_ASYNCIO; the current kernel
causes glibc's tst-aio4 test to fail because rt_sigqueueinfo()
fails with EPERM.
- Further examination of the glibc source shows that getaddrinfo_a()
wants to use SI_ASYNCNL (which the kernel does not even define).
The timer_create() fallback code wants to queue signals with SI_TIMER.
As suggested by Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, loosen the check to
forbid only the problematic SI_TKILL case.
Reported-by: Klaus Dittrich <kladit@arcor.de>
Acked-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
[wt: 2.6.27 has no rt_tgsigqueueinfo()]
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commit 1821df040ac3cd6a57518739f345da6d50ea9d3f upstream.
The pointer '(*auth_tok_key)' is set to NULL in case request_key()
fails, in order to prevent its use by functions calling
ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit d1e12de804f9d8ad114786ca7c2ce593cba79891 upstream.
During device discovery, scsi mid layer sends INQUIRY command to LUN
0. If the LUN 0 is not mapped to host, it creates a temporary
scsi_device with LUN id 0 and sends REPORT_LUNS command to it. After
the REPORT_LUNS succeeds, it walks through the LUN table and adds each
LUN found to sysfs. At the end of REPORT_LUNS lun table scan, it will
delete the temporary scsi_device of LUN 0.
When scsi devices are added to sysfs, it calls add_dev function of all
the registered class interfaces. If ses driver has been registered,
ses_intf_add() of ses module will be called. This function calls
scsi_device_enclosure() to check the inquiry data for EncServ
bit. Since inquiry was not allocated for temporary LUN 0 scsi_device,
it will cause NULL pointer exception.
To fix the problem, sdev->inquiry is checked for NULL before reading it.
Signed-off-by: Somasundaram Krishnasamy <Somasundaram.Krishnasamy@lsi.com>
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@lsi.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 877a55979c189c590e819a61cbbe2b7947875f17 upstream.
enclosure page 7 gives us the "pretty" names of the enclosure slots.
Without a page 7, we can still use the enclosure code as long as we
make up numeric names for the slots. Unfortunately, the current code
fails to add any devices because the check for page 10 is in the wrong
place if we have no page 7. Fix it so that devices show up even if
the enclosure has no page 7.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 8bc8aecdc5e26cfda12dbd6867af4aa67836da6a upstream.
This field is used to determine the inactivity time. When in AP mode,
hostapd uses it for kicking out inactive clients after a while. Without this
patch, hostapd immediately deauthenticates a new client if it checks the
inactivity time before the client sends its first data frame.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 4d00135a680727f6c3be78f8befaac009030e4df upstream.
User-controllable indexes for voice and channel values may cause reading
and writing beyond the bounds of their respective arrays, leading to
potentially exploitable memory corruption. Validate these indexes.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 1ddd5049545e0aa1a0ed19bca4d9c9c3ce1ac8a2 upstream.
Under certain workloads a command may seem to get lost. IOW, the Smart Array
thinks all commands have been completed but we still have commands in our
completion queue. This may lead to system instability, filesystems going
read-only, or even panics depending on the affected filesystem. We add an
extra read to force the write to complete.
Testing shows this extra read avoids the problem.
Signed-off-by: Mike Miller <mike.miller@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jaxboe@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit cda6587c21a887254c8ed4b58da8fcc4040ab557 upstream.
Rmmod myri10ge crash at free_netdev() -> netif_napi_del(), because napi
structures are already deallocated. To fix call netif_napi_del() before
kfree() at myri10ge_free_slices().
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit dd65c736d1b5312c80c88a64bf521db4959eded5 upstream.
The dcdbas driver can do an I/O write to cause a SMI to occur. The SMI handler
looks at certain registers and memory locations, so the SMI needs to happen
immediately. On some systems I/O writes are posted, though, causing the SMI to
happen well after the "outb" occurred, which causes random failures. Following
the "outb" with an "inb" forces the write to go through even if it is posted.
Signed-off-by: Stuart Hayes <stuart_hayes@yahoo.com>
Acked-by: Doug Warzecha <douglas_warzecha@dell.com>
Cc: Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 8c3c283e6bf463ab498d6e7823aff6c4762314b6 upstream.
A virtualized display device is usually viewed with the vncviewer
application, either by 'xm vnc domU' or with vncviewer localhost:port.
vncviewer and the RFB protocol provides absolute coordinates to the
virtual display. These coordinates are either passed through to a PV
guest or converted to relative coordinates for a HVM guest.
A PV guest receives these coordinates and passes them to the kernels
evdev driver. There it can be picked up by applications such as the
xorg-input drivers. Using absolute coordinates avoids issues such as
guest mouse pointer not tracking host mouse pointer due to wrong mouse
acceleration settings in the guests X display.
Advertise either absolute or relative coordinates to the input system
and the evdev driver, depending on what dom0 provides. The xorg-input
driver prefers relative coordinates even if a devices provides both.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 7e7797e7f6f7bfab73fca02c65e40eaa5bb9000c upstream.
Fix potential null-pointer exception on disconnect introduced by commit
11ea859d64b69a747d6b060b9ed1520eab1161fe (USB: additional power savings
for cdc-acm devices that support remote wakeup).
Only access acm->dev after making sure it is non-null in control urb
completion handler.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit adaa3c6342b249548ea830fe8e02aa5b45be8688 upstream.
My testprog do a lot of bitbang - after hours i got following warning and my machine lockups:
WARNING: at /build/buildd/linux-2.6.38/lib/kref.c:34
After debugging uss720 driver i discovered that the completion callback was called before
usb_submit_urb returns. The callback frees the request structure that is krefed on return by
usb_submit_urb.
Signed-off-by: Peter Holik <peter@holik.at>
Acked-by: Thomas Sailer <t.sailer@alumni.ethz.ch>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit b5a3b3d985493c173925907adfebf3edab236fe7 upstream.
This patch (as1453) fixes a long-standing bug in the ehci-hcd driver.
There is no need to set the Halt bit in the overlay region for an
unlinked or blocked QH. Contrary to what the comment says, setting
the Halt bit does not cause the QH to be patched later; that decision
(made in qh_refresh()) depends only on whether the QH is currently
pointing to a valid qTD. Likewise, setting the Halt bit does not
prevent completions from activating the QH while it is "stopped"; they
are prevented by the fact that qh_completions() temporarily changes
qh->qh_state to QH_STATE_COMPLETING.
On the other hand, there are circumstances in which the QH will be
reactivated _without_ being patched; this happens after an URB beyond
the head of the queue is unlinked. Setting the Halt bit will then
cause the hardware to see the QH with both the Active and Halt bits
set, an invalid combination that will prevent the queue from
advancing and may even crash some controllers.
Apparently the only reason this hasn't been reported before is that
unlinking URBs from the middle of a running queue is quite uncommon.
However Test 17, recently added to the usbtest driver, does exactly
this, and it confirms the presence of the bug.
In short, there is no reason to set the Halt bit for an unlinked or
blocked QH, and there is a very good reason not to set it. Therefore
the code that sets it is removed.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Tested-by: Andiry Xu <andiry.xu@amd.com>
CC: David Brownell <david-b@pacbell.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit d6244bc0ed0c52a795e6f4dcab3886daf3e74fac upstream.
Use mask 0x10 for "soft cursor" detection on in function tile_cursor.
(Tile Blitting Operation in framebuffer console).
The old mask 0x01 for vc_cursor_type detects CUR_NONE, CUR_LOWER_THIRD
and every second mode value as "software cursor". This hides the cursor
for these modes (cursor.mode = 0). But, only CUR_NONE or "software cursor"
should hide the cursor.
See also 0x10 in functions add_softcursor, bit_cursor and cw_cursor.
Signed-off-by: Henry Nestler <henry.nestler@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 5883f57ca0008ffc93e09cbb9847a1928e50c6f3 upstream.
While mm->start_stack was protected from cross-uid viewing (commit
f83ce3e6b02d5 ("proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged
processes")), the start_code and end_code values were not. This would
allow the text location of a PIE binary to leak, defeating ASLR.
Note that the value "1" is used instead of "0" for a protected value since
"ps", "killall", and likely other readers of /proc/pid/stat, take
start_code of "0" to mean a kernel thread and will misbehave. Thanks to
Brad Spengler for pointing this out.
Addresses CVE-2011-0726
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 0db0c01b53a1a421513f91573241aabafb87802a upstream.
The current code fails to print the "[heap]" marking if the heap is split
into multiple mappings.
Fix the check so that the marking is displayed in all possible cases:
1. vma matches exactly the heap
2. the heap vma is merged e.g. with bss
3. the heap vma is splitted e.g. due to locked pages
Test cases. In all cases, the process should have mapping(s) with
[heap] marking:
(1) vma matches exactly the heap
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
int main (void)
{
if (sbrk(4096) != (void *)-1) {
printf("check /proc/%d/maps\n", (int)getpid());
while (1)
sleep(1);
}
return 0;
}
# ./test1
check /proc/553/maps
[1] + Stopped ./test1
# cat /proc/553/maps | head -4
00008000-00009000 r-xp 00000000 01:00 3113640 /test1
00010000-00011000 rw-p 00000000 01:00 3113640 /test1
00011000-00012000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap]
4006f000-40070000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
(2) the heap vma is merged
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
char foo[4096] = "foo";
char bar[4096];
int main (void)
{
if (sbrk(4096) != (void *)-1) {
printf("check /proc/%d/maps\n", (int)getpid());
while (1)
sleep(1);
}
return 0;
}
# ./test2
check /proc/556/maps
[2] + Stopped ./test2
# cat /proc/556/maps | head -4
00008000-00009000 r-xp 00000000 01:00 3116312 /test2
00010000-00012000 rw-p 00000000 01:00 3116312 /test2
00012000-00014000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap]
4004a000-4004b000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
(3) the heap vma is splitted (this fails without the patch)
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
int main (void)
{
if ((sbrk(4096) != (void *)-1) && !mlockall(MCL_FUTURE) &&
(sbrk(4096) != (void *)-1)) {
printf("check /proc/%d/maps\n", (int)getpid());
while (1)
sleep(1);
}
return 0;
}
# ./test3
check /proc/559/maps
[1] + Stopped ./test3
# cat /proc/559/maps|head -4
00008000-00009000 r-xp 00000000 01:00 3119108 /test3
00010000-00011000 rw-p 00000000 01:00 3119108 /test3
00011000-00012000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap]
00012000-00013000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap]
It looks like the bug has been there forever, and since it only results in
some information missing from a procfile, it does not fulfil the -stable
"critical issue" criteria.
Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit ce654b37f87980d95f339080e4c3bdb2370bdf22 upstream.
Orphan cleanup is currently executed even if the file system has some
number of unknown ROCOMPAT features, which deletes inodes and frees
blocks, which could be very bad for some RO_COMPAT features.
This patch skips the orphan cleanup if it contains readonly compatible
features not known by this ext3 implementation, which would prevent
the fs from being mounted (or remounted) readwrite.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@users.sf.net>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit da48524eb20662618854bb3df2db01fc65f3070c upstream.
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
[wt: 2.6.27 does not have do_rt_tgsigqueueinfo()]
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commit bee4c36a5cf5c9f63ce1d7372aa62045fbd16d47 upstream.
Up to 2.6.22, you could use remap_file_pages(2) on a tmpfs file or a
shared mapping of /dev/zero or a shared anonymous mapping. In 2.6.23 we
disabled it by default, but set VM_CAN_NONLINEAR to enable it on safe
mappings. We made sure to set it in shmem_mmap() for tmpfs files, but
missed it in shmem_zero_setup() for the others. Fix that at last.
Reported-by: Kenny Simpson <theonetruekenny@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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