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commit 8d7f6690cedb83456edd41c9bd583783f0703bf0 upstream.
The kernel currently crashes with a low-address-protection exception
if a user space process executes an instruction that tries to use the
linkage stack. Set the base-ASTE origin and the subspace-ASTE origin
of the dispatchable-unit-control-table to point to a dummy ASTE.
Set up control register 15 to point to an empty linkage stack with no
room left.
A user space process with a linkage stack instruction will still crash
but with a different exception which is correctly translated to a
segmentation fault instead of a kernel oops.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d7736ff5be31edaa4fe5ab62810c64529a24b149 upstream.
Dumps created by kdump or zfcpdump can contain invalid memory holes when
dumping z/VM systems that have memory pressure.
For example:
# zgetdump -i /proc/vmcore.
Memory map:
0000000000000000 - 0000000000bfffff (12 MB)
0000000000e00000 - 00000000014fffff (7 MB)
000000000bd00000 - 00000000f3bfffff (3711 MB)
The memory detection function find_memory_chunks() issues tprot to
find valid memory chunks. In case of CMM it can happen that pages are
marked as unstable via set_page_unstable() in arch_free_page().
If z/VM has released that pages, tprot returns -EFAULT and indicates
a memory hole.
So fix this and switch off CMM in case of kdump or zfcpdump.
Signed-off-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4fcfc7443d072582b5047b8b391d711590e5645c upstream.
Raw id and FW id should be switched.
Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <linux@rempel-privat.de>
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <linux@rempel-privat.de>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2fa4cb905605c863bf570027233af7afd8149ae4 upstream.
sta_rc_update() callback must be atomic, hence we can not take mutexes
or do other operations, which can sleep in ath9k_htc_sta_rc_update().
I think we can just return from ath9k_htc_sta_rc_update(), if it is
called without IEEE80211_RC_SUPP_RATES_CHANGED bit. That will help
with scheduling while atomic bug for most cases (except mesh and IBSS
modes).
For mesh and IBSS I do not see other solution like creating additional
workqueue, because sending firmware command require us to sleep, but
this can be done in additional patch.
Patch partially fixes bug:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=990955
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 338f977f4eb441e69bb9a46eaa0ac715c931a67f upstream.
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0297ea17bf7879fb5846fafd1be4c0471e72848d upstream.
When the driver cannot start the AP or when the assignement
of the beacon goes wrong, we need to unassign the vif.
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2f617435c3a6fe3f39efb9ae2baa77de2d6c97b8 upstream.
ieee80211_start_roc_work() might add a new roc
to existing roc, and tell cfg80211 it has already
started.
However, this might happen before the roc cookie
was set, resulting in REMAIN_ON_CHANNEL (started)
event with null cookie. Consequently, it can make
wpa_supplicant go out of sync.
Fix it by setting the roc cookie earlier.
Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller <eliad@wizery.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 83e3bc23ef9ce7c03b7b4e5d3d790246ea59db3e upstream.
The get/set ACL xattr support for CIFS ACLs attempts to send old
cifs dialect protocol requests even when mounted with SMB2 or later
dialects. Sending cifs requests on an smb2 session causes problems -
the server drops the session due to the illegal request.
This patch makes CIFS ACL operations protocol specific to fix that.
Attempting to query/set CIFS ACLs for SMB2 will now return
EOPNOTSUPP (until we add worker routines for sending query
ACL requests via SMB2) instead of sending invalid (cifs)
requests.
A separate followon patch will be needed to fix cifs_acl_to_fattr
(which takes a cifs specific u16 fid so can't be abstracted
to work with SMB2 until that is changed) and will be needed
to fix mount problems when "cifsacl" is specified on mount
with e.g. vers=2.1
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d979f3b0a1f0b5499ab85e68cdf02b56852918b6 upstream.
Changeset 666753c3ef8fc88b0ddd5be4865d0aa66428ac35 added protocol
operations for get/setxattr to avoid calling cifs operations
on smb2/smb3 mounts for xattr operations and this changeset
adds the calls to cifs specific protocol operations for xattrs
(in order to reenable cifs support for xattrs which was
temporarily disabled by the previous changeset. We do not
have SMB2/SMB3 worker function for setting xattrs yet so
this only enables it for cifs.
CCing stable since without these two small changsets (its
small coreq 666753c3ef8fc88b0ddd5be4865d0aa66428ac35 is
also needed) calling getfattr/setfattr on smb2/smb3 mounts
causes problems.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 666753c3ef8fc88b0ddd5be4865d0aa66428ac35 upstream.
When mounting with smb2 (or smb2.1 or smb3) we need to check to make
sure that attempts to query or set extended attributes do not
attempt to send the request with the older cifs protocol instead
(eventually we also need to add the support in SMB2
to query/set extended attributes but this patch prevents us from
using the wrong protocol for extended attribute operations).
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8d547ff4ac5927245e0833ac18528f939da0ee0e upstream.
mce-test detected a test failure when injecting error to a thp tail
page. This is because we take page refcount of the tail page in
madvise_hwpoison() while the fix in commit a3e0f9e47d5e
("mm/memory-failure.c: transfer page count from head page to tail page
after split thp") assumes that we always take refcount on the head page.
When a real memory error happens we take refcount on the head page where
memory_failure() is called without MF_COUNT_INCREASED set, so it seems
to me that testing memory error on thp tail page using madvise makes
little sense.
This patch cancels moving refcount in !MF_COUNT_INCREASED for valid
testing.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/&&/&/]
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Chen Gong <gong.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 96c7a2ff21501691587e1ae969b83cbec8b78e08 upstream.
Recently due to a spike in connections per second memcached on 3
separate boxes triggered the OOM killer from accept. At the time the
OOM killer was triggered there was 4GB out of 36GB free in zone 1. The
problem was that alloc_fdtable was allocating an order 3 page (32KiB) to
hold a bitmap, and there was sufficient fragmentation that the largest
page available was 8KiB.
I find the logic that PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER can't fail pretty dubious
but I do agree that order 3 allocations are very likely to succeed.
There are always pathologies where order > 0 allocations can fail when
there are copious amounts of free memory available. Using the pigeon
hole principle it is easy to show that it requires 1 page more than 50%
of the pages being free to guarantee an order 1 (8KiB) allocation will
succeed, 1 page more than 75% of the pages being free to guarantee an
order 2 (16KiB) allocation will succeed and 1 page more than 87.5% of
the pages being free to guarantee an order 3 allocate will succeed.
A server churning memory with a lot of small requests and replies like
memcached is a common case that if anything can will skew the odds
against large pages being available.
Therefore let's not give external applications a practical way to kill
linux server applications, and specify __GFP_NORETRY to the kmalloc in
alloc_fdmem. Unless I am misreading the code and by the time the code
reaches should_alloc_retry in __alloc_pages_slowpath (where
__GFP_NORETRY becomes signification). We have already tried everything
reasonable to allocate a page and the only thing left to do is wait. So
not waiting and falling back to vmalloc immediately seems like the
reasonable thing to do even if there wasn't a chance of triggering the
OOM killer.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7cde9b27e7b3a2e09d647bb4f6d94e842698d2d5 upstream.
Due to the way kernel is initialized under Xen is possible that the
ring1 selector used by the kernel for the boot cpu end up to be copied
to userspace leading to segmentation fault in the userspace.
Xen code in the kernel initialize no-boot cpus with correct selectors (ds
and es set to __USER_DS) but the boot one keep the ring1 (passed by Xen).
On task context switch (switch_to) we assume that ds, es and cs already
point to __USER_DS and __KERNEL_CSso these selector are not changed.
If processor is an Intel that support sysenter instruction sysenter/sysexit
is used so ds and es are not restored switching back from kernel to
userspace. In the case the selectors point to a ring1 instead of __USER_DS
the userspace code will crash on first memory access attempt (to be
precise Xen on the emulated iret used to do sysexit will detect and set ds
and es to zero which lead to GPF anyway).
Now if an userspace process call kernel using sysenter and get rescheduled
(for me it happen on a specific init calling wait4) could happen that the
ring1 selector is set to ds and es.
This is quite hard to detect cause after a while these selectors are fixed
(__USER_DS seems sticky).
Bisecting the code commit 7076aada1040de4ed79a5977dbabdb5e5ea5e249 appears
to be the first one that have this issue.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0160676bba69523e8b0ac83f306cce7d342ed7c8 upstream.
On hosts with more than 168 GB of memory, a 32-bit guest may attempt
to grant map an MFN that is error cannot lookup in its mapping of the
m2p table. There is an m2p lookup as part of m2p_add_override() and
m2p_remove_override(). The lookup falls off the end of the mapped
portion of the m2p and (because the mapping is at the highest virtual
address) wraps around and the lookup causes a fault on what appears to
be a user space address.
do_page_fault() (thinking it's a fault to a userspace address), tries
to lock mm->mmap_sem. If the gntdev device is used for the grant map,
m2p_add_override() is called from from gnttab_mmap() with mm->mmap_sem
already locked. do_page_fault() then deadlocks.
The deadlock would most commonly occur when a 64-bit guest is started
and xenconsoled attempts to grant map its console ring.
Introduce mfn_to_pfn_no_overrides() which checks the MFN is within the
mapped portion of the m2p table before accessing the table and use
this in m2p_add_override(), m2p_remove_override(), and mfn_to_pfn()
(which already had the correct range check).
All faults caused by accessing the non-existant parts of the m2p are
thus within the kernel address space and exception_fixup() is called
without trying to lock mm->mmap_sem.
This means that for MFNs that are outside the mapped range of the m2p
then mfn_to_pfn() will always look in the m2p overrides. This is
correct because it must be a foreign MFN (and the PFN in the m2p in
this case is only relevant for the other domain).
v3: check for auto_translated_physmap in mfn_to_pfn_no_overrides()
v2: in mfn_to_pfn() look in m2p_overrides if the MFN is out of
range as it's probably foreign.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@citrix.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3661371701e714f0cea4120f6a365340858fb4e4 upstream.
Backend drivers shouldn't transistion to CLOSED unless the frontend is
CLOSED. If a backend does transition to CLOSED too soon then the
frontend may not see the CLOSING state and will not properly shutdown.
So, treat an unexpected backend CLOSED state the same as CLOSING.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on c8721bbbdd36382de51cd6b7a56322e0acca2414 upstream, but only the
bugfix portion pulled out.
Hi Naoya or Greg,
We found a bug in 3.10.x.
The problem is that we accidentally have a hwpoisoned hugepage in free
hugepage list. It could happend in the the following scenario:
process A process B
migrate_huge_page
put_page (old hugepage)
linked to free hugepage list
hugetlb_fault
hugetlb_no_page
alloc_huge_page
dequeue_huge_page_vma
dequeue_huge_page_node
(steal hwpoisoned hugepage)
set_page_hwpoison_huge_page
dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page
(fail to dequeue)
I tested this bug, one process keeps allocating huge page, and I
use sysfs interface to soft offline a huge page, then received:
"MCE: Killing UCP:2717 due to hardware memory corruption fault at 8200034"
Upstream kernel is free from this bug because of these two commits:
f15bdfa802bfa5eb6b4b5a241b97ec9fa1204a35
mm/memory-failure.c: fix memory leak in successful soft offlining
c8721bbbdd36382de51cd6b7a56322e0acca2414
mm: memory-hotplug: enable memory hotplug to handle hugepage
The first one, although the problem is about memory leak, this patch
moves unset_migratetype_isolate(), which is important to avoid the race.
The latter is not a bug fix and it's too big, so I rewrite a small one.
The following patch can fix this bug.(please apply f15bdfa802bf first)
Signed-off-by: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 603e7729920e42b3c2f4dbfab9eef4878cb6e8fa upstream.
qib_user_sdma_queue_pkts() gets called with mmap_sem held for
writing. Except for get_user_pages() deep down in
qib_user_sdma_pin_pages() we don't seem to need mmap_sem at all. Even
more interestingly the function qib_user_sdma_queue_pkts() (and also
qib_user_sdma_coalesce() called somewhat later) call copy_from_user()
which can hit a page fault and we deadlock on trying to get mmap_sem
when handling that fault.
So just make qib_user_sdma_pin_pages() use get_user_pages_fast() and
leave mmap_sem locking for mm.
This deadlock has actually been observed in the wild when the node
is under memory pressure.
Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
[Backported to 3.10: (Thanks to Ben Huthings)
- Adjust context
- Adjust indentation and nr_pages argument in qib_user_sdma_pin_pages()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f15bdfa802bfa5eb6b4b5a241b97ec9fa1204a35 upstream.
After a successful page migration by soft offlining, the source page is
not properly freed and it's never reusable even if we unpoison it
afterward.
This is caused by the race between freeing page and setting PG_hwpoison.
In successful soft offlining, the source page is put (and the refcount
becomes 0) by putback_lru_page() in unmap_and_move(), where it's linked
to pagevec and actual freeing back to buddy is delayed. So if
PG_hwpoison is set for the page before freeing, the freeing does not
functions as expected (in such case freeing aborts in
free_pages_prepare() check.)
This patch tries to make sure to free the source page before setting
PG_hwpoison on it. To avoid reallocating, the page keeps
MIGRATE_ISOLATE until after setting PG_hwpoison.
This patch also removes obsolete comments about "keeping elevated
refcount" because what they say is not true. Unlike memory_failure(),
soft_offline_page() uses no special page isolation code, and the
soft-offlined pages have no elevated.
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7b320cb1ed2dbd2c5f2a778197baf76fd6bf545a upstream.
We have few fedora bug reports about list corruption on pinctrl,
for example:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1051918
Most likely corruption happen due lack of protection of pinctrl_list
when adding new nodes to it. Patch corrects that.
Fixes: 42fed7ba44e ("pinctrl: move subsystem mutex to pinctrl_dev struct")
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f17248ed868767567298e1cdf06faf8159a81f7c upstream.
Due to an assumption in the VT8500 pinctrl driver, the value passed
from devicetree for 'wm,pull' was not explicitly translated before
being passed to pinconf.
Since v3.10, changes to 'enum pin_config_param', PIN_CONFIG_BIAS_PULL_(UP/DOWN)
no longer map 1-to-1 with the expected values in devicetree.
This patch adds a small translation between the devicetree values (0..2)
and the enum pin_config_param equivalent values.
Signed-off-by: Tony Prisk <linux@prisktech.co.nz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6583327c4dd55acbbf2a6f25e775b28b3abf9a42 upstream.
Commit d61931d89b, "x86: Add optimized popcnt variants" introduced
compile flag -fcall-saved-rdi for lib/hweight.c. When combined with
options -fprofile-arcs and -O2, this flag causes gcc to generate
broken constructor code. As a result, a 64 bit x86 kernel compiled
with CONFIG_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL=y prints message "gcov: could not create
file" and runs into sproadic BUGs during boot.
The gcc people indicate that these kinds of problems are endemic when
using ad hoc calling conventions. It is therefore best to treat any
file compiled with ad hoc calling conventions as an isolated
environment and avoid things like profiling or coverage analysis,
since those subsystems assume a "normal" calling conventions.
This patch avoids the bug by excluding lib/hweight.o from coverage
profiling.
Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/52F3A30C.7050205@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 13e1b87c986100169b0695aeb26970943665eda9 upstream.
Fix the following build error:
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/
mxl111sf-tuner.h:72:9: error: expected ‘;’, ‘,’ or ‘)’ before ‘struct’
struct mxl111sf_tuner_config *cfg)
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Krufky <mkrufky@linuxtv.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f2e4c5e004691dfe37d0e4b363296f28abdb9bc7 upstream.
Add USB ID [2040:f900] for Hauppauge WinTV-MiniStick 2.
Device is build upon IT9135 chipset.
Tested-by: Stefan Becker <schtefan@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Antti Palosaari <crope@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f98b7a772ab51b52ca4d2a14362fc0e0c8a2e0f3 upstream.
There was a large performance regression that was bisected to
commit 611ae8e3 ("x86/tlb: enable tlb flush range support for
x86"). This patch simply changes the default balance point
between a local and global flush for IvyBridge.
In the interest of allowing the tests to be reproduced, this
patch was tested using mmtests 0.15 with the following
configurations
configs/config-global-dhp__tlbflush-performance
configs/config-global-dhp__scheduler-performance
configs/config-global-dhp__network-performance
Results are from two machines
Ivybridge 4 threads: Intel(R) Core(TM) i3-3240 CPU @ 3.40GHz
Ivybridge 8 threads: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3770 CPU @ 3.40GHz
Page fault microbenchmark showed nothing interesting.
Ebizzy was configured to run multiple iterations and threads.
Thread counts ranged from 1 to NR_CPUS*2. For each thread count,
it ran 100 iterations and each iteration lasted 10 seconds.
Ivybridge 4 threads
3.13.0-rc7 3.13.0-rc7
vanilla altshift-v3
Mean 1 6395.44 ( 0.00%) 6789.09 ( 6.16%)
Mean 2 7012.85 ( 0.00%) 8052.16 ( 14.82%)
Mean 3 6403.04 ( 0.00%) 6973.74 ( 8.91%)
Mean 4 6135.32 ( 0.00%) 6582.33 ( 7.29%)
Mean 5 6095.69 ( 0.00%) 6526.68 ( 7.07%)
Mean 6 6114.33 ( 0.00%) 6416.64 ( 4.94%)
Mean 7 6085.10 ( 0.00%) 6448.51 ( 5.97%)
Mean 8 6120.62 ( 0.00%) 6462.97 ( 5.59%)
Ivybridge 8 threads
3.13.0-rc7 3.13.0-rc7
vanilla altshift-v3
Mean 1 7336.65 ( 0.00%) 7787.02 ( 6.14%)
Mean 2 8218.41 ( 0.00%) 9484.13 ( 15.40%)
Mean 3 7973.62 ( 0.00%) 8922.01 ( 11.89%)
Mean 4 7798.33 ( 0.00%) 8567.03 ( 9.86%)
Mean 5 7158.72 ( 0.00%) 8214.23 ( 14.74%)
Mean 6 6852.27 ( 0.00%) 7952.45 ( 16.06%)
Mean 7 6774.65 ( 0.00%) 7536.35 ( 11.24%)
Mean 8 6510.50 ( 0.00%) 6894.05 ( 5.89%)
Mean 12 6182.90 ( 0.00%) 6661.29 ( 7.74%)
Mean 16 6100.09 ( 0.00%) 6608.69 ( 8.34%)
Ebizzy hits the worst case scenario for TLB range flushing every
time and it shows for these Ivybridge CPUs at least that the
default choice is a poor on. The patch addresses the problem.
Next was a tlbflush microbenchmark written by Alex Shi at
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=133727348217113 . It
measures access costs while the TLB is being flushed. The
expectation is that if there are always full TLB flushes that
the benchmark would suffer and it benefits from range flushing
There are 320 iterations of the test per thread count. The
number of entries is randomly selected with a min of 1 and max
of 512. To ensure a reasonably even spread of entries, the full
range is broken up into 8 sections and a random number selected
within that section.
iteration 1, random number between 0-64
iteration 2, random number between 64-128 etc
This is still a very weak methodology. When you do not know
what are typical ranges, random is a reasonable choice but it
can be easily argued that the opimisation was for smaller ranges
and an even spread is not representative of any workload that
matters. To improve this, we'd need to know the probability
distribution of TLB flush range sizes for a set of workloads
that are considered "common", build a synthetic trace and feed
that into this benchmark. Even that is not perfect because it
would not account for the time between flushes but there are
limits of what can be reasonably done and still be doing
something useful. If a representative synthetic trace is
provided then this benchmark could be revisited and the shift values retuned.
Ivybridge 4 threads
3.13.0-rc7 3.13.0-rc7
vanilla altshift-v3
Mean 1 10.50 ( 0.00%) 10.50 ( 0.03%)
Mean 2 17.59 ( 0.00%) 17.18 ( 2.34%)
Mean 3 22.98 ( 0.00%) 21.74 ( 5.41%)
Mean 5 47.13 ( 0.00%) 46.23 ( 1.92%)
Mean 8 43.30 ( 0.00%) 42.56 ( 1.72%)
Ivybridge 8 threads
3.13.0-rc7 3.13.0-rc7
vanilla altshift-v3
Mean 1 9.45 ( 0.00%) 9.36 ( 0.93%)
Mean 2 9.37 ( 0.00%) 9.70 ( -3.54%)
Mean 3 9.36 ( 0.00%) 9.29 ( 0.70%)
Mean 5 14.49 ( 0.00%) 15.04 ( -3.75%)
Mean 8 41.08 ( 0.00%) 38.73 ( 5.71%)
Mean 13 32.04 ( 0.00%) 31.24 ( 2.49%)
Mean 16 40.05 ( 0.00%) 39.04 ( 2.51%)
For both CPUs, average access time is reduced which is good as
this is the benchmark that was used to tune the shift values in
the first place albeit it is now known *how* the benchmark was
used.
The scheduler benchmarks were somewhat inconclusive. They
showed gains and losses and makes me reconsider how stable those
benchmarks really are or if something else might be interfering
with the test results recently.
Network benchmarks were inconclusive. Almost all results were
flat except for netperf-udp tests on the 4 thread machine.
These results were unstable and showed large variations between
reboots. It is unknown if this is a recent problems but I've
noticed before that netperf-udp results tend to vary.
Based on these results, changing the default for Ivybridge seems
like a logical choice.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Tested-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-cqnadffh1tiqrshthRj3Esge@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 227d53b397a32a7614667b3ecaf1d89902fb6c12 upstream.
To use spin_{un}lock_irq is dangerous if caller disabled interrupt.
During aio buffer migration, we have a possibility to see the following
call stack.
aio_migratepage [disable interrupt]
migrate_page_copy
clear_page_dirty_for_io
set_page_dirty
__set_page_dirty_buffers
__set_page_dirty
spin_lock_irq
This mean, current aio migration is a deadlockable. spin_lock_irqsave
is a safer alternative and we should use it.
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: David Rientjes rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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spin_lock_irq()
commit a85d9df1ea1d23682a0ed1e100e6965006595d06 upstream.
During aio stress test, we observed the following lockdep warning. This
mean AIO+numa_balancing is currently deadlockable.
The problem is, aio_migratepage disable interrupt, but
__set_page_dirty_nobuffers unintentionally enable it again.
Generally, all helper function should use spin_lock_irqsave() instead of
spin_lock_irq() because they don't know caller at all.
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&(&ctx->completion_lock)->rlock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&(&ctx->completion_lock)->rlock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
print_usage_bug+0x1f7/0x208
mark_lock+0x21d/0x2a0
mark_held_locks+0xb9/0x140
trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x105/0x1d0
trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x50
__set_page_dirty_nobuffers+0x8c/0xf0
migrate_page_copy+0x434/0x540
aio_migratepage+0xb1/0x140
move_to_new_page+0x7d/0x230
migrate_pages+0x5e5/0x700
migrate_misplaced_page+0xbc/0xf0
do_numa_page+0x102/0x190
handle_pte_fault+0x241/0x970
handle_mm_fault+0x265/0x370
__do_page_fault+0x172/0x5a0
do_page_fault+0x1a/0x70
page_fault+0x28/0x30
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <jweiner@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c7579fed1f1b2567529aea64ef19871337403ab3 upstream.
The mixer widget on AD1983 at NID 0x0e was missing in the commit
[f2f8be43c5c9: ALSA: hda - Add aamix NID to AD codecs].
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70011
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c20f31ec421ea4fabea5e95a6afd46c5f41e5599 upstream.
Mac Pro 1,1 with ALC889A codec needs the VREF setup on NID 0x18 to
VREF50, in order to make the speaker working. The same fixup was
already needed for MacBook Air 1,1, so we can reuse it.
Reported-by: Nicolai Beuermann <mail@nico-beuermann.de>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4fa71c1550a857ff1dbfe9e99acc1f4cfec5f0d0 upstream.
The commit 44dcbbb1cd61 introduced the usage of bitreverse helpers but
forgot to add the dependency. This patch adds the selection for
CONFIG_BITREVERSE.
Fixes: 44dcbbb1cd61 ('ALSA: snd-usb: add support for bit-reversed byte formats')
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5044bad43ee573d0b6d90e3ccb7a40c2c7d25eb4 upstream.
Add DSB after icache flush to complete the cache maintenance operation.
The function __flush_icache_all() is used only for user space mappings
and an ISB is not required because of an exception return before executing
user instructions. An exception return would behave like an ISB.
Signed-off-by: Vinayak Kale <vkale@apm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 069b918623e1510e58dacf178905a72c3baa3ae4 upstream.
When __kernel_clock_gettime is called with a CLOCK_MONOTONIC_COARSE or
CLOCK_REALTIME_COARSE clock id, it returns incorrectly to whatever the
caller has placed in x2 ("ret x2" to return from the fast path). Fix
this by saving x30/LR to x2 only in code that will call
__do_get_tspec, restoring x30 afterward, and using a plain "ret" to
return from the routine.
Also: while the resulting tv_nsec value for CLOCK_REALTIME and
CLOCK_MONOTONIC must be computed using intermediate values that are
left-shifted by cs_shift (x12, set by __do_get_tspec), the results for
coarse clocks should be calculated using unshifted values
(xtime_coarse_nsec is in units of actual nanoseconds). The current
code shifts intermediate values by x12 unconditionally, but x12 is
uninitialized when servicing a coarse clock. Fix this by setting x12
to 0 once we know we are dealing with a coarse clock id.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathan_lynch@mentor.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a55f9929a9b257f84b6cc7b2397379cabd744a22 upstream.
With the 64K page size configuration, __create_page_tables in head.S
maps enough memory to get started but using 64K pages rather than 512M
sections with a single pgd/pud/pmd entry pointing to a pte table.
create_mapping() may override the pgd/pud/pmd table entry with a block
(section) one if the RAM size is more than 512MB and aligned correctly.
For the end of this block to be accessible, the old TLB entry must be
invalidated.
Reported-by: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 40507403485fcb56b83d6ddfc954e9b08305054c upstream.
Whilst the text segment for our VDSO is marked as PT_LOAD in the ELF
headers, it is mapped by the kernel and not actually subject to
demand-paging. ld doesn't realise this, and emits a p_align field of 64k
(the maximum supported page size), which conflicts with the load address
picked by the kernel on 4k systems, which will be 4k aligned. This
causes GDB to fail with "Failed to read a valid object file image from
memory" when attempting to load the VDSO.
This patch passes the -n option to ld, which prevents it from aligning
PT_LOAD segments to the maximum page size.
Reported-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d4022a335271a48cce49df35d825897914fbffe3 upstream.
Update wall-to-monotonic fields in the VDSO data page
unconditionally. These are used to service CLOCK_MONOTONIC_COARSE,
which is not guarded by use_syscall.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathan_lynch@mentor.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a6f089e95b1e08cdea9633d50ad20aa5d44ba64d upstream.
In the Armada 370/XP driver, when we receive an IRQ 0, we read the
list of doorbells that caused the interrupt from register
ARMADA_370_XP_IN_DRBEL_CAUSE_OFFS. This gives the list of IPIs that
were generated. However, instead of acknowledging only the IPIs that
were generated, we acknowledge *all* the IPIs, by writing
~IPI_DOORBELL_MASK in the ARMADA_370_XP_IN_DRBEL_CAUSE_OFFS register.
This creates a race condition: if a new IPI that isn't part of the
ones read into the temporary "ipimask" variable is fired before we
acknowledge all IPIs, then we will simply loose it. This is causing
scheduling hangs on SMP intensive workloads.
It is important to mention that this ARMADA_370_XP_IN_DRBEL_CAUSE_OFFS
register has the following behavior: "A CPU write of 0 clears the bits
in this field. A CPU write of 1 has no effect". This is what allows us
to simply write ~ipimask to acknoledge the handled IPIs.
Notice that the same problem is present in the MSI implementation, but
it will be fixed as a separate patch, so that this IPI fix can be
pushed to older stable versions as appropriate (all the way to 3.8),
while the MSI code only appeared in 3.13.
Signed-off-by: Lior Amsalem <alior@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Fixes: 344e873e5657e8dc0 'arm: mvebu: Add IPI support via doorbells'
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ee97dc7db4cbda33e4241c2d85b42d1835bc8a35 upstream.
In s390 des and 3des ctr mode there is one preallocated page
used to speed up the en/decryption. This page is not protected
against concurrent usage and thus there is a potential of data
corruption with multiple threads.
The fix introduces locking/unlocking the ctr page and a slower
fallback solution at concurrency situations.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit adc3fcf1552b6e406d172fd9690bbd1395053d13 upstream.
In s390 des and des3_ede cbc mode the iv value is not protected
against concurrency access and modifications from another running
en/decrypt operation which is using the very same tfm struct
instance. This fix copies the iv to the local stack before
the crypto operation and stores the value back when done.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0519e9ad89e5cd6e6b08398f57c6a71d9580564c upstream.
The aes-ctr mode uses one preallocated page without any concurrency
protection. When multiple threads run aes-ctr encryption or decryption
this can lead to data corruption.
The patch introduces locking for the page and a fallback solution with
slower en/decryption performance in concurrency situations.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8101c8dbf6243ba517aab58d69bf1bc37d8b7b9c upstream.
It's just broken and it's taking a lot of effort to fix it, so for now just
disable it so people can defrag in peace. Thanks,
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98 upstream.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7244cb62d96e735847dc9d08f870550df896898c upstream.
The minimum pstate is supposed to be a percentage of the maximum P
state available. Calculate min using max pstate and not the
current max which may have been limited by the user
Signed-off-by: Dirk Brandewie <dirk.j.brandewie@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d253d2a52676cfa3d89b8f0737a08ce7db665207 upstream.
This patch addresses Bug 60727
(https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60727)
which was due to the truncation of intermediate values in the
calculations, which causes the code to consistently underestimate the
current cpu frequency, specifically 100% cpu utilization was truncated
down to the setpoint of 97%. This patch fixes the problem by keeping
the results of all intermediate calculations as fixed point numbers
rather scaling them back and forth between integers and fixed point.
References: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60727
Signed-off-by: Brennan Shacklett <bpshacklett@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Dirk Brandewie <dirk.j.brandewie@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1ccf7a1cdafadd02e33e8f3d74370685a0600ec6 up |
