diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 15 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/capability.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 78 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/device_cgroup.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/compat.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/internal.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/key.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/keyctl.c | 77 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/permission.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/process_keys.c | 22 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/request_key.c | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 51 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 15 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 36 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 15 |
16 files changed, 173 insertions, 186 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 032daab449b..8ea39aabe94 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -490,17 +490,9 @@ static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot, return common_file_perm(op, file, mask); } -static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, - unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) +static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { - int rc = 0; - - /* do DAC check */ - rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); - if (rc || addr_only) - return rc; - return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags); } @@ -646,7 +638,8 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = { .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission, .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security, .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security, - .file_mmap = apparmor_file_mmap, + .mmap_file = apparmor_mmap_file, + .mmap_addr = cap_mmap_addr, .file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect, .file_lock = apparmor_file_lock, diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index fca889676c5..61095df8b89 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -949,7 +949,8 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_ioctl); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mmap); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_addr); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_file); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mprotect); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_lock); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_fcntl); diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index f80d1160939..6dbae4650ab 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -77,12 +77,12 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit) { for (;;) { - /* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */ - if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && targ_ns->creator == cred->user) + /* The owner of the user namespace has all caps. */ + if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && uid_eq(targ_ns->owner, cred->euid)) return 0; /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */ - if (targ_ns == cred->user->user_ns) + if (targ_ns == cred->user_ns) return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; /* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */ @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, *If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have * it over all children user namespaces as well. */ - targ_ns = targ_ns->creator->user_ns; + targ_ns = targ_ns->parent; } /* We never get here */ @@ -137,10 +137,10 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) rcu_read_lock(); cred = current_cred(); child_cred = __task_cred(child); - if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns && + if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted)) goto out; - if (ns_capable(child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto out; ret = -EPERM; out: @@ -169,10 +169,10 @@ int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) rcu_read_lock(); cred = __task_cred(parent); child_cred = current_cred(); - if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns && + if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted)) goto out; - if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto out; ret = -EPERM; out: @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP * capability */ - if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user->user_ns, + if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0) return 0; return 1; @@ -473,19 +473,22 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct cred *new = bprm->cred; bool effective, has_cap = false; int ret; + kuid_t root_uid; effective = false; ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap); if (ret < 0) return ret; + root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0); + if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { /* * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin. */ - if (has_cap && new->uid != 0 && new->euid == 0) { + if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) { warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename); goto skip; } @@ -496,12 +499,12 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit. */ - if (new->euid == 0 || new->uid == 0) { + if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) { /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */ new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset, old->cap_inheritable); } - if (new->euid == 0) + if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) effective = true; } skip: @@ -516,8 +519,8 @@ skip: * * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs. */ - if ((new->euid != old->uid || - new->egid != old->gid || + if ((!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || + !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid) || !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) && bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) { /* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */ @@ -553,7 +556,7 @@ skip: */ if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) { if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) || - new->euid != 0 || new->uid != 0 || + !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); if (ret < 0) @@ -578,16 +581,17 @@ skip: int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); + kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, 0); - if (cred->uid != 0) { + if (!uid_eq(cred->uid, root_uid)) { if (bprm->cap_effective) return 1; if (!cap_isclear(cred->cap_permitted)) return 1; } - return (cred->euid != cred->uid || - cred->egid != cred->gid); + return (!uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) || + !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid)); } /** @@ -677,15 +681,21 @@ int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) */ static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { - if ((old->uid == 0 || old->euid == 0 || old->suid == 0) && - (new->uid != 0 && new->euid != 0 && new->suid != 0) && + kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0); + + if ((uid_eq(old->uid, root_uid) || + uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) || + uid_eq(old->suid, root_uid)) && + (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && + !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) && + !uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid)) && !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) { cap_clear(new->cap_permitted); cap_clear(new->cap_effective); } - if (old->euid == 0 && new->euid != 0) + if (uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) cap_clear(new->cap_effective); - if (old->euid != 0 && new->euid == 0) + if (!uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted; } @@ -718,11 +728,12 @@ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here. */ if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) { - if (old->fsuid == 0 && new->fsuid != 0) + kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0); + if (uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid)) new->cap_effective = cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective); - if (old->fsuid != 0 && new->fsuid == 0) + if (!uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid)) new->cap_effective = cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective, new->cap_permitted); @@ -875,7 +886,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/ || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ || (cap_capable(current_cred(), - current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, + current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/ /* * [1] no changing of bits that are locked @@ -947,22 +958,15 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) } /* - * cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr - * @file: unused - * @reqprot: unused - * @prot: unused - * @flags: unused + * cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr * @addr: address attempting to be mapped - * @addr_only: unused * * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need * CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the * capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed * -EPERM if not. */ -int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, - unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) +int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) { int ret = 0; @@ -975,3 +979,9 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, } return ret; } + +int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c index c43a3323fee..442204cc22d 100644 --- a/security/device_cgroup.c +++ b/security/device_cgroup.c @@ -447,22 +447,16 @@ static struct cftype dev_cgroup_files[] = { .read_seq_string = devcgroup_seq_read, .private = DEVCG_LIST, }, + { } /* terminate */ }; -static int devcgroup_populate(struct cgroup_subsys *ss, - struct cgroup *cgroup) -{ - return cgroup_add_files(cgroup, ss, dev_cgroup_files, - ARRAY_SIZE(dev_cgroup_files)); -} - struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys = { .name = "devices", .can_attach = devcgroup_can_attach, .create = devcgroup_create, .destroy = devcgroup_destroy, - .populate = devcgroup_populate, .subsys_id = devices_subsys_id, + .base_cftypes = dev_cgroup_files, }; int __devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c index e35ae1d208a..1c261763f47 100644 --- a/security/keys/compat.c +++ b/security/keys/compat.c @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov( ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc, ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), - iovstack, &iov, 1); + iovstack, &iov); if (ret < 0) return ret; if (ret == 0) diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index f173be2ce3e..c990b8c8ef1 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <linux/task_work.h> #ifdef __KDEBUG #define kenter(FMT, ...) \ @@ -148,6 +149,7 @@ extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long flags, #define KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK 0x04 extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name); +extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct task_work *twork); extern struct work_struct key_gc_work; extern unsigned key_gc_delay; diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index c9bf66ac36e..50d96d4e06f 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen; /* get hold of the key tracking for this user */ - user = key_user_lookup(uid, cred->user->user_ns); + user = key_user_lookup(uid, cred->user_ns); if (!user) goto no_memory_1; diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index b61c063888b..3bdc419b272 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type, vm = false; if (_payload) { ret = -ENOMEM; - payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL); + payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!payload) { if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE) goto error2; @@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id, goto no_payload; ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc, - ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov, 1); + ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov); if (ret < 0) return ret; if (ret == 0) @@ -1454,50 +1454,57 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid, */ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void) { -#ifdef TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME struct task_struct *me, *parent; const struct cred *mycred, *pcred; - struct cred *cred, *oldcred; + struct task_work *newwork, *oldwork; key_ref_t keyring_r; + struct cred *cred; int ret; keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK); if (IS_ERR(keyring_r)) return PTR_ERR(keyring_r); + ret = -ENOMEM; + newwork = kmalloc(sizeof(struct task_work), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!newwork) + goto error_keyring; + /* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in * our parent */ - ret = -ENOMEM; cred = cred_alloc_blank(); if (!cred) - goto error_keyring; + goto error_newwork; cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r); - keyring_r = NULL; + init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring, cred); me = current; rcu_read_lock(); write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); - parent = me->real_parent; ret = -EPERM; + oldwork = NULL; + parent = me->real_parent; /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */ if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm) - goto not_permitted; + goto unlock; /* the parent must be single threaded */ if (!thread_group_empty(parent)) - goto not_permitted; + goto unlock; /* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or * there's no point */ mycred = current_cred(); pcred = __task_cred(parent); if (mycred == pcred || - mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring) - goto already_same; + mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring) { + ret = 0; + goto unlock; + } /* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be * SUID/SGID */ @@ -1507,50 +1514,40 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void) pcred->gid != mycred->egid || pcred->egid != mycred->egid || pcred->sgid != mycred->egid) - goto not_permitted; + goto unlock; /* the keyrings must have the same UID */ if ((pcred->tgcred->session_keyring && pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) || mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) - goto not_permitted; + goto unlock; - /* if there's an already pending keyring replacement, then we replace - * that */ - oldcred = parent->replacement_session_keyring; + /* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */ + oldwork = task_work_cancel(parent, key_change_session_keyring); /* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace * restarting */ - parent->replacement_session_keyring = cred; - cred = NULL; - set_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(parent), TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME); - - write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); - rcu_read_unlock(); - if (oldcred) - put_cred(oldcred); - return 0; - -already_same: - ret = 0; -not_permitted: + ret = task_work_add(parent, newwork, true); + if (!ret) + newwork = NULL; +unlock: write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); rcu_read_unlock(); - put_cred(cred); + if (oldwork) { + put_cred(oldwork->data); + kfree(oldwork); + } + if (newwork) { + put_cred(newwork->data); + kfree(newwork); + } return ret; +error_newwork: + kfree(newwork); error_keyring: key_ref_put(keyring_r); return ret; - -#else /* !TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME */ - /* - * To be removed when TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME has been implemented on - * m68k/xtensa - */ -#warning TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME not implemented - return -EOPNOTSUPP; -#endif /* !TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME */ } /* diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c index 57d96363d7f..0b4d019e027 100644 --- a/security/keys/permission.c +++ b/security/keys/permission.c @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); - if (key->user->user_ns != cred->user->user_ns) + if (key->user->user_ns != cred->user_ns) goto use_other_perms; /* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */ @@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, goto use_these_perms; } - ret = groups_search(cred->group_info, key->gid); + ret = groups_search(cred->group_info, + make_kgid(current_user_ns(), key->gid)); if (ret) { kperm = key->perm >> 8; goto use_these_perms; diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index e137fcd7042..4ad54eea1ea 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -834,23 +834,17 @@ error: * Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when * the target process is about to resume userspace execution. */ -void key_replace_session_keyring(void) +void key_change_session_keyring(struct task_work *twork) { - const struct cred *old; - struct cred *new; - - if (!current->replacement_session_keyring) - return; + const struct cred *old = current_cred(); + struct cred *new = twork->data; - write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); - new = current->replacement_session_keyring; - current->replacement_session_keyring = NULL; - write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); - - if (!new) + kfree(twork); + if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) { + put_cred(new); return; + } - old = current_cred(); new-> uid = old-> uid; new-> euid = old-> euid; new-> suid = old-> suid; @@ -860,7 +854,7 @@ void key_replace_session_keyring(void) new-> sgid = old-> sgid; new->fsgid = old->fsgid; new->user = get_uid(old->user); - new->user_ns = new->user->user_ns; + new->user_ns = get_user_ns(new->user_ns); new->group_info = get_group_info(old->group_info); new->securebits = old->securebits; diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index cc3790315d2..000e7501752 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -93,16 +93,9 @@ static void umh_keys_cleanup(struct subprocess_info *info) static int call_usermodehelper_keys(char *path, char **argv, char **envp, struct key *session_keyring, int wait) { - gfp_t gfp_mask = (wait == UMH_NO_WAIT) ? GFP_ATOMIC : GFP_KERNEL; - struct subprocess_info *info = - call_usermodehelper_setup(path, argv, envp, gfp_mask); - - if (!info) - return -ENOMEM; - - call_usermodehelper_setfns(info, umh_keys_init, umh_keys_cleanup, - key_get(session_keyring)); - return call_usermodehelper_exec(info, wait); + return call_usermodehelper_fns(path, argv, envp, wait, + umh_keys_init, umh_keys_cleanup, + key_get(session_keyring)); } /* diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 5497a57fba0..3efc9b12aef 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ #include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/evm.h> #include <linux/fsnotify.h> +#include <linux/mman.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/personality.h> #include <net/flow.h> #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 @@ -657,18 +660,56 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg); } -int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, - unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) +static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) { - int ret; + /* + * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect + * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about... + */ + if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ) + return prot; + if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)) + return prot; + /* + * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it. + */ + if (!file) + return prot | PROT_EXEC; + /* + * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need + * BDI_CAP_EXEC_MMAP (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case + */ + if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) { +#ifndef CONFIG_MMU + unsigned long caps = 0; + struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping; + if (mapping && mapping->backing_dev_info) + caps = mapping->backing_dev_info->capabilities; + if (!(caps & BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP)) + return prot; +#endif + return prot | PROT_EXEC; + } + /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */ + return prot; +} - ret = security_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); +int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flags) +{ + int ret; + ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, prot, + mmap_prot(file, prot), flags); if (ret) return ret; return ima_file_mmap(file, prot); } +int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) +{ + return security_ops->mmap_addr(addr); +} + int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) { diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index fa2341b6833..372ec6502aa 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3083,9 +3083,7 @@ error: return rc; } -static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, - unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) +static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) { int rc = 0; u32 sid = current_sid(); @@ -3104,10 +3102,12 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, } /* do DAC check on address space usage */ - rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); - if (rc || addr_only) - return rc; + return cap_mmap_addr(addr); +} +static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) +{ if (selinux_checkreqprot) prot = reqprot; @@ -5570,7 +5570,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security, .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security, .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl, - .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap, + .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file, + .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr, .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect, .file_lock = selinux_file_lock, .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl, diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c index 0920ea3bf59..d309e7f472d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ #include <linux/netlink.h> #include <linux/rtnetlink.h> #include <linux/if.h> -#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_queue.h> #include <linux/inet_diag.h> #include <linux/xfrm.h> #include <linux/audit.h> @@ -70,12 +69,6 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] = { RTM_SETDCB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, }; -static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_firewall_perms[] = -{ - { IPQM_MODE, NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, - { IPQM_VERDICT, NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, -}; - static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] = { { TCPDIAG_GETSOCK, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, @@ -145,12 +138,6 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm) sizeof(nlmsg_route_perms)); break; - case SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET: - case SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET: - err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_firewall_perms, - sizeof(nlmsg_firewall_perms)); - break; - case SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET: err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms, sizeof(nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms)); diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 4e93f9ef970..3ad29025128 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -1259,12 +1259,8 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void) if (!inode) goto out; - ret = -EINVAL; - len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]); - if (len < 0) - goto out; - ret = -ENAMETOOLONG; + len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]); if (len >= PAGE_SIZE) goto out; @@ -1557,19 +1553,10 @@ static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino) static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - ssize_t rc, len; - char *page; unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino; - - page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!page) - return -ENOMEM; - - len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino)); - rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len); - free_page((unsigned long)page); - - return rc; + char res[TMPBUFLEN]; + ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino)); + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len); } static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = { @@ -1580,19 +1567,10 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = { static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - ssize_t rc, len; - char *page; unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino; - - page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!page) - return -ENOMEM; - - len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino)); - rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len); - free_page((unsigned long)page); - - return rc; + char res[TMPBUFLEN]; + ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino)); + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len); } static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = { diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index d583c054580..ee0bb5735f3 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, } /** - * smack_file_mmap : + * smack_mmap_file : * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g. * if mapping anonymous memory. * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL). @@ -1180,10 +1180,9 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, * @flags contains the operational flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. */ -static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file, +static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, - unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr, - unsigned long addr_only) + unsigned long flags) { struct smack_known *skp; struct smack_rule *srp; @@ -1198,11 +1197,6 @@ static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file, int tmay; int rc; - /* do DAC check on address space usage */ - rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); - if (rc || addr_only) - return rc; - if (file == NULL || file->f_dentry == NULL) return 0; @@ -3482,7 +3476,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = { .file_ioctl = smack_file_ioctl, .file_lock = smack_file_lock, .file_fcntl = smack_file_fcntl, - .file_mmap = smack_file_mmap, + .mmap_file = smack_mmap_file, + .mmap_addr = cap_mmap_addr, .file_set_fowner = smack_file_set_fowner, .file_send_sigiotask = smack_file_send_sigiotask, .file_receive = smack_file_receive, |