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-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/Kconfig2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c40
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/path.c9
-rw-r--r--security/capability.c3
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h5
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c2
-rw-r--r--security/security.c21
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c21
10 files changed, 66 insertions, 41 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
index 72555b9ca7d..9b9013b2e32 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
config SECURITY_APPARMOR
bool "AppArmor support"
- depends on SECURITY
+ depends on SECURITY && NET
select AUDIT
select SECURITY_PATH
select SECURITYFS
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 8db33a8b50c..f73e2c20421 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -607,8 +607,8 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
return error;
}
-static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource,
- struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
+ unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
struct aa_profile *profile = aa_current_profile();
int error = 0;
@@ -667,17 +667,29 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
* AppArmor sysfs module parameters
*/
-static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
-static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
#define param_check_aabool(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
+ .set = param_set_aabool,
+ .get = param_get_aabool
+};
-static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
-static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
#define param_check_aauint(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
+ .set = param_set_aauint,
+ .get = param_get_aauint
+};
-static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
-static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
#define param_check_aalockpolicy(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
+ .set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
+ .get = param_get_aalockpolicy
+};
static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
@@ -751,7 +763,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
-static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
@@ -760,35 +772,35 @@ static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
return param_set_bool(val, kp);
}
-static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
}
-static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return param_set_bool(val, kp);
}
-static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
}
-static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return param_set_uint(val, kp);
}
-static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c
index 96bab9469d4..19358dc1460 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/path.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/path.c
@@ -62,19 +62,14 @@ static int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
int deleted, connected;
int error = 0;
- /* Get the root we want to resolve too */
+ /* Get the root we want to resolve too, released below */
if (flags & PATH_CHROOT_REL) {
/* resolve paths relative to chroot */
- read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
- root = current->fs->root;
- /* released below */
- path_get(&root);
- read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
+ get_fs_root(current->fs, &root);
} else {
/* resolve paths relative to namespace */
root.mnt = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->root;
root.dentry = root.mnt->mnt_root;
- /* released below */
path_get(&root);
}
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index a0bbf30fb6d..95a6599a37b 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -411,7 +411,8 @@ static int cap_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}
-static int cap_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+static int cap_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
+ struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 4e015996dd4..9d172e6e330 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
*
* Warn if that happens, once per boot.
*/
-static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(char *fname)
+static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
{
static int warned;
if (!warned) {
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index addb67b169f..56a133d8f37 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -15,11 +15,6 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
-static inline __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)))
-void no_printk(const char *fmt, ...)
-{
-}
-
#ifdef __KDEBUG
#define kenter(FMT, ...) \
printk(KERN_DEBUG "==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 0d26f689bd7..0088dd8bf68 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -537,6 +537,8 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)
intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
+ return -ENOKEY;
return key_validate(key);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e8c87b8601b..c53949f17d9 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -619,7 +619,13 @@ void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- return security_ops->file_permission(file, mask);
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = security_ops->file_permission(file, mask);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ return fsnotify_perm(file, mask);
}
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
@@ -683,7 +689,13 @@ int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
int security_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
- return security_ops->dentry_open(file, cred);
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = security_ops->dentry_open(file, cred);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN);
}
int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
@@ -768,9 +780,10 @@ int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
return security_ops->task_getioprio(p);
}
-int security_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
+ struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
- return security_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
+ return security_ops->task_setrlimit(p, resource, new_rlim);
}
int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p,
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index f013982df41..58d80f3bd6f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -25,6 +25,6 @@ $(obj)/avc.o: $(obj)/flask.h
quiet_cmd_flask = GEN $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
cmd_flask = scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
-targets += flask.h
+targets += flask.h av_permissions.h
$(obj)/flask.h: $(src)/include/classmap.h FORCE
$(call if_changed,flask)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9b40f4c0ac7..4796ddd4e72 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2170,8 +2170,9 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
tty = get_current_tty();
if (tty) {
- file_list_lock();
+ spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
+ struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
struct inode *inode;
/* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
@@ -2179,14 +2180,16 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
file may belong to another process and we are only
interested in the inode-based check here. */
- file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
+ file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
+ struct tty_file_private, list);
+ file = file_priv->file;
inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
drop_tty = 1;
}
}
- file_list_unlock();
+ spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
tty_kref_put(tty);
}
/* Reset controlling tty. */
@@ -2284,12 +2287,15 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
if (rc) {
+ /* protect against do_prlimit() */
+ task_lock(current);
for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
}
- update_rlimit_cpu(current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur);
+ task_unlock(current);
+ update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
}
}
@@ -3333,16 +3339,17 @@ static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
}
-static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
+ struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
- struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
+ struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
/* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
- return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
+ return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
return 0;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 (git 2.32.0) at 2024-12-27 05:52:20 +0000