diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
43 files changed, 671 insertions, 376 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index e9c6ac724fe..beb86b500ad 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ config INTEL_TXT config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation" depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX - default 32768 if ARM + default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT) default 65536 help This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index a5918e01a4f..05f1c934d74 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -16,14 +16,14 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MMU) += min_addr.o # Object file lists obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o capability.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS) += inode.o -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/ obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/built-in.o -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o # Object integrity file lists subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity -obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/ diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 4257b7e2796..99810009333 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO); static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enabled; - int error = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled); + int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled); if (!error) apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; return 1; diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 8b4f24ae433..ad0d4de6994 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int cap_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, struct qstr *name, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { - return 0; + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } static int cap_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) @@ -757,7 +757,8 @@ static void cap_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM static int cap_xfrm_policy_alloc_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, + gfp_t gfp) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c index 7c2a0a71049..8365909f5f8 100644 --- a/security/device_cgroup.c +++ b/security/device_cgroup.c @@ -58,11 +58,9 @@ static inline struct dev_cgroup *css_to_devcgroup(struct cgroup_subsys_state *s) static inline struct dev_cgroup *task_devcgroup(struct task_struct *task) { - return css_to_devcgroup(task_css(task, devices_subsys_id)); + return css_to_devcgroup(task_css(task, devices_cgrp_id)); } -struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys; - /* * called under devcgroup_mutex */ @@ -274,10 +272,9 @@ static void set_majmin(char *str, unsigned m) sprintf(str, "%u", m); } -static int devcgroup_seq_read(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css, - struct cftype *cft, struct seq_file *m) +static int devcgroup_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { - struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup = css_to_devcgroup(css); + struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup = css_to_devcgroup(seq_css(m)); struct dev_exception_item *ex; char maj[MAJMINLEN], min[MAJMINLEN], acc[ACCLEN]; @@ -499,7 +496,7 @@ static inline bool has_children(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup) * parent cgroup has the access you're asking for. */ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup, - int filetype, const char *buffer) + int filetype, char *buffer) { const char *b; char temp[12]; /* 11 + 1 characters needed for a u32 */ @@ -655,7 +652,7 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup, } static int devcgroup_access_write(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css, - struct cftype *cft, const char *buffer) + struct cftype *cft, char *buffer) { int retval; @@ -679,19 +676,17 @@ static struct cftype dev_cgroup_files[] = { }, { .name = "list", - .read_seq_string = devcgroup_seq_read, + .seq_show = devcgroup_seq_show, .private = DEVCG_LIST, }, { } /* terminate */ }; -struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys = { - .name = "devices", +struct cgroup_subsys devices_cgrp_subsys = { .css_alloc = devcgroup_css_alloc, .css_free = devcgroup_css_free, .css_online = devcgroup_online, .css_offline = devcgroup_offline, - .subsys_id = devices_subsys_id, .base_cftypes = dev_cgroup_files, }; diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile index 0f9cffb1f9a..0793f4811cb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile @@ -10,6 +10,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o integrity-y := iint.o subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima -obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/ subdir-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm -obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/ diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig index fea9749c375..d35b4915b00 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ config EVM boolean "EVM support" - depends on SECURITY && KEYS && (TRUSTED_KEYS=y || TRUSTED_KEYS=n) + depends on SECURITY + select KEYS + select ENCRYPTED_KEYS select CRYPTO_HMAC - select CRYPTO_MD5 select CRYPTO_SHA1 - select ENCRYPTED_KEYS default n help EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index 30bd1ec0232..37c88ddb3cf 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -32,19 +32,19 @@ extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm; /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */ extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[]; -extern int evm_init_key(void); -extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *req_xattr_name, - const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len); -extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, - const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); -extern int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, - const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); -extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr, - char *hmac_val); -extern int evm_init_secfs(void); +int evm_init_key(void); +int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, + size_t req_xattr_value_len); +int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); +int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); +int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr, + char *hmac_val); +int evm_init_secfs(void); #endif diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 3bab89eb21d..babd8626bf9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ * Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC */ +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> @@ -103,13 +105,13 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, umode_t mode; } hmac_misc; - memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc); + memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc)); hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid); hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; - crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc); + crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc)); if (evm_hmac_version > 1) crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid)); @@ -221,7 +223,7 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC); if (IS_ERR(desc)) { - printk(KERN_INFO "init_desc failed\n"); + pr_info("init_desc failed\n"); return PTR_ERR(desc); } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 336b3ddfe63..996092f21b6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ * evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr */ +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> #include <linux/audit.h> @@ -432,7 +434,7 @@ static int __init init_evm(void) error = evm_init_secfs(); if (error < 0) { - printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: Error registering secfs\n"); + pr_info("Error registering secfs\n"); goto err; } @@ -449,7 +451,7 @@ static int __init evm_display_config(void) char **xattrname; for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) - printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: %s\n", *xattrname); + pr_info("%s\n", *xattrname); return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index 30f670ad6ac..cf12a04717d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ * - Get the key and enable EVM */ +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include "evm.h" @@ -79,9 +81,9 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, error = evm_init_key(); if (!error) { evm_initialized = 1; - pr_info("EVM: initialized\n"); + pr_info("initialized\n"); } else - pr_err("EVM: initialization failed\n"); + pr_err("initialization failed\n"); return count; } diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index c49d3f14cbe..a521edf4cbd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo; - memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint); + memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint)); iint->version = 0; iint->flags = 0UL; iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 0356e1d437c..f79fa8be203 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ #include "../integrity.h" enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN, - IMA_SHOW_ASCII }; + IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT, IMA_SHOW_ASCII }; enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 }; /* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index c38bbce8c6a..ba9e4d792dd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename) { - const char *op = "add_template_measure"; - const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error"; + static const char op[] = "add_template_measure"; + static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error"; char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name; int result; struct { @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, const char *op, const char *cause) { struct ima_template_entry *entry; - struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); int violation = 1; int result; @@ -160,10 +160,10 @@ err_out: * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MMAP_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK) * * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: - * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= + * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. - * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK - * mask: contains the permission mask + * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK + * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask. @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * We only get here if the inode has not already been measured, * but the measurement could already exist: - * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or + * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or * different filesystems. * - the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info, * containing the hashing info. @@ -260,8 +260,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) { - const char *op = "add_template_measure"; - const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; + static const char op[] = "add_template_measure"; + static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM"; int result = -ENOMEM; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct ima_template_entry *entry; @@ -332,5 +332,5 @@ const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf) pathname = NULL; } } - return pathname; + return pathname ?: (const char *)path->dentry->d_name.name; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 734e9468aca..291bf0f3a46 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -177,11 +177,11 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) { + static const char op[] = "appraise_data"; + char *cause = "unknown"; struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry; struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; - const char *op = "appraise_data"; - char *cause = "unknown"; int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0; if (!ima_appraise) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index fdf60def52e..1bde8e62776 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -10,9 +10,11 @@ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. * * File: ima_crypto.c - * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash + * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash */ +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> @@ -85,16 +87,20 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file, if (rc != 0) return rc; - rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!rbuf) { - rc = -ENOMEM; + i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); + + if (i_size == 0) goto out; - } + + rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rbuf) + return -ENOMEM; + if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) { file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ; read = 1; } - i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); + while (offset < i_size) { int rbuf_len; @@ -111,12 +117,12 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file, if (rc) break; } - kfree(rbuf); - if (!rc) - rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest); if (read) file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ; + kfree(rbuf); out: + if (!rc) + rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest); return rc; } @@ -161,15 +167,22 @@ static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data, return rc; for (i = 0; i < num_fields; i++) { + u8 buffer[IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1] = { 0 }; + u8 *data_to_hash = field_data[i].data; + u32 datalen = field_data[i].len; + if (strcmp(td->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) { rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, (const u8 *) &field_data[i].len, sizeof(field_data[i].len)); if (rc) break; + } else if (strcmp(td->fields[i]->field_id, "n") == 0) { + memcpy(buffer, data_to_hash, datalen); + data_to_hash = buffer; + datalen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1; } - rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, field_data[i].data, - field_data[i].len); + rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, data_to_hash, datalen); if (rc) break; } @@ -205,7 +218,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr) return; if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0) - pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip\n"); + pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n"); } /* diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index db01125926b..da92fcc08d1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -133,14 +133,14 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) * PCR used is always the same (config option) in * little-endian format */ - ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr); + ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(pcr)); /* 2nd: template digest */ ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); /* 3rd: template name size */ namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name); - ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen); + ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen)); /* 4th: template name */ ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen); @@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "d") == 0) show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN; + if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "n") == 0) + show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT; field->field_show(m, show, &e->template_data[i]); } return 0; @@ -290,7 +292,7 @@ static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1); /* * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file */ -static int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp) +static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { /* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */ if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 37122768554..e8f9d70a465 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ * File: ima_init.c * initialization and cleanup functions */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/scatterlist.h> #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -42,10 +45,10 @@ int ima_used_chip; */ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) { + static const char op[] = "add_boot_aggregate"; + const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; struct ima_template_entry *entry; struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint; - const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate"; - const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; int result = -ENOMEM; int violation = 0; struct { @@ -93,7 +96,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void) ima_used_chip = 1; if (!ima_used_chip) - pr_info("IMA: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n"); + pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n"); rc = ima_init_crypto(); if (rc) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 149ee1119f8..52ac6cf41f8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -71,15 +71,14 @@ __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup); * ima_rdwr_violation_check * * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files: - * - Opening a file for write when already open for read, + * - Opening a file for write when already open for read, * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. * - Opening a file for read when already open for write, - * could result in a file measurement error. + * could result in a file measurement error. * */ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file) { - struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; int must_measure; @@ -111,8 +110,6 @@ out: return; pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf); - if (!pathname || strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) - pathname = dentry->d_name.name; if (send_tomtou) ima_add_violation(file, pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU"); @@ -220,9 +217,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename, if (rc != 0) goto out_digsig; - pathname = !filename ? ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf) : filename; - if (!pathname) - pathname = (const char *)file->f_dentry->d_name.name; + pathname = filename ?: ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf); if (action & IMA_MEASURE) ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index a9c3d3cd199..93873a450ff 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. * * ima_policy.c - * - initialize default measure policy rules + * - initialize default measure policy rules * */ #include <linux/module.h> @@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ #include "ima.h" /* flags definitions */ -#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001 -#define IMA_MASK 0x0002 +#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001 +#define IMA_MASK 0x0002 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004 #define IMA_UID 0x0008 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010 @@ -69,35 +69,35 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { * and running executables. */ static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = { - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = MMAP_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, }; static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = { - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,.flags = IMA_FOWNER}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER}, }; static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules); @@ -122,12 +122,12 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str) } __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup); -/* +/* * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old, * stale LSM policy. * - * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy. + * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy. * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't. */ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void) @@ -167,9 +167,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int i; - if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func) + if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && + (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; - if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask) + if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && + (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic) @@ -216,7 +218,7 @@ retry: retried = 1; ima_lsm_update_rules(); goto retry; - } + } if (!rc) return false; } @@ -232,7 +234,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func) if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC)) return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE; - switch(func) { + switch (func) { case MMAP_CHECK: return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE; case BPRM_CHECK: @@ -304,7 +306,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0; appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0; - + for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) { if (i < measure_entries) list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, @@ -329,7 +331,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) */ void ima_update_policy(void) { - const char *op = "policy_update"; + static const char op[] = "policy_update"; const char *cause = "already exists"; int result = 1; int audit_info = 0; @@ -520,8 +522,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) break; } - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, - &entry->fsmagic); + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic); if (!result) entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC; break; @@ -547,7 +548,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) break; } - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); if (!result) { entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum); if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum)) @@ -564,7 +565,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) break; } - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); if (!result) { entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum); if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum)) @@ -645,7 +646,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) */ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) { - const char *op = "update_policy"; + static const char op[] = "update_policy"; char *p; struct ima_rule_entry *entry; ssize_t result, len; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c index d85e99761f4..552705d5a78 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c @@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ * The measurement list is append-only. No entry is * ever removed or changed during the boot-cycle. */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/rculist.h> #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -72,7 +75,7 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry) qe = kmalloc(sizeof(*qe), GFP_KERNEL); if (qe == NULL) { - pr_err("IMA: OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry.\n"); + pr_err("OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry\n"); return -ENOMEM; } qe->entry = entry; @@ -95,8 +98,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash) result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, hash); if (result != 0) - pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", - result); + pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result); return result; } @@ -115,7 +117,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex); if (!violation) { - memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof digest); + memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof(digest)); if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) { audit_cause = "hash_exists"; result = -EEXIST; @@ -131,7 +133,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, } if (violation) /* invalidate pcr */ - memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof digest); + memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof(digest)); tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest); if (tpmresult != 0) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index 635695f6a18..a076a967ec4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ * File: ima_template.c * Helpers to manage template descriptors. */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include "ima.h" @@ -19,20 +22,20 @@ static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = { {.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT}, - {.name = "ima-ng",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"}, - {.name = "ima-sig",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"}, + {.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"}, + {.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"}, }; static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = { - {.field_id = "d",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_init, + {.field_id = "d", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_digest}, - {.field_id = "n",.field_init = ima_eventname_init, + {.field_id = "n", .field_init = ima_eventname_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_string}, - {.field_id = "d-ng",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init, + {.field_id = "d-ng", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng}, - {.field_id = "n-ng",.field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init, + {.field_id = "n-ng", .field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_string}, - {.field_id = "sig",.field_init = ima_eventsig_init, + {.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, }; @@ -58,7 +61,7 @@ static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str) */ if (template_len == 3 && strcmp(str, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0 && ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_SHA1 && ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_MD5) { - pr_err("IMA: template does not support hash alg\n"); + pr_err("template does not support hash alg\n"); return 1; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index c38adcc910f..1506f024857 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo) enum data_formats { DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0, DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO, - DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME, DATA_FMT_STRING, DATA_FMT_HEX }; @@ -37,18 +36,10 @@ static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen, struct ima_field_data *field_data) { u8 *buf, *buf_ptr; - u32 buflen; + u32 buflen = datalen; - switch (datafmt) { - case DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME: - buflen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1; - break; - case DATA_FMT_STRING: + if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) buflen = datalen + 1; - break; - default: - buflen = datalen; - } buf = kzalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!buf) @@ -63,7 +54,7 @@ static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen, * split into multiple template fields (the space is the delimitator * character for measurements lists in ASCII format). */ - if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME || datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) { + if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) { for (buf_ptr = buf; buf_ptr - buf < datalen; buf_ptr++) if (*buf_ptr == ' ') *buf_ptr = '_'; @@ -109,13 +100,16 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_binary(struct seq_file *m, enum data_formats datafmt, struct ima_field_data *field_data) { + u32 len = (show == IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT) ? + strlen(field_data->data) : field_data->len; + if (show != IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN) - ima_putc(m, &field_data->len, sizeof(u32)); + ima_putc(m, &len, sizeof(len)); - if (!field_data->len) + if (!len) return; - ima_putc(m, field_data->data, field_data->len); + ima_putc(m, field_data->data, len); } static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m, @@ -129,6 +123,7 @@ static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m, break; case IMA_SHOW_BINARY: case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN: + case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT: ima_show_template_data_binary(m, show, datafmt, field_data); break; default: @@ -162,8 +157,7 @@ void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show, } static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, u8 hash_algo, - struct ima_field_data *field_data, - bool size_limit) + struct ima_field_data *field_data) { /* * digest formats: @@ -176,11 +170,10 @@ static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, u8 hash_algo, enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST; u32 offset = 0; - if (!size_limit) { + if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) { fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO; - if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) - offset += snprintf(buffer, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1, - "%s", hash_algo_name[hash_algo]); + offset += snprintf(buffer, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1, "%s", + hash_algo_name[hash_algo]); buffer[offset] = ':'; offset += 2; } @@ -243,8 +236,8 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, cur_digest = hash.hdr.digest; cur_digestsize = hash.hdr.length; out: - return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize, -1, - field_data, true); + return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize, + HASH_ALGO__LAST, field_data); } /* @@ -255,7 +248,7 @@ int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data) { - u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO__LAST; + u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; u32 cur_digestsize = 0; /* If iint is NULL, we are recording a violation. */ @@ -268,7 +261,7 @@ int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, hash_algo = iint->ima_hash->algo; out: return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize, - hash_algo, field_data, false); + hash_algo, field_data); } static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, @@ -279,8 +272,6 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, { const char *cur_filename = NULL; u32 cur_filename_len = 0; - enum data_formats fmt = size_limit ? - DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME : DATA_FMT_STRING; BUG_ON(filename == NULL && file == NULL); @@ -303,7 +294,7 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX; out: return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len, - fmt, field_data); + DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data); } /* diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c index 85253b58479..90987d15b6f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c +++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. * * File: integrity_audit.c - * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem + * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem */ #include <linux/fs.h> @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static int __init integrity_audit_setup(char *str) { unsigned long audit; - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit)) + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &audit)) integrity_audit_info = audit ? 1 : 0; return 1; } @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const char *cause, int result, int audit_info) { struct audit_buffer *ab; + char name[TASK_COMM_LEN]; if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1) /* Skip info messages */ return; @@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, audit_log_format(ab, " cause="); audit_log_string(ab, cause); audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(name, current)); if (fname) { audit_log_format(ab, " name="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, fname); diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c index bbd32c729db..347896548ad 100644 --- a/security/keys/compat.c +++ b/security/keys/compat.c @@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ no_payload: * taking a 32-bit syscall are zero. If you can, you should call sys_keyctl() * directly. */ -asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option, - u32 arg2, u32 arg3, u32 arg4, u32 arg5) +COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option, + u32, arg2, u32, arg3, u32, arg4, u32, arg5) { switch (option) { case KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID: diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 9e1e005c759..5fe443d120a 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key, long dlen; int ret; - ret = strict_strtol(datalen, 10, &dlen); + ret = kstrtol(datalen, 10, &dlen); if (ret < 0 || dlen < MIN_DATA_SIZE || dlen > MAX_DATA_SIZE) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index d46cbc5e335..2fb2576dc64 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -1000,7 +1000,11 @@ static int keyring_detect_cycle_iterator(const void *object, kenter("{%d}", key->serial); - BUG_ON(key != ctx->match_data); + /* We might get a keyring with matching index-key that is nonetheless a + * different keyring. */ + if (key != ctx->match_data) + return 0; + ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EDEADLK); return 1; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index e13fcf7636f..6b804aa4529 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; break; case Opt_keyhandle: - res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); + res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype; @@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; break; case Opt_pcrlock: - res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock); + res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; opt->pcrlock = lock; @@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p, c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); if (!c) return -EINVAL; - ret = strict_strtol(c, 10, &keylen); + ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen); if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) return -EINVAL; p->key_len = keylen; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 15b6928592e..8b774f362a3 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -433,11 +433,20 @@ int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, } int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, - struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) + struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, + unsigned int flags) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode) || (new_dentry->d_inode && IS_PRIVATE(new_dentry->d_inode)))) return 0; + + if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { + int err = security_ops->path_rename(new_dir, new_dentry, + old_dir, old_dentry); + if (err) + return err; + } + return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); } @@ -524,11 +533,20 @@ int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, } int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, - struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) + struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, + unsigned int flags) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode) || (new_dentry->d_inode && IS_PRIVATE(new_dentry->d_inode)))) return 0; + + if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { + int err = security_ops->inode_rename(new_dir, new_dentry, + old_dir, old_dentry); + if (err) + return err; + } + return security_ops->inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); } @@ -1317,9 +1335,11 @@ void security_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM -int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) +int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, + gfp_t gfp) { - return security_ops->xfrm_policy_alloc_security(ctxp, sec_ctx); + return security_ops->xfrm_policy_alloc_security(ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 57b0b49f4e6..b4beb77967b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ #include <linux/syslog.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <linux/export.h> -#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <linux/shm.h> @@ -107,7 +106,7 @@ int selinux_enforcing; static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enforcing; - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0; return 1; } @@ -120,7 +119,7 @@ int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enabled; - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; return 1; } @@ -669,7 +668,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT) continue; rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], - strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid); + strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) { printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", @@ -1419,15 +1418,33 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent isec->sid = sbsec->sid; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { - if (opt_dentry) { - isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); - rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry, - isec->sclass, - &sid); - if (rc) - goto out_unlock; - isec->sid = sid; - } + /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on + * procfs inodes */ + if (opt_dentry) + /* Called from d_instantiate or + * d_splice_alias. */ + dentry = dget(opt_dentry); + else + /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to + * find a dentry. */ + dentry = d_find_alias(inode); + /* + * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed + * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we + * may find inodes that have no dentry on the + * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as + * these will get fixed up the next time we go through + * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes + * could be used again by userspace. + */ + if (!dentry) + goto out_unlock; + isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); + rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid); + dput(dentry); + if (rc) + goto out_unlock; + isec->sid = sid; } break; } @@ -2490,7 +2507,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT) continue; len = strlen(mount_options[i]); - rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid); + rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) { printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", @@ -2894,7 +2912,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (rc) return rc; - rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid); + rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc == -EINVAL) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; @@ -3051,7 +3069,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, if (!value || !size) return -EACCES; - rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid); + rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) return rc; @@ -3205,24 +3223,20 @@ error: static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) { - int rc = 0; - u32 sid = current_sid(); + int rc; + + /* do DAC check on address space usage */ + rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr); + if (rc) + return rc; - /* - * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before - * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt - * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even - * if DAC would have also denied the operation. - */ if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) { + u32 sid = current_sid(); rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL); - if (rc) - return rc; } - /* do DAC check on address space usage */ - return cap_mmap_addr(addr); + return rc; } static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, @@ -3303,6 +3317,9 @@ static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, case F_GETLK: case F_SETLK: case F_SETLKW: + case F_GETLKP: + case F_SETLKP: + case F_SETLKPW: #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 case F_GETLK64: case F_SETLK64: @@ -4490,14 +4507,10 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; int err; - u16 family = sk->sk_family; + u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family; u32 connsid; u32 peersid; - /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ - if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) - family = PF_INET; - err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid); if (err) return err; @@ -5534,7 +5547,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, str[size-1] = 0; size--; } - error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid); + error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; @@ -5643,7 +5656,7 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) { - return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid); + return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL); } static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index fe341ae3700..ce7852cf526 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -33,13 +33,14 @@ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS 26 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS 27 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE 28 +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES 29 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE #else -#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES #endif /* Mask for just the mount related flags */ @@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len); int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, - u32 *out_sid); + u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp); int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index 48c3cc94c16..1450f85b946 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ #include <net/flow.h> int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx); + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, + gfp_t gfp); int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp); void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); @@ -45,10 +46,11 @@ static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void) { struct net *net; - atomic_inc(&flow_cache_genid); rtnl_lock(); - for_each_net(net) + for_each_net(net) { + atomic_inc(&net->xfrm.flow_cache_genid); rt_genid_bump_all(net); + } rtnl_unlock(); } #else diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c index 6235d052338..0364120d1ec 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c @@ -101,6 +101,32 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk) } /** + * selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr - Get the cached NetLabel secattr + * @sk: the socket + * @sid: the SID + * + * Query the socket's cached secattr and if the SID matches the cached value + * return the cache, otherwise return NULL. + * + */ +static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr( + const struct sock *sk, + u32 sid) +{ + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr; + + if (secattr == NULL) + return NULL; + + if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) && + (secattr->attr.secid == sid)) + return secattr; + + return NULL; +} + +/** * selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate - Invalidate the NetLabel cache * * Description: @@ -224,7 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB) return 0; - secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr; + secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, sid); } if (secattr == NULL) { secattr = &secattr_storage; @@ -410,6 +436,9 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_CONNLABELED)) { netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); lock_sock(sk); + /* call the netlabel function directly as we want to see the + * on-the-wire label that is assigned via the socket's options + * and not the cached netlabel/lsm attributes */ rc = netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr); release_sock(sk); if (rc == 0) diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c index 332ac8a80cf..2df7b900e25 100644 --- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include <linux/inet_diag.h> #include <linux/xfrm.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/sock_diag.h> #include "flask.h" #include "av_permissions.h" @@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] = { { TCPDIAG_GETSOCK, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, { DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, + { SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, }; static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] = diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 5122affe06a..c71737f6d1c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str) { unsigned long checkreqprot; - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0; return 1; } @@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid); + length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -731,11 +731,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid); + length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid); + length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -817,11 +819,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) objname = namebuf; } - length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid); + length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid); + length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -878,11 +882,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid); + length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid); + length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -934,7 +940,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid); + length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -994,11 +1000,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid); + length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid); + length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h index 149dda731fd..96fd947c494 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct constraint_expr { u32 op; /* operator */ struct ebitmap names; /* names */ + struct type_set *type_names; struct constraint_expr *next; /* next expression */ }; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index f6195ebde3c..9c5cdc2caae 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -143,6 +143,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = { .sym_num = SYM_NUM, .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, }, + { + .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES, + .sym_num = SYM_NUM, + .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, + }, }; static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version) @@ -613,6 +618,19 @@ static int common_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p) return 0; } +static void constraint_expr_destroy(struct constraint_expr *expr) +{ + if (expr) { + ebitmap_destroy(&expr->names); + if (expr->type_names) { + ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->types); + ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->negset); + kfree(expr->type_names); + } + kfree(expr); + } +} + static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p) { struct class_datum *cladatum; @@ -628,10 +646,9 @@ static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p) while (constraint) { e = constraint->expr; while (e) { - ebitmap_destroy(&e->names); etmp = e; e = e->next; - kfree(etmp); + constraint_expr_destroy(etmp); } ctemp = constraint; constraint = constraint->next; @@ -642,16 +659,14 @@ static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p) while (constraint) { e = constraint->expr; while (e) { - ebitmap_destroy(&e->names); etmp = e; e = e->next; - kfree(etmp); + constraint_expr_destroy(etmp); } ctemp = constraint; constraint = constraint->next; kfree(ctemp); } - kfree(cladatum->comkey); } kfree(datum); @@ -1156,8 +1171,34 @@ bad: return rc; } -static int read_cons_helper(struct constraint_node **nodep, int ncons, - int allowxtarget, void *fp) +static void type_set_init(struct type_set *t) +{ + ebitmap_init(&t->types); + ebitmap_init(&t->negset); +} + +static int type_set_read(struct type_set *t, void *fp) +{ + __le32 buf[1]; + int rc; + + if (ebitmap_read(&t->types, fp)) + return -EINVAL; + if (ebitmap_read(&t->negset, fp)) + return -EINVAL; + + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); + if (rc < 0) + return -EINVAL; + t->flags = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + + return 0; +} + + +static int read_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, + struct constraint_node **nodep, + int ncons, int allowxtarget, void *fp) { struct constraint_node *c, *lc; struct constraint_expr *e, *le; @@ -1225,6 +1266,18 @@ static int read_cons_helper(struct constraint_node **nodep, int ncons, rc = ebitmap_read(&e->names, fp); if (rc) return rc; + if (p->policyvers >= + POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) { + e->type_names = kzalloc(sizeof + (*e->type_names), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!e->type_names) + return -ENOMEM; + type_set_init(e->type_names); + rc = type_set_read(e->type_names, fp); + if (rc) + return rc; + } break; default: return -EINVAL; @@ -1301,7 +1354,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) goto bad; } - rc = read_cons_helper(&cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp); + rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp); if (rc) goto bad; @@ -1311,7 +1364,8 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) if (rc) goto bad; ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - rc = read_cons_helper(&cladatum->validatetrans, ncons, 1, fp); + rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->validatetrans, + ncons, 1, fp); if (rc) goto bad; } @@ -1941,7 +1995,19 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) if (rc) goto out; - hashtab_insert(p->filename_trans, ft, otype); + rc = hashtab_insert(p->filename_trans, ft, otype); + if (rc) { + /* + * Do not return -EEXIST to the caller, or the system + * will not boot. + */ + if (rc != -EEXIST) + goto out; + /* But free memory to avoid memory leak. */ + kfree(ft); + kfree(name); + kfree(otype); + } } hash_eval(p->filename_trans, "filenametr"); return 0; @@ -2753,6 +2819,24 @@ static int common_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr) return 0; } +static int type_set_write(struct type_set *t, void *fp) +{ + int rc; + __le32 buf[1]; + + if (ebitmap_write(&t->types, fp)) + return -EINVAL; + if (ebitmap_write(&t->negset, fp)) + return -EINVAL; + + buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(t->flags); + rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp); + if (rc) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + static int write_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node *node, void *fp) { @@ -2784,6 +2868,12 @@ static int write_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node *node, rc = ebitmap_write(&e->names, fp); if (rc) return rc; + if (p->policyvers >= + POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) { + rc = type_set_write(e->type_names, fp); + if (rc) + return rc; + } break; default: break; @@ -3248,10 +3338,10 @@ static int filename_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr) if (rc) return rc; - buf[0] = ft->stype; - buf[1] = ft->ttype; - buf[2] = ft->tclass; - buf[3] = otype->otype; + buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ft->stype); + buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ft->ttype); + buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(ft->tclass); + buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(otype->otype); rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp); if (rc) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h index da637471d4c..725d5945a97 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h @@ -154,6 +154,17 @@ struct cond_bool_datum { struct cond_node; /* + * type set preserves data needed to determine constraint info from + * policy source. This is not used by the kernel policy but allows + * utilities such as audit2allow to determine constraint denials. + */ +struct type_set { + struct ebitmap types; + struct ebitmap negset; + u32 flags; +}; + +/* * The configuration data includes security contexts for * initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems, TCP and UDP port numbers, * network interfaces, and nodes. This structure stores the diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index ba5bb9be9d9..4bca49414a4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -1232,6 +1232,10 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, struct context context; int rc = 0; + /* An empty security context is never valid. */ + if (!scontext_len) + return -EINVAL; + if (!ss_initialized) { int i; @@ -1285,16 +1289,18 @@ out: * @scontext: security context * @scontext_len: length in bytes * @sid: security identifier, SID + * @gfp: context for the allocation * * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that * has the string representation specified by @scontext. * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient * memory is available, or 0 on success. */ -int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid) +int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, + gfp_t gfp) { return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len, - sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 0); + sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0); } /** @@ -1831,7 +1837,7 @@ static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p); */ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) { - struct policydb oldpolicydb, newpolicydb; + struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb; struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab; struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL; struct convert_context_args args; @@ -1840,12 +1846,19 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) int rc = 0; struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file; + oldpolicydb = kzalloc(2 * sizeof(*oldpolicydb), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!oldpolicydb) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1; + if (!ss_initialized) { avtab_cache_init(); rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp); if (rc) { avtab_cache_destroy(); - return rc; + goto out; } policydb.len = len; @@ -1855,14 +1868,14 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) if (rc) { policydb_destroy(&policydb); avtab_cache_destroy(); - return rc; + goto out; } rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab); if (rc) { policydb_destroy(&policydb); avtab_cache_destroy(); - return rc; + goto out; } security_load_policycaps(); @@ -1874,36 +1887,36 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno); selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); - return 0; + goto out; } #if 0 sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids"); #endif - rc = policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp); + rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp); if (rc) - return rc; + goto out; - newpolicydb.len = len; + newpolicydb->len = len; /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */ - if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb.mls_enabled) + if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled) printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n"); - else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb.mls_enabled) + else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled) printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n"); - rc = policydb_load_isids(&newpolicydb, &newsidtab); + rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab); if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n"); - policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb); - return rc; + policydb_destroy(newpolicydb); + goto out; } - rc = selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size); + rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size); if (rc) goto err; - rc = security_preserve_bools(&newpolicydb); + rc = security_preserve_bools(newpolicydb); if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n"); goto err; @@ -1921,7 +1934,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) * in the new SID table. */ args.oldp = &policydb; - args.newp = &newpolicydb; + args.newp = newpolicydb; rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args); if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to convert the internal" @@ -1931,12 +1944,12 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) } /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */ - memcpy(&oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb); + memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof(policydb)); sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab); /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */ write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock); - memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb); + memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(policydb)); sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab); security_load_policycaps(); oldmap = current_mapping; @@ -1946,7 +1959,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock); /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */ - policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb); + policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb); sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab); kfree(oldmap); @@ -1956,14 +1969,17 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); - return 0; + rc = 0; + goto out; err: kfree(map); sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab); - policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb); - return rc; + policydb_destroy(newpolicydb); +out: + kfree(oldpolicydb); + return rc; } size_t security_policydb_len(void) diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index 0462cb3ff0a..98b042630a9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x) * xfrm_user_sec_ctx context. */ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, + gfp_t gfp) { int rc; const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); @@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE) return -ENOMEM; - ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, gfp); if (!ctx) return -ENOMEM; @@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, ctx->ctx_len = str_len; memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len); ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0'; - rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid); + rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp); if (rc) goto err; @@ -282,9 +283,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid) * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy. */ int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, + gfp_t gfp) { - return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx); + return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx, gfp); } /* @@ -332,7 +334,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) { - return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx); + return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx, GFP_KERNEL); } /* diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 364cc64fce7..d072fd32212 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -241,7 +241,8 @@ u32 smack_to_secid(const char *); extern int smack_cipso_direct; extern int smack_cipso_mapped; extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient; -extern char *smack_onlycap; +extern struct smack_known *smack_onlycap; +extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label; extern const char *smack_cipso_option; extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor; @@ -312,7 +313,7 @@ static inline int smack_privileged(int cap) if (!capable(cap)) return 0; - if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == skp->smk_known) + if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == skp) return 1; return 0; } diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index aaf770159eb..14f52be78c7 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -219,8 +219,6 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp) * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog * @type: message type * - * Require that the task has the floor label - * * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise. */ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file) @@ -231,7 +229,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file) if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; - if (skp != &smack_known_floor) + if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp) rc = -EACCES; return rc; @@ -341,10 +339,12 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) struct inode *inode = root->d_inode; struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security; struct inode_smack *isp; + struct smack_known *skp; char *op; char *commap; char *nsp; int transmute = 0; + int specified = 0; if (sp->smk_initialized) return 0; @@ -359,34 +359,56 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSHAT, strlen(SMK_FSHAT)) == 0) { op += strlen(SMK_FSHAT); nsp = smk_import(op, 0); - if (nsp != NULL) + if (nsp != NULL) { sp->smk_hat = nsp; + specified = 1; + } } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSFLOOR, strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR)) == 0) { op += strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR); nsp = smk_import(op, 0); - if (nsp != NULL) + if (nsp != NULL) { sp->smk_floor = nsp; + specified = 1; + } } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSDEFAULT, strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT)) == 0) { op += strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT); nsp = smk_import(op, 0); - if (nsp != NULL) + if (nsp != NULL) { sp->smk_default = nsp; + specified = 1; + } } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSROOT, strlen(SMK_FSROOT)) == 0) { op += strlen(SMK_FSROOT); nsp = smk_import(op, 0); - if (nsp != NULL) + if (nsp != NULL) { sp->smk_root = nsp; + specified = 1; + } } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSTRANS, strlen(SMK_FSTRANS)) == 0) { op += strlen(SMK_FSTRANS); nsp = smk_import(op, 0); if (nsp != NULL) { sp->smk_root = nsp; transmute = 1; + specified = 1; } } } + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { + /* + * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values. + */ + if (specified) + return -EPERM; + /* + * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller. + */ + skp = smk_of_current(); + sp->smk_root = skp->smk_known; + sp->smk_default = skp->smk_known; + } /* * Initialize the root inode. */ @@ -423,53 +445,6 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) return rc; } -/** - * smack_sb_mount - Smack check for mounting - * @dev_name: unused - * @path: mount point - * @type: unused - * @flags: unused - * @data: unused - * - * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem - * being mounted on, an error code otherwise. - */ -static int smack_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, - const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) -{ - struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->dentry->d_sb->s_security; - struct smk_audit_info ad; - - smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); - smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path); - - return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad); -} - -/** - * smack_sb_umount - Smack check for unmounting - * @mnt: file system to unmount - * @flags: unused - * - * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem - * being unmounted, an error code otherwise. - */ -static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) -{ - struct superblock_smack *sbp; - struct smk_audit_info ad; - struct path path; - - path.dentry = mnt->mnt_root; - path.mnt = mnt; - - smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); - smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, path); - - sbp = path.dentry->d_sb->s_security; - return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad); -} - /* * BPRM hooks */ @@ -837,31 +812,43 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct smack_known *skp; + int check_priv = 0; + int check_import = 0; + int check_star = 0; int rc = 0; + /* + * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr + */ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || - strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 || - strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || - strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { - if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) - rc = -EPERM; - /* - * check label validity here so import wont fail on - * post_setxattr - */ - if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL || - smk_import(value, size) == NULL) - rc = -EINVAL; + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) { + check_priv = 1; + check_import = 1; + } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { + check_priv = 1; + check_import = 1; + check_star = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) { - if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) - rc = -EPERM; + check_priv = 1; if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE || strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0) rc = -EINVAL; } else rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); + if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + rc = -EPERM; + + if (rc == 0 && check_import) { + skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); + if (skp == NULL || (check_star && + (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web))) + rc = -EINVAL; + } + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry); @@ -1364,7 +1351,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) int may = 0; struct smk_audit_info ad; - smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); /* * This code relies on bitmasks. @@ -2847,8 +2834,17 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) if (rc >= 0) transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; } - isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp); - isp->smk_mmap = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp); + /* + * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@". + */ + skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp); + if (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web) + skp = NULL; + isp->smk_task = skp; + skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp); + if (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web) + skp = NULL; + isp->smk_mmap = skp; dput(dp); break; @@ -3742,8 +3738,6 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = { .sb_copy_data = smack_sb_copy_data, .sb_kern_mount = smack_sb_kern_mount, .sb_statfs = smack_sb_statfs, - .sb_mount = smack_sb_mount, - .sb_umount = smack_sb_umount, .bprm_set_creds = smack_bprm_set_creds, .bprm_committing_creds = smack_bprm_committing_creds, diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index 160aa08e3cd..3198cfe1dcc 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ enum smk_inos { SMK_CIPSO2 = 17, /* load long label -> CIPSO mapping */ SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ = 18, /* set rules with subject label to '-' */ SMK_CHANGE_RULE = 19, /* change or add rules (long labels) */ + SMK_SYSLOG = 20, /* change syslog label) */ }; /* @@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ enum smk_inos { */ static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_cipso_lock); static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ambient_lock); +static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_syslog_lock); static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock); /* @@ -90,7 +92,13 @@ int smack_cipso_mapped = SMACK_CIPSO_MAPPED_DEFAULT; * everyone. It is expected that the hat (^) label * will be used if any label is used. */ -char *smack_onlycap; +struct smack_known *smack_onlycap; + +/* + * If this value is set restrict syslog use to the label specified. + * It can be reset via smackfs/syslog + */ +struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label; /* * Certain IP addresses may be designated as single label hosts. @@ -301,7 +309,8 @@ static int smk_perm_from_str(const char *string) * @import: if non-zero, import labels * @len: label length limit * - * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure + * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL on failure and -ENOENT when either subject + * or object is missing. */ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object, const char *access1, const char *access2, @@ -314,28 +323,28 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object, if (import) { rule->smk_subject = smk_import_entry(subject, len); if (rule->smk_subject == NULL) - return -1; + return -EINVAL; rule->smk_object = smk_import(object, len); if (rule->smk_object == NULL) - return -1; + return -EINVAL; } else { cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, len); if (cp == NULL) - return -1; + return -EINVAL; skp = smk_find_entry(cp); kfree(cp); if (skp == NULL) - return -1; + return -ENOENT; rule->smk_subject = skp; cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len); if (cp == NULL) - return -1; + return -EINVAL; skp = smk_find_entry(cp); kfree(cp); if (skp == NULL) - return -1; + return -ENOENT; rule->smk_object = skp->smk_known; } @@ -381,6 +390,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_parse_long_rule(char *data, struct smack_parsed_rule *rule, { ssize_t cnt = 0; char *tok[4]; + int rc; int i; /* @@ -405,10 +415,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_parse_long_rule(char *data, struct smack_parsed_rule *rule, while (i < 4) tok[i++] = NULL; - if (smk_fill_rule(tok[0], tok[1], tok[2], tok[3], rule, import, 0)) - return -1; - - return cnt; + rc = smk_fill_rule(tok[0], tok[1], tok[2], tok[3], rule, import, 0); + return rc == 0 ? cnt : rc; } #define SMK_FIXED24_FMT 0 /* Fixed 24byte label format */ @@ -1603,7 +1611,7 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_ambient_ops = { }; /** - * smk_read_onlycap - read() for /smack/onlycap + * smk_read_onlycap - read() for smackfs/onlycap * @filp: file pointer, not actually used * @buf: where to put the result * @cn: maximum to send along @@ -1622,7 +1630,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_onlycap(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, return 0; if (smack_onlycap != NULL) - smack = smack_onlycap; + smack = smack_onlycap->smk_known; asize = strlen(smack) + 1; @@ -1633,7 +1641,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_onlycap(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, } /** - * smk_write_onlycap - write() for /smack/onlycap + * smk_write_onlycap - write() for smackfs/onlycap * @file: file pointer, not actually used * @buf: where to get the data from * @count: bytes sent @@ -1656,7 +1664,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, * explicitly for clarity. The smk_access() implementation * would use smk_access(smack_onlycap, MAY_WRITE) */ - if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp->smk_known) + if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp) return -EPERM; data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1676,7 +1684,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) rc = -EFAULT; else - smack_onlycap = smk_import(data, count); + smack_onlycap = smk_import_entry(data, count); kfree(data); return rc; @@ -1856,11 +1864,12 @@ static ssize_t smk_user_access(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, res = smk_parse_long_rule(data, &rule, 0, 3); } - if (res < 0) + if (res >= 0) + res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object, + rule.smk_access1, NULL); + else if (res != -ENOENT) return -EINVAL; - res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object, - rule.smk_access1, NULL); data[0] = res == 0 ? '1' : '0'; data[1] = '\0'; @@ -2143,7 +2152,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_change_rule(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, /* * Must have privilege. */ - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL, @@ -2158,12 +2167,89 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_change_rule_ops = { }; /** - * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock + * smk_read_syslog - read() for smackfs/syslog + * @filp: file pointer, not actually used + * @buf: where to put the result + * @cn: maximum to send along + * @ppos: where to start + * + * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate + */ +static ssize_t smk_read_syslog(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, + size_t cn, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct smack_known *skp; + ssize_t rc = -EINVAL; + int asize; + + if (*ppos != 0) + return 0; + + if (smack_syslog_label == NULL) + skp = &smack_known_star; + else + skp = smack_syslog_label; + + asize = strlen(skp->smk_known) + 1; + + if (cn >= asize) + rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos, skp->smk_known, + asize); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * smk_write_syslog - write() for smackfs/syslog + * @file: file pointer, not actually used + * @buf: where to get the data from + * @count: bytes sent + * @ppos: where to start + * + * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate + */ +static ssize_t smk_write_syslog(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char *data; + struct smack_known *skp; + int rc = count; + + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL); + if (data == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) + rc = -EFAULT; + else { + skp = smk_import_entry(data, count); + if (skp == NULL) + rc = -EINVAL; + else + smack_syslog_label = smk_import_entry(data, count); + } + + kfree(data); + return rc; +} + +static const struct file_operations smk_syslog_ops = { + .read = smk_read_syslog, + .write = smk_write_syslog, + .llseek = default_llseek, +}; + + +/** + * smk_fill_super - fill the smackfs superblock * @sb: the empty superblock * @data: unused * @silent: unused * - * Fill in the well known entries for /smack + * Fill in the well known entries for the smack filesystem * * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure */ @@ -2208,6 +2294,8 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, [SMK_CHANGE_RULE] = { "change-rule", &smk_change_rule_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + [SMK_SYSLOG] = { + "syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, /* last one */ {""} }; |