diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/commoncap.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 13 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index ff9b113bb07..e771cb1b2d7 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include <linux/securebits.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <linux/binfmts.h> +#include <linux/personality.h> /* * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in @@ -508,15 +509,23 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } skip: + /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ + if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + + /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised - * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit + * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit. + * + * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs. */ if ((!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid) || !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) && bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) { /* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */ - if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) { + if (!capable(CAP_SETUID) || + (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)) { new->euid = new->uid; new->egid = new->gid; } |