diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig | 167 |
1 files changed, 108 insertions, 59 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 559293922a4..beb86b500ad 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -4,40 +4,19 @@ menu "Security options" -config KEYS - bool "Enable access key retention support" - help - This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and - access keys in the kernel. - - It also includes provision of methods by which such keys might be - associated with a process so that network filesystems, encryption - support and the like can find them. - - Furthermore, a special type of key is available that acts as keyring: - a searchable sequence of keys. Each process is equipped with access - to five standard keyrings: UID-specific, GID-specific, session, - process and thread. - - If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. +source security/keys/Kconfig -config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS - bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed" - depends on KEYS +config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT + bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog" + default n help - This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which - can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the - reading process. - - The only keys included in the list are those that grant View - permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them. - Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further - filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view. + This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel + syslog via dmesg(8). - Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in - the resulting table. + If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced + unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). - If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY bool "Enable different security models" @@ -51,6 +30,15 @@ config SECURITY If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config SECURITYFS + bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem" + help + This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by + the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is + not used by SELinux or SMACK. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + config SECURITY_NETWORK bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks" depends on SECURITY @@ -73,33 +61,51 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM IPSec. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. -config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES - bool "File POSIX Capabilities" - default n +config SECURITY_PATH + bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control" + depends on SECURITY help - This enables filesystem capabilities, allowing you to give - binaries a subset of root's powers without using setuid 0. - - If in doubt, answer N. + This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control. + If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to + implement pathname based access controls. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. -config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG - bool "Root Plug Support" - depends on USB=y && SECURITY +config INTEL_TXT + bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)" + depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT help - This is a sample LSM module that should only be used as such. - It prevents any programs running with egid == 0 if a specific - USB device is not present in the system. + This option enables support for booting the kernel with the + Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize + Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch + of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this + will have no effect. + + Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and + initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to + create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which + helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning + correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside + of the kernel itself. + + Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having + confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that + it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for + providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it. + + See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information + about Intel(R) TXT. + See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot. + See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable + Intel TXT support in a kernel boot. - See <http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6279> for - more information about this module. - - If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. -config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR - int "Low address space to protect from user allocation" - depends on SECURITY - default 0 - help +config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR + int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation" + depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX + default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT) + default 65536 + help This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs. @@ -107,16 +113,59 @@ config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. - Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional - permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have - this protection disabled. - - This value can be changed after boot using the - /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable. - + Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map + this low address space will need the permission specific to the + systems running LSM. source security/selinux/Kconfig source security/smack/Kconfig +source security/tomoyo/Kconfig +source security/apparmor/Kconfig +source security/yama/Kconfig + +source security/integrity/Kconfig + +choice + prompt "Default security module" + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC + + help + Select the security module that will be used by default if the + kernel parameter security= is not specified. + + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX + bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y + + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK + bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y + + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO + bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y + + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y + + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA + bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y + + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC + bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls" + +endchoice + +config DEFAULT_SECURITY + string + default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX + default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK + default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO + default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA + default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC endmenu |