diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4/tcp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp.c | 287 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 269 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index e2202079070..dcb116dde21 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -409,15 +409,6 @@ void tcp_init_sock(struct sock *sk) icsk->icsk_sync_mss = tcp_sync_mss; - /* TCP Cookie Transactions */ - if (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size > 0) { - /* Default, cookies without s_data_payload. */ - tp->cookie_values = - kzalloc(sizeof(*tp->cookie_values), - sk->sk_allocation); - if (tp->cookie_values != NULL) - kref_init(&tp->cookie_values->kref); - } /* Presumed zeroed, in order of appearance: * cookie_in_always, cookie_out_never, * s_data_constant, s_data_in, s_data_out @@ -2397,92 +2388,6 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, release_sock(sk); return err; } - case TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS: { - struct tcp_cookie_transactions ctd; - struct tcp_cookie_values *cvp = NULL; - - if (sizeof(ctd) > optlen) - return -EINVAL; - if (copy_from_user(&ctd, optval, sizeof(ctd))) - return -EFAULT; - - if (ctd.tcpct_used > sizeof(ctd.tcpct_value) || - ctd.tcpct_s_data_desired > TCP_MSS_DESIRED) - return -EINVAL; - - if (ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired == 0) { - /* default to global value */ - } else if ((0x1 & ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired) || - ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired > TCP_COOKIE_MAX || - ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired < TCP_COOKIE_MIN) { - return -EINVAL; - } - - if (TCP_COOKIE_OUT_NEVER & ctd.tcpct_flags) { - /* Supercedes all other values */ - lock_sock(sk); - if (tp->cookie_values != NULL) { - kref_put(&tp->cookie_values->kref, - tcp_cookie_values_release); - tp->cookie_values = NULL; - } - tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always = 0; /* false */ - tp->rx_opt.cookie_out_never = 1; /* true */ - release_sock(sk); - return err; - } - - /* Allocate ancillary memory before locking. - */ - if (ctd.tcpct_used > 0 || - (tp->cookie_values == NULL && - (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size > 0 || - ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired > 0 || - ctd.tcpct_s_data_desired > 0))) { - cvp = kzalloc(sizeof(*cvp) + ctd.tcpct_used, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (cvp == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; - - kref_init(&cvp->kref); - } - lock_sock(sk); - tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always = - (TCP_COOKIE_IN_ALWAYS & ctd.tcpct_flags); - tp->rx_opt.cookie_out_never = 0; /* false */ - - if (tp->cookie_values != NULL) { - if (cvp != NULL) { - /* Changed values are recorded by a changed - * pointer, ensuring the cookie will differ, - * without separately hashing each value later. - */ - kref_put(&tp->cookie_values->kref, - tcp_cookie_values_release); - } else { - cvp = tp->cookie_values; - } - } - - if (cvp != NULL) { - cvp->cookie_desired = ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired; - - if (ctd.tcpct_used > 0) { - memcpy(cvp->s_data_payload, ctd.tcpct_value, - ctd.tcpct_used); - cvp->s_data_desired = ctd.tcpct_used; - cvp->s_data_constant = 1; /* true */ - } else { - /* No constant payload data. */ - cvp->s_data_desired = ctd.tcpct_s_data_desired; - cvp->s_data_constant = 0; /* false */ - } - - tp->cookie_values = cvp; - } - release_sock(sk); - return err; - } default: /* fallthru */ break; @@ -2902,41 +2807,6 @@ static int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, return -EFAULT; return 0; - case TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS: { - struct tcp_cookie_transactions ctd; - struct tcp_cookie_values *cvp = tp->cookie_values; - - if (get_user(len, optlen)) - return -EFAULT; - if (len < sizeof(ctd)) - return -EINVAL; - - memset(&ctd, 0, sizeof(ctd)); - ctd.tcpct_flags = (tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always ? - TCP_COOKIE_IN_ALWAYS : 0) - | (tp->rx_opt.cookie_out_never ? - TCP_COOKIE_OUT_NEVER : 0); - - if (cvp != NULL) { - ctd.tcpct_flags |= (cvp->s_data_in ? - TCP_S_DATA_IN : 0) - | (cvp->s_data_out ? - TCP_S_DATA_OUT : 0); - - ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired = cvp->cookie_desired; - ctd.tcpct_s_data_desired = cvp->s_data_desired; - - memcpy(&ctd.tcpct_value[0], &cvp->cookie_pair[0], - cvp->cookie_pair_size); - ctd.tcpct_used = cvp->cookie_pair_size; - } - - if (put_user(sizeof(ctd), optlen)) - return -EFAULT; - if (copy_to_user(optval, &ctd, sizeof(ctd))) - return -EFAULT; - return 0; - } case TCP_THIN_LINEAR_TIMEOUTS: val = tp->thin_lto; break; @@ -3015,6 +2885,8 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_tso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 delta; unsigned int oldlen; unsigned int mss; + struct sk_buff *gso_skb = skb; + __sum16 newcheck; if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*th))) goto out; @@ -3044,6 +2916,7 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_tso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN | SKB_GSO_TCPV6 | SKB_GSO_GRE | + SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL | 0) || !(type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCPV6)))) goto out; @@ -3064,11 +2937,13 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_tso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, th = tcp_hdr(skb); seq = ntohl(th->seq); + newcheck = ~csum_fold((__force __wsum)((__force u32)th->check + + (__force u32)delta)); + do { th->fin = th->psh = 0; + th->check = newcheck; - th->check = ~csum_fold((__force __wsum)((__force u32)th->check + - (__force u32)delta)); if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) th->check = csum_fold(csum_partial(skb_transport_header(skb), @@ -3082,6 +2957,17 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_tso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, th->cwr = 0; } while (skb->next); + /* Following permits TCP Small Queues to work well with GSO : + * The callback to TCP stack will be called at the time last frag + * is freed at TX completion, and not right now when gso_skb + * is freed by GSO engine + */ + if (gso_skb->destructor == tcp_wfree) { + swap(gso_skb->sk, skb->sk); + swap(gso_skb->destructor, skb->destructor); + swap(gso_skb->truesize, skb->truesize); + } + delta = htonl(oldlen + (skb->tail - skb->transport_header) + skb->data_len); th->check = ~csum_fold((__force __wsum)((__force u32)th->check + @@ -3408,134 +3294,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_key); #endif -/* Each Responder maintains up to two secret values concurrently for - * efficient secret rollover. Each secret value has 4 states: - * - * Generating. (tcp_secret_generating != tcp_secret_primary) - * Generates new Responder-Cookies, but not yet used for primary - * verification. This is a short-term state, typically lasting only - * one round trip time (RTT). - * - * Primary. (tcp_secret_generating == tcp_secret_primary) - * Used both for generation and primary verification. - * - * Retiring. (tcp_secret_retiring != tcp_secret_secondary) - * Used for verification, until the first failure that can be - * verified by the newer Generating secret. At that time, this - * cookie's state is changed to Secondary, and the Generating - * cookie's state is changed to Primary. This is a short-term state, - * typically lasting only one round trip time (RTT). - * - * Secondary. (tcp_secret_retiring == tcp_secret_secondary) - * Used for secondary verification, after primary verification - * failures. This state lasts no more than twice the Maximum Segment - * Lifetime (2MSL). Then, the secret is discarded. - */ -struct tcp_cookie_secret { - /* The secret is divided into two parts. The digest part is the - * equivalent of previously hashing a secret and saving the state, - * and serves as an initialization vector (IV). The message part - * serves as the trailing secret. - */ - u32 secrets[COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS]; - unsigned long expires; -}; - -#define TCP_SECRET_1MSL (HZ * TCP_PAWS_MSL) -#define TCP_SECRET_2MSL (HZ * TCP_PAWS_MSL * 2) -#define TCP_SECRET_LIFE (HZ * 600) - -static struct tcp_cookie_secret tcp_secret_one; -static struct tcp_cookie_secret tcp_secret_two; - -/* Essentially a circular list, without dynamic allocation. */ -static struct tcp_cookie_secret *tcp_secret_generating; -static struct tcp_cookie_secret *tcp_secret_primary; -static struct tcp_cookie_secret *tcp_secret_retiring; -static struct tcp_cookie_secret *tcp_secret_secondary; - -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tcp_secret_locker); - -/* Select a pseudo-random word in the cookie workspace. - */ -static inline u32 tcp_cookie_work(const u32 *ws, const int n) -{ - return ws[COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS + ((COOKIE_MESSAGE_WORDS-1) & ws[n])]; -} - -/* Fill bakery[COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS] with generator, updating as needed. - * Called in softirq context. - * Returns: 0 for success. - */ -int tcp_cookie_generator(u32 *bakery) -{ - unsigned long jiffy = jiffies; - - if (unlikely(time_after_eq(jiffy, tcp_secret_generating->expires))) { - spin_lock_bh(&tcp_secret_locker); - if (!time_after_eq(jiffy, tcp_secret_generating->expires)) { - /* refreshed by another */ - memcpy(bakery, - &tcp_secret_generating->secrets[0], - COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS); - } else { - /* still needs refreshing */ - get_random_bytes(bakery, COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS); - - /* The first time, paranoia assumes that the - * randomization function isn't as strong. But, - * this secret initialization is delayed until - * the last possible moment (packet arrival). - * Although that time is observable, it is - * unpredictably variable. Mash in the most - * volatile clock bits available, and expire the - * secret extra quickly. - */ - if (unlikely(tcp_secret_primary->expires == - tcp_secret_secondary->expires)) { - struct timespec tv; - - getnstimeofday(&tv); - bakery[COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS+0] ^= - (u32)tv.tv_nsec; - - tcp_secret_secondary->expires = jiffy - + TCP_SECRET_1MSL - + (0x0f & tcp_cookie_work(bakery, 0)); - } else { - tcp_secret_secondary->expires = jiffy - + TCP_SECRET_LIFE - + (0xff & tcp_cookie_work(bakery, 1)); - tcp_secret_primary->expires = jiffy - + TCP_SECRET_2MSL - + (0x1f & tcp_cookie_work(bakery, 2)); - } - memcpy(&tcp_secret_secondary->secrets[0], - bakery, COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS); - - rcu_assign_pointer(tcp_secret_generating, - tcp_secret_secondary); - rcu_assign_pointer(tcp_secret_retiring, - tcp_secret_primary); - /* - * Neither call_rcu() nor synchronize_rcu() needed. - * Retiring data is not freed. It is replaced after - * further (locked) pointer updates, and a quiet time - * (minimum 1MSL, maximum LIFE - 2MSL). - */ - } - spin_unlock_bh(&tcp_secret_locker); - } else { - rcu_read_lock_bh(); - memcpy(bakery, - &rcu_dereference(tcp_secret_generating)->secrets[0], - COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS); - rcu_read_unlock_bh(); - } - return 0; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_cookie_generator); - void tcp_done(struct sock *sk) { struct request_sock *req = tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk; @@ -3590,7 +3348,6 @@ void __init tcp_init(void) unsigned long limit; int max_rshare, max_wshare, cnt; unsigned int i; - unsigned long jiffy = jiffies; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tcp_skb_cb) > sizeof(skb->cb)); @@ -3666,13 +3423,5 @@ void __init tcp_init(void) tcp_register_congestion_control(&tcp_reno); - memset(&tcp_secret_one.secrets[0], 0, sizeof(tcp_secret_one.secrets)); - memset(&tcp_secret_two.secrets[0], 0, sizeof(tcp_secret_two.secrets)); - tcp_secret_one.expires = jiffy; /* past due */ - tcp_secret_two.expires = jiffy; /* past due */ - tcp_secret_generating = &tcp_secret_one; - tcp_secret_primary = &tcp_secret_one; - tcp_secret_retiring = &tcp_secret_two; - tcp_secret_secondary = &tcp_secret_two; tcp_tasklet_init(); } |