diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth/hci_event.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 25 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index 3454807a40c..640c54ec1bd 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -45,9 +45,13 @@ static void hci_cc_inquiry_cancel(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) return; clear_bit(HCI_INQUIRY, &hdev->flags); - smp_mb__after_clear_bit(); /* wake_up_bit advises about this barrier */ + smp_mb__after_atomic(); /* wake_up_bit advises about this barrier */ wake_up_bit(&hdev->flags, HCI_INQUIRY); + hci_dev_lock(hdev); + hci_discovery_set_state(hdev, DISCOVERY_STOPPED); + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); + hci_conn_check_pending(hdev); } @@ -1453,6 +1457,7 @@ static int hci_outgoing_auth_needed(struct hci_dev *hdev, * is requested. */ if (!hci_conn_ssp_enabled(conn) && !(conn->auth_type & 0x01) && + conn->pending_sec_level != BT_SECURITY_FIPS && conn->pending_sec_level != BT_SECURITY_HIGH && conn->pending_sec_level != BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) return 0; @@ -1879,7 +1884,7 @@ static void hci_inquiry_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!test_and_clear_bit(HCI_INQUIRY, &hdev->flags)) return; - smp_mb__after_clear_bit(); /* wake_up_bit advises about this barrier */ + smp_mb__after_atomic(); /* wake_up_bit advises about this barrier */ wake_up_bit(&hdev->flags, HCI_INQUIRY); if (!test_bit(HCI_MGMT, &hdev->dev_flags)) @@ -3076,7 +3081,8 @@ static void hci_link_key_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) } if (key->type == HCI_LK_COMBINATION && key->pin_len < 16 && - conn->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { + (conn->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH || + conn->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)) { BT_DBG("%s ignoring key unauthenticated for high security", hdev->name); goto not_found; @@ -3535,7 +3541,11 @@ static void hci_io_capa_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) cp.authentication = conn->auth_type; /* Request MITM protection if our IO caps allow it - * except for the no-bonding case + * except for the no-bonding case. + * conn->auth_type is not updated here since + * that might cause the user confirmation to be + * rejected in case the remote doesn't have the + * IO capabilities for MITM. */ if (conn->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT && cp.authentication != HCI_AT_NO_BONDING) @@ -3626,8 +3636,11 @@ static void hci_user_confirm_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, /* If we're not the initiators request authorization to * proceed from user space (mgmt_user_confirm with - * confirm_hint set to 1). */ - if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_PEND, &conn->flags)) { + * confirm_hint set to 1). The exception is if neither + * side had MITM in which case we do auto-accept. + */ + if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_PEND, &conn->flags) && + (loc_mitm || rem_mitm)) { BT_DBG("Confirming auto-accept as acceptor"); confirm_hint = 1; goto confirm; |